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Abstract
Many commentators and reports popularly place the record industry in an increasing 
state of crisis since the advent of digital copying and distribution. This thesis addresses 
how the interplay of technological, economic, legal and policy factors, particularly the 
copyright strand of intellectual property law, shape the form and extent of the Internet’s 
disruptive potential in the music industry. It points to significant continuities regarding 
the  music  industry  in  an  environment  where  it  is  often  regarded  as  experiencing 
turbulence and change, and in doing so the thesis challenges the form and extent of the 
crisis the music industry currently claims to be battling. 
The thesis questions the impact the internet is having on the power or role of 
major music companies, their revenue streams, their relationships with other actors in 
the music industry chain and their  final  consumers.  The thesis  further questions the 
extent  to  which  the  internet  has  evolved  to  realise  its  disruptive  potential  on  the 
organisation  and  structure  of  the  record  industry  by  democratising  the  channels  of 
distribution. It also serves to illuminate the impact of the internet on the role of more 
traditional intermediaries, particularly radio, in the circulation and promotion of music 
in the contemporary era.
For  its  primary  research material,  the thesis  draws on a  series  of  thirty-nine 
interviews conducted with record industry management and personnel as well as key 
informants  from the  fields  of  music  publishing,  artist  management,  music  retailing, 
radio,  the  music  press,  related  industry  bodies  and  policy  fields,  and  other  key 
commentators.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction
For over forty years Simon Napier-Bell has worked as a songwriter, record producer 
and author, but he is best known as the manager of a number of successful international 
recording  acts  including  Eric  Clapton  and  the  Yardbirds,  Marc  Bolan  and  T-Rex, 
Boney-M, Japan and Wham!. In a 2008 newspaper article entitled ‘The Life and Crimes 
of the Music Biz’ he somewhat  gleefully describes the music industry as ‘careering 
towards meltdown’ (The Observer – Music Monthly, 20th January 2008, p.41). Focusing 
on six key music  industry executives  from the present  and recent  past,  Napier-Bell 
dramatically outlines how just four major music companies1 have usurped almost all 
rivals  and grown to increasingly dominate  a business  that  is  ‘distinctly  medieval  in 
character:  the  last  form of  indentured  servitude’  (ibid).  In  Napier-Bell’s  sensational 
account, a core group of notorious moguls control and operate these companies and use 
bullying and thuggery to extract products and performances from their employees and 
artists. He accuses these companies of being ‘intentionally fraudulent’ and practising 
‘systematic thievery’ from their artists (ibid: 45). However, he now sees each passing 
week heaping more gloom on these majors who are seeing their record sales plummet, 
and consequently losing their grip on the industry as the internet renders the machinery 
of the music corporation obsolete. The music companies, Napier-Bell concludes, were 
never the guardians of the music industry, they were greedy bouncers who have now 
become irrelevant. The internet has produced, for artists:
…the moment to take things into their own hands. Artists no longer need to be held [by a label] 
for ten years,  and they no longer need to sign away ownership of their recorded copyrights.  
These days, an artist working closely with his manager can ensure that everything is done in the 
artist’s best interest. (Napier-Bell, 2008: 41)
Napier-Bell’s account is decidedly sensational and not only must we consider 
that it reflects the biases he evolved over four decades of negotiating and battling with 
the big industry players, but also that Napier-Bell himself is a character of considerable 
1 These companies are the Universal  Music Group (UMG),  the Warner Music Group (WMG),  Sony 
Music Entertainment and EMI – the four corporate players whose combined share of the global recorded 
music market has, over the past decade, fluctuated between 70%-80% and, by 2007 had grown to account  
for 92% of the Irish market (IFPI, 2008).
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controversy and notoriety2. Sensationalism aside, his perspective on the evolution of the 
music  industry  to  this  point  in  history  is  illustrative  of  two  commonly  held  and 
frequently relayed assumptions: 
1) The first is that major music companies - the ‘bad guys’ of the music industry – 
are  facing  ruin  in  light  of  recent  and  ongoing  technological  developments 
centred around the internet. 
2) The  second  is  that  such  technological  developments,  which  enable  the 
distribution and promotion of music online, have revolutionised the industry’s 
core structure by enabling interface between artists and consumers minus the 
mediation of a large corporation. 
Thus,  the  internet  is  widely  perceived  as  having  severely  disrupted  the  roles  and 
interests of established industry actors, and producing a ‘new music order’. In short, 
change is the order of the day for the music industry.
Much discourse within and surrounding the music industry over the past decade 
has been predicated on two major themes: 
1) A  significant  decline  in  recorded  music  sales  and  with  this,  questions 
surrounding the long-term viability of the music industry.
2) The  concomitant  transition  to  a  digital  milieu  which  has  generated  several 
salient problems for the record and music publishing industries, and how they 
make money. 
The notion of a ‘crisis of digitalisation’ in the music industry has consistently echoed 
from various corners of the industry itself3, and from the political establishment. For 
example:
We run the risk of witnessing a genuine destruction of culture…The internet must not become a  
high tech wild west, a lawless zone where outlaws can pillage works with abandon, or worse, 
trade in them in total impunity. And on whose backs? On artists’ backs.
(Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France, November 23rd 2007)
Drawing upon these comments, the manager of U2 appealed to national governments 
around the world to force internet service providers to remove music file-sharers from 
their networks:
I believe President Sarkozy truly caught the spirit of the age with that statement… It is a good  
rule of thumb that when it is the manager and not the artist getting the headlines, something is 
2 In the late 1980s he paid the UK Inland Revenue approximately £5m in a settlement relating to unpaid 
taxes; he also threatened to sue a British daily paper for defamation of character over allegations that he  
was heterosexual.
3 See, for example, any International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI) Music Industry In 
Numbers annual sales report from 2000 onwards.
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out of kilter. Well there is certainly something out of kilter with the music business today…The  
record industry is in crisis.
(Paul McGuinness, speech delivered at Music Matters conference, Hong Kong, 4th June 2008)
 
Such crisis  rhetoric  has  also  consistently  flowed from many  quarters  of  the 
media.  Headlines  such as ‘The music  industry…knee deep in  a  downloading crisis’ 
(The Sunday Business Post, April 6th 2008); ‘Industry crisis as album sales drop’ (The 
Irish Independent, January 14th 2008); and ‘Music industry in a flat spin’ (The Sunday 
Times, January 27th 2008); have become commonplace in news stories, features and 
opinion columns.  Magazines  such as  Globe and Mail have  carried  features  entitled 
“Want a snapshot of an industry in crisis? Take a look at the music business right now” 
(Globe and Mail, January 31st 2008).  Such headlines are nothing new. In 2003 the 
Financial Times reported how the downturn in record sales revenues experienced by the 
Universal Music Group ‘underlined the severity of the crisis facing the world’s biggest 
record companies…a crisis created by the combination of stagnant sales, internet theft 
and rampant piracy’ (The Financial Times, June 17th 2003). 
Furthermore, in 2002 Britney Spears, Eminem and Luciano Pavorotti headed a 
coalition of ninety recording artists and songwriters that placed full page advertisements 
in  The New York Times and  Los Angeles Times  condemning the practice of internet 
downloading on the  grounds that  it  threatened  their  careers.  ‘It  may seem innocent 
enough, but every time you illegally download music, a songwriter doesn't get paid’ the 
Dixie Chicks are quoted in the ad (The Associated Press & Wire, September 26th, 2002). 
Subsequently,  established international artists such as Metallica and The Corr’s have 
appeared on main evening news bulletins denouncing the use of peer-to-peer services 
and  claiming  the  future  of  the  industry  that  enables  them  to  pursue  their  artistic 
endeavours is  under threat,  as are  their  livelihoods and the conditions  that  facilitate 
musical creativity and the production of music recordings. Summer 2009 saw English 
pop singer Lily Allen, supported by counterparts James Blunt and Gary Barlow launch a 
blog  campaigning  against  internet  music  ‘piracy’ 
(idontwanttochangetheworld.blogspot.com).  Soundings  from  industry  seminars  and 
trade fairs have consistently echoed similar sentiments. Perhaps this doomsday scenario 
is captured most succinctly by Irish Times journalist Conor Pope who asks:
3
Has music had its day?...Of the all the upheavals wrought by the internet  revolution over the last 
fifteen years, the shake up in the world of music has been  amongst  the  most  profound.  The  
consequence of free music downloads could end up destroying not just the shops that used  
to sell music, but an entire industry. (The Irish Times, Monday April 27th 2009, p. 15)
Moreover,  such sentiments  are  also to  be found echoing in  the chambers  of 
academia, most notably through the comments of those who argue the transformative 
power of digital technologies. As far back as the mid-1990s, Nicholas Negroponte, a 
professor  at  MIT and celebrated  guru of  the information  age,  argues  that  copyright 
would ‘disintegrate’, with everything capable of being reduced to streams of ones and 
zeros being potentially  ‘up for grabs’ (Wired.com,  February 1995).  Society’s  digital 
future would revolutionise traditional social and economic structures. Such an outcome 
could, potentially, collapse the established music industries. According to Negroponte’s 
intellectual  peer,  Kevin  Kelly,  the  associate  editor  of  high-tech  publication  Wired 
magazine: ‘The recording industry as we know it is history…[with] digital file-sharing 
technologies…undermining  the  established  economics  of  music’  (New  York  Times 
Magazine, 17th March, 2002: 19-21). For Kelly, concomitant with the downfall of the 
major music company is the empowerment of the individual recording artist. Free from 
the shackles of entertainment corporations, those ‘musicians with the highest status are 
those who have a 24-hour net channel devoted to streaming their music’ (ibid). Indeed 
for Kelly (1996), the ‘new economy’ deemed to arise from digital technologies means 
the demise of the ‘old’ economic laws that have characterised the modern capitalist era.
Taking these various accounts at  their  word, we may deduce that from a lay 
person’s perspective, digital technologies pose a grave threat to the established music 
industry as a whole. Furthermore, this threat is being realised and the various attempts 
at  nullifying  or  reducing  its  effects  either  through  the  application  of  technological 
safeguards  (such  as  encryption  or  digital  rights  management  technologies)  or,  via 
legislative  means  (i.e.  the  pursuit  of  infringing  parties  through  the  courts  and  the 
lobbying of institutions of governance at national and global level by the major music 
companies) have largely been ineffective.  In short,  the very existence of a recorded 
music industry in the near to medium-term future is commonly perceived as hanging in 
the  balance  with  artists,  record  companies  and  retailers  all  facing  the  prospect  of 
economic destruction. Media accounts critiquing these accounts of crisis and the extent 
of the claims made by the music industry regarding its collapse have been extremely 
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rare, although not unheard of: for example, ‘The Big Question: Is the Crisis Facing the 
Music Industry as Bad as the Big Record Labels Claim?’ (The Independent, February 
14th 2007).
The sum of the above accounts is that the music industry is experiencing radical 
upheaval  in  the wake of the  ‘internet  revolution’.  In  the more  extreme cases,  these 
accounts  spell  out  changes  that  are  leading to  the destruction  of  an entire  industry. 
These notions of change have become common-sense assumptions in much discourse 
surrounding the recent evolution of the music industry. It is against this background that 
the core questions of this research study have evolved. Thus, the central concern of this 
thesis  is  to  examine  change  in  the  twenty-first  century  music  industry.  The  key 
questions it asks are:
 ‘What’ has changed in the twenty-first century music industry?
 ‘Why’ has it changed?
 ‘How’ has it changed?
These questions in turn direct us to ask a number of others: Is the internet, as some of 
the afore-mentioned accounts have reported, inducing a ‘crisis’ that is signalling the 
collapse of the music industry? Or is it the case that it is producing a period of pressure 
that is resulting in an intensified restructuring and reordering within the industry? What, 
if any, implications do the widely reported decline in recorded music sales have for 
other music industry sub-sectors? Over a decade after the internet first emerged as a 
medium for the distribution and promotion of music, has the structure and organisation 
of the overall music industry been significantly altered? What are the characteristics of 
the contemporary music industry? To draw on Kelly’s words, does the contemporary 
music industry illustrate the ‘new rules for the new economy’ that were predicted to 
arise  from the  ability  to  digitise  content  and the  rapid  and widespread diffusion of 
internet technologies? Does this signal, as Negroponte predicted, the disintegration of 
copyright  law?  To  what  extent  has  the  music  industry  ‘playing  field’  been 
‘democratised’?  –  By this,  I  refer  to  the  increased  opportunities  offered  to  smaller 
businesses and recording artists for self-promotion and distribution. And how have the 
established  music  companies  responded  to  the  threats,  challenges  and  opportunities 
associated with ‘being digital’? Furthermore, what continuities have been carried into 
the digital era? Do the changes that have occurred mark a radical transformation of this 
cultural industry sector, or do they merely mark a new way of doing the same things?
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In  producing  answers  to  these  questions  this  thesis  will  adopt  a  multi-level 
approach to institutional and organisational aspects of the industry’s evolving trends as 
well as engaging with the context of wider political-economic change induced by the 
adoption  of  neo-liberal  doctrine  as  the  dominant  political  ideology  of  the  Western 
world. 
As the music industry is the key focus of this study, it is necessary to define 
more precisely how I interpret this term. This forms the next task of this introductory 
chapter.
1.2 Matters of  definition: Which music industry is under scrutiny 
here?
While the term ‘music industry’ is now part of everyday parlance, defining the term can 
be problematic. Firstly, ‘music industry’ implies a homogenous industry with a unified 
and cohesive set of interests and aims. Such an interpretation of the term oversimplifies 
the  organisational  structure  of  the  industry  and  overlooks  the  complexities  of  an 
industrial arena comprising of several disparate entities with some shared interests and 
objectives (Williamson and Cloonan, 2007). Thus, representations of the music industry 
are frequently misleading and confusing. Thinking in terms of music industry ‘singular’ 
misrepresents  the  organisational  structure  of  the  global  music  economy  in  the  first 
decade of the new millennium. Viewing this economy as anything other than:
…music  industries  plural  is  simplistic  and  does little  to  aid understanding  of  those cultural 
industries which are primarily concerned with the creation, management and selling of music 
either as a physical/digital product, a performance, or as a bundle of intellectual property rights. 
(Cloonan and Williamson, 2007: 305)
What is more significant for this research and thesis is the frequent conflation of 
the music industry as a whole with just one of its constituent industrial sectors – the 
recording industry.  Such a  misleading  representation  is  partly  fuelled  by the  record 
industry’s  own  representative  trade  bodies.  For  example,  on  its  website,  the 
International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI) – a trade body representing 
the interests of the recording sector globally, but dominated by the four major record 
companies that account for almost eighty per cent of the global market (Sony-BMG, 
Universal,  Warner’s  and  EMI)  –  proclaims  ‘music’  as  ‘one  of  the  great  global 
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industries’ (www.ifpi.org). Thus, the record industry portrays itself as representing the 
music  industry.  IFPI  proceeds  to  state  its  aim  as  ‘promoting  the  value  to  modern 
economies  of a thriving,  legitimate  music industry’  (ibid).  Such an overstatement  is 
misleading and distorts the picture of what constitutes the music economy.  The IFPI 
consistently lobbies  for the extension and expansion of copyright  laws to tackle the 
problems and issues they present as threatening the music industry as a whole.  For 
example, IFPI’s most recent Digital Music Report states that: 
The vast growth of illegal file-sharing quite simply threatens to put the whole music sector out of 
business…95%  of  all  music  is  downloaded  without  payment  to  artists  or  producers  …
[Governments  must]  accept  that  in  the  debate  over  ‘free  content’,  and  engaging  ISPs  over 
intellectual property rights, ‘doing nothing’ is not an option. (IFPI, 2009a: 3). 
The record sales revenues published by the IFPI are most commonly treated as music 
industry revenues, to the neglect of other sources of income. Thus, the downturn in sales 
revenues reported by the IFPI throughout the first  decade of the new millennium is 
popularly  perceived  as  a  music  industry  ‘crisis’  where  the  music  industry  requires 
saving from the threats of online file-sharing networks and piracy.
This blurring of distinctions between the record industry and the music industry 
has been assisted by media use of the term ‘music industry’ when describing what is 
exclusively a recording industry downturn. The media accounts referred to in section 
1.1 above illustrate  this.  In addition,  the various legal  actions  taken during the past 
decade by the major record companies or their representative trade groups against the 
producers and suppliers of file-sharing technologies, network users, and network service 
providers are routinely portrayed in the media as legal proceedings instigated by the 
music  industry.  Portraying  the  ‘music  industry’  as  a  unified  whole  rather  than 
identifying the recording industry as a smaller, less economically significant component 
within the broader music industries serves to increase the lobbying influence of the four 
major record labels and the IFPI. It must also be noted that the statistics produced by the 
IFPI are almost always relayed as fact via the press, and rarely critiqued or questioned.
As noted, many academic accounts have also long since adopted the term ‘music 
industry’. Harker (1997), Laing, (1986), Rothenbuhler and McCourt (1997) and Lopes 
(1992)  all  conflate  the  record  industry  with  the  music  industry,  referring  to  their 
respective  studies  a  ‘music  industry’  studies,  yet  focusing  solely  on  the  recording 
industry. In other accounts, such as Burnett (1996), Chapple & Garofalo (1977), Frith 
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(1978, 2001), Frith & Goodwin (1990), Longhurst, (1995), Negus (1992; 1999), Shuker 
(2001)  amongst  many  others,  the  recording  industry  is  privileged  in  the  level  of 
coverage it receives relative to other sectors on music industry activity. For example, 
Negus (1992) devotes only two pages of his entire  book,  Producing Pop,  to factors 
other than the recording industry. Here, I wish to flag an imbalance in their accounts 
and highlight  how easily  the  conflation  of  record  industry with  music  industry can 
occur.
However, it is essential to recognise that recording is just one component of a 
broader chain of industrial activities. In this research study, the use of the term ‘music 
industry’ will therefore imply a core group of industrial sub-sectors, namely, the record 
industry,  the  music  publishing  industry,  the  live  music  industry  and  the  music 
merchandise  industry.  Surrounding  this  core  there  also  exists  a  broad  network  of 
ancillary activities. Given that this study is conducted from an Irish base, and primarily 
within an Irish context, it is best categorised as a study that focuses upon the music 
industry in Ireland. Here, it is necessary to further clarify what this study infers (and 
doesn’t infer) by the term ‘music industry’ in a specifically Irish context. 
Over  the  past  three  decades,  Ireland  has  become  synonymous  with  music 
industry success stories. In terms of market size, Ireland has consistently ranked inside 
the top twenty-five recorded music markets in the world, and as such is ‘significantly 
ahead  of  markets  with  larger  populations  such  as  those  in  Denmark  and  Greece’ 
(O’Flynn, 2004: 53). Equally, the global success of such acts as U2 and Enya in recent 
decades has seen them as listed amongst Ireland’s largest exports. In terms of music 
production, Strachan and Leonard (2004) cited Ireland as the fourth largest producer of 
hit records in the EU through the mid-1990s (behind USA, UK and Germany).  The 
Music  Board  of  Ireland  (2002)  estimated  that  global  album  sales  for  Irish  artists 
exceeded 56 million units in 2001 – This accounted for no less than 2.3% of the world 
market. However, as O’Flynn indicates: ‘A narrow selection of Irish-produced music 
enjoys a disproportionately high share of international music sales’ (2009: 200), and as 
such, the above examples and statistics serve to illustrate  but a small  portion of the 
spectrum of music production and practice in contemporary Irish society. In the case of 
Ireland,  O’Flynn  identifies  three  specific  spheres  of  music  production  and practice: 
beyond the popular, O’Flynn also points to a folk and traditional music industry as well 
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as a classical/art music sector that in itself comes heavily subsidised by the state. Here, 
it is necessary to further clarify the parameters of this research study by explicating the 
realms of music production and distribution that it does not address or (intentionally)  
comment upon. While the findings of this study may well be seen to apply to the two 
latter categories identified by O’Flynn, the study does not itself claim to address these 
spheres of activity.  As will be indicated in section 1.5 below (and expanded upon in 
much  greater  detail  in  chapter  5),  the  core  empirical  research  produced  during  the 
course of this study is based on indepth interviews with thirty-nine key music industry 
professionals/informants. Here, it must be acknowledged that the vast majority of these 
participant  interviewees  are  primarily  engaged  in  what  may  be  most  accurately 
described as the ‘popular’ music industry. As such, this thesis should primarily be seen 
as a study of the popular music industry from an Irish perspective.
1.3 The music industry is a rights-based industry
It is now over twenty years since Simon Frith declared: ‘For the music industry, the age 
of manufacture is now over’ (Frith, 1987: 57). Frith’s declaration was premature given 
that the compact disc, then in its (relative) infancy, would evolve to yield super-profits 
for  an  industry  that  would,  on  the  back  of  this  technological  innovation,  enjoy 
significant year on year growth for almost a further decade an a half. Frith’s key point  
here, however, is extremely pertinent and central to forming a more in depth perspective 
on the state of the music industries at the end of the first decade of this new millennium. 
The music industries are organised less around the making of ‘things’ and more around 
the creation and exploitation of ‘rights’. 
As Frith states: ‘each piece of music represents a basket of rights’ (ibid). So, 
aside  from  the  direct  sale  of  physical  (and  subsequently  digital  recordings),  when 
recorded music is re-used for other purposes, copyright holders receive royalties from 
the use of recordings and the use of the content contained on them. The proliferation of 
outlets for music across a variety of media platforms in recent decades means that the 
decrease in demand for compact  disc by music consumers  as illustrated by industry 
sales statistics coincides with a concomitant increase in multi-use music content. Thus, 
the ‘secondary’ use of music by, for example, broadcasters, filmmakers and advertisers 
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and, across a range of digital  platforms provides revenue streams for recording and 
music publishing rights holders alike. Examining the reported collapse of record sales 
revenues in the context of these expanding traditional and emerging avenues for the 
exploitation of music copyrights helps to paint a fuller picture of the music industries, 
even if one potentially less useful to the IFPI and its constituent members when it comes 
to  lobbying  policy  makers  for  legislative  changes  to  produce  longer  and  stronger 
copyrights. As Frith noted: 
Providing sounds for radio and television, for films and advertisements, for computer games and 
mobile phones, for public spaces generally, is nowadays as commercially important as directly 
pleasing the public. (Frith, 2004: 176)
So music,  as  a  cultural  industry  that  had  formerly  been  studied  in  terms  of 
manufacture (e.g. Gillett, 1975; Hirsch, 1972; 1980; Peterson, 1976) was, from the mid-
1980s onwards increasingly understoond as a service industry based around the creation 
and exploitation of rights (e.g. Frith, 1986; 1987; Laing, 1993; Litman, 1991; 2001). As 
we will see in the chapters ahead, copyright law – the legal ‘form’ of the information 
age (Boyle, 2008) – is increasingly used by the music industries to extend their property 
rights and to defend themselves against the threats carried by technological innovations 
to their revenue streams. According to King (2002), the term ‘music industry’ describes 
‘a  complex network of rights  owners and network users,  a  continual  flow of  rights 
income which seems inexhaustible,  and sometimes,  indeed,  quite  random.’  (cited  in 
Frith, 2004: 176). It is therefore necessary to consider the role of copyright in relation to 
the evolution of digital technologies, and the overall outcome of the music industry to 
date. In fact, beyond any pre-occupation with music, a research study that proposes an 
examination of the internet as a medium for the distribution and circulation of culture 
per  sé,  must  consider  the question of legal  rights  and issues  arising from copyright 
(Boyle, 2008; Gillespie, 2007).
Music copyright and the shaping of the digital distribution domain
Ever since the industrial revolution, radical technological innovations have frequently 
operated  to  disrupt  the  existing  industrial  and  organisational  structures  and  the 
prevailing ‘rules of the economic game’ between different players and interests within 
the established industries. Often such radical innovations have given rise to entirely new 
industries and/or enabled the rise of significant new firms within particular economic 
sectors. The same applies to the internet, even if we must seriously deflate much of the 
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transformative hype and digital deliria that surrounded its initial diffusion curve in the 
late  1990s.  For,  like  other  radical  technological  innovations,  the  internet,  with  its 
relatively  rapid  and  widespread  diffusion  may  be  taken  as  having  the  potential  to 
seriously  disrupt  the  existing  industrial  structures  and rules  of  the  economic  game, 
especially  between  different  players  within  the  media  industries.  This  includes  the 
potential  to  disrupt  the  power or  role  of  existing  media  firms  and their  established 
industrial practices and interests, not least in the case of the music industry which is our 
primary concern here (Preston, 2001; Burnett and Marshall, 2003). Indeed the power of 
entrenched interests may also serious limit or subvert any disruptive potential (Winston, 
1998).
Indeed, with regard to the music industry, the internet has been widely perceived 
as possessing a particularly disruptive potential, especially in terms of the established 
music  corporations’  relationships  with  (or  modes  of  service  delivery  to)  their  final 
consumers. This is because the internet’s application and use in the music industry has 
been widely defined as having most direct impact on the sphere of distribution, the key 
control stage or moment the overall value chain in the music industry (as in all other 
media industries). In this sense, the internet may be defined as having relatively more 
disruptive potential  than the prior major technical innovation that preceded it in this 
industry: the development of the CD player and disc. (The latter proved to be a real 
boom technology for the music industry since it provided the platform for a decade-long 
period of super-profits, despite some tame and relatively fruitless efforts at regulatory 
intervention to protect consumer interests).
However, a historical perspective also indicates that the precise socio-economic 
outcomes of radical technological innovations (such as the internet) have rarely been 
read or predicted with any accuracy from the latter’s apparent technical features, not 
least those envisaged and proposed by their designers and suppliers (Winston, 1998). 
Rather, the widespread adoption and appropriation of radical technological innovations 
(especially inter-related clusters of same) must also be accompanied and facilitated by a 
diverse  set  of  ‘matching’  innovations.  The  latter  may  be  considered  as  relatively 
autonomous from any ‘inherent’ technical considerations, characteristics or trajectories 
and they include organisational,  industrial,  social  and institutional  (including policy) 
innovations. Hence, the precise outcome of any radical technological innovation (i.e. in 
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terms of its  socio-economic effects)  is always the product of conflicts  and struggles 
between  different  interest  groups  in  domains  that  are  often  far  removed  from any 
predominantly ‘technological’ logic or trajectory (Winston, 1998). The full working out 
and  embedding  of  such  complex  sets  of  innovations  involves  a  process  of  social 
learning which may require a relatively extended phase of social  struggles, trial  and 
error experimentation, and social learning processes (Preston, 2001).
We can draw upon historical insights from past research on radical technical 
innovation processes to inform our approach to the internet and its applications in (and 
social or economic implications for) the music industry today. These indicate how we 
must move beyond technology-centred analysis to address the empirical interplay of key 
socio-economic interests and powers that are framing the practical application and/or 
appropriation  of  the  internet.  In  this  light,  we  are  here  concerned  with  how  such 
interplay shapes the form and extent of the internet’s disruptive potential in the music 
industry. In the contemporary ‘information society’ or ‘knowledge economy’, this also 
means that we must pay special attention to one particular area of conflict and struggle 
over  ‘matching’  policy  innovation  –  that  related  to  the  intellectual  property  rights 
regime.  Thus,  this  research  must  be  attentive  to  the  shaping  of  digital  distribution 
technologies,  their  implications  for  the  relationship  between  music  industry 
determinations and music-user sovereignty. The significance of the copyright strand of 
intellectual  property  law to the  shaping of  digital  culture  is  most  lucidly  illustrated 
through the works of Boyle (1997, 2008), Lessig (2001). Equally, as Gillespie argues, 
the widespread adoption of the internet changes ‘the game’ not only technologically, but 
politically,  economically  and  culturally  as  ‘copyright  now  faced  a  technology  that 
dramatically reimagined how and by whom culture is produced, sold, distributed and 
consumed’(Gillespie, 2007: 5). In such a threatening environment, ‘those in power turn 
to  the  stability  and  authority  of  existing  law;  using  the  law  they  tame  the  new 
technology into submission’ (ibid: 11). Thus, it is imperative that this research study 
examine the evolving ‘nature’ of copyright to the evolution of the music industry in the 
internet era.
Thus, copyright is a key thread that runs through the spine of this thesis.
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1.4 Why study the music industry through its relationship with the 
internet?
Napier-Bell details an industry that has been and is controlled, almost exclusively, by a 
small group of very powerful players. Since the late 1970s concentration has increased 
significantly and, for the first two of these decades so too did profits. It will soon be a  
decade since compact disc sales reached saturation point in the majority of advanced 
capitalist  societies.  Since  then,  the  record  companies  own  sales  statistics  detail  a 
significant and continuing decline4. This, combined with their extensive staff cuts and 
the closure of many significant retail outlets, paints a decidedly unhappy picture for the 
record industry as a whole. All of this contrasts greatly with the decade prior to the turn 
of the millennium when year after year, this same industry boasted remarkable growth. 
The  past  decade  has  seen  developments,  primarily  associated  with  digital 
technologies, that are widely viewed as key causes of the decline of this industry and the 
diminishing  power  of  the  major  record  companies.  Developments  in  hard-drive 
recording  have  greatly  reduced  the  costs  associated  with  generating  recordings  and 
greatly increased accessibility to the whole recording process. The development of the 
MP3  file  and  subsequently  peer-to-peer  file  sharing  software  has  enabled  the 
duplication and circulation of music among consumers to proliferate, and provide the 
major companies in the industry with questionably the most significant  challenge of 
their  history.  As  noted  above,  much  commentary  has  detailed  the  collapse  of  the 
recorded  music  industry  as  peer-to-peer  file-sharing  is  widely  perceived  to  have 
decimated  the  market  for  physical  recordings  (e.g.  Liebowitz,  2002).  Napier-Bell’s 
conclusion echoes the perception of many commentators (e.g. Barfe, 2004) that such 
developments have consigned the record industry as we know it to its deathbed. Like 
many other commentators, Napier-Bell heralds this situation as an absolute good as it 
democratises the entire music industry by giving greater power to both creative artists 
and  music  consumers  and  freeing  them  from  the  shackles  of  multinational 
entertainment/media  corporations.  In  essence,  the  recorded  music  industry  is  in  the 
throes  of  significant  change  and  is  still  in  the  process  of  negotiating  an  extremely 
turbulent and critical junction. Developments in the record industry are being keenly 
4 Each year the International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI) produces a world sales report 
entitled The Record Industries in Numbers. Each year of the new millennium has seen them detail falling 
overall global sales figures.
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observed by the cultural industries as a whole, because the record industry is the first 
major sector of cultural production to face the challenges and opportunities associated 
with the internet. Peter Gabriel puts it thus:  
In some ways  we are the canary down the mine, the first battle ground, but behind us goes 
anyone who creates anything that can be turned into data whether its software, films, pictures, 
music. (www.petergabriel.com)
For Boyle (2008), an assumption held by society is that in order for the market 
to ‘work’, goods must be ‘rivalrous’ – to use Boyle’s analogy of a petunia farmer: ‘If I 
have the petunia, you can’t have it’; and also ‘excludable’ – ‘The farmer only gives you 
petunias  when you  pay for  them’  (Boyle,  2008:  2-3).  The received  wisdom is  that 
digitisation brings with it non-rival and non-excludable products, thus making digitised 
content extremely difficult to monetise. Here, Boyle invites us to ‘pause…and inquire 
how closely reality hews to the economic story of non-rival and non-excludable public 
goods’  (ibid:  3).  This  research study accepts  Boyle’s  challenge  and interrogates  the 
‘received wisdom’ regarding the economic impact of digitalisation on the music market.
MySpace, YouTube and internet blogs are now perceived as key intermediaries 
necessary for the generation of profile at consumer/user level. Traditional intermediaries 
such  as  radio  and  the  music  press  are  perceived  to  carry  a  decreasing  level  of 
significance.  Furthermore,  in  this  era  of  crisis  for  the  record  industry,  we  are 
increasingly told of the growth of the live music market, and the necessity for artists to 
be able to generate income through this, and other sources such as synchronisation fees 
as the market for recordings declines, possibly terminally. 
In short, we are being invited to accept that prevailing relationships of power 
within the record industry are currently undergoing radical transformation. In the course 
of this thesis, I question the extent of this change, and ultimately contend that we are 
witnessing as much continuity as change in the structure and character of the music 
industry.  Again, however, we must be mindful to acknowledge that while this thesis 
ultimately concerns itself with activities across the range of music industry sub-sectors, 
it does so almost exclusively within the realm of international popular music. The reader 
should thus be conscious that any similar such studies conducted in the realms of other 
major music styles clearly hold the possibility to produce different sets of findings and 
conclusions regarding the implications of the internet.
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1.5 Methodological approach
This thesis first proposes a conceptual framework for understanding the dynamics of the 
record industry and broader music industries in terms of the discourse of contemporary 
capitalism, and how contemporary capitalism functions in relation to the production and 
consumption  of  recorded  music.  Furthermore,  it  must  provide  a  framework  for 
examining the role  of digital  technologies,  particularly the internet  in  shaping these 
relationships, and other matching innovations from the social world in influencing or 
shaping the outcome of these technologies. 
This  thesis  is  predominantly  qualitative  in  approach.  The  modus  operandi 
incorporates an extensive literature review across several fields of enquiry relevant to 
this research. The theoretical framework arrived draws on the field of political economy 
of  the  media  and,  theories  of  techno-social  relations.  The  former  is  crucial  in 
understanding of the political-economic context within which the music industry has 
evolved  in  recent  years.  Given  the  primacy  afforded  to  technology  in  the  media, 
industrial  and  academic  accounts  outlined  earlier,  perspectives  on  the  relationship 
between  technology  and  society  constitute  an  essential  aspect  of  any  analytical 
framework constructed to examine the role of the internet in the evolution of the music 
industry.  Overall,  this  framework  provides  the  critical  structure  for  assessing, 
understanding and explaining the changes that have occurred in the music industry in 
recent years.
The  core  empirical  research  interrogating  these  relationships  has  primarily 
involved a qualitative methodology based on an extensive series of indepth interviews 
with  thirty-nine  key  informants.  The  interviewees  comprise  of  record  industry 
personnel, music publishers, artist managers, live music promoters, record producers, 
recording artists, music broadcasting personnel, music journalists, policy makers and 
other key informants [see appendix A for a full list of interviewees and accompanying 
biographies]. This has produced approximately eighty hours of audio material, with the 
interviews  ranged  in  duration  from forty-five  minutes  to  three  hours.  Many of  the 
interviewees have worked in more than one field across these areas of occupation. The 
assembly of such an array of informants for my primary research has provided me with 
a unique, and extremely rich, information resource, based on the accumulated (and often 
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tacit) knowledge of highly-experienced actors in the relevant fields directly related to 
his research. Many of these informants were very generous with their time and, indeed 
in some cases, recommended colleagues or former colleagues to be interviewees.  
1.6 Outline of Chapters
Chapter two forms a conceptual framework that addresses the specific characteristics of 
the recorded music  sector  as  a core institutions  within the broader  cultural  and 
media  industries.   In  examining  how  the  characteristics  or  operations  of  the 
recorded  music  industry  are  shaped,  it  is  necessary  to  follow  Hesmondhalgh’s 
(2006;  2007)  lead  and  seek  an  understanding  of  how  contemporary  capitalism 
functions  in  relation  to  the  production  and  consumption  of  cultural  texts.  This 
involves  considering  how  cultural  and  media  industries  are  situated  within 
developments in capitalism as a whole. Chapter two aims at an understanding of 
cultural production in an era of neo-liberalism. This process requires a historically-
grounded  analysis  of  capitalism’s  early  development  to  more  comprehensively 
understand neo-liberalism’s  increasing  emphasis  on information,  knowledge and 
culture.  This,  in  turn,  has  the  effect  of  highlighting  the  role  of  the  intellectual 
property system in the contemporary cultural environment.
Given  the  central  role  attributed  to  technology,  particularly  technologies  of 
digital  reproduction  and distribution,  in  inducing the  apparent  ‘crisis’  for  the  major 
music companies, and the potential associated with internet technologies for making the 
recorded music market more accessible and democratic, chapter three is concerned with 
examining  theoretical  perspectives  on  techno-social  relations.  Two  core  schools  of 
thought are discussed here: technological determinism; and social shaping approaches to 
technology. Technological determinism assumes a paradigm shift in social relations and 
social  organisation  deriving  from  technological  developments.  It  assumes  a  causal 
relationship between technology and social change. The predominance of technological 
determinist ideals in contemporary society is reflected in the fatalistic accounts of the 
record industry in the digital environment referred to earlier in journalistic, industry and 
academic spheres. Social shaping theories, on the contrary, offer approaches that afford 
primacy to  the  ability  of  social  forces  to  mould  the  outcome of  technology.  While 
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acknowledging  the  implications  of  technological  innovation  and  development,  this 
thesis  ultimately emphasises  the role of other  political,  economic,  legal  and cultural 
variables in shaping the outcome of internet technologies in the music industries and, 
the evolution of these industries over the past decade and a half.
Chapter four primarily examines literature concerning the role and implications 
of the internet with regard to the music industry over the past decade. It is informed by 
perspectives that are attentive to the interplays of technological, economic and policy 
factors (especially the copyright strand of intellectual property rights) in the evolution 
of online distribution of music. I address how these factors have been shaping the form 
and extent of the internet’s disruptive potential in the recorded music industry since the 
late  1990s.  I  also  explore  contrasting  perspectives  on  the  relationship  between 
digitalisation  and  the  downturn  being  experienced  by  the  recorded  music  industry 
during the first decade of the new millennium. Tensions between these two conflicting 
views form the basis of the remainder of the chapter. Drawing on Benkler (2006) and 
Vaidhyanathan (2001), I examine Lessig’s (2001; 2004) contrasting futuristic visions of 
the internet,  one as  a  technology of  increased  freedom that  enhances  creativity  and 
commercial innovation; the other as a technology of increased control. Lessig places 
contrasting  concepts  of  intellectual  property  at  the  heart  of  both  these  ‘visions’. 
Emanating  from this  the  chapter  then  provides  a  review  of  literature  outlining  the 
historical trajectory of copyright and its relationship with the music industry to date. 
Beyond this, chapter four also examines literature that explores ownership trends in the 
music industry and perspectives on how this has evolved before and during the era of 
internet music. 
Chapter five provides a more detailed overview of the methodological approach 
employed  in  conducting  this  research,  and  the  reasoning  behind  applying  such  an 
approach.  It  examines  the  nature  of  the  research  questions  and outlines  appropriate 
strategies of enquiry.
Chapters six, seven and eight present the findings of this research study.  The 
responses of interviewees to questions about change in the music industry may best be 
categorised under two headings: one, focusing on ‘problems’ generated for the music 
industry  either  directly  or  indirectly  by  digitalisation;  and  the  other,  strategies 
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formulated by the industry to provide ‘solutions’ to these problems, or to compensate in 
other ways for any losses incurred through falling record sales. As such, chapter six 
focuses specifically on interviewee’s perceptions of the challenges being faced by the 
contemporary music industry,  i.e. ‘problems’. Chapter seven focuses on mapping the 
‘solutions’  or core  strategies  of  the  established  music  companies  as  they reposition 
themselves to respond to the challenges posed primarily by the disruptive potential of 
internet technologies. Beyond these issues, chapter eight, the final chapter of findings, is 
fundamentally concerned with encouraging interviewees to consider and reflect upon 
issues  of  power  in  the  music  industry.  It  essentially  evaluates  if  and  how  the 
decentralisation of power that was promised by the widespread of the internet has been 
realised in the music industry. A brief outline of each of these three chapters follows 
below:
In chapter six, I ask each participant to consider any key changes they regard as 
having occurred over the past decade. Perhaps unsurprisingly,  all interviewees signal 
the internet as the most significant development, and most link this to a downturn in 
record sales revenues. However, beyond this they advance additional factors that they 
claim  provide  evidence  of  severe  record  industry  decline,  as  well  as  forwarding 
perspectives on a range of phenomena that they perceive as causing these problems. 
While  some of  these factors  extend beyond technological  logic,  most  are  related  to 
various aspects of digitalisation.  This leads us to consider recent employment trends 
across  the  major  music  companies;  the  decline  of  ‘bricks  and  mortar’  retailing; 
criticisms levelled at the major music companies over long-term inefficiencies and a 
failure  to  realise  or  grasp opportunities  afforded by the  internet  at  an earlier  stage; 
consequences arising from the shift from physical to digital formats; and the effects of 
supermarket retailing.
Chapter  seven sees interviewees advancing and highlighting  the strategies  or 
solutions of the music industry in relation to the problems raised in chapter six. These 
include  legal  developments  that  were  unfolding  during  the  course  of  my  primary 
research, as well as the development of new business models and licensing systems that 
enable  music  companies  to  profit  from  emerging  and  growing  digital  distribution 
opportunities. Overall we will see how the emergence and proliferation of new digital 
platforms  and  the  ongoing  formation  of  alliances  and  partnerships  between  music 
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companies and actors on the technology sector is serving to accelerate the growth of the 
overall digital  music market,  increase the number of revenue streams open to music 
companies  relating  to  recording,  publishing and other  related  products  and services. 
Interviewees also consider how opportunities for revenue generation from ‘intangible’, 
secondary sources (such as synchronisation fees) have evolved, and how this shapes the 
overall picture of the music industry. Beyond this, the chapter sees interviewees reflect 
upon  the  current  state  of  the  live  music  industry  in  the  context  of  its  increasing 
convergence  with  other  core  music  industry  sub-sectors.  The  emergence  of  new 
territories within which recorded music can be sold is also highlighted.
Chapter  eight,  the  final  chapter  of  research  findings,  essentially  asks  ‘has 
digitalisation, and particularly the internet, produced a new music economy with a new 
set  of  rules?’.  In  doing  this,  the  chapter  first  examines  the  composition  of  the 
contemporary recorded music  market,  outlining  the current  market  share breakdown 
between major and independent companies. We proceed to consider the roles of and 
relationships  between  major  and  independent  actors.  My interviewees  are  asked  to 
reflect upon earlier techno-centric predictions which point to more independent actors 
achieving increased and easier access to the marketplace and offer their perspectives on 
and  experience  of  the  current  relationship  between  major  and  independent  actors. 
Beyond  this,  drawing  largely  on  the  contributions  of  the  artist  managers  who 
participated in interviews, we examine contemporary processes for getting new music to 
market  and  the  role  and  implications  of  internet  technologies  in  evolving  these 
processes. Then, acknowledging the ongoing significance of the major record labels in 
shaping the market, my interviewees offer insights into why this is the case. A number 
of interviewees outline what they perceive as the current working model for breaking a 
recording artist into the mass market. This leads us to consider the role of tastemakers in 
the internet age and which ‘intermediaries’ are most effective in growing a consumer 
base. Leading on from this, interviewees are asked to reflect upon and advance their 
concepts of the contemporary music consumer and the consumer bands that constitute 
the music consumer market.
Chapter nine proceeds to present the major conclusions of this study. Ultimately 
this chapter contends that, based on the research undertaken throughout the course of 
this study, the music industry has undergone significant change during the past decade. 
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However, the chapter raises significant questions as to whether these changes represent 
a significant shift in power away from the industry’s traditional oligopolistic structures. 
Rather, it contends that the key restructuring and reconfiguration of the broader music 
industry that has taken place, derives from successful strategies designed to ‘manage’ 
the outcome of technological innovations or negate their potentially harmful effects on 
the established industry’s core centres of power. Ultimately, a new, more consolidated 
music industry model has emerged within which the conception of the recording artist 
has been radically altered. This development provides the established music industry 
companies with new avenues for revenue generation at a time when one of their most 
significant revenue streams, i.e. the sale of recordings, has been under challenge. Such 
processes, the chapter concludes, reveal the dynamic nature of contemporary capitalism 
and also highlight  significant  flaws in  techno-centric  approaches  which advance the 
transformative effects of technology on the social sphere. This chapter also makes some 
recommendations for future study in the area.
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Chapter 2: Theories of Market and State
2.1 Introduction
Examining the recent evolution of the music industries requires consideration of the 
evolving features of the capitalist industrial system overall, including the role of new 
and emerging  communication  technologies  in  shaping these  relationships,  and other 
matching  innovations  from the  social  world  that  influence  or  shape  the  forms  and 
outcome  of  these  technologies.  Such  a  study  must  be  embedded  in  a  conceptual 
framework that addresses the specific characteristics of the music industries as core sets 
of  institutions  within  the  broader  cultural  and  media  industries.  Forming  such  a 
framework is the focus of this chapter. There are two levels of institutional influences 
that must be considered in constructing an appropriate theoretical framework for this 
thesis. On one level we must consider perspectives that focus on the interfacing of the 
music industries with the internet. Chapter four will be dedicated to this task. However, 
the operations of the recorded music industry and its relationship technology are shaped 
by  the  political-economic  changes  that  have  occurred  over  the  past  three-to-four 
decades. Thus I must contextualise and connect the core relationships under scrutiny 
here with broader patterns of society, culture and economy. To echo Habermas, the two 
key ‘steering mechanisms’ in modern society are money and state/policy. Therefore, in 
this chapter we consider macro-level theories of the evolving role and relations between 
market and state. 
To  understand  how  the  characteristics  or  operations  of  the  recorded  music 
industry are shaped, it is necessary to examine how contemporary capitalism functions 
in  relation  to  the  production  and  consumption  of  cultural  texts.  This  involves 
considering  how  cultural  and  media  industries  are  situated  within  the  evolving 
development of capitalism as a whole. This chapter aims at an understanding of cultural 
production  in  an  era  of  neo-liberalism,  focusing  on  the  contemporary  relationship 
between economics, politics and culture. However, we require a historically-grounded 
analysis  of  capitalism’s  early  development  to  fully  understand  neo-liberalism’s 
increasing emphasis on information,  knowledge and culture.  This analysis  will  draw 
predominantly on the work of Ellen Meiksins Wood’s work on the early development of 
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capitalism.  Historically,  capitalism  has  been  characterised  by  a  cyclical  process 
alternating between booms and crashes. The early 1970s saw the advanced capitalist 
economies enter a period of stagnation and crisis – the ‘long downturn’ – the effects of 
which lasted for two decades. This chapter also examines the response of the advanced 
capitalist states to this crisis of ‘over-accumulation’ of capital, and how broader changes 
in the political-economic sphere shaped change in the cultural domain. Here, I outline 
the dismantling of established rationales around telecommunications and broadcasting 
as  public  resources  (both  of  which  impact  on  the  production,  mediation  and 
consumption of recorded music), shifts in investment towards service industries and the 
linked expansion of the cultural industries as a whole, within which the recorded music 
industry has been a prime sector. 
Then, taking as a cue the recent work of David Hesmondhalgh (2006, 2008) on 
new cultural ‘imperialisms’, where he has drawn on the works of Arendt (1968), Arrighi 
(1994) and Harvey (2005), I explore how Marx’s notion of ‘primitive accumulation’ 
enables us to understand the private appropriation of knowledge and culture as one key 
feature of the latest chapter of capital expansion. This requires analysis of intellectual 
property,  and  in  particular  the  emergence  of  a  new  form of  global  governance  of 
intellectual property via the 1993 World Trade Organisation (WTO) treaty chapter on 
the  Trade  Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Agreement  (TRIPS).  Making 
intellectual  property  rights  (IPRs)  a  key  object  of  focus  in  the  study  of  cultural 
production  and  consumption  brings  to  the  fore  fundamental  questions  about  the 
restructuring of cultural industries and where the money generated from the creation of 
cultural ‘texts’ goes. IPRs also highlights how, despite the declared tenets of neo-liberal 
discourse,  the  state  is  continually  involved  in  the  formation  of  markets  and wealth 
creation  processes.  Such  an  approach  emphasises  the  relationship  of  ownership  of 
companies to the idea of knowledge and culture as ‘property’. 
These are all issues relevant to understanding the contemporary music industry 
environment, particularly in light of current debates surrounding the evolution of the 
internet as a platform for the circulation, marketing and distribution of recorded music 
in a ‘new’ information age. As the first of the cultural industries to face the challenges 
and  opportunities  of  the  internet,  the  recorded  music  industry  is  proving  a  testing 
ground for the cultural industries as a whole. Film and television industries have also 
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started to move down this route with developments such as the BBC iPlayer and the sale 
of films on iTunes and other similar platforms.
2.2 Early  capitalism  and  the  emergence  of  ‘appropriation  by 
dispossession’
Capitalism has emerged as the Western World’s  dominant  economic  system,  within 
which the means of production is largely privately owned, and goods and services are 
developed as commodities to be traded in the market place. As Wood explains, the key 
difference  that  distinguishes  capitalist  society from all  earlier  societal  forms derives 
from property relations between producers and appropriators:
Only in capitalism is the dominant mode of appropriation based on the complete dispossession 
of direct  producers,  who (unlike chattel  slaves) are legally free and whose surplus labour is  
appropriated  by  purely  ‘economic’  means.  Because  direct  producers  in  a  fully  developed 
capitalism are propertyless,  and because their only access to the means of production, to the 
requirements of their own reproduction, even to the means of their own labour, is the sale of 
their  labour-power  in  exchange  for  a  wage,  capitalists  can  appropriate  the  workers’  surplus 
without direct coercion. (Wood: 2002: 96)
Capitalism  thus  implies  a  thoroughly  ‘market  society’  where,  at  least  theoretically, 
opportunities for the maximisation of profits are optimised and choice to the consumer 
is maximised. However, rather than affording us the ‘opportunity’ to access the market 
and benefit from it, Wood argues that we are actually ‘compelled’ to enter the market as 
to ensure access to the ‘means of life’. All actors in the process may thus be seen as 
market dependent. Producers are dependent on the market in order to sell their labour. 
Appropriators  are  dependent  on  the  market  in  order  to  buy this  labour  power,  and 
generate profit through the sale of goods and services derived from this labour power. 
Capitalism is thus a system where:
…the bulk of society’s  work is done by propertyless  labourers  who are obliged to sell  their 
labour-power in exchange for a wage in order to gain access to the means of life and of labour 
itself. In the process of supplying the needs and wants of society, workers are at the same time  
and inseparably creating profits for those who buy the labour power. (ibid: 3)
While markets have existed throughout history for the sale or exchange of goods or 
services,  Wood  argues  that  the  market  in  capitalism  is  unique  insofar  as  almost 
everything in capitalist society may be treated as a commodity produced for the market. 
The centrality of the market to all parties and actions thus ensures that the maximisation 
of profits is the key objective of the capitalist system. Such an objective means that 
capitalism must:
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…constantly accumulate, constantly search out new markets, constantly impose its imperatives 
on new territories and new spheres of life, on all human beings and the natural environment.  
(ibid: 97)
History  provides  the  clues  as  to  why  appropriator-producer  relations  have 
evolved  to  be  market  dependent.  Wood  argues  that  historical  accounts  of  how 
capitalism  came  into  being  work  on  the  assumption  that  it  is/has  been  a  natural 
evolution  that  realises  ever-present  tendencies.  Classical  political  economy  and 
enlightenment conceptions of progress present us with accounts of:
…historical development within which the growth and development to maturity of capitalism are 
already  pre-figured  in  the  earliest  manifestations  of  human  rationality,  in  the  technological 
advances that began when Homo sapiens first wielded a tool and in the acts of exchange human 
beings have practised since time immemorial. (ibid: 4)
Such a  perceived link  or  process  of  continuity  between non-capitalist  and capitalist 
society  denies  the  specificity  of  capitalism.  In  challenging  the  naturalisation  of 
capitalism, Wood tells us that it occurred not as “a simple extension or expansion of 
barter or trade” but rather a radical transformation “in the most basic human relations 
and practices” (ibid: 95). While this shift in established relations and practices might be 
traced back indefinitely  throughout  history,  the first  instance  of  such a  new market 
‘dynamic’  being  clearly  evident  may  be  localised  to  rural  England  in  the  sixteenth 
century (Hesmondhalgh, 2006; Wood, 2002, 2003). 
Politically, by the sixteenth century England had evolved into the most cohesive 
and unified state in Europe. The political centralisation of the English state, as Wood 
explains, made it the one significant exception in the pre-capitalist European economy. 
The ‘material foundation’ underpinning the English economy was agriculture. However, 
while the state served to protect the property of the landed gentry, the relatively weak 
‘extra-economic’ powers of the aristocracy meant that wealth was generated through the 
productivity  of  the  tenant,  rather  than  through  rents/direct  coercion.  The  high 
concentration of ownership of land in England meant that a very significant proportion 
of it was farmed by tenants as opposed to peasant-owners. Rents were quite frequently 
determined by market conditions – effectively a market for lease agreements between 
owners  and tenants.  There  emerged a  rental  market  where tenant-producers  actively 
competed for access to land as a means of producing the goods that enabled them to 
compete  in  a  market  for  consumers.  Success  in  this  latter  market  was essential  for 
security of tenure.  In such a competitive environment, those tenants who were most 
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productive saw their lease holdings increase, while those who were less productive lost 
access to the land. Agricultural producers were thus in every sense market dependent.
So,  as  Wood  emphasises,  when  competition  and  market  forces  became 
established:
The famous triad of landlord, capitalist tenant and wage labourer was the result, and with the  
growth of wage labour, the pressures to improve labour productivity also increased. The same 
process  created  a highly productive  agriculture  capable  of  sustaining a large  population not 
engaged  in  agricultural  production,  but  also  an  increasing  propertyless  mass  that  would 
constitute both a large wage-labour force and a domestic market for cheap consumer goods – a 
type of market with no historical precedent. (Wood, 2002: 103)
Thus within English agriculture, the world was witnessing the emergence and rise of 
capitalist property relations. This process would not have been possible without the state 
providing  the  legislation  and  judicial  interventions  necessary  to  ensure  such  a 
transformation of the agricultural sphere. Thus the state was an essential tool in making 
property rights market-dependent, a point that we will address in greater depth later on.
In the drive to maximise productivity, the concept of ‘improvement’ took hold 
(Wood, 1998; 2002). Improvement, in this instance, relates to techniques designed to 
render land more productive and thus profitable. As the decades progressed, volumes of 
literature  were  generated  which  extolled  the  virtues  of  improvement  and  detailed 
processes and techniques designed to achieve improvement. What is of interest here is 
how this concept of agricultural improvement is linked to processes of reclamation, and 
more significantly enclosure:
Improvement did not, in the first instance, depend on significant technological  innovations…
[and]  improvement  meant  something  more  than  new  or  better  techniques  of  farming. 
Improvement meant, more fundamentally, new forms and conceptions of property. ‘Improved’ 
farming’ for the enterprising landlord and his prosperous capitalist tenant, ideally,  though not 
necessarily, meant enlarged and concentrated land-holdings. It certainly meant the elimination of 
old customs and practices that interfered with the most productive use of land. (Wood, 2002: 
107)
Wood proceeds to tell us that:
Peasants have since time immemorial  employed various means of regulating land use in the 
village community. They have restricted certain practices and granted certain rights, not in order 
to enhance the wealth of landlords or states, but in order to preserve the peasant community 
itself, perhaps to conserve the land or redistribute its fruits more equitably, and often to provide  
for  the  community’s  less  fortunate  members.  Even  private  ownership  of  property  has  been 
typically  conditioned  by  such  customary  practices,  giving  non-owners  certain  use  rights  to 
property owned by somebody else. (ibid.)
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In England there  once  existed  common lands  to  which  the  public  possessed 
grazing  rights  for  their  animals,  the  rights  to  collect  firewood  and  leavings  of  the 
harvest.  Such  long-established  practices  were  clearly  not  conducive  to  the  most 
profitable application of property. Thus, from the sixteenth century onwards, property 
rights were significantly redefined. The pressures to change long-established customs 
and traditions  regarding  property  were  reflected  in  legal  proceedings  deriving  from 
conflicts  and  disputes  over  specific  property  rights,  or  disputes  over  private  and 
common land where two or more parties claimed various usage rights (Wood, 1998). 
The principles of ‘improvement’ demanded a new conception of property – one serving 
capitalist  imperatives,  and this  meant redefining property as not only private,  but as 
exclusive  (Wood,  2002).  The law was thus  required  to  ensure the  exclusion  of  the 
community at large from access to property. Property was, in effect, deregulated. The 
community could no longer impose restrictions on land use in the interests of providing 
for or sustaining itself.
Hannah  Arendt  sees  capitalism  as  being  dependent  upon  ‘a  fund  of  assets 
outside itself’ in order to relieve ‘pressures of accumulation’ and thus, capitalists pursue 
‘the original accumulation of capital’ in new areas (Arendt, 1973, cited in Harvey, 2003: 
143).  This  new market  dynamic  was  facilitated  by  what  Adam Smith  had  labelled 
‘primitive accumulation’. Marx defines this process as ‘divorcing the producer from the 
means of production’ (Part VIII Volume 1 chapter 26) and outlines the major forms of 
primitive accumulation as including:
…the expulsion  of  the  peasants;  the  appropriation  of  assets;  monetization  of  exchange  and 
taxation;  the  commodification  of  labour  power  and  the  suppression  of  alternatives;  usury, 
national  debt  and  the  credit  system;  the  slave  trade;  the  conversion  of  common,  collective 
property  rights  into  exclusive,  private  property  rights;  and  the  suppression  of  rights  to  the 
commons. (cited in Hesmondhalgh, 2006: 11-12)
Harvey (2005) sees these major forms of accumulation by dispossession as remaining 
central to capitalism, and he describes such actions as ‘accumulation by dispossession’. 
Hesmondhalgh (2006, 2008) argues that two specific strands of such accumulation by 
dispossession remain particularly relevant to recent developments in the cultural sphere: 
the conversion of common, collective property rights into exclusive, private property 
rights; and the suppression of rights to the commons. Of particular significance here is 
the  process  of  ‘enclosure’.   From the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth  century  onwards, 
enclosure meant not only the physical marking of a boundary around a property, but 
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more  significantly,  the  abolition  of  use  rights  to  the  community  at  large.  Wood 
describes  the  process  of  enclosure  as  “the  most  vivid  expression  of  the  relentless 
process that was changing not only the English countryside, but also the world: the birth 
of capitalism” (2002: 109).
Thus,  the  medieval  commons  were  transferred  into  the  hands  of  private 
landowners  for  commercial  exploitation.  But  the  ‘commons’  is  a  term  that  has 
(particularly since the advent of internet and the world wide web) found its way back 
into  more  general  parlance,  particularly  in  debates  and  discussions  surrounding 
intellectual property rights. These days it is frequently used to describe cultural texts or 
knowledge  which  many  (Boyle,  1997,  2008;  Lessig,  2001;  Vaidhyanathan,  1999 
amongst others) argue should be common, accessible, sharable resources for the benefit 
of all. Equally, the term ‘enclosure’ is used to describe the process (usually involving 
copyright or patent law) to further the private appropriation of culture and knowledge.
The concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ enables us to understand not 
only the early acts of enclosure in the transition from feudalism to capitalism that were 
designed to  turn common land into  privately  owned profitable  commodities,  it  also 
enables us to understand the private appropriation of knowledge and culture as the latest 
chapter  in  the  ‘long-term march  of  capitalist  relations  into  evermore  areas  of  life’ 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2006: 13). Forms of knowledge and creativity that were not formerly 
regarded as being ownable are now being induced into the intellectual property system. 
They are made available for the investment of capital and the generation of profit. Thus, 
the productivity of former common resources is maximised to the advantage of private 
owners. The twenty-first century cultural commons merely represents another area of 
capitalisms ‘fund of assets outside itself’ used to avoid the recurring problem of over-
accumulation (ibid). 
The  onward  extension  and  expansion  of  intellectual  property  rights  into  the 
cultural  and media  industries  is  illustrated  by Lessig  (2001)  who uses  a  variety  of 
examples  from the  motion  picture  industry  to  show how creative  control  has  now 
become a legal matter5. Copyright law demands that many elements of the audio-visual 
5 The movie Twelve Monkeys was stopped by a court 28 days after its release because an artist claimed a 
chair in the movie resembled a sketch of a piece of furniture that he had designed. The movie Batman 
Forever was threatened because the batmobile drove through an allegedly copyrighted courtyard and the 
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experience  (and  indeed  everyday  cultural  life)  now  require  clearance,  and  usually 
payment, before they may be used by a director in the final cut. Lessig is less concerned 
with ‘ordinary and reasonable limits on the creative process’ such as permission from 
record companies or publishers for the use of songs or music. Rather, he is highlighting 
the  extension  of  intellectual  property  rights  to  ‘the  stuff  that  appears  in  the  film 
incidentally’ (Lessig, 2001: 3). Likewise with music, the growing acuteness of this trend 
is  illustrated  through  such  cases  as  the  legal  action  brought  by  Peters  Edition,  the 
company who owns publishing rights to the work of the late American composer John 
Cage against British composer and songwriter Mike Batt regarding Batt’s infringement 
of Cage’s exclusive right to silence as the basis of a musical composition6. We can also 
consider the use of digital  rights management  technologies7 (DRM) by major  music 
companies which ‘lock(s) up content through trusted systems in which copy protection 
is built into every component sold’ (McCourt & Burkart, 2003: 342). While the four 
major record companies dispensed with DRM for many physical products throughout 
2007 and 2008, they have retained it for many of their digital products.
2.3 Political-economic context of changes within cultural and media 
industries
Any analysis of the contemporary recorded music industry and its relationships with 
radio  and  the  internet  must  be  attentive  to  the  context  of  patterns  of  change  and 
continuity in the broader cultural industries over the past three decades. These changes 
are themselves intertwined with processes of political-economic change that mark an 
important historical shift away from the post-World War Two decades’ emphasis on 
social  expenditure  towards  ‘ventures  that  have  been  hugely  profitable  for  a  new 
international class of Chief Executive Officers and investors’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2006: 6). 
original  architect  demanded money before the film could be released (Lessig,  2001: 4). Also, Trinity 
College Dublin threatened to sue Lucas Films over a claim that a Jedi temple resembled a section of one 
of their libraries.
6 Mike Batt was sued by John Cage’s publishers Peters Edition after he released a silent piece on his 2001 
album Classical Graffiti. Cage had originally released his own silent composition entitled 4’33’’ in 1952. 
Batt reached an out of court settlement with Peters Edition for ST£160,000.
7 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act enables copyright owners to write their own intellectual property 
regime in computer code which, for example, in the case of music CDs can be used to prevent the disc 
being played in particular devices or prevent the disc being copied. 
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Historically capitalism has been characterised by a cyclical process alternating 
between booms and crashes. The boom-to-bust feature of capitalism was characterised 
by the Russian economist Nikolai Kondratieff as a series of ‘long waves’ which lasted 
on average  fifty-four  years  between economic  peaks  (Wilden,  1987).  Boom periods 
witness growth and expansion (fundamental to capitalism) leading to increased profits. 
On  the  other  hand,  economic  downturn  means  over-accumulation,  which  Harvey 
defines as:
…a condition in which idle capital  and idle labour supply could exist  side by side with no 
apparent  way  to  bring  these  idle  resources  together  to  accomplish  socially  useful  tasks.  A 
generalised condition of overaccumulation would be indicated by idle productive capacity, a glut 
of commodities and an excess of inventories, surplus money capital (perhaps held in hoards),  
and high unemployment. (Harvey, 1989: 180-1)
Harvey (1989) proceeds to identify ‘spatio-temporal fixes’ as capitalisms well-
worn response to such crises of over-accumulation. Essentially there are two ways in 
which excess capital is absorbed: 
1) The first involves long-term capital investment – i.e. ‘temporal’ fix - which can 
either be profit-oriented (such as the launch of a new product) or alternatively,  
social expenditure (such as the provision of public services or resources). 
2) The second form of response that Harvey identifies is spatial, and might involve 
attempts at creating new markets, or re-organising existing resources or seeking 
to find new ones (e.g. land / labour / raw materials). 
In practice, Harvey tells us, these two process or forms of response combine to offer 
resolution to the crisis of over-accumulation.
Spatio-temporal  fixes  are  shaped  by  the  policies  of  both  nation  states  and 
international  governmental  institutions.  The  re-organisation  or  management  of  both 
national and international economic processes following the economic downturn of the 
1970s thus provides  the most  promising  starting point for understanding patterns  of 
change in the cultural industries. This long downturn, (see, for example, Hesmondhalgh, 
2007) served as the key agent accelerating processes of political-economic change that 
were already in motion.
The long downturn
The Bretton-Woods agreement of 1944 shaped ‘the form and substance of the capitalist 
management of international development for the post-war period’ (Hardt and Negri, 
2001: 264).  This was a system of US-led economic  hegemony which differed from 
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earlier international monetary systems as it placed controls in the hands of governmental 
and regulatory organisations rather than private bankers and financiers (Arrighi, 1994). 
These institutions included the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
Such monetary hegemony:
…was secured through the strategic choice of a liberal  development based on relatively free 
trade, and moreover by maintaining gold (of which the United States possessed about one third  
of the world total) as the guarantee of the power of the dollar. (Hardt and Negri, 2001: 265)
With the Bretton-Woods agreement, the ‘pegged rate’ currency regime evolved, where 
members  agreed  to  establish  a  parity  of  their  national  currencies  in  terms  of  gold, 
however as the principal reserve currency was the US dollar, the agreement meant other 
countries  would  peg  their  currencies  to  the  US  dollar.  With  other  currencies  now 
defined  in  relation  to  the  US  dollar,  and  with  the  European  warring  nations  in 
significant debt to the United States, the dollar effectively became the world currency. 
The US ensured its  economic  hegemony throughout  the  latter  half  of  the  twentieth 
century via the Bretton Woods agreement, the IMF, the World Bank, the subsequent 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT),  and  later  the  World  Trade 
Organisation (WTO). European economies were to be reconstructed, and third world 
economies  developed  within  the  framework  of  conditions  imposed  by  these 
international institutions. 
Under the governance of relatively stable Keynesian social democratic regimes, 
the  decades  following  the  end  of  World  War  Two  saw  the  advanced  capitalist 
economies of Europe,  North America and Australasia  enjoying significant  economic 
growth and improved standards of living. Evidence even existed which indicated the 
reversal of trends regarding growing social and economic equality (Hobsbawn, 1995). 
Such a ‘golden age’ of capitalism would last for over two decades during which many 
mainstream economists foretold the death of ‘boom and bust’ cycles (Hesmondhalgh, 
2007). These decades witnessed economic competition – in ‘uneasy tandem’ with the 
co-operation amongst advanced capitalist economies required to guarantee their markets 
(Wood, 2003) – rise to replace military rivalry among the key capitalist powers.
However, by the 1970s, in keeping with the historical trend of boom and bust 
cycles,  the system of political  and economic  balance  established under  the Bretton-
Woods agreement had destabilised. Profits dropped significantly across many industrial 
sectors, most notably manufacturing. 
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Table 2.1: Comparing  the  post-war  boom  and  the  ‘long  downturn’  (average  annual  rates  of 
change):
Manufacturing
     Net Profit Rate          Output
                          1950-70                  70-93                     50-73                  73-93         
U.S 24.35 14.5   4.3 1.9
Germany 23.1 10.9   5.1 0.9
Japan 40.4 20.4                14.1 5.0
G-7 26.2 15.7   5.5 2.1
Private Business
                       Net Profit Rate                                     Output
                        1950-70                 70-93                       50-73                  73-93         
U.S 12.9 9.9   4.2 2.6
Germany 23.2 13.8   4.5 2.2
Japan 21.6 17.2                 9.1 4.1
G-7 17.6 13.3   4.5 2.2
Source: Hesmondhalgh, 2007 adapted from Brenner, 1998
A variety of explanations are offered as to why advanced capitalist economies 
suffered this economic downturn. The capitalist crisis of the 1970s, according to David 
Harvey (2006) was caused by a combination of economic and political factors. These 
included the unravelling of the state interventionist model which had prevailed in most 
of the advanced capitalist countries since 1945 and delivered significant rates of growth. 
Another key factor that we must consider is the effects of the oil crisis of 1973. The 
increase in oil consumption which had accompanied the boom, was, by the early 1970s, 
threatening to deplete oil reserves (Armstrong et al, 1984). Then in October 1973, war 
broke out in the Middle East. The Arab members of OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries) introduced an oil embargo which saw the supply of oil to the US 
and its allies in Western Europe dramatically reduced over their support of Israel in its 
conflict  with  Egypt  and  Syria.  This  unfolded  within  the  wider  context  of  a  global 
process of decolonisation which included the defeat of the US in Vietnam. Between 
autumn  1973  and  spring  1974  the  price  of  oil  effectively  quadrupled.  Given  the 
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manufacturing  sectors  reliance  on  oil,  manufacturing  activities  were  substantially 
suppressed. 
Running parallel  to  these  developments,  Hesmondhalgh  (2007) points  to  the 
growing involvement  of German and Japanese corporations in manufacturing,  and a 
subsequent crisis in over-production in the United States.
Alongside the movement for decolonisation mentioned above, labour unrest was 
‘rampant’  with  the  political  movements  of  the  Left  making  significant  advances 
internationally (Harvey, 2006). Even within the US, the power of established political 
and economic elites was being increasingly undermined by ‘the combination of the anti-
war movement, civil rights movement and a student movement’ (ibid: x). We should 
also consider the role of the women’s movement and the emerging green / ecological 
movements as part of this challenge to the existing elites.
This is the political-economic context in which the neo-liberal response to the 
crisis emerged.
The growth of neo-liberalism
Such a  crisis  as  outlined  above is  not  necessarily  negative  from the  perspective  of 
capitalism. As Hardt and Negri explain:
Marx claims that capitalism does indeed have a fundamental interest in economic crisis for its  
transformative  power…Economic  crisis  can…destroy  unprofitable  sectors,  restructure  the 
organisation of production and renew its technologies. In other words, economic crisis can push 
forward a transformation that re-establishes a high general rate of profit… 
(Hardt and Negri, 2001: 264)
The  political  changes  instigated  by  this  economic  depression,  which  in  turn  would 
impact  significantly  on  the  regulation  of  the  cultural  industries,  are  succinctly 
summarised by Hesmondhalgh:
The various advanced capitalist states responded to the crisis that hit capitalism in the late-1970s  
by  attacking  the  institutional  strength  of  labour  movements  and  by  moving  away  from the 
arrangements for state intervention in economic life that had prevailed in the post-war period,  
whereby government spending was used to supplement consumer spending whenever consumer 
spending  was  inadequate  to  sustain  economic  growth…From  1979,  after  some  years  of 
attempting to reflate  western economies, governments made permanent  a set of anti-inflation 
strategies that had been tried in 1974-75. Emergency cutbacks in public spending and stripping 
away of  regulation  by  democratically  elected  governments  were  promoted  from emergency 
measures to permanent policy. (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 97)
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As such, the unregulated, free-market approach gained prominence, or more accurately, 
regained prominence. The origins of such ‘laissez faire’ ideology are to be found with a 
group of 18th century French economists  called The Physiocrats  who attacked state 
intervention in industrial affairs as harmful to society as a whole. Government action 
should only exist as a last resort to break up private monopoly. A similar approach to 
the role of government was taken up in Britain by Adam Smith:
The Statesman,  who  should  attempt  to  direct  private  people  in  what  manner  they  ought  to 
employ  their  capitals,  would  not  only  load  himself  with  a  most  unnecessary  attention,  but 
assume an authority which could safely be trusted not only to no single person, but to no council  
or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had 
folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it. 
(Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter 2) 
Smith believed that the economic system was harmonious and essentially self-regulating 
and thus it required the minimum of government interference. Although each individual 
in the marketplace would be motivated by self-interest,  competition (i.e. what Smith 
termed as the ‘invisible hand’ of the market) would act to ensure that each individual’s 
self-serving  actions  would  work  for  the  good  of  society  at  large.  Thus  the  market 
mechanism delivers consumer sovereignty as a result of the pursuit of self-interest on 
the  part  of  the  producer.  Thus,  for  Smith,  free  competition,  and  the  freedom  of 
industrialists from government regulation was central to achieving economic efficiency.
Harvey (2005) charts  the  evolution  of  neo-liberalism,  as  a  political  doctrine, 
from the 1930s onwards. The ideas and perspectives of such thinkers as von Hayek, von 
Mises,  Friedman  and  Popper,  which  effectively  condemned  ‘all  forms  of  active 
government intervention beyond that required to secure private property arrangements, 
market institutions and entrepreneurial activity’ remained for over three decades on the 
periphery as ‘an isolated and largely ignored corpus of thought’ (Harvey, 2005: 157).  It 
was only in the aftermath of the long downturn, or what Harvey refers to as ‘the general  
crisis of over-accumulation’ that neo-liberal think-tanks were regarded as providing a 
framework  for  confronting  immediate  economic  crises.  Adam Smith’s  belief  in  the 
efficiency of the market system echoed loudly in ‘Reaganomics’ and ‘Thatcherism’ and 
the election of regimes that worked to diminish the power of labour movements and 
reduce  wage-costs  to  the  economy.  Interest  rates  were  raised  and  credit  was 
consequently severely limited. This shaped a ‘survival of the fittest’ environment within 
which  unprofitable  business  folded  and  unemployment  consequently  rose.  Harvey 
outlines how Thatcher  and Reagan radically shifted the focus of state activity away 
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from the welfare state and towards “active support for the ‘supply-side conditions of 
capital  accumulation”  (Harvey,  2005:  157).  The  IMF  and  the  World  Bank  swiftly 
transformed their policy frameworks. As the 1980s progressed, neo-liberal doctrine rose 
to  dominate  policy  internationally.  Hesmondhalgh  (2007)  describes  the  sphere  of 
communication  policy  by  the  1990s,  internationally,  as  witnessing  ‘four  waves  of 
marketisation’:  first,  deregulation  occurred  in  the  United  States,  second,  in  other 
advanced capitalist states (notably UK, France, Germany, Australia), thirdly in Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and Asia. The fourth wave relates to convergence of cultural 
industries with telecommunication and information technology from the early-to-mid 
1990s  onwards,  and  the  growing  significance  of  international  policy  agencies  in 
enabling ‘free trade’.
Privitization, according to Harvey, marks the “cutting edge of accumulation by 
dispossession” (2005: 157). The mainstreaming of neo-liberal  doctrine made a fresh 
wave of enclosure of the commons a key policy objective in advanced capitalist states. 
The waves of marketisation described by Hesmondhalgh illustrated the relatively swift 
reshaping of global  political-economic  order where new territories  for the profitable 
investment  of  over-accumulating  capital  opened up courtesy of  the release  of  state-
owned or commonly-held resources and assets into the marketplace. Thatcher’s Britain, 
for example, saw the selling off of publicly owned companies and the privitization of 
utilities  and  resources  such  as  water,  electricity,  energy,  transport  and 
telecommunications,  as  well  as  opening  up  the  sphere  of  broadcasting  to  the  free 
market. Thus, capital was looking to ‘its outside, as Rosa Luxembourg said, on its non-
capitalist  environment  in  order  to  realise  and  capitalise  its  surplus  value  and  thus 
continue its cycles of accumulation’ (Hardt and Negri, 2001: 270). 
All  of  this  provides  the  political  context  for  understanding  changes  in  the 
cultural industries in recent decades, as the emergence of such neo-liberal models of 
governance marked fundamental changes regarding the regulation of broadcasting and 
telecommunications,  both  of  which  hold  significant  implications  for  the  cultural 
industries.
Change in the spheres of telecommunications and broadcasting
34
Traditionally, the resources of telecommunications and broadcasting have been owned 
and operated by the state. This, until recent decades, was true for liberal democracies 
and  authoritarian  regimes  alike.  In  most  liberal  democracies,  the  installation  of 
telecommunications  infrastructure  and  provision  of  telecommunications  services  fell 
under the aegis of the existing state postal company. The early decades of the twentieth 
century saw national  postal  organisations  upgraded to become postal,  telegraph and 
telephone authorities (PTTs). Telecommunications were thus treated as a public utility.  
Even in the United States where private ownership was the preferred model, and where 
the  American  Telephone  and  Telegraph  company  (AT&T)  had  been  granted  a 
monopoly  for  the  installation  and  provision  of  telecoms   (in  the  interests  of 
standardisation and delivering a ‘universal’ service), a tight system of regulation was 
nonetheless in operation. Up until the 1980s, for example, AT&T was not permitted to 
become involved in the production and distribution of programming and had its pricing 
structure tightly controlled (Hesmondhalgh, 2007).
As the 1980s progressed, however, widespread accessibility to telecoms services 
in  advanced  industrial  countries  led  for  calls  for  the  sector  to  be  opened  up  to 
competition on the grounds that it no longer required ‘protection’ as a public utility (De 
Sola Pool,  1983). The logic underpinning the neo-liberal argument was that a ‘free’ 
telecoms  market  meant  competition,  which  would  serve  to  accelerate  technological 
advancement  as companies would seek to outdo each other in the attempt to secure 
market share. This improved effectiveness and efficiency within the sector would carry 
benefits for all industrial sectors and thus help to propel the economy as a whole out of 
‘long  downturn’.  Hesmondhalgh  (2007)  also  emphasises  how such  arguments  were 
supported  not  only  by  the  major  telecoms  firms,  but  also  from  within  the  long 
established  PTTs,  whose  senior  executives  stood  to  profit  substantially  from 
privatisation. Paradoxically, these same executives lobbied governments to restrict and 
limit  the  entry  of  rivals  in  to  the  marketplace  as  to  enable  them  to  compete  at 
international level. Such ‘contradictions in the discourses of marketisation’ have come 
to characterise the policy landscape over recent decades (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 123).
The evolution of broadcasting illustrates a not dissimilar pattern. While the early 
history of radio is that of a point-to-point system of communication used primarily by 
the military and subsequently by radio enthusiasts, the post-World War One period saw 
it transformed into a broadcast medium. In the United States a subsequent radio craze 
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resulted  in  chaotic  and  cluttered  airwaves.  Despite  America’s  bent  towards  private 
appropriation  of  resources  and  it’s  reluctance  towards  state  interference  and 
intervention, it was widely argued that broadcasting, as a resource limited by the range 
of  frequency spectrum,  was  in  need  of  regulation.  Consequently  the  Federal  Radio 
Commission  (FRC)  was  formed  in  the  late  1920s  to  allocate  spectrum  space  and 
regulate the airwaves.
In  Europe,  where  there  was  an  established  tradition  of  public  ownership  of 
resources, the desire to provide public service broadcasting had become significant in 
discourse around national cultures and identity.  State appointed governing authorities 
(e.g. BBC) were thus handed the responsibility of delivering the service. 
A further rationale supporting an interventionist role for the state with regard to 
broadcasting is to be found in the perceived social power of radio (Scannell and Cardiff, 
1991).  Radio’s  potential  for  propagating  political  and  commercial  messages  left  it 
susceptible to abuse. It was widely accepted that the state must act to ensure that no 
such abuse occurred. Even in the USA, radio’s perceived social power meant it accepted 
much higher levels of regulation and monitoring than other industrial sectors. It thus 
seemed natural that some three decades later, the innovation of television should come 
matched with the same regulatory frameworks. 
By the 1980s, the notion of broadcasting as a national and a limited resource was 
coming  under  attack.  The  neo-liberal  argument  centred  on  how  technological 
advancement  had rendered the necessity for state control  of broadcasting redundant. 
Cable and satellite (and subsequently digital) technologies increased broadcast ‘capacity 
multi-fold  without  suffering  the  spectrum  scarcity  associated  with  analogue 
broadcasting. Technological determinism thus provided the ammunition for such a pro-
market  approach. These new technologies  were portrayed as evolving precisely as a 
result of private  sector investment,  though many originated within state (particularly 
military)  research  funding.  As  key  drivers  behind  social  change,  cultural  industry 
companies argued that  these technologies  demanded the relaxing of regulation as to 
facilitate their competition in the international marketplace.
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The proliferation of cable and satellite technologies further served to diminish 
arguments  supporting  the  maintenance  of  tight  regulation  based  on  the  grounds  of 
threats  around the social  power of broadcasting.  The social  penetration  achieved by 
television  over  the  previous  three  decades,  according  to  the  proponents  of  neo-
liberalism, diminished televisions authority.  However, televisions perceived declining 
power was less the argument for dismantling public ownership of broadcasting. Rather, 
documents such as the Peacock Report (1986) pointed to public service broadcasting 
(PSB) failing to meet the needs of the viewer regarding choice. Peacock recommended 
the  provision  of  more  commercial  channels  as  the  means  to  satisfying  this  need. 
Similarly with radio, ‘complimentarity’  was becoming evident in the way the public 
service  stations  position  themselves  in  relation  to  their  independent  rivals,  thus 
rendering  PSB redundant  (Barnard,  2000).   Subsequently,  the  early  1990s  saw the 
National Economic Research Associates call for the privatisation of BBC Radio One on 
the grounds that its output was largely similar in content to its commercial rivals both at 
local  and  national  level  (Hendy,  2000).  This  shifting  political-economic  landscape 
shaped significant change in the strategic approach of businesses in advanced capitalist 
states.
Shifts in investment towards service industries
From the  1970s  onwards  there  was a  shift  in  investment  strategies  towards  service 
industries. This, as Harvey points out, formed part of a much longer-term trend (Harvey, 
1989:  157).   However,  as  the  1970s  progressed,  this  trend  became  irreversible 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2002). Table 2 indicates the pattern that emerged over a two-decade 
period from the outset of the long downturn:
Table 2.2: The shift to services
Industry US 
1970
US 
1991
Japan 
1970
Japan 
1991
France 
1968
France 
1989
UK 
1970
UK 
1990
Extractive 4.6 3.5 19.8 7.2 15.6 6.4 3.6 3.3
Transformative 33.0 24.7 34.1 33.7 39.4 29.5 46.7 27.3
Distributive Services 22.4 20.6 22.4 24.3 18.5 20.5 18.7 20.6
Producer Services 8.2 14.0 4.8 9.6 5.0 10.0 5.0 12.0
Social Services 22.0 25.5 10.3 14.3 15.1 19.5 17.7 27.2
Personal Services 10.0 11.7 8.5 10.2 8.2 14.1 8.1 8.1
Figures refer to the percentage of total workforce. (continued overleaf)
Sector definitions:
Extractive: agriculture and mining
Transformative: construction, utilities and manufacturing
Distributive services: transport, communication and wholesale
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Producer services: banking, insurance, real estate, engineering, accounting, legal services, 
miscellaneous
Social services: medical, hospital, education, welfare, religious services, non-profit 
organisations, postal services, government organisations, miscellaneous,
Personal services: domestic service, hotels, eating and drinking places, repairs, laundry, barbers 
and beauty shops, miscellaneous and unclassifiable services.
Source: Hesmondhalgh, 2007, adapted from Castells, 1996: 282-3
While  Hesmondhalgh  bemoans  the  fact  that  Castells’  data  fails  to  include  a 
breakdown of  trends  in  specific  cultural  industries,  information  on this  is  available 
elsewhere  (e.g.  Preston,  2001).  For  example  in  Ireland,  by  the  mid-1990s,  cultural 
industries  accounted  for  approximately  33,800 full-time  equivalent  jobs  (FAS/ESRI, 
1994 cited in Smith,  1995),  with the music  industry serving as the most  significant 
cultural  employer  in the sector,  representing 41.9% of these positions. The recorded 
music industry indicates a 15% per annum expansion between 1999 and 2003, making it 
the  twenty-fifth  largest  music  market  in  the  world  by  2003  (IFPI,  2004).  A  study 
compiled by Goodbody Economic Consultants on behalf of the Music Board of Ireland 
in 2001/02 shows the scale of the industry in terms of value added to be estimated at 
€478.4m representing just under half of one per cent of Gross Domestic Product. Based 
on the mid-1990s valuation of the Irish music industry by An Bord Trachtála  (now 
Enterprise  Ireland),  this  figure  represents  a  staggering  250% increase  in  the  annual 
value of this industry to the national economy since 1995. In Britain, by the late 1990s, 
cultural industries accounted for approximately 4% of the overall workforce (Dept. of 
Culture,  Media and Sport,  1998).  Cultural  employment  in other  European territories 
also increased exponentially from the early 1980s onwards: Germany saw 23% growth 
between 1980-94; France saw 36% growth between 1982-90; Spain saw 24% growth 
between 1987-97 (European Commission,  1998 cited in  Hesmondhalgh,  2002: 100). 
This mushrooming of attention to the cultural industries in Europe is indicative of the 
overall  change  in  investment  strategies  towards  service  industries  as  illustrated  by 
Castells. 
Technology and shifts in organisational strategies
For Castells (1996), the above changes are driven by technology: 
…information  generation,  processing  and  transmission  become  the  fundamental  sources  of 
production because of new technological conditions emerging in this historical period. (Castells, 
1996: 21)
Garnham succinctly summarises Castells’ overall approach as thus:
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Drawing on Innis,  McLuhan and Bell,  while acknowledging the influence of Schumpter and 
Weber, the [Castells’] argument is that a small group of innovations responded to capitalism’s 
crisis of profitability by introducing a set of new technologies that massively raised productivity. 
(Garnham, 2001: 132)
Such radical  technological  innovations,  according to Castells,  spawned the ‘network 
firm’  amidst  the  increased  competition  derived  form  ‘accelerated  innovation’  and 
production  cycles.  Furthermore,  the  development  of  real-time,  computerised 
telecommunications  networks enhanced the ability of firms to operate globally,  thus 
fuelling the globalisation process. Technology also delivered a new division of labour 
between network savvy ‘inter-actors’ or knowledge workers, and those workers in other 
less secure sectors who operate ‘at the mercy of network flexibility’ (Garnham, 2001: 
page unknown). 
For Castells, this new network society is a capitalist society, but a capitalism that 
is “profoundly different from its historical predecessors …[in that] it is global and is 
structured to a large extent around a network of financial flows” (Castells, 1996: 471). 
Castells argues that this new strand in capitalisms evolution is evidenced by the growing 
dependence  of  finance  capital  on IT generated  ‘knowledge’.  While  Garnham agrees 
with the core tenets of Castells’ argument here, he raises significant concerns in relation 
to the extent of the ‘novelty and wider determining powers’ that Castells associates with 
information and communication technologies. The impact of ICTs is thus substantially 
exaggerated, and Garnham advances some key criticisms: Most significantly, he rejects 
Castells’  concept  of  a  ‘network  enterprise’  as  central  in  the  ‘causal  chain  of 
determination’  between technology and culture  (Garnham, 2001).  Further,  he rejects 
Castells’ accounts of processes of vertical disintegration and organisation restructuring 
of businesses around networks. Instead, Garnham asserts that:
…we need to distinguish between the firm as a set of property relations and control over income 
flows, a set of principle/agent relations directed at accumulation through profit on one hand, and 
the  organisation  of  specific  production  or  labour  processes  on  the  other.  The  relationship 
between the two has always been variable…But its dialectic is contained for the capitalist mode 
of production to continue, within the bounds of property relations. (Garnham, 2001: 139)
Thus the relative rigidity of organisational  boundaries emphasises  the importance of 
social  relations  of  production  over  the  technological.  The  global  development  of 
communication and information networks, according to Garnham, is driven by the ‘goal 
of accumulation’. The dominant political and economic models shape the outcome of 
technological innovation appropriate to their sustenance and needs. But networks are 
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characteristically  ‘collaborative’  rather  than  ‘competitive’  systems  that  operate  to 
facilitate  the  sharing  rather  than  the  trading  of  information  and  resources.  In  an 
environment where everyone is connected to the ‘network’, there is an absence of the 
‘barriers’ necessary to control the flow of, and extract tolls based on the exchange of 
such information  /  resources.  Thus Garnham,  writing  at  the  turn  of  the  millennium 
asserts that:
…the future development of the internet will undoubtedly demonstrate using the network for the 
mutual  exchange  of  information  with  seamless  interconnection  of  all  with  all  is  inherently 
incompatible  with  using  the  network  as  a  technical  infrastructure  for  competitive  market 
relations. (Garnham, 2001: 140)
A notable example confirming the accuracy of Garnham’s prediction is the evolution of 
the online music economy, and the growing significance of intellectual property rights 
in shaping the outcome of digital distribution software and its application and adoption 
by producers and consumers of music alike. The legal shaping of online networks is 
evidenced by the major entertainment corporations using their considerable power and 
resources, including political influence to guarantee the ongoing extending of copyright 
control mechanisms in cyberspace, and the consequent enclosure (private appropriation) 
of the web as a commons for the exchange of music. This illustrates how the web, as an 
ICT network, held the potential to collapse the market system. Policy innovation, not 
technological  innovation,  ensured  the  erection  of  the  necessary  barriers  within  the 
network to reshape it as a profit centre.
2.4 The de-regulation of international finance capital and the role of 
the state in contemporary capitalism
In most advanced capitalist economies, the social concessions and emphasis on social 
expenditure which marked the first three decades following the end of World War Two 
has  largely  been  reversed.  Neo-liberal  policy  has  succeeded  in  directing  over-
accumulated capital towards private ventures. The past two decades has also seen the 
de-regulation of international finance capital, thus enabling a significant increase in the 
transnational activity of finance. The US treasury,  Wall Street, and to a lesser extent 
London  ‘City’  have  come  to  exert  a  growing  influence  over  these  activities  and 
dominate institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. As 
Wood argues, this period, which is commonly referred to as ‘globalisation’ saw:
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…the  internationalisation  of  capital,  its  free  and  rapid  movements,  and  the  most  predatory 
financial speculation around the globe……The US used its control of financial and commercial  
networks to postpone the day of reckoning for its own domestic capital, enabling it to shift the  
burden elsewhere, easing the movements of excess capital to seek profits wherever they were to 
be found in an orgy of financial speculation. (Wood, 2003: 133)
Wood details how the IMF and the World Bank coerced developing economies into 
adopting a range of measures designed to render them more vulnerable to the pressures 
of global capital.  What became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ required that 
developing economies:
1) Privatize public services (thus opening up the possibility of takeovers by multi-
national corporations or companies based in advanced capitalist states);
2) Dismantle import regulations (thus opening up national markets to international 
competition).
3) Impose higher interest  rates,  combined with steps to deregulate  finance (thus 
generating profits for US financial interests while simultaneously creating a debt 
crisis in developing economies).
Through the medium of global institutions of financial governance the US can:
…compel other economies to serve the interests of the imperial  hegemon in response to the 
fluctuating needs of its own domestic capital – by manipulating debt, the rules of trade, foreign 
aid, and the whole economic system. (ibid: 134)
So globalisation, as Wood emphasises, is not about ‘free trade’, and neither is it 
about an integrated world economy. Rather it is characterised by the imposition of strict 
trading conditions  designed to  serve  the  interests  of  imperial  capital.  Multi-national 
corporations almost always have an international base within a specific state, along with 
its key shareholders and boards. Moreover the magnitude of international trade as a 
share  of  GDP,  or  global  exports  as  a  percentage  of  global  product  provide  further 
indicators  as  to  the  ‘failure’  of  global  integration.  However,  the  most  compelling 
argument offered by Wood in this respect centres on the fact that wages, prices and 
conditions of labour remain highly diverse across the world, but:
In  a  truly  integrated  market,  market  imperatives  would  impose  themselves  universally,  so 
compelling all competitors to approximate some common social average of labour productivity 
and costs, in order to survive in conditions of price competition. (ibid: 136)
On one hand, the international movements of capital demand free transborder 
access to labour, resources and markets. On the other, they also require restrictions to be 
placed on opposite movements ‘as well as a kind of economic and social fragmentation 
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that  enhances  profitability  by differentiating  the costs  and conditions  of production’ 
(ibid).  
There is an assumption,  according to Woods, that the ‘detrimental’ effects of 
capitalism  can  be  overcome  by  reshaping  multi-national  corporations  as  more 
‘responsible’  and socially  conscious  institutions.  This,  she argues,  is  indicative  of a 
prevailing oppositional view that centres on capital’s global reach rather than capitalism 
itself as the chief cause of social injustices, the increasing gap between rich and poor, 
the  failing  ecological  state  of  the  planet  and  most  of  society’s  other  ills.  This  is 
evidenced by the fact that the anti-capitalist movements have, over the course of the 
past decade, focused protests and demonstrations directly at multi-national corporations 
and global  institutions  such as the WTO, IMF, World Bank and the G8 (who have 
arguably been at the centre of the most high profile demonstrations). There is thus an 
assumption that global capital means the highly intense global political organisation of 
capital. What such an assumption misses, and what Wood is at pains to argue, is that 
any accurate assessment of the forces at the disposal of capital depends upon a much 
closer scrutiny of the relationship between global capital and the nation state.
The  economic  survival  and  success  of  corporations  is  dependent  upon  their 
playing by the ‘laws of the market’ which requires them to, in Chomsky’s words, place 
‘profit before people’ and operate specific economic imperatives around competition, 
the  maximisation  of  profits,  and accumulation.  Thus,  as  Wood points  out,  however 
much globalisation  has  intensified  these economic  imperatives  that  drive capitalism, 
globalisation is their symptom or effect rather than their cause. As Greenfield argues:
…corporations, as powerful as they are, are only vehicles for capitalists…It’s often assumed that  
corporations are a power in themselves, rather than a particular way in which capitalists organise 
their wealth. (Greenfield, 1991: 13-14)
Where  capitalists  may  lose  through  a  specific  corporation  faltering,  they  may 
subsequently restructure their wealth and recoup losses / generate additional profits via 
an alternative enterprise. Furthermore as the UK Economic and Social Research Council 
highlight:
…multi-national enterprises are not particularly good at managing their international operations’ 
and profits tend to be lower while costs are higher than in domestic operations. These enterprises 
‘have very little control over their own international operations, let alone over globalisation’.  
Any such success  they have had  in  the  global  economy has  depended on the indispensable 
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support of the state, both in the locale of their home base and elsewhere in their multi-national  
network. (ESRC, 2000, summarised by Rugman, cited in Wood, 2003: 139)
All of the above factors require a detailed consideration of the role of the state in 
the neo-liberal phase of capitalism and how the state may be acting to facilitate  the 
opening of borders and removal of restrictions to global capital, whilst simultaneously 
(as argued by Wood and others) acting to prevent the very integration that globalisation 
claims to promote,  as to ensure against an equality in social  conditions amongst the 
global workforce. For Wood, Harvey and Hesmondhalgh, the state is essential to the 
current era of capitalist development.  Globalisation is to a degree, a contradiction in 
terms because, while the free movement of capital is of necessity,  globalisation also 
requires fragmentation. It requires that the world remains comprised of unique national 
economies with their own unique conditions of labour.
As  evidenced  from  Wood’s  accounts  of  the  early  ‘enclosures’  dating  from 
sixteenth century, ‘primitive accumulation’ would not have been possible without the 
state intervening via judicial and legislative means. The expansion of capitalism thus 
demands the imposition of specific economic imperatives (detailed above) in terrains 
where they do not already exist. Such an ‘imposition’ requires the legal reach of the 
capital economy to be extended. 
Croteau and Hoynes (2003) emphasise the necessity for a focus on the role of 
government  in  regulating  ownership,  technology,  content  and distribution  of  media. 
Government acts as “an organising structure that can, to varying degrees, constrain or 
promote the free activity (or agency) of the media” (ibid: 77-8). This then, is the tension 
between structure and agency as it applies to cultural and media industries and the state, 
and  it  raises  issues  regarding  the  impact  of  economic  interests  and  the  role  of 
government. Croteau and Hoynes brief case study of pirate radio in the United States 
(ibid: 78-80) illustrates a number of common features of media regulation debates: 
1) Technology and regulation go hand in hand, and each time a new technology 
emerges,  new rules  are  created  to  regulate  the  environment  within  which  it 
operates, and by extension, shape its outcome.
2) While many in the media industries cite the merits of deregulation, there is a 
desire  among  all,  or  at  least  most  parties  within  the  media  industries  for 
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regulation of some form to exist. The debate is not whether or not there should 
be regulatory frameworks, but rather what form regulatory frameworks should 
take.
3) Most importantly, according to Croteau and Hoynes, regulatory structures that 
constrain the behaviour of one particular actor within the media industries will 
almost invariably profit another. They insist that the media industries would not, 
nor could not exist in their current form without the intervention of government 
to introduce and enforce regulations and controls. We must thus consider who 
benefits from the introduction of regulation, and who is constrained by it.
2.5 Copyright: an evolving form of global governance of culture
Hesmondhalgh (2006) suggests that the increasing emphasis on information, knowledge 
and culture in neo-liberal discourse points to neo-liberalism making its own ‘cultural 
turn’.  In  particular,  developments  such as  the  Trade  Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) underlines how the emergence of a ‘new nexus of 
state and financial power underpinned by neo-liberalism’ is increasingly linked to new 
forms  of  global  governance  of  cultural  production,  with  ‘marked  effects  on  how 
creativity is conceptualised and practised’ (ibid: 11).
Since the early 1980s, the growing importance of global markets has seen US 
companies  that  trade in copyright  focus their  attention  on achieving the removal  of 
barriers  to  American  copyright  exports  globally.  This  period  has  witnessed  the 
formation of the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), an umbrella group 
representing, amongst others, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) 
and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). An intense period of lobbying 
resulted in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Under this act, any 
nations alleged to be damaging to the US copyright industries could find themselves 
subject to the imposition of trade sanctions by the US courtesy of the Office of the 
United  States  Trade  Representative  (USTR)  [see  below].  The  1993  World  Trade 
Organisation  (WTO)  treaty  was  the  most  significant  development  in  the  political 
economy of culture over the past two decades according to many authors. This treaty 
created  a  new form of  global  governance  of  intellectual  property  in  the  form of  a 
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chapter  on  the  Trade  Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  Agreement 
(TRIPS). TRIPS came into effect from 1995 and covers patents, trademarks, copyright 
and other forms of intellectual property. It is an agreement that is aimed at establishing 
minimum international standards for intellectual property.
TRIPS essentially emphasises the rights of authors, performers and producers 
already  prioritised  in  the  Berne  and  Rome  conventions,  however  it  also  stipulates 
precise courses of action to be pursued by the courts and customs services in relation to 
copyright  infringement.  The  private  sector  of  the  advanced  industrial  countries, 
especially  that  of  the  USA,  played  a  major  role  in  these  developments.  While 
developing  countries  were  granted  permission  to  introduce  TRIPS  provisions  on  a 
phased basis, the agreement largely favours Western copyright holders by opening up 
the  markets  of  less  developed  states  in  a  more  comprehensive  manner  than  before 
(Houtart, 2003; Laing, 2004). As such, TRIPS facilitates the imposition of the products 
and content of multi-national corporations on the developing world.  Furthermore, May 
argues that:
…the net  effect  of  the TRIPS agreement  is,  actually,  to  critically  reduce  the area  of public 
knowledge,  especially in areas  where new technologies  are important  or even vital to socio-
economic development. (May, 2000: 77)
Laing (2004) illustrares how the changes to national legislation regimes brought 
about by TRIPS are complemented by the actions of the USTR. From the early years of 
the Reagan era, the USTR has played a significant role in the extension of intellectual 
property laws around the world. With responsibility for US trade policy and bi-lateral 
and multi-lateral level, the USTR is essentially an executive branch of the American 
government operating within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). US trade law 
requires the compilation of an annual report – i.e. Special 301 – which identifies and 
examines ‘those countries that deny adequate and effective protection for IPR or deny 
fair and equitable market access for persons that rely on intellectual property protection’ 
- [we should remember here that corporations are categorised as individuals/persons for 
the  purposes  of  law].  ‘Countries…that  have  the  greatest  adverse  impact  (actual  or 
potential)  on  the  relevant  US  products  must  be  designated  as  Priority  Foreign 
Countries’. Under Section 306, the USTR ‘monitors a country’s compliance with bi-
lateral intellectual property agreements…[and] may apply sanctions if a country fails to 
satisfactorily implement and agreement’ (www.ustr.gov). May’s (2004) research shows 
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how developing countries are currently receiving extensive technical support in training 
legislators  and  administrators  from a  variety  of  international,  government  and non-
governmental  organisations.  According  to  Hesmondhalgh,  “this  is  cultural  neo-
liberalism,  buttressed  by  US  trade  power”  (2006:  9)  and  it  is  enabled  by  the 
‘geopolitical-economic’ developments outlined above. In many ways we may see this as 
the logical ‘next step’ in the process of accumulation by dispossession. As Harvey tells 
us:
Free trade and open capital markets have become primary means through which to advantage the 
monopoly  powers  based  in  the  advanced  capitalist  countries  that  already  dominate  trade, 
production,  services  and  finance  within  the  capitalist  world.  The  primary  vehicle  for 
accumulation by dispossession therefore, has been the forcing open of markets throughout the 
world by institutional pressures exercised by the IMF and the WTO, backed by the power of the 
United States (and to a lesser extent Europe) to deny access to its own vast market to those  
countries that refuse to dismantle their protections. (Harvey, 2005: 181)
TRIPS is a means of ensuring the normalisation of a neo-liberal approach to 
culture  across  the  world  (Hesmondhalgh,  2006).  This  perspective  on  culture  sees 
intellectual property rights as the ultimate tool in motivating an incentive to produce 
creative works. The compensation of the individual for his/her creative or artistic labour 
is painted as the main driver behind such activity.  However we note the success of 
shareware software and such shared resources as the online encyclopedia Wikipedia as 
examples of counter-vailing social movements. As Boyle, (1997, 2008), Lessig (1999, 
2001, 2004), Vaidhyanathan (1999) and many others argue, intellectual property laws 
and practice present significant barriers to the production, mediation and consumption 
of information, culture and knowledge. The spread of TRIPS represents the increasing 
privatisation of knowledge and culture. 
At  the  core  of  this  extension  of  intellectual  property  laws  lies  the  idea  that 
economic prosperity is now reliant on the successful expansion of commodified cultural 
and knowledge intensive services, or what some define as the creation of an Information 
Society.  The major  corporations  have  subverted  many  key elements  of  the  original 
Information Society thesis to argue that their economic base needs building (for the sake 
of  national  prosperity  in  an  increasingly  globally  competitive  marketplace)  and  so 
copyright terms should be extended. The US corporations have been very successful in 
this  respect.  While  the  Rome  Convention  of  1961  had  set  the  minimum  period  of 
protection  for  recordings  at  twenty  years,  the  1996  World  Intellectual  Property 
Organisation (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms Treaty increased this to fifty. This 
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was taken to the extreme by the United States Congress who, courtesy of the 1998 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act set the term of protection at ninety-five 
years  for  film,  recorded  music  and  broadcasts.  The  actions  of  Congress  were 
significantly  influenced  by extensive  lobbying  by various  Hollywood  studios,  most 
notably Disney (Laing, 2004). This law has succeeded in preventing vast quantities of 
creative works from passing into the public  domain.  If,  as Lessig and others argue, 
creativity is often, or in part based upon recycling the old to produce the new (ie ‘remix 
culture’)  through  shared/social  processes,  then  restricting  access  to  creative  works 
ultimately hinders creativity. 
TRIPS pushes upon society the concept of creative work as being based upon 
the individual property model.  While copyright law in theory protects the individual 
author, the reality is that the majority or benefits or entitlements attaching to copyrights 
tend to be owned by corporations. Cultural corporations thus become more wealthy and 
powerful,  and thus  more  effective  in  lobbying  governments  for  more  extensions  of 
copyright laws.
2.6 The music industry in the neo-liberal era
A critical examination of cultural and media industries in the neo-liberal era reveals an 
ongoing process of change and continuities (Preston 2001, 2008). Croteau and Hoynes 
(2003) and others point to the proliferation of new communication technologies, and the 
fresh application of old ones.  They highlight  how the products /  texts  generated  by 
cultural  and  media  industry  companies  increasingly  circulate  beyond  national 
boundaries.  Regulation  has  experienced  key shifts  (as  illustrated  earlier  through the 
opening up of the broadcasting and telecommunications sectors to the rigours of the 
market).  While  the  enforcement  of  policy  is  still  very  much  dependent  on  the 
institutions  of  state,  policy  decisions  are  increasingly  made  at  international  level. 
Cultural  and  media  industries  have  assumed  greater  economic  significance,  and 
concentration  of  ownership  in  these  industries  has  evolved  to  a  situation  of  media 
synergy where the largest companies enjoy networks of alliance and partnership and 
operate across a variety of industries (Thussu, 2006). However against this backdrop, 
and  increasing  volume  of  small  and  medium-sized  companies  have  evolved  that 
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experience  increasingly  complex  relationships  with  larger  companies.  Hand in  hand 
with  these  changes  there  have  been some important  continuities,  and there  remains 
enduring  issues  relating  to  all  forms  of  mass  media.  We  observe  the  continuing 
significance of broadcast media as sources of information and entertainment; how stars 
remain the key vehicles for selling products / texts; how the US is still perceived as the 
world  centre  for  popular  culture;  and  also  how  copyright,  has  been  and  remains 
fundamental to understanding these industries. 
Thus, interweaving patterns of change and continuity in the cultural and media 
industries since the late 1970s form a central theme in many of the recent texts on the 
reshaping of the media industries. Both processes must be considered in understanding 
the evolving music industries, and the relationship of internet technologies with same. 
Critical political economy
Within this thesis, the music industry is examined as a cultural and media industry, and 
the study is informed predominantly by a socio-political perspective.  Political economy 
is  itself  a  broad  term  for  ‘an  entire  tradition  of  economic  analysis  at  odds  with 
mainstream economics, in that it places much greater emphasis on ethical and normative 
questions’  (Hesmondhalgh,  2002;  30).   Golding  and  Murdock  (2000)  highlight  a 
number of key departures that political economy makes from mainstream economics in 
its approach to the media: Critical political economy (so-called as to distinguish itself 
from the writings of ‘conservative classical theorists’ such as Smith and Ricardo) views 
the economy as experiencing a mutual relationship with political, social and cultural life 
as opposed to occupying a separate domain. It is concerned with ‘long-term changes in 
the role of state,  corporations  and the media in culture’  (Hesmondhalgh,  2002: 31). 
Critical  political  economy  is  centrally  concerned  with  the  balance  between  private 
enterprise and public intervention, and engages with the issues of justice, equity and the 
public good (Golding & Murdock, 2000). To these distinctions, Hesmondhalgh further 
adds that critical  political  economy differs in that  it  regards the fact that  ‘culture is 
produced  and  consumed  under  capitalism  as  a  fundamental  issue  in  explaining 
inequalities  of  power,  prestige  and  profit’  (2002:  31)  and  it  makes  central  debates 
around ownership and control of the cultural industries.
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Hesmondhalgh warns against portraying the political economy of culture as a 
‘single unified approach’ (ibid: 32) and points to particular strands of political economy 
thinking as being more effective in assessing what lies behind patterns of change and 
continuity in the cultural  industries than others. In this respect,  the most appropriate 
models for consideration are the North American Schiller – McChesney tradition and 
the  European cultural  industries  perspective.  In  his  comparative  evaluation  of  these 
traditions,  Hesmondhalgh  finds  the  cultural  industries  approach  more  useful  for  a 
number of reasons: While the Schiller – McChesney tradition highlights the strategic 
use of power and assumes a ‘simplistic polarity between corporations and non-profit 
alternative  producers’  (ibid:  33),  the  cultural  industries  approach  provides  an 
understanding of ‘contradiction within industrial, commercial cultural production’ (ibid: 
33). Furthermore, this adeptness at dealing with contradiction is linked to the fact that 
the cultural  industries approach combines a wide scope interest  in relations between 
‘general  economy  and  cultural  industries...with  an  analysis  of  what  distinguishes 
cultural  production  from other  forms  of  production’  (ibid.  34).  This  approach  also 
engages with both production and consumption as different stages in the same process 
and thus concerns itself with connections and tensions between these entities that are 
ignored by the Schiller – McChesney model. While the Schiller – McChesney tradition 
emphasises  processes  of  concentration,  conglomeration  and  integration,  the  cultural 
industry perspective links these processes to ‘the organisation of cultural production and 
the making of texts on an ordinary, everyday level’ (ibid: 34). As such, Hesmondhalgh 
regards it as better placed to evaluate whether or not ‘cultural production is organised in 
a socially just manner’ (ibid: 34). A significant difference between these two political 
economy approaches derives from the fact that the Schiller – McChesney tradition is 
focused on information to the neglect of entertainment. While both approaches concern 
themselves  with  history,  Hesmondhalgh  finds  the  cultural  industries  approach to  be 
more ‘sensitive to historical variations in the social relations of cultural production and 
consumption’ (ibid: 35).
Golding & Murdock: historical processes central to critical political economy of  
culture
Golding and Murdock, themselves two important contributors to the field, point out four 
specific  historical  processes  that  form  the  basis  of  a  critical  political  economy  of 
culture: the growth of the media; the extension of the corporate reach; commodification; 
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the changing role  of state  and government  intervention.  They highlight  Thompson’s 
description  of  the  ‘process  by  which  the  transmission  of  symbolic  forms  becomes 
increasingly  mediated  by  the  technical  and  institutional  apparatuses  of  the  media 
industries’ (Thompson,  cited in Golding and Murdock,  1996: 16) as pointing to the 
media industries as the logical starting point of analysis of contemporary culture. While 
media  production  has  long  since  been  ‘commandeered’  by  major  corporations,  and 
shaped in accordance with their interests, the corporate reach ‘has been considerably 
extended in recent years by the pull towards ‘privatisation’ and the declining vitality of 
publicly  funded  institutions’  (Golding  and  Murdock,  1996:  16).  The  corporate 
domination of culture is characterised by, on one hand, major media conglomerates that 
largely control production and distribution across a range of media sectors, and on the 
other hand, corporations from outside the cultural industries that invest in them through 
advertising and sponsorship and thus acquire influence on cultural activity. 
The above processes lead to another significant process – the commodification 
of cultural  life,  which was emphasised earlier  by the Frankfurt School. Golding and 
Murdock briefly trace the evolution of commercial communications corporations which 
initially produced ‘symbolic commodities that could be consumed directly’  by those 
with literary or other competencies such as books, newspapers, theatre performances 
and music recitals (ibid: 16). Through the development of domestic technologies such 
as  radio,  television  and  recording,  consumers  required  hardware  as  a  ‘condition  of 
access’. Golding and Murdock argue that this ‘compounded the already considerable 
effect of inequalities in disposable income, and made communicative activity dependent 
on ability to pay’ (ibid: 16). While, on the surface, this may appear to have little to do 
with  the  shaping  of  commercial  broadcasting,  there  are  two significant  factors  that 
suggest otherwise: First, audiences contribute to the costs of programming through the 
retail price of advertised products; and second, audiences themselves are commodities 
as  commercial  broadcasting  centres  on  ‘the  exchange  of  audiences  for  advertising 
revenue’ (ibid: 16). The need of the broadcaster to attract the largest audience possible 
means that programming is inevitably designed around the more familiar formulas and 
formats  to  the  neglect  of  the  more  innovative  and  risky.  Thus,  for  Golding  and 
Murdock,  ‘the  position  of  audience  as  a  commodity  serves  to  reduce  the  overall 
diversity  of  programming  and  ensure  that  it  confirms  established  mores  and 
assumptions far more often than it challenges them’ (ibid: 17).
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This  ‘commodification  of  communicative  activity’  has  traditionally  been 
countered  by  institutions  funded  by  the  taxpayer  and  aimed  at  ‘providing  cultural 
resources  for  the  full  exercise  of  citizenship’  (ibid:  17)  –  i.e.  public  service 
broadcasting. Golding and Murdock quote John Reith, the first director general of the 
BBC who stated the ideal of public service broadcasting to be a resource that ‘may be 
shared by all alike, for the same outlay and to the same extent...there need be no first 
and third class’ (Reith, 1924, cited in Golding and Murdock, 1996: 17). In recent years, 
such a vision of public service has been dented, for example, by the BBC’s growing 
commercial activities in its quest to generate revenue. More generally,  PSB has been 
under pressure from neo-liberal policies throughout the EU. On the other hand, the BBC 
has experienced pressure from the political arena, particularly in the area of news and 
current affairs. The significance of the role of the state in managing communicative 
activity has been highlighted through issues such as the former ban on interviews with 
members of Sinn Fein, and public attacks by the government on the impartiality of the 
BBC resulting in the restriction of public discourse on particular issues (Golding and 
Murdock, 1996). Critical  political economy is therefore concerned with ‘determining 
the scope of public intervention...It  is concerned with changing the world as well as 
analysing it’ (ibid: 17). While classical liberal political economy, such as that associated 
with  Adam Smith,  argued for  minimal  state  intervention  in  market  activity,  critical 
political  economy highlights  the ‘distortions  and inequalities  of  market  systems and 
argues that these deficiencies can only be rectified by public intervention’ (ibid: 17). 
Furthermore, while classical political economy does acknowledge that private enterprise 
cannot satisfy all of the needs of society and recognised difficulties in the ‘sphere of 
culture’ that do require public intervention, critical political economy goes much further 
in arguing the extension of citizenship rights as pre-requisite in the shaping of a ‘good’ 
society.
The  history  of  modern  communications  media  is  therefore  ‘not  only  an 
economic history of their growing incorporation into the capitalist economic system, but 
also a political history of their increasing centrality to the full exercise of citizenship” 
(ibid: 18). An ideally functioning media would provide citizens with the information 
necessary for them to know and pursue their interests and rights. It would also provide 
citizens with the optimum information and analysis with regard to political choices.
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Production and consumption: two aspects of a political economy of the media
According  to  Golding  and  Murdock,  there  are  three  core  areas  that  illustrate  the 
concerns and distinctive priorities of a political economy of media and communication: 
production,  consumption,  and  textual  analysis.  Below,  I  consider  production  and 
consumption. However I am choosing not to include textual analysis given the specific 
concerns of this thesis.
(1) The Production of Cultural Goods
The above-mentioned notion of an ideally functioning media has been severely dented 
in recent years by technological and economic developments that promote a ‘shift away 
from involving people in societies as political citizens of nation states towards involving 
them as consumption units in a corporate world’ (Golding and Murdock, 1996: 19). An 
important issue for critical political economy therefore is to ‘investigate how changes in 
the array of forces which exercise control over cultural production and distribution limit 
or liberate the public sphere’ (ibid: 19). Tackling this issue involves analysing issues of 
ownership and control of media and communications institutions, as well as examining 
their relationship with state regulation. 
Golding and Murdock examine how the growth of media and communications 
conglomerates extends the ‘old debate’ around potential abuses of owner power through 
strategies of synergy, and the growing impact of digital technologies that has led to an 
era of media convergence. While the promise of these changes has been the transfer of 
power from owner to audience, it has thus far proved false. As Golding and Murdock 
point out, in the emerging environment:
...power will lie with those who own the building blocks of new communications systems, the 
rights to the key pieces of technology,  and even more importantly,  the rights to the cultural 
materials – the films, books, images, sounds, writings – that will be used to put together the new  
environment.(Golding and Murdock, 1996: 21)
With regard to intellectual property, the major media corporations possess an enormous 
advantage in that they already own the rights to very large repertoires. On the issue of 
diversity in the marketplace,  these corporations,  through their  control  of distribution 
channels, can exert considerable influence over smaller companies trying to enter the 
market. Those that do manage to enter and survive must compete by offering ‘similar 
products to the leading concerns,  and employing tried and tested editorial  formulae’ 
(ibid: 20). 
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Traditionally,  the main ‘interruptions’ to this process have derived from state 
regulation of commercial enterprises aimed at preserving and maintaining diversity in 
cultural production. This cultural  diversity has also been fed through public subsidy. 
Golding and Murdock point to these regulatory systems being changed over the past 
quarter-century to ‘favour the freedom of operations for owners and advertisers’ and in 
doing so greatly increase the potential reach and power of the major communications 
companies so as to ‘reinforce the danger that public culture will be commandeered by 
private  interests’  (ibid:  21).  Charting  these  changes  and  assessing  their  impact  on 
cultural diversity is a central concern for critical political economy. It must also analyse 
‘how and in what ways the relation between the media and the state has consequences 
for the range of expression and ideas in the public arena’ (ibid: 22). The autonomy of 
media industry personnel is also a concern for critical political economy that aims to 
assess the extent of this autonomy within the context of the broad economic structure of 
the media, and the degree to which some products and forms of expression fail to find 
an access route to an audience. Overall of Golding and Murdock, we can say that the 
political economy of cultural production ‘is concerned with the concrete consequences 
for the work of making media goods and of the broad patterns of power that are their 
backdrop’ (ibid: 24).
(2) Consumption – Sovereignty or Struggle
Proponents of free market ideology argue that optimal production and distribution of 
goods is achieved through the market.  Under such a philosophy,  the same principle 
applies to cultural goods, so in effect, cultural goods are just the same as any other. The 
critical  political  economy  of  cultural  consumption  takes  issue  with  this  approach. 
Cultural  studies  and  liberal  pluralism  adopt  the  view  that  consumer  sovereignty  is 
achieved  through  individuals  imposing  their  own  meaning  on  goods  that  are 
‘polysemic’. Golding and Murdock point out that ‘consumer sovereignty is in any total 
sense clearly impossible – nobody has access to a complete range of cultural goods as 
and when they wish, without restriction’ (ibid: 26). Critical political economy is thus 
concerned with examining the barriers (which Golding and Murdock define as material 
and cultural) that restrict such freedom.
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Instrumentalism and structuralism
Devising an analytical model to probe the cultural industries from a cultural industries 
perspective requires an awareness and careful avoidance of the pitfalls instrumentalism 
and structuralism (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 15). Instrumentalism argues that capitalists, by 
virtue of their economic power ‘ensure that the flow of public information is consonant 
with their  interests’ (ibid: 15). The economically powerful have at their  disposal the 
means by which to ‘fix the premises of discourse, to decide what the general populace is 
allowed  to  see,  hear  and  think  about,  and  to  manage  public  opinion  by  regular 
propaganda  campaigns’  (Herman  and  Chomsky,  1998:  ix).  Golding  and  Murdock 
contend that such a view is only partly right. Analysing media and cultural industries 
demands recognising contradictions in the system. Media and cultural industry owners 
also operate within ‘structures which constrain as well as facilitate, imposing limits as 
well  as  offering  opportunities’  (Golding  and  Murdock,  1996:  15).  Critical  political 
economy must necessarily investigate these limits and constructs.
Proponents  of  a  structuralist  view  argue  that  political  economy  relates  the 
outcome  of  the  media  process  to  the  economic  structure  of  media  organisations 
(Schudson, 1989). Golding and Murdock argue that critical political economy analysis 
of culture goes beyond this to examine the processes through which meaning is ‘made 
and re-made through the concrete activities of producers and consumers’ (1996: 15). 
Critical  political  economy  is  therefore  urging  us  to  re-think  the  concept  of 
economic determination to arrive at a situation where economic forces, while playing a 
crucial role in shaping the media and communications environment, must combine with 
other factors in order to provide a complete explanation of activity in this area.
2.8 Chapter Summary 
The  twenty  first  century  recorded  music  industry  cannot  be  understood  without 
consideration of the late capitalist economic system within which they evolve, and the 
broader political,  social and cultural environments in which they are embedded. This 
chapter  has  provided  an  overview  of  the  crucial  political-economic  context  within 
which  the  relationship  between  the  recorded  music  industry  and  music  radio  has 
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evolved, and within which the record industry has become the first sphere of cultural 
production to face the challenges and opportunities  associated with the internet.  We 
must thus interpret these specific industries and institutions in light of those broader 
trends outlined above. In short, it is important to recognise that my ‘meso-level’ study is 
connected to these ‘macro-level’ trends. 
We have seen that  what is  special  or different  about  such institutions  as the 
music industries at present is that we are not only living in an increasingly informational 
society or a more technological society, but that it is a neo-liberal information society. 
We must remember that the seminal period of the information society theory in the 
1960s-70s saw it emerge in Keynesian society – a very different vision from that of neo-
liberalism. It was a vision of de-marketisation where the autonomy of knowledge and 
culture was based on the removal of the market and the creation of new insulated spaces 
where scientific knowledge and other types of knowledge could take place in relative 
autonomy (Preston,  2001).  So the  political-economic  is  crucial  in  avoiding a  linear, 
technological view of development. 
In addition to the political-economic factor, this chapter is also placing emphasis 
on  changing  business  investment  strategies  that  have  fuelled  the  growth  of  service 
industries as a response to the economic downturn (in particular in manufacturing) of 
the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, while I have addressed technological change, I have 
emphasised a focus on the role of policy and institutional innovations in shaping the 
outcome of technological  developments,  particularly the (continuing)  significance  of 
copyright as a legal innovation and a fundamental factor in understanding the evolution 
of cultural and media industries in the digital era. This holds particular resonance for my 
study of the record industry in the advent of the internet.
55
Chapter 3: Key Perspectives  on  the  Power  and Role  of 
Digital Technologies
3.1 Introduction
We are often told that we live in ‘the internet age’ or ‘the digital era’. The branding of 
Ireland as a ‘knowledge economy’ (and more recently ‘smart economy’) illustrates this 
trend for apotheosis through technological innovation, and it mirrors a similar campaign 
in  Thatcher’s  Britain  in  the 1980s (Preston,  2001).  The production,  distribution and 
consumption of music can, amongst other things, be seen as technological practices. 
Given  the  centrality  of  digital  technologies,  particularly  the  internet,  to  arguments 
surrounding  the  apparent  crisis  in  the  music  industries  and  to  debates  surrounding 
change  in  music  production,  distribution  and  consumption  practices,  it  is  useful  to 
incorporate some key perspectives on relationships between technology and actors in 
the social world into the analytical framework underpinning this thesis. There is much 
debate among researchers and theoreticians as to the role and place of technology in 
society. While some theoretical approaches label technology as a discreet, independent, 
autonomous force that determines social change, others argue that it  is impossible to 
separate technology from the social environment within which it emerges, and that the 
reification of the technological is flawed (Lister et al, 2008). 
Today,  the  transformative  potential  of  apparently  new  and  emerging 
technologies  is  frequently  touted.  The  internet  has  been  widely  proclaimed  as  a 
transformative  technology,  profoundly  impacting  upon  the  entire  fabric  of  human 
society,  let  alone  the  music  industries.  Digital  technologies  are  at  the  centre  of  an 
ongoing debate as to the disruptive potential  of technological innovation on existing 
industrial structures, established industrial practices, relationships of cultural  industry 
firms with, and methods of content delivery to their end-user market. 
This thesis is primarily concerned with examining the crisis popularly perceived 
as  afflicting  the  ‘music’  industry.  Given  that  digital  technologies,  particularly  the 
internet,  are  commonly  regarded  as  inducing  this  apparent  crisis,  a  critique  of  the 
determinist  account  of  role  of  technologies  in  the  economy and  society  is  implicit 
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throughout this study, Here, it  is necessary to explicate some of the perspectives on 
techno-social relations that inform the overall analytical approach in this thesis. 
Two  key  theoretical  perspectives  are  of  note:  ‘technological  determinism’, 
which emphasises the transformative characteristics of technologies which are seen as 
the  drivers  of  change  throughout  society;  and  ‘social  shaping’  of  technology 
approaches, which emphasise the primacy of social forces in shaping the outcome of 
technological innovations in society. While both traditions have established historical 
trajectories,  for the purposes of this  study it  is  sufficient  to focus on two relatively 
recent perspectives on the outcome of digital technologies in society that illustrate each 
tradition.  First,  we will  briefly outline the techno-centric approaches of Kevin Kelly 
(1999)  and  Nicholas  Negroponte  (1995,  1996)  that  emphasise  the  transformative 
‘effects’  of  digital  technologies  on contemporary  human  society.  Second,  and more 
significantly in terms of the research questions being pursued in this  study,  we will 
consider  two  ‘models’  that  illustrate  how  social  innovations  evolve  to  ‘match’ 
technological  innovations,  and  thus  shape  technological  outcomes.  The  first  model 
analysed is Winston’s model for the nature of change in media technologies; the second 
is Lessig’s model for ‘malleable’ internet architecture. 
Overall,  the two sets of arguments  articulate  radically different  views on the 
power and role of technology with regard to the social world. 
Digital Deliria: Kelly and Negroponte
Kelly (1999) continued Toffler’s (1970, 1980) theme of a break with the old relations of 
industrial capitalism, arguing that in the age of the internet, a whole new set of 
economic rules and relations are required. Kelly’s approach can, perhaps be 
most succinctly summarised in the following quote:
Technology creates an opportunity for a demand and then fills it… Supply and demand are no 
longer  driven  by  resource  scarcity  and  human  desire.  Now  both  are  driven  by  one,  single 
exploding force: technology. (Kelly, 1999: 55)
Writing specifically in relation to music Kelly argues: ‘The recording industry as we 
know  it  is  history’  as  internet  technologies  transform  the  entire  spheres  of  music 
production and consumption (Kelly, 2002: 19). In Kelly’s account, technology assumes 
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the  characteristics  of  a  cognitive  being  (Cawley,  2003)  and  effectively  determines 
society’s path. 
Following on in technological determinist tradition is Kelly’s contemporary, and 
professional  and  ideological  ally  Nicholas  Negroponte.  Negroponte  argues  that 
technologies  are  the  product  of  ‘purely  technological  imperatives’  (1996:  81).  In 
Negroponte’s  account,  technological  innovation  occurs,  followed  by  diffusion  and 
appropriation. Virtual reality and internet technologies will facilitate global networking 
are ‘creating a totally new, global social  fabric’ (1996: 183). Society must  adopt to 
technological change and form new sets of socio-economic and political relations as a 
consequence. 
The concept of ‘revolution’ is intertwined with technological determinism, not 
least in the postulations of Negroponte. For example, he espouses the radical potential 
and determining forces he perceives as inherent in digital technologies – revolutionary 
technologies that imply an eschewal of much of what has gone before. This sense of 
revolution  is  most  starkly  conveyed  in  his  assertion  that:  ‘Copyright  law…is  a 
Gutenburg  artefact’  (1996:  58),  and:  ‘Copyright  law  will  disintegrate...Bits  are  bits 
indeed. But what they cost, who owns them, and how we interact with them are all up 
for grabs’ (Negroponte, Wired.com, February 1995). Such statements, bluntly outlining 
the  revolutionary  quality  of  the  internet  on  the  cultural  and media  spheres  holds  a 
particular  resonance  in  the  context  of  this  thesis.  The death  of  copyright  implies  a 
drastic  reordering  of  the  relationship  between  cultural  corporations  and  consumers. 
Negroponte further asks: ‘If moving these bits [of digital data] around is so effortless, 
what advantage would the large media corporations have over you and me?’ (ibid). 
Moreover,  digitalisation  can  serve  to  ‘flatten  organisations…decentralise 
control’  and make the nation-state  ‘go away’  (ibid).  All  of these assertions underlie 
claims  of revolution  in  the music  industries  and thus ring loudly in the ears  of the 
student  of  these  industries.  In  Negroponte’s  terms,  the  internet  brings  with  it  the 
democratisation  of  the  music  economy where the  small  independent  artist  faces  the 
large cultural corporation on a level playing field. As the newspaper headlines detailed 
at the outset of chapter one indicate, popular and media discourses on the state of the 
music industries tend, largely, towards the deterministic and revolutionary.
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The  ideology  of  Kelly  and  Negroponte  can  be  seen  to  inform  policy  and 
investment  decisions  of  both  state  and  industry  alike.  Although  technological 
determinism remains the dominant informant of political, industrial and media accounts 
of  techno-social  relations,  it  finds  significant  opposition  in  the  academic  world, 
primarily in the arena of social shaping approaches to technology. As we shall see in the 
two models related below, such techno-centric perspectives are vehemently criticised by 
those  who argue  that  there  are  many  actors  and interest  groups  –  often  with  wide 
ranging  and  even  conflicting  interests,  and  often  quite  far  removed  from  any 
predominantly technological logic or trajectory – involved in shaping the outcome of 
technological innovations. 
Far from following a predictable, linear path producing revolutionary impacts on 
the socio-cultural  order,  Winston urges us to consider technology’s  trajectory as the 
outcome of a complex process of negotiation involving many actors. It is to Winston’s 
model that we shall next turn our focus.
3.3  Winston’s model for the nature of change in media technologies
While Raymond Williams stresses the role of ‘real decision-making groups’ such as 
political and economic elites in shaping technological evolution, he does not expand on 
how social actors serve to accelerate or decelerate technological development, or how 
interest groups (possibly far removed from any predominantly technological logic or 
trajectory) serve to influence the extent to which these social needs are fulfilled or not.  
Winston (1995, 1998) serves to illuminate these processes by providing a model for 
technological  change,  based  in  part  of  Saussurian  linguistics,  which  deals  with  the 
emergence of a technology from its emergence from its general background to its social 
acceptance.  This  section  outlines  Winston’s  approach  and,  section  3.6  proceeds  to 
illustrate the relevance of this model to the contemporary environment by examining 
Lessig’s (1999, 2001, 2004) four key and interdependent constraints  - (the architecture 
and design of the technologies;  legal forces, particularly copyright law; social norms; 
and market forces) - that regulate social practice and behaviour in cyberspace, factors 
crucial in understanding the implication of internet technologies in the recent evolution 
of the music industries.
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Winston’s (1995, 1998) detailed studies shed light on the complex set of social 
needs,  political  expedience  and  economic  forces  that  are  behind  the  creation  and 
dissemination  of  media  technologies.  Taking  a  long-term,  historical  perspective, 
Winston  refutes  the  concept  of  sudden  technological  change  arguing  that  his  study 
‘reveals the ‘Information Revolution’ to be largely an illusion, a historical gambit and 
an  expression  of  technological  ignorance’  (1998:  2).  Winston  proceeds  to  describe 
manifold historical continuities that underlie apparently radical technological change. 
He illustrates how new technologies are suppressed by ‘general social constraints’ that 
‘coalesce  to  limit  the  potential  of  the  device  to  radically  disrupt  pre-existing  social 
formations’ (ibid: 11). 
Winston emphasises a fundamental continuity in Western civilisation as opposed 
to  the  accounts  of  ‘monumental  and  increasingly  frequent  change’  driven  by 
information and communications technologies that are widely disseminated via many 
academic  as  well  as  popular  and journalistic  accounts  (1998:  1).  For  Winston,  that 
which  is  propagated  as  ‘revolutionary’  should  rather  be  understood  as  part  of  an 
‘evolutionary’  process.  Broadly  speaking,  continuity  underlies  seemingly  seismic 
changes.
For  Winston,  technological  change is  facilitated  and accommodated  by ‘pre-
existing social formations’. In Winston’s model, technological innovation draws upon 
an already evolved body of scientific understanding. It is a response, by technologists, 
to this ‘ground of scientific competence’ (1998: 3). 
Within  Winston’s  model,  a  series  of  transformations  occurs.  The  first 
transformation,  he terms ideation.  This is where technological  possibilities that have 
been envisioned or  hypothesised  are tested,  i.e.  built  as  devices  and diffused in  the 
social world. Such devices may be thought of as prototypes. The success or failure of a 
prototype  is  determined  by  a  second  transformation  that  impacts  upon  this 
‘technological  performance’.  This  is  what  Winston  terms  as  supervening  social 
necessities, which lie at ‘the interface between society and technology’ (1995: 67). This, 
in essence, is the emergence of an application for a prototype.
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Supervening social necessities serve to move the prototype out of the laboratory 
and into the social world. For example, the supervening social necessities that related to 
the rise of television include the nature and form of the family, the rise of the home and 
the  spare  industrial  capacity  in  the  years  following  the  end  of  World  War  Two 
(Winston, 1995). Likewise,  the supervening need for the rotary press and automatic 
typesetting is evidenced in the introduction of the first universal education acts and the 
removal  of  newspaper  taxation  (Winston,  1974).  It  is  these  supervening  social 
necessities  that  transform  prototype  into  invention.  Invention  is  a  further  stage  of 
‘technological  performance’  that  is  informed  or  shaped by the  application  of  social 
forces to earlier prototypes. As such, the device produced now purports to serve social 
needs. This invention is subsequently unveiled in the market place. Winston argues that 
society displays schizophrenic characteristics regarding technological devices:
On one hand… we still believe in the inevitability of progress. On the other, we control every 
advance by conforming it so it ‘fits’ to pre-existing social patterns. (Winston, 1998: 11)
As such, upon moving into the market  place,  a third transformative phase is 
entered – what Winston terms as the law of the suppression of radical potential. This 
refers  to  the  pressure  and  actions  of  established  societal  institutions  to  combat  the 
disruptive potential of technology on existing social formations and power structures, 
with ‘the great corporation as the primary institution of our society’ (ibid: 11). 
It  is  thus,  the  interaction,  conflict  and  struggle  between,  on  one  hand, 
supervening social necessities and, on the other, the law of the suppression of radical 
potential that serves to hinder and constrain these processes that ultimately shape the 
outcome of a  technology.  In Winston’s  account,  television  overcame the oppressive 
forces of the established entertainment corporations to satisfy the supervening social 
necessities  of  family,  home  and  spare  electronic  manufacturing  capacity.  This 
relationship between the accelerator of supervening social necessities and the brake of 
the law of suppression of radical potential is, for Winston, a much more effective and 
more ‘powerful’ way of explaining ‘the nature and change in media technologies…than 
any that the technological determinists can produce’ (1995: 68). 
The latter phase of Winston’s model is particularly pertinent to this thesis. With 
regard  to  the  recorded  music  industry,  the  internet  has  been  widely  perceived  as 
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possessing  a  particularly  disruptive  potential,  especially  in  terms  of  the  established 
music  corporations’  relationships  with  (or  modes  of  service  delivery  to)  their  final 
consumers.  However,  a  historical  perspective  also  indicates  that  the  precise  socio-
economic  outcomes  of  radical  technological  innovations  (such as  the  internet)  have 
rarely been read or predicted with any accuracy from the latter’s  apparent  technical 
features,  not  least  those  envisaged  and  proposed  by  their  designers  and  suppliers. 
Rather, the widespread adoption and appropriation of radical technological innovations 
must also be accompanied and facilitated by a diverse set of ‘matching’ innovations. 
The precise outcome of any radical technological innovation is always the product of 
conflicts and struggles between different interest groups in domains that are often far 
removed  from  any  predominantly  ‘technological’  logic  or  trajectory.  In  the 
contemporary ‘information society’ or ‘knowledge economy’, this means that we must 
pay special  attention  to  one particular  area of conflict  and struggle over ‘matching’ 
policy innovation – that  related  to  the intellectual  property rights  regime,  and more 
specifically  for  the  case  at  hand,  copyright.  This,  to  borrow  and  bend  Winston’s 
phrasing, forms one of the key suppressants of the radical potential associated with the 
internet and other digital technologies in the context of the music industries (as will be 
illustrated later).
3.4 Lessig’s model for malleable internet architecture
A key reason why the music industries are so threatened by internet technologies is 
because the idea of freedom, not control is embedded within the internet’s technical and 
organisational features (Latonero,  2006). For Lessig (2001), the internet represents a 
‘commons’,  a  public  space  that  is  shared  by  all  who  use  it,  but  owned  by  none. 
However, legal developments are transforming it from an open, democratic, if chaotic 
sphere, into a highly controlled experience. 
By placing ‘intelligence’ in the computers and servers at the end of the ‘wires’, 
the network itself remains unintelligent.  Lessig refers to this as the end-to-end (e2e) 
characteristic which is at the core of internet  design. By its inability to discriminate 
what travels across its wires, this characteristic of the internet makes it amenable to 
being a commons. Drawing on Benkler’s (2000) layer concept, a model outlining the 
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different layers within a communication system that combine to make communication 
possible, Lessig reduces the internet to three such layers: code. physical and content. 
The  end-to-end  design  of  the  internet  is  implemented  by  a  set  of  protocols 
implemented at the middle layer, the code layer. This is where decisions get made about 
what  gets  produced and distributed.  Traditionally,  in real-space physical  distribution 
environments, the code layer refers to the non-creative intermediaries (such as, in music 
terms, record company executives, radio station managers etc.) that filter content and 
influence the nature and form of creative endeavour, or indeed influence the creative 
artist to create or not. Lessig argues that with the advent of digital distribution and the 
architecture of the wires, the code layer possesses the ability to dramatically improve 
the way the market works by enabling new technologies to be accessed and used:
If you want to sell very weird widgets and only a hundred thousand people are in range, then 
you’re not likely to be able to sell enough widgets to make it worthwhile. But if you had the  
world as your market – if the code layer facilitated the broad distribution of selective information 
about widgets,  thus lowering the cost  of  information – then you might  have a market large  
enough to make your weird widget factory work. (Lessig, 2001: 114)
Below  the  code  layer  is  the  physical  layer,  representing  the  unintelligent 
architecture of the wires, the layer across which communication travels. It is this layer 
that  allows  content  to  flow,  thus  making  possible  interaction,  collaboration  and 
innovation. Above the code layer is the content layer, referring to creative output, the l 
material delivered by the protocols over the wires – ‘the actual stuff that gets said or 
transmitted…digital images, texts, online movies and the like’ (ibid: 23). It is this layer 
at which the law intervenes to strike a balance between access and control with much of 
the content being protected by copyright law.
The most salient feature of this tripartite structure is its end-to-end form, the lack 
of intervention  or ‘intelligent’  interference  to disrupt  communication  between users. 
Much  of  the  transformative  hype  and  digital  deliria  postulated  about  the  music 
industries  and  the  collapse  of  their  established  corporate  structures  is  (albeit 
unconsciously, perhaps) underpinned by the assumption of the continued existence of 
such an end-to-end structure - an unfiltered, democratic code layer, operating upon an 
unintelligent physical layer,  and the futility of legislators  and judiciary in exercising 
control over access to material at the content layer.
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Lessig argues that each of these layers in cyberspace is being transformed by the 
forces of market and state in such a manner that has led to the private appropriation of 
the layers. For Lessig, this represents the development of intelligence in the layers, thus 
transforming them from an indiscriminating commons into increasingly discriminating 
filters. This points to a ‘blind spot’ in our culture where the creativity of artists and 
internet  entrepreneurs  is  compromised  through  the  establishment  of  ‘old’  economy 
power over ‘new’ technology sphere. Lessig cites the AOL-Time Warner merger  - a 
marriage between technological medium and content - as an example of this process in 
the physical layer:  ‘the forging of an estate of large-scale networks with power over 
users  to  an  estate  dedicated  to  almost  perfect  control  over  content’  (ibid:  7).  To 
emphasise the dangers of such developments, Lessig cites Tim Berners-Lee, the man 
who unveiled the world wide web:
Keeping the medium and content separate…is a good rule in most media. When I turn on the  
television I don’t expect it to jump to a particular channel, or give a better picture if I choose the  
channel with the right commercials. (Berners-Lee, cited in Lessig, 2001: 166)
Lessig  argues  that  the  success  of  the  major  music  companies  in  pursuing 
‘illegal’ music distribution services such as MP3.com and Napster through the courts 
highlilghts the shifting nature of the code and content layers of the internet as the courts  
extend the definition infringement and consequently constrain public use of code and 
content.  Thus,  for  Lessig  (1999,  2001,  2004),  the  internet  is,  under  pressure  from 
economic and political forces, evolving to prevent change rather than induce it:
When we see  the path that  cyberspace  is  on…we see  that  much of  the “liberty”  present  at 
cyberspace’s founding will vanish in it’s future. (Lessig, 1999: 6)
For Lessig, social order is produced by activities in four realms: technology; economy; 
civic  institutions;  and the  polity.  Social  practice  and behaviour  is  regulated  I  these 
realms  by four key distinct  but interdependent  constraints:  architecture;  norms;  law; 
market (1999, 2004). The same factors converge to regulate practice and behaviour in 
cyberspace. 
By architecture, Lessig refers to technologies, how they are designed, how they 
are built, and how they serve to constrain or determine particular behaviour or practice. 
It is the underlying software and protocols on which the internet is based, but also the 
kinds of applications  that may run on top of that software infrastructure.  Regarding 
market, Lessig identifies pricing structures around paid-access services and the drive for 
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advertising revenues as shaping the actions of providers and users of online services. 
Thinking specifically in terms of music services,  the utilisation of customer relation 
management (CRM) technologies can also be seen as the regulation of user-behaviour 
driven by market imperatives. Regarding norms, as a set of understandings or agreed 
do’s and don’ts among particular ‘communities’ or users. Lessig also identifies law as 
the  regulator  of  cyberspace,  identifying  defamation  law,  obscenity  laws,  but  most 
significantly in relation to this thesis, copyright law as constraining online behaviour 
and  practice.  Much  like  Winston,  Lessig’s  model  implies  an  interplay  between 
technology and market forces, the legal sphere and broader communities of users that 
ultimately shapes the outcome of internet technologies in the social world. Each of these 
four  factors  or  constraints  can  influence  the  others.  The  architecture  of  internet 
technologies is ultimately shaped by other factors.
Lessig  (1999)  highlights  that  the  ability  to  regulate  cyberspace  is  dependent 
upon ‘architectures of control’. He particularly points to identity and authentication. As 
commerce  was  increasing  in  significance  on  the  internet,  pressures  to  develop  the 
architecture to limit opportunities of anonymous interaction and to improve methods for 
authentication also increased, thus making cyberspace more governable or regulable. 
Lessig identified cookies and encryption as two such developments already applied by 
the late 1990s. Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies provide a subsequent 
example with particular relevance to online music. For Lessig, the application of these 
new architectures  of  control  to  the  sphere  of  intellectual  property  holds  significant 
imperatives  for  the  relationship  between  copyright  holders  and wider  society.  Such 
developments,  for example,  diminish fair use. In doing so, this shifts the balance in 
favour of copyright holders – frequently entertainment and media corporations - and 
away from users.
An argument reinforced throughout Lessig’s work (1999, 2001, 2004) is that 
internet architecture is malleable and thus can be shaped by human beings and groups in 
society that may wish to implement an agenda. When it first realised as a technology of 
mass  communication,  the  architecture  of  the  internet  emphasised  openness  and 
flexibility. Lessig (2004) argues that the possibilities arising from the advent of peer-to-
peer file-sharing technologies on the internet has induced new conditions within which 
copyright protection has become more far reaching than at any point in history. Lessig 
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expresses significant concern at the stifling and potentially detrimental effect that this 
has on creativity and cultural  production.  Technological  innovations  have frequently 
appeared to threaten content producers and suppliers and to disrupt their  established 
practices  and  revenue  streams.  For  Lessig,  previously  regulation  had  managed  to 
balance  the  interests  of  copyright  owners  with  the  interests  of  society  in  having 
intellectual  property available  and accessible.  However,  its  subsequent  reshaping by 
commerce – driven on one hand by the need to identify consumers and share data about 
them, and on the other by the desire to protect intellectual property – brought with it 
technologies  of  encryption,  technologies  that  limit  usage  possibilities,  identification 
architecture, and the extension and expansion of real-space copyright mechanisms into 
cyberspace to restrict access to intellectual property.
Lessig  emphasises  that  his  point  is  not  about  the  removal  of  copyright 
protections. While the debate is commonly framed as no copyright protection free-for-
all versus complete copyright protection as the only available options, Lessig suggests a 
middle-ground of shorter  copyright  durations,  a  registration  requirement  and the re-
introduction of renewable copyrights. Regarding registration, Lessig notes that for most 
of the history of American copyright, it was necessary to register a work in order to 
make it eligible for copyright protection. Authors were required to mark a work with the 
© symbol or the word copyright, and to deposit it with the US government. In Lessig’s 
account, during the early years of the American republic, ninety-five per cent of works 
that  were  eligible  for  copyright  were  never  copyrighted.  Regarding  renewable 
copyrights, early US copyright law had a duration of fourteen years. If the owner was 
still alive at the end of this period he had the option to exercise renewal of his copyright 
ownership  for  a  further  fourteen  years.  However,  Lessig  notes  that  only  a  small 
percentage of copyright holders ever availed of this option, thus releasing the bulk of 
copyrighted work into the public domain where it could be freely accessed and used.
However, Lessig is not hopeful for a return to any such middle-ground in the 
contemporary environment. He details how many of these early copyright ‘formalities’ 
in  the  US were  dispensed with  in  favour  of  a  European model  where  copyright  is 
automatic and exists whether you make a copy available for others to copy or not. Big 
corporate powers use their economic clout to organise a reshaping of legislation as to 
extend  and  expand  copyright  protection  and  intensify  enactment  against  infringing 
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parties. So, as Lessig laments, new opportunities offered by the potential  of internet 
technologies  cannot  be  explored  because  of  legal  constraints.  Along  with  the 
consolidation of the media (which we will consider in chapter 4), real-space content 
outlets, and also increasingly in cyberspace, are largely under the control of a few major 
corporations.  For  Lessig,  all  of  this  means  that  despite  the potential  offered  by the 
internet,  it  is  becoming  increasingly  hard  to  derive  creative  benefits  or  enhance 
commercial innovation on the back of this potential.
Lessig’s model on constraining forces, the primacy he affords to law in exerting 
influence over architecture, and his accounts of the evolution of cyberspace, all seem to 
resonate with Winston’s law of the suppression of radical potential.  
A  recurring  theme  in  Lessig’s  work  is  the  consequences  of  contemporary 
copyright  protection.  Lessig (2001) highlights  the  penalties  imposed for  file-sharing 
offences  in  the  digital  world  as  being  phenomenally  burdensome  relative  to  those 
imposed for the theft of physical products. The justification forwarded by the courts for 
handing out financial penalties up to one hundred and fifty times more severe for file-
sharing  offences  is  that  file-sharing  makes  available  music  files  for  mass  ‘illegal’ 
consumption.  While  Lessig  highlights  the  inordinately  high  costs  of  patent 
infringement,  he  also  emphasises  how  the  ‘legitimate’  use  of  music  is  stifled  by 
copyright processes.
Ultimately,  Lessig  directly  challenges  the  assumption,  perhaps  asserted  most 
pointedly by Negroponte, that the very edifice of copyright law is going to crumble in 
the digital era. Lessig observes how copyright holders have moved to force changes in 
technology and changes in the law. As a result, technologically implemented copyright 
protection and copyright management schemes evolved, with governments putting in 
place mechanisms to prohibit the circumvention of such schemes. This has resulted in 
an environment in which the traditional exercise of ‘fair use’ of a copyrighted work 
becomes less and less meaningful because, as Lessig implies, the fact that an individual 
can technically engage in fair use is of little consequence when one can’t engage in any 
unauthorised copying. 
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3.5 The ‘negotiable’ outcome of the phonograph
‘Negotiability’  is  a  concept  bound up with  social  shaping approaches.  Negotiability 
refers to the ability of different groups and forces in society to shape the outcome of  
technologies to their own ends. Given the preoccupation of this research study with the 
music industry,  and in particular it’s evolution in the context of recent technological 
developments, an interesting and useful example illustrating negotiability can be found 
in various accounts of early music recording technology. Latonero (2003) offers a long-
term historical overview of music technology that supports the theoretical efficacy of 
the  social  and  cultural  shaping  of  music  technologies.  The  historical  relationship 
between music and technology is well established with music stating its case as one of 
the earliest imperatives of communications technology8. However, as Latonero points 
out,  it  was  not  until  the  late  1800s  and the  unveiling  of  Edison’s  phonograph that  
technology moved the music experience away form ‘live’ performance.  For the first 
time  in  history,  technology  provided  for  the  storage  of  musical  sounds,  and  their 
retrieval at a subsequent place and time. According to Conot (1979), Edison’s device 
emerged through his  attempts  at  solving  four key problems:  first,  a  speaker  for the 
telephone;  second,  a  copying  machine;  third,  a  telegraph  for  the  transmission  of 
handwriting and drawings; and fourth, how to employ the telephone in Western Union 
operations.  It’s subsequent evolution as a (primarily)  music technology is somewhat 
ironic given that Edison, first and foremost, regarded it as a device for recorded speech 
to be employed for business purposes (Gellat, 1977; Middleton, 1990; Laing, 2004), and 
secondly as a device to be used for producing phonographic books for blind people 
(Gellat,  1977).  According to  Garofalo’s  (1977)  account,  when Edison unveiled  this 
‘legendary talking machine’ in 1877…the reproduction of music was fourth down his 
list of intended uses’ (1999: 232). Jones also argues that:
It is surprising that the phonograph came to be a primarily music device given that there was 
nothing in its technical development that vigorously pointed in that direction. (Jones, 1992: 24)
Winston (1998) provides  an  account  that  illustrates  how music  subsequently 
came  to  be  the  key  application  of  phonographic  devices.  By  1889  phonographic 
companies experienced little demand within the business community for their devices. 
8 According to Turk and Kunej (2000), a flute believed to be 43,000 years old was discovered made from 
bones; Clottes (1999) tells of a 15,000 year-old wall engraving in Ariège, France, that illustrates a harp  
made from a hunting bow.
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In efforts to generate greater public interest, exhibitors attached coin-operated listening 
tubes to these phonographic devices. In Latonero’s account:
To gain more attention, some exhibitors experimented by playing recorded music during the 
presentation instead of diction. It was an instant hit. Hearing music from a device fitted with  
rotating cylinders and a horn lured much larger crowds. (Latonero, 2003: 5)
This demonstrates that ‘the real supervening social necessity for was not the office, but 
the amusement requirements of the urban masses’ (Winston, 1998: 63). As such, it was 
the exhibitors, not the inventors/producers of phonographs, interfacing with the general 
public, who discovered the value of music recordings for entertainment and in doing so, 
played a significant role in shaping the outcome of the device. The evident willingness 
of the public  to place a coin in a slot  to play a tune or a song at  these exhibitions 
subsequently led to what popularly became known as the jukebox, and the widespread 
installation of these coin operated machines in public spaces. According to Welch and 
Burt (1994), Edison was loath to see the dictation function of his device diminished in 
favour of entertainment  and ‘warned’ phonographic company representatives ‘not to 
neglect the original purposed of the their companies’ organisation – the promotion of 
the phonograph as an adjunct to business’ (Welch and Burt, cited in Latonero, 2003: 6). 
Nevertheless, by the dawn of the twentieth century, music had established itself as the 
primary application of sound recording technologies.
Beyond the phonograph, the history of  music  technology provides numerous 
examples  of  outcomes  illustrating  negotiability.  Music  production  technologies  are 
unveiled  with  an  intended  meaning  fixed  to  them  by  their  producer.  While  these 
meanings serve to impose pressure and limits on the music making process, Frith (1986) 
argues  that  creative  artists  /  musicians  often  subvert  these  meanings  or  intended 
uses/applications.  Goodwin (1992) provides a series of examples to illustrate  Frith’s 
point,  describing  the  ‘history  of  pop’  as  the  ‘history  of  corruption  of  musical 
instruments’ (ibid: 95). As Goodwin details:
Think of Jimi Hendrix and the discovery that noise ‘feedback’ could be musical. Sampling, after  
all, is often deployed as a high-tech version of an earlier practice – the re-appropriation of the 
record  turntable  to  steal  and  scratch  sounds  in  the  dance  clubs.  The  drum  machine  was 
developed after composers such as Daniel Miller…had redeployed the electronic synthesiser to 
create  drum-like  sounds.  The  multi-track  tape  machine  exists  because  musicians  and 
composers…improvised recording techniques using existing equipment, that the manufacturers 
had not anticipated. The mixing desk, designed to produce the ‘best’ final’ mix of a song was 
reworked ion the 1980s as a place where songs could be remixed, deconstructed or perhaps 
destroyed. (Goodwin, 1992: 95)
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As such accounts indicate, it is the subversion of music technologies, rather than their 
adoption on the terms of the producers and manufacturers that shapes innovation in pop 
music. While there are aesthetic implications arising from changing music making and 
recording technologies, such technologies do not determine a path for musical creativity 
or  production  techniques  (see,  for  example,  Channan  1997).  Rather,  they  serve  to 
provide for fresh possibilities and practices that are frequently beyond the control of the 
producer or manufacturer. In many cases, these practices feed back into the subsequent 
modification of technological devices. For example, DJs in underground Harlem clubs 
in the 1970s started using two record turntables to facilitate alternating directly from the 
instrumental break in one track to the instrumental break in the next. This unorthodox 
use of turntables led, through its growing popularity, to the production of the twin-deck 
console as standard for mainstream club DJs. 
Equally, at the consumption end, the Walkman was launched in 1979 with twin 
headphone  sockets.  Its  producers,  Sony,  conceived  of  music  only  as  a  shared 
experience, as opposed to a purely individual listening experience (Du Gay et al., 1997). 
It was only upon observing the application of the device by users that the device was 
modified to contain single headphone sockets.
Thus, the technical application of a device as intended by its producer need not 
be  the  application  that  achieves  popularity  for  that  technology.  Morton’s  history of 
sound recording further emphasises this point:
The phenomenon of consumers appropriating recording technology, or redefining the uses and 
reasons for making a sound recording, is one of the most important aspects of sound recording 
history.  Often,  the process  of  appropriation was the transgression  of  boundaries.  Underlying 
many of  the  different  artistic,  commercial,  scientific  and  engineering  applications  of  sound 
recording, for example, is a history of subversion. (Morton, 2000: 178)
Also, Middleton (1990) urges us to see the outcome of the phonograph as a 
device for the reproduction of music in the context of ‘a nineteenth century history of 
instruments for mechanical reproduction’ (ibid: 84). Thus, he sees its evolution shaped 
by a social world that placed increased emphasis on the development of leisure and 
entertainment markets where music boxes, barrel organs and pianolas grew mass market 
commodities.
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As  such,  it  is  the  problems  and  solutions  acted  out  by  forces  beyond  the 
technological that have thus far shaped the outcome of music technologies.
3.6  Chapter summary
Given the centrality of technology to popular discourse surrounding the recent evolution 
of  the  recording  industry,  both  technological  determinism  and  social  shaping 
approaches to the relationship between technology and the social world (and the 
tensions  between  these  two  sets  of  approaches),  are  key  informants  of  any 
analytical framework examining the role of the internet in the recording industry 
and wider music industries.
Williams  argument  that  technological  hegemony is  achieved  by the  constant 
repetition of technological deterministic rhetoric in media and other sources, leading to 
the uncritical acceptance of techno-centric ideology in the mainstream, is particularly 
relevant given the ‘received wisdom’ of contemporary society regarding the detrimental 
effects  of  file-sharing  technologies  on  both  economic  and  cultural  processes 
surrounding  music,  and  the  futility  of  legislation  in  combating  these  effects.  While 
acknowledging  the  implications  of  technological  innovation  and  development,  this 
thesis emphasises the role of other political, economic, legal and cultural variables in 
shaping the outcome of internet technologies in the music industries and, the evolution 
of these industries over the past decade and a half.
Chapter  four  will  proceed  to  examine  literature  concerning  the  role  and 
implications of the internet with regard to the music industry over the past decade. In 
light of these perspectives on the roles and outcomes of technology, it will be informed 
by approaches that are attentive to the interplays of technological, economic and policy 
factors  (most  especially,  the  copyright  strand  of  intellectual  property  rights)  in  the 
evolution  of  online  distribution  of  music.  I  will  draw on the  available  literature  to 
address  how these  factors  have  been  shaping  the  form and extent  of  the  internet’s 
disruptive potential in the recorded music industry since the late 1990s. 
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Chapter 4: Literature  Review:  The  Internet  Music 
Economy
4.1 Introduction
This chapter primarily examines literature concerning the role and implications of the 
internet with regard to the music industry over the past decade. It is informed by 
perspectives  that  are  attentive  to  the  interplays  of  technological,  economic  and 
policy factors (especially the copyright strand of intellectual property rights) in the 
evolution of online distribution of music.  I address how these factors have been 
shaping the form and extent of the internet’s disruptive potential in the recorded 
music industry since the late 1990s. I also explore contrasting perspectives on the 
relationship  between  digitalisation  and  the  downturn  being  experienced  by  the 
recorded music industry during the first decade of the new millennium.
Radical  technological  innovations  have  frequently  operated  to  disrupt  the 
existing industrial and organisational structures and the prevailing rules of the economic 
game between different players and interests within established industries. The internet, 
with its relatively rapid and widespread diffusion may be taken as having the potential 
to seriously disrupt the existing industrial structures and rules of the economic game, 
especially  between  different  players  within  the  cultural  and  media  industries.  This 
includes the potential to disrupt the power or role of existing firms and their established 
industrial practices and interests, not least in the case of the record industry (Preston, 
2001; Burnett and Marshall, 2003). Indeed, with regard to the recorded music industry, 
since the late 1990s the internet has been widely perceived as possessing a particularly 
disruptive potential in terms of the established music corporations’ relationships with 
(or modes of service delivery to) their final consumers. This is because the internet’s 
application and use in the music industry has been widely defined as having most direct 
impact on the sphere of distribution, the key control stage in the overall value chain in 
the music industry. 
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In  the  recorded  music  industry,  control  over  the  channels  of  distribution  is 
crucial, and they have long since been monopolised by the major players in the global 
recorded music industry (Negus, 1992). In this chapter, I first consider literature (e.g. 
Burnett, 1996) detailing the promises of the internet with respect to the circulation of 
music, and the potential for disintermediation and restructuring of distribution channels 
along more democratic lines. Then, drawing on Théberge (2001) and Bakker (2005) I 
briefly  outline  the  digital  technological  developments  that  emerged  to  threaten  the 
power and control of the major music companies, and detail chronologically the key 
attempts that have been made at establishing a new music order. However, against the 
general  drift  of  academic  and  journalistic  accounts  (which  tend  to  emphasise  the 
transformative  affect  of  internet  technologies  on  the  music  industry),  I  proceed  to 
consider  those  authors  who  question  the  view  that  digitalisation  is  significantly 
unsettling prevailing relationships of power in the music industry. The tensions between 
these two conflicting views forms the basis of the remainder of the chapter. Drawing on 
Benkler  (2006)  and  Vaidhyanathan  (2001),  I  examine  Lessig’s  (2001)  contrasting 
futuristic visions of the internet, one as a technology of increased freedom that enhances 
creativity and commercial innovation; the other as a technology of increased control. 
Lessig, Hesmondhalgh and others argue that copyright is central to the outcome of the 
internet in the cultural industries. This leads me to a review of literature detailing the 
historical trajectory of copyright and its role in the evolution of the music industry. The 
final task of this chapter is to engage with the literature that examines ownership trends 
in the music industry. This, as we shall see in chapter seven, proves particularly relevant 
when it comes to understanding the opportunities that are arising for music companies 
to generate revenue in the contemporary era.
4.2 The promise and potential of the internet
As  noted  earlier,  cultural  and  media  industries  are  marked  by  a  high  degree  of 
uncertainty when it comes to new products or product innovations. In sum, individual 
companies cannot control or pre-determine what is going to be commercially successful. 
The best that recorded music corporations can do ‘is struggle to monopolise access to 
recording facilities, promotional outlets, manufacturing arrangements and distribution 
systems,  and be in  a  position  to  appropriate  the  profits’  (Negus,  1992:  152).  Many 
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authors have addressed the potential  of the internet to greatly enhance the ability of 
artists  to  produce,  market  and  distribute  their  own  work  independently.  While 
acknowledging  that  the  digital  distribution  of  music  held  the  potential  to  serve  the 
interests of the major music corporations, Burnett makes the point that it ‘could open a 
Pandora’s box that could ultimately destroy their own control of popular music’ (1996: 
148).   In the latter  half  of the 1990s,  such commentary and analysis  pointed to the 
advent  of  digital  distribution  technologies  inducing a  process  of  disintermediation  - 
removing the middle layers of distribution channels. It was widely predicted that such a 
process  would  ultimately  lead  to  the  collapse  of  the  traditional  music  industry. 
Producers of music would be able to directly access their public without the machinery 
of  a  multi-national  corporation  mediating  this  relationship.  Costs  associated  with 
distribution  and  retailing  would  be  eliminated  (retail  outlets  currently  take 
approximately one-third of the retail price of recordings exclusive of value added tax). 
Rather,  the  rapid  diffusion  of  internet  technologies  would  mean  anyone  could 
potentially enter the market. Burnett suggested that the internet could, in theory, ensure 
that ‘a small group of users spread out geographically, could generate sufficient demand 
to sustain the product of small independent producers’ (1996: 144). 
Three  related  technological/commercial  ‘laws’  relating  to  advances  in  the 
performance  of  networks  and  devices  fuelled  such  assumptions:  Moore’s  Law, 
Metcalfe’s Law and Gilder’s Law (Verhulst, 2006). Moore’s law states that the number 
of transistors that can be placed in an integrated computer circuit doubles approximately 
every  two  years.  Thus,  the  performance  capabilities  of  devices  are  continuing  and 
rapidly being enhanced in such areas as the processing power of a microchip, memory 
and other. Metcalfe’s law ‘describes a technological and economic force’ that drives 
that  drives  the  growth  of  the  internet:  ‘As  a  network  grows,  the  utility  of  being 
connected  to  that  network  grows  even  more’  (ibid:  333).  Gilder’s  law  states  that 
bandwidth increases at three times the rate of processing power, thus, it doubles every 
six months.  These  laws,  combined  with Kryder’s  Law regarding price  and capacity 
trends are all based on the observation of radical improvements in such areas as the 
speed of  networks,  RAM and hard-drive storage capacity,  and relative  price  trends. 
During the primary research phase of this thesis project, such arguments were seen to 
underpin many of the arguments  forwarded by record industry personnel and others 
regarding the role of technology in inducing a crisis in the music industries. As Verhulst 
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concludes, these laws imply a ‘loss of scarcity’ and a ‘shift in the locus of power’ from 
the content provider to the content user (2006: 332-334). 
Developments  such  as  digital  recording  and  the  compact  disc  saw  digital 
technologies  enter  the  worlds  of  music  production  and  consumption  in  the  1980s 
(Goodwin,  1992).  In  the  1990s  digital  communication  technologies  provided  the 
medium to connect these worlds. Effectively, the internet held the potential to enable 
direct interface between artist and consumer. The promise of the technology was that 
the traditional role of the established record companies would be diminished or even 
eradicated,  thus realising the  Gatesian vision of friction-free capitalism in which  no 
noise interrupts the process of consumption (Herman & Sloop, 2000). Artists would be 
free to exercise their creativity free from the constraints imposed by the major recording 
companies;  consumers  would experience  greater  choice  and exercise  greater  control 
over the music they listened to. Many of these arguments echo techno-centric notions of 
the collapse of corporations and the decentralisation of control such as those advanced 
in chapter 3.3.
Here, we may also consider arguments examined in the previous two chapters 
regarding the role of the nation-state in contemporary society. Authors focusing on the 
contemporary music world such as Authors such as Harley (1993) imply a diminishing 
significance  of  the  nation-state  as  a  result  of  the  increasingly  global  reach  of 
communication  technologies.  Harley  argues  that  for  the  evolving  music  industry, 
geographic  boundaries  are  increasingly  irrelevant.  Cloonan  (1999;  2008)  challenges 
these  arguments  primarily  on  the  grounds  that  the  nation-state  regulates  music 
broadcasting within its borders and can exercise music censorship. Most significantly in 
relation  to  this  research  study,  Cloonan highlights  that  it  is  the willingness  and the 
capability of the nation-state to adopt and enforce copyright law that makes the nation-
state of continued importance within the business of music.
4.3 The internet as a technology of opportunity?
Regarding the internet, Benkler tells us that:
…the networked environment makes possible a new modality of organising production: radically 
decentralised, collaborative and non-proprietary; based on sharing resources and outputs among 
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widely distributed, loosely connected individuals who cooperate with each other without relying 
on market signals or managerial commands. (Benkler, 2006: 60)
This is what Benkler labels ‘commons-based peer production’ where ‘commons’ means 
‘a  particular  institutional  form  of  structuring  the  rights  to  access,  use  and  control 
resources’ (ibid). Over the past decade there have been a number of contributions that 
detail the merits of a creative commons approach and highlight the threats to culture that 
copyright poses (Benkler, 2006; Benkler and Nissenbaum, 2006; Lessig, 1999, 2001, 
2004;  Vaidhyanathan,  1999).  Lessig  identifies  one  potential future  in  store  for  the 
internet as a network that can enable as individuals to have greater control over our lives 
and  the  various  institutions  that  shape  and  regulate  our  lives. Lessig  points  to  the 
benefits of this future: a future where developments in digital technologies bring with 
them reductions in costs of both production and distribution of knowledge, information 
and  cultural  texts.  Benkler  and  Nissenbaum (2006)  emphasise  important  moral  and 
political virtues deriving from participation in commons-based peer production. Lessig 
(2001)  highlights  the  essentiality  of  access  to  existing  texts  and  ideas  in  order  to 
facilitate  creativity  and  greater  diversity  in  cultural  production  as  well  as  the 
enhancement of commercial innovation. Vaidhyanathan argues that a ‘leaky copyright 
system allows users to enjoy the benefits of cultural proliferation’ (1999: 184). Music 
has  always  involved  recycling  what  went  before  to  produce  something  new.  By 
lessening  the  constraints  of  copyright  law,  the  advent  of  digital  could  mean  that 
individual consumers would be enables to freely access, and actively add to, modify or 
remix their version of the content. This would foster the establishment of free culture – 
diminishing restrictions around creativity and opening up the internet to the broadest 
possible spectrum of commercial innovation.
While copyright is central to the creative process in that it provides an incentive 
to  produce  creative  works,  Lessig  argues  that  the  loosening  or  even  absence  of 
copyright protection can be a benefit as well as a cost to creative artists. This is because 
‘creative works are both an input and output in the creative process; if you raise the cost 
of  the input,  you  get  less  at  the  output’  (Lessig,  2001:  108).  Lessig cites  historical 
precedents that emphasise the benefits of ‘loose’ control in terms of creativity, and by 
extension diversity of content. He uses the example of piano rolls in the late nineteenth / 
early twentieth century to illustrate how limiting the rights of the originators of musical 
works expands the creative opportunity of others: Producers of piano rolls in the United 
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States were effectively stealing the content created by composers and songwriters to use 
in their machines. The refusal of the United States Supreme Court to recognise this as a 
violation of existing copyright law prompted Congress to change the law. The result 
was a compromise that brought about the introduction of a compulsory licensing right 
which enabled the reproduction without permission of music or songs that had already 
been commercially recorded, provided a statutory royalty was paid to the owner. New 
performers now had the right to enter the market by performing and re-recording the 
music of other artists. Such compromise solutions became the rule in relation to creative 
rights. 
Specifically  with  regard  to  music,  while  the  traditional  system  of  copyright 
primarily benefits non-creative intermediaries, the emerging internet would be devoid of 
intermediary organisations to filter content for consumers. Writers such as Lessig point 
to statistical data that indicate a significant increase in the concentration of ownership 
across media industries, including music, over the past two decades. Such developments 
affect the character of the market as well as its structure, and have provided us with 
homogenous media.  Lessig’s analysis  suggests,  however,  that  the architecture of the 
internet could re-shape the media sphere and change these concentrations as ‘it neither 
needs  nor  permits  the  centralisation  of  control  that  real-space  structures  demand’ 
(Lessig, 2001: 119). This digital music market would be more contested, and as such 
encourage and accommodate new forms of music. This, in turn, would influence the 
major music corporations to take greater risks in terms of the range and diversity of 
repertoire they promote and distribute in an environment where their power and control 
was under threat. The result for consumers would be lower retail prices and an increased 
variety of content to choose from. 
The is one rather utopian vision of the internet future, but Lessig (2001) also 
provides us with a contrasting futuristic vision that positions the internet as a technology 
of control, where those corporations that have power wrest control of the network to 
bolster and consolidate their dominance of the recording industry. Lessig tells us that a 
key assumption contemporary society holds in relation to intellectual property is that 
control is good: ‘A time is not so much marked by the ideas that are argued about as by 
the ideas that are taken for granted’  (Lessig, 2001: 5). In a similar vein Benkler argues 
that:
77
…policy makers and their advisors came to believe toward the end of the twentieth century that 
property in information and innovation was like property in wristwatches and automobiles. The 
more clearly you defined and enforced it, and the closer it was to perfect exclusive rights, the  
more production you would get. (Benkler, 2006: 461)
This  assumption  that  control  is  good  leads  to  the  creativity  of  artists  and  internet 
entrepreneurs  being  compromised  through the  establishment  of  old economy power 
over new technology sphere in an environment where creative control has now become 
a  legal  matter.  Ultimately  Lessig  (2001,  2004)  argues  that  those  threatened  by key 
developments  in  digital  technologies  are  coalescing  and  forming  a  strategy  to 
reconfigure the internet so as to protect their own interests. This strategy amounts to 
what  Lessig  terms  ‘the  enclosure  of  the  digital  commons’.  Such  a  strategy  will, 
according  to  Lessig,  have  the  effect  of  nullifying  the  internet’s  potential  for  social 
benefit.
At this point, it is helpful to consider some accounts of the key early attempts at 
creating a ‘new music order’ on the internet, and the initial response strategies of the 
established music companies.
MP3.com and Napster
Théberge  (2001)  and  Bakker  (2005)  succinctly  outline  technological  developments 
around  the  duplication  and  circulation  of  music  from  the  latter  half  of  the  1990s 
onwards that have become a major cause of concern for the music industry. Initially, the 
large size and slow transfer speed of audio files made the digital distribution of music 
troublesome. However, the development of file compression techniques and significant 
improvements in the speed of computer networking has now enabled the circulation of 
music  in  cyberspace  to  proliferate  phenomenally.  There  are  a  number  of  key 
developments to note: First, the popularisation of the MP3 file – a digital file format 
that sees audio files reduced to a fraction of their normal size; and second, the evolution 
of the Napster software programme. 
It is worth noting that the widespread application and outcome of the MP3 file 
was  neither  instant  nor  predicted.  In  1987,  following  a  series  of  collaborations  in 
Germany between the Fraunhofer Institute for Integrated Circuits and the University of 
Erlangen, a new method for compressing digital audio for broadcasting was unveiled. 
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However, there was little to indicate the role that this ‘invention’ would play in the 
music industries, let alone any claims of the impending ‘revolutionary’ status that would 
be conferred upon it (Latonero,  2003). For almost a decade after its unveiling, MP3 
technology remained  in  relative  obscurity.  Latonero  outlines  a  series  of  subsequent 
developments,  modifications  and  refinements  to  this  technology  over  a  twelve-year 
period, involving actors operating with commercial and cultural imperatives that shaped 
the evolution of the MP3 file as a user-friendly format for music distribution. These 
processes illustrate that internet music technologies emerged along a non-linear path, 
shaped by social actors and, as such, proffer support to many of the arguments of social 
shaping of technology approaches examined in the previous chapter.
Ultimately, these developments, combined with the speed of networks, led to the 
MP3 format providing for the start-up of a variety of websites that offered a new form 
of distribution. The most notable was MP3.com, launched in 1996, which represented ‘a 
new type of business model based on the potential of digital technology and computer 
networks’ that offered users access to a centralised bank of music files (Théberge, 2001: 
21).
The second significant development relates to the Napster software programme. 
While the MP3.com era saw a relatively low number of MP3 files being downloaded by 
a minority of internet users, the advent of Napster brought with it a vast increase in the 
number of people using a centralised database system that enabled users to access music 
files on their peers computers. 
In addition to Napster, the late 1990s witnessed the arrival of numerous other 
digital  music  start-ups,  all  of  which  held  fast  to  the  proposition  that  online  music 
possessed the potential to diminish the power of the major corporations that controlled 
the  music  industry.  Following  the  demise  of  Napster  in  the  wake  of  a  successful 
copyright infringement case taken against them by the Recording Industry Association 
of America (RIAA), sites such as Grokster and Kazaa emerged to fill the void. Their 
subsequent downfall under foot of copyright litigation saw Limewire and others rise to 
the fore as key networking sites facilitating free access to and downloading of music. 
Along with to these factors, Bakker (2005) highlights the introduction and proliferation 
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of multimedia computers  with increased storage capacity,  improved soundcards,  and 
CD players and burners. 
The  generation  of  profits  in  the  cultural  and  media  industries  requires  the 
production  of  ‘artificial  scarcity’  (Garnham,  2000;  Hesmondhalgh,  2007).  The 
developments outlined by Théberge and Bakker renders the duplication and distribution 
of any information relatively easy and threatens that scarcity. Music files demand less 
disk space and bandwidth than other non-print media, and unlike print media, music can 
be experienced through a computer with greater ease and comfort. It is for these reasons 
that the music industry has been the first of the cultural and media industries to confront 
digital distribution. 
Copyright law and DRM/CRM 
We  may  highlight  two  ‘strategies’  that  illustrate  Lessig’s  ‘second  vision’  for  the 
internet,  where  it  evolves  as  a  technology  of  control  (Bakker,  2005;  Burkart  and 
McCourt, 2003, 2004): These relate to the extension and expansion of copyright law, 
and also the application of digital rights management technologies (DRM). 
Whilst the record industry initially ignored the threats and possibilities arising 
with the internet, they subsequently moved to ‘fight’ the initial online music distribution 
sites with the courts providing the key mechanism that enabled them to do this (Bakker, 
2005). Likewise, The Record Industry Association of America initially charged Napster 
with  copyright  infringement  in  1999.  Napster  sought  to  protect  itself  by  selling  a 
controlling stake to the Bertelsmann Music Group. MP3.com subsequently settled with 
the major labels for $160m before being bought by Universal in early summer 2001. 
Also at this time Universal purchased Emusic.com and Bertelsmann bought Cdnow and 
MyPlay.com. 
A further point to be observed in this respect are that the emphasis on piracy by 
the established record companies has been little more than a ‘public relations foil’, and 
their  actions  illustrate  a  ‘successful  counter-strategy  to  relieve  anti-trust  pressures’ 
(McCourt and Burkart: 340). The timing of the case against Napster was particularly 
significant given that it coincided with lawsuits taken in the United States against the 
then five major record companies over price fixing.
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The  late  1990s  saw  differences  emerge  within  the  international  community 
towards the protection of copyrights. While the United States approach to intellectual 
property makes:
…copyright the financial concern of an industrial group and its stable of artists. In contrast, the 
European  model  of  moral  rights  affords  creators  greater  control  over  the  alteration  of  their  
works, and assigns pecuniary rights traditionally a secondary or derivative value. 
(Vaver, cited in McCourt & Burkart, 2003: 342).
Such differences have prompted the European Union to mobilise ‘tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to free trade with the US’ in the audio-visual products sector (ibid: 342). In 
order  to  manoeuvre  around  international  differences  in  copyright  enforcement,  the 
major  music  corporations  have  given  their  backing  to  Digital  Rights  Management 
(DRM) technologies.  These technologies have been developed to cover “description, 
identification, trading, protection, monitoring and tracking of all forms of rights usages 
over both tangible  and intangible  assets” (Iannella,  2001). They effectively ‘lock up 
content’ through trusted systems in which copy protection is built into every component 
sold  (McCourt  & Burkart,  2003:  342).  As  such,  Digital  Rights  Management  is  the 
digital management of rights and not just the management of digital rights. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – a key 
institution in the global diffusion of neo-liberal trade and related policies – emphasises 
that: 
…developers  of DRM, players  in the market employing DRM, and users  of DRM-protected 
material should be equally concerned to ensure appropriate usage rights, transparency, privacy, 
as well as ease and reliability of access. (OECD, cited in Gasser and Begue, 2005: 9)
However, the decisions of the courts in favour of the Recording Industry Association of 
America against  MP3.com, Napster and the like,  and the more recent action against 
Grokster have legitimised online rights management and determined a cost basis for 
legal  claims  against  infringing parties.  These court  decisions  have made official  the 
practice of extending intellectual  property controls on the internet.  This has had the 
effect  of  re-affirming  the  major  record  industry’s  power  in  relation  to  content  and 
distribution of product. In stark contrast to the vision of a creative commons feeding 
musical innovation and consumer choice, the assumption that control is good and the 
business  as  usual  approach of  the  established music  industry point  to  online  music 
services offering a one-way transmission system where individual users are fed content 
when they demand it:
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What gets offered will be just what fits within the current model of concentrated systems of 
distribution:  cable  television  on  speed,  addicting  a  much  more  manageable,  malleable  and 
sellable public. (Lessig, 2001: 7)
This approach legitimates and facilitates the extension of real-space property control 
mechanisms into the domain of cyberspace.
Ultimately,  record  companies  have  been  faced  with  two  specific  challenges 
relating  to  the internet.  One is  that  of  preventing  the duplication  and circulation  of 
music for free. The other is finding a way to get people to pay for music on the internet.  
The optimal strategy employed by the established music companies to achieve the latter 
objective is customer relations management (Burkart and McCourt, 2004).  Customer 
Relations  Management  (CRM)  is  designed  to  ‘steer  the  right  content  to  the  right 
consumers at the right moments of their online activities’ (ibid: 354). CRM technologies 
are  thus  used  in  a  process  of  ‘push  marketing’  designed  to  promote  the  ‘preferred 
content’ to each individual consumer (ibid). CRM thus enables companies to know their 
audience and grow it.
Ultimately,  for  Bakker  (2005)  and  Hesmondhalgh  (2008),  file-sharing  is 
associated with a niche group, and the record industry’s strategies for pursuing both 
software distributors and individual users serves to deter many from becoming involved 
in such sites.
Given the emphasis placed on the role of copyright law in many of the above 
accounts,  it  is  thus  necessary  to  consider  the  role  of  copyright  in  relation  to  the 
evolution of digital technologies, and the overall outcome of the music industry to date. 
Section 4.4 will be dedicated to this task.
4.4 Music as a copyright industry
Copyright  was effectively born of a matching policy or institutional  innovation that 
accompanied  and  facilitated  new  publishing  activities  based  on  early  technical 
innovations in print technologies (Pardo, 2003; Rose, 1993). While music was initially 
excluded from statutory protection [because, bizarre as it may seem to the contemporary 
reader,  music  publishers  prior  to  the  nineteenth  century  commonly  accepted  that 
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musical works would not remain in fashion for very long (Hunter, 1986)], music would 
become  the  key  ‘trend-setter  in  defining  abstract  work  identity  through  the  newly 
restricted acts of public performance and adaptation’ (Kretschmer and Kawohl, 2004: 
22). As Frith notes:
…for  music  business  executives,  most  business  problems  are  legal  problems…while  other  
creative industries have their own interests in the ownership, management and exploitation of 
intellectual property rights…they seem not to share the record company belief that all problems 
can be solved via the right legislation. (Frith, 2002: 197)
In this light, copyright can be conceptualised as lying at the core of the music industry. 
The trajectory  of  copyright  regarding  the  broader  cultural  industries  throughout  the 
twentieth century is illustrated through various legal actions involving different interest 
groups and players. Numerous cases around music and film (documented by, amongst 
others, Bettig, 1996; Goldstein, 2003; Lessig, 2001; Vaidhyanathan, 2001) emphasise 
the  increasingly  constraining  and  restrictive  character  of  copyright  in  relation  to 
creativity and innovation. Before considering perspectives on the role of copyright law 
in shaping the outcome of digital technologies in the music industry (as I will do in the 
next section), I wish to use the existing literature to briefly trace the trajectory of music 
copyright, as to emphasise its historical significance to the expansion and sustenance of 
the music industry.  Understanding copyright’s  history and development  is helpful in 
explaining how threats to the major music companies dominance (detailed in section 3.2 
above) might not, after all, carry the dire consequences for the established players in the 
industry that declining record sales statistics might have us believe.
The rights of the author
For many, the first defining moment in the process of shaping music copyright can be 
traced to the Café Concert  des Ambassadeurs,  a Parisienne café along the Champs-
Elysées.  In  a  much documented  story dating from 1848 (Attalli,  1985;  Frith,  2004; 
Laing, 2002, 2004 amongst many others), three French composers - Ernest Bourget, 
Victor  Parizot  and  Paul  Henrion  –  were  angered  to  discover  that  a  guitar  quartet 
employed by the café, were using their material for the purposes of entertaining guests. 
The composers  first  refused  to  pay for  their  food unless  the  proprietor  of  the  café 
compensated them for the use of their music.  They subsequently demanded separate 
reimbursement from the guitar quartet. The failure of the various parties to reach any 
agreement in the matter resulted in Bourget, backed by his two friends, instigating legal 
proceedings.  The subsequent  court  ruling in favour  of  the composers  confirmed the 
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existence  of  a  ‘performing  right’  for  creators  of  musical  works,  and  led  to  the 
establishment of provisions for compensating them whenever their work was used in the 
‘public domain’. Thus a new relationship between music owners and music users had 
emerged. 
As  such,  we  might  regard  copyright  as  a  positive  step:  composers  and 
songwriters had the right to benefit from the fruits of their own labour, and were thus 
given an incentive to produce more. The 1848 ruling in Paris resulted in the formation 
of  internationally  networked  rights  societies  which  operated  with  the  objective  of 
collecting royalties on behalf of composers when their material was performed (Laing, 
2004; Petri, 2002; Wallis and Malm, 1984; Wallis, 2004). By the dawn of the twenty-
first century, the annual value of performing rights in the global market had reached 
$US3 billion (NMPA, 2003) with over one hundred ‘networked’ societies in existence. 
Laing  (2004)  labels  this  early  period  of  music  copyright  from  the  mid-nineteenth 
century onwards as ‘the rights of the author’ era where copyright was promoted as a 
device to encourage the generation of ideas and information, and accommodate their 
exchange.
This is all very much in keeping with the early founding principles of copyright 
related to print publishing. Looking further back through history, the 1710 Statute of 
Anne (which is widely regarded as the world’s first copyright act) was entitled Act for  
the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors  
or Purchasers of Such Copies During the Times Therein Mentioned. The enactment of 
the Statute had signalled an attempt at shaping a balanced legal system that secured and 
represented the rights of printers, vendors, and for the first time, authors. Declaring his 
support for America’s first copyright act in 1790, George Washington stated that the 
promotion of science and literature would help to secure:
…a free constitution…[by] convincing those that are entrusted with public administration that 
every valuable end of government is best answered by the enlightened confidence of the public; 
and  by teaching  the  people  themselves  to  know and value  their  own rights;  to  discern  and 
provide against invasions of them; to distinguish between oppression and the necessary exercise 
of lawful authority. (Washington, cited in Netanel, 1996: 359)
Thus,  for  Washington,  Madison  and  the  other  contemporary  legislators,  the 
diffusion and exchange of ideas and information through texts was fundamental (at least 
theoretically)  to a functioning democracy. Thus, copyright was a mechanism devised 
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and  designed  for  the  benefit  of  the  public  and  to  provide  incentives  for  creativity 
(Goldstein,  2003).  However,  granting  copyright  meant  granting  monopolies,  and 
monopolies  possess  the  scope  to  generate  profit  by  generating  ‘artificial  scarcity’ 
(Garnham,  1990;  Hesmondhalgh,  2002).  Such  an  outcome  was  feared  by  Thomas 
Jefferson almost two centuries ago who viewed copyright as ‘a necessary evil…not to 
be granted or expanded lightly’ (Jefferson 1813 cited in Vaidhyanathan, 1999: 24).
Neighbouring rights
A further key stage in the history of music copyright evolved in response to the advent  
of  phonographic  recording.  The  1911  Copyright  Act  in  the  UK  recognised  record 
companies  as  the  ‘owners’  of  music  recording.  Significantly,  under  this  piece  of 
legislation, the act of purchasing a gramophone record also brought with it to the user 
the right to public performance of that recording (Frith, 1987; McFarlane, 1980). Lord 
Gorrell, the then Chairman of the Copyright Committee stated:
The  purchaser  of  a  disc  should  not  merely  acquire  the  right  to  use  it  in  his  own  private 
surroundings like the singing of a song, but to use it in public? Yes. And therefore to perform the 
songs publicly? Yes. We think it perfectly reasonable to grant that concession. It is not a matter  
that would affect us directly as manufacturers, but it would affect a considerable number of our  
clients and customers…it should be understood to be part of the sale of the phonographic print. 
(cited in McFarlane, 1980: 141)
However,  this  ‘loose  control’  approach  to  the  use  of  recordings  was  radically  re-
evaluated in the succeeding decades. The advent and spread of broadcasting and the use 
of recorded music in public venues stemmed numerous successful ‘test cases’ in the 
early 1930s which resulted in the formation of new rights management organisations to 
administer recorded music usage rights on behalf of record companies. The Carwardine 
Case  in  1934  illustrates  this  shift  in  sensibility  regarding  ‘secondary’  usage  rights 
(McFarlane, 1980). This case saw The Gramophone Company take a restaurant to court 
for the unlicensed public use of one of its recordings. The ruling deemed the record 
company to be ‘the owner of the sole right to use that  record for a performance in 
public’  (ibid:  131).  Such  developments  ultimately  led  to  the  formation  of  the  IFPI 
which,  according  to  McFarlane,  operated  with  the  primary  brief  of  promoting  the 
performing  right  in  gramophone  records  at  international  level.  Three  decades  of 
lobbying  eventually  saw  the  IFPI  achieve  the  Rome  Convention  for  Protection  of 
Performers,  Producers  of  Phonograms,  and Broadcasting  Organisations  (1961).  This 
treaty  ensured  that  the  performers  on  a  particular  recording,  as  well  as  the  record 
company that produced the recording both held the right to control its reproduction and 
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performance. Like the Berne Convention of 1886 with respect to performing rights, the 
Rome Convention granted national governments the scope for the compulsory licensing 
of broadcasting and sound recordings.
The Rome Convention set the minimum period of protection for recordings at 
twenty years. The 1996 World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty increased this to fifty.  This was taken to the extreme by the 
United  States  Congress  who,  courtesy  of  the  1998  Sonny  Bono  Copyright  Term 
Extension Act set the term of protection at ninety-five years for film, recorded music 
and broadcasts. The key arguments used in justifying the 1998 extension were delivered 
in  a  Congressional  Research  Service  Report  (Rappaport,  1998).  This  estimated  the 
contemporary value of copyrights originating between 1923 and 1942 (the earliest years 
covered by the new proposed extension, at that time) to be US$ 317m.
The era of economic interests
While the ‘rights of the author’ era and ‘neighbouring rights’ era saw emphasis placed 
on the development of international conventions, more recent history has witnessed the 
foregrounding of trade agreements, most notably Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). Over the past three decades the established music companies 
have developed a new lobbying strategy that has mobilised the economic and political 
support  of  the  most  powerful  states  and  trading  blocs  (Laing,  2002;  2004).  Their 
approach highlights the commercial significance of music and other cultural industries 
rather than merely asserting the legal rights of copyright holders. 
This  strategy  is  driven  by  the  growing  significance  of  global  sales  to  the 
entertainment industries. Prior to the 1970s, American record companies were satisfied 
to license their recordings to local companies in international territories. From the 1970s 
onwards  US companies  began to  take  a  more  direct  presence  in  foreign  territories.  
While  the  music  industry  has,  since  its  origins,  experienced  a  situation  where  a 
relatively  small  number  of  companies  own  and  control  the  key  production  and 
distribution processes (Chapple and Garofalo, 1977; Frith, 1978), this trend accelerated 
from the  1980s  onwards  to  a  point  where  mergers,  acquisitions  and  joint-ventures 
ensured  an  oligopoly  of  four  major  trans-national  companies.  Such  developments 
emphasise the increased significance of international markets for copyrighted music and 
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recordings.  For  example,  core  copyright  industries  generated  US$89  billion  for  US 
companies  internationally  in 2001 (International  Intellectual  Property Alliance  2002, 
cited in Laing, 2004). This figure includes revenues generated from sales of music, film, 
television,  video/dvd,  and computer  software.  This signalled a 300% increase in the 
value  of  US  copyright  industry  exports  in  just  over  a  decade,  surpassing  both  the 
chemical and motor vehicle industries in significance to the US economy (ibid).
TRIPs and music
The TRIPs agreement, a treaty aimed at establishing minimum international standards 
for intellectual property emerged from the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on 
Tarifs and Trade (GATT) in 1993. TRIPS essentially emphasises the rights of authors, 
performers  and  producers  already  prioritised  in  the  Berne  and  Rome  conventions. 
However it also stipulates precise courses of action to be pursued by the courts and 
customs services in relation to copyright infringement. While developing countries were 
granted permission to introduce TRIPS provisions on a phased basis,  the agreement 
largely favours Western copyright holders by opening up the markets of less developed 
states in a more comprehensive manner than before (Houtart, 2003; Laing, 2004). As 
such,  TRIPS facilitates  the imposition  of the products  and content  of  multi-national 
corporations on the developing world.  Furthermore, May argues that ‘the net effect of 
the TRIPS agreement  is, actually,  to critically reduce the area of public  knowledge, 
especially  in  areas  where  new  technologies  are  important  or  even  vital  to  socio-
economic development’ (May, 2000: 77).
The key message to be gleaned from all of the above is that while performing 
rights  administration  societies  (from SACEM onwards)  were  formed  and  for  many 
years functioned in the interests of composers in the spirit of that famous Paris court 
ruling of 1848, the rise and dominance of global entertainment corporations has eroded 
those ‘founding’ principles. The early concept of copyright as a policy to incentivise 
creativity has been transformed into a property right. This reflects a broader trend in the 
status of cultural industries in economic and employment policy in advanced industrial 
countries where cultural and media industries are perceived as moving ‘closer to the 
centre of the economic action’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 1). Garnham (2005) argues that 
there is ‘an unjustified claim of the cultural sector as a key economic growth sector 
within  the  global  economy’  that  is  being  fuelled  by  information  society  ideology 
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(Garnham,  2005:  15).  This  ‘creates  a  coalition  of  disparate  interests  around  the 
extension of intellectual property rights’ (ibid). For Garnham:
the  use  of  the  term  “creative  industries”  and  related  terms  such  as  “copyright  industries”, 
“intellectual property industries”, “knowledge industries” or “information industries” serves a 
specific rhetorical purpose within policy discourse’ (ibid: 15-16). 
Hesmondhalgh further argues that the Congressional Research Report (1998) detailed 
earlier  echoes  the  grandiose  claims  which  are  in  turn  used  by  the  ‘creative’  or 
‘copyright’  industries  to  exert  influence  on  policymakers  (Hesmondhalgh,  2008: 
forthcoming).  Such a ‘coalition of interests’  around the value of cultural  and media 
industries is itself a reason to take claims about a crisis in the music industry ‘with a 
heavy flavouring of salt’ (ibid).
4.5 Concentration,  synergy,  conglomeration:  historical  trends  in 
music industry ownership and organisation
From the early twentieth century onwards, media and cultural services experienced the 
increasing  presence  of  large  corporations,  with  new  technologies  such  as  recorded 
music, radio, film and television serving to both maintain traditional forms of cultural 
activity as well as give rise to new ones (Williams, 1981). This, for Williams, was the 
age  of  the  ‘corporate  professional’,  contextualised  by the  increasing  significance  of 
commercial cultural production as the twentieth century progressed. One of the most 
striking characteristics of this era was the evolution of vertically integrated companies 
that combined to form oligopolies in individual  cultural  industries (Garnham, 1990). 
Since its origins, the music industry has experienced a situation where production and 
distribution  channels  fall  under  the  ownership  and  control  of  a  small  number  of 
companies  (Chapple  and  Garofalo,  1977).  By  1992,  six  major  multi-national 
corporations  controlled  over  seventy  per  cent  of  the  entire  world  market  and 
approaching eighty per cent of the American market  (Negus,  1992).  These six have 
since become four,  namely,  the Universal Music Group (UMG), E.M.I.,  the Warner 
Music Group (WMG) and Sony Music Entertainment.
Concentration means that fewer owners dominate the market. In tandem with the 
increasing concentration of music markets, a processes of synergy has been occurring. 
Music companies have, particularly since the late 1980s, become part of much larger 
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corporations  which  operate  with  a  broad  range  of  interests  across  the  spectrum of 
media/cultural spheres (Croteau and Hoynes, 2003; Thussu, 2006). This involves music 
companies  ‘horizontally  integrating’  with  actors  in  broadcasting,  film,  print  media, 
digital games and other (see, for example, Thussu, 2006: 98-111). 
By the 1980s, the majority of record sales and music publishing revenues were 
being generated by no more than a few dozen multi-million-selling,  global superstar 
acts  (Garafalo,  1999).  For  Garofalo,  it  was  from  this  point  that  the  major  music 
companies began to think of themselves more as exploiters of Frith’s ‘basket of rights’ 
than producers of records. The emphasis shifted from selling discs to developing as 
many revenue streams as possible.  Since the late  1980s, the Sony Corporation have 
bought  C.B.S.  Records  and  subsequently  acquire  Columbia  (both  film  and  music). 
Universal purchased the Phillips Polygram label. Warner’s had recording interests from 
1947 until  the sale of the music arm to a consortium led by former Universal chief 
Edgar  Bronfman  in  2003.  Thus,  the  music,  television  and  film  industries  are 
inextricably interwoven: 
The video promoted the movie. The movie sold the record. The label cashed in at every step. 
Advertising  was  also  institutionalized  as  a  source  of  revenue…The  music  industry  had 
effectively  harnessed  all  the  technology  and  marketing  tools  at  its  disposal  to  create  an 
international roster of superstars who were capable of generating unheard-of profits with less 
product. (Garofalo, 1999: 344)
Further to the television and movie industry links referred to above, B.M.G., 
Universal and Time-Warner all have print publishing interests. Murdock and Golding 
(1996) explain that these companies’ interests and activities in a variety of media forms 
derives from their need to maintain profits if and when certain media sectors experience 
a reduction in consumer demand. As Longhurst explains, strategies of diversification 
throughout media sectors therefore facilitate:
…the maintenance of overall profits when individual sectors suffer from a lack of potential for  
expansion due to falling demand and…the process provides the opportunity for one sector to 
cushion another where profitability has declined due to other factors. (Longhurst, 1995: 32)
So,  one  of  the  effects  of  the  ‘long  downturn’  was  a  push  towards  industry 
restructuring, and one outcome was that cultural companies increasingly tended towards 
synergy.  Different  arms of a corporation were now relating  to each other in  such a 
manner as to provide for cross-promotion and cross-selling of cultural industry products 
(Bagdikian, 2004; Croteau and Hoynes, 2003; Hesmondhalgh, 2007). In short, the same 
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product was simultaneously marketed and sold across a variety of media forms, and 
generating revenue through its exploitation across the various media forms. 
Also,  in  recent  decades,  music  companies  have  become part  of  much  larger 
conglomerates that operate across a diverse range of industrial sectors. By the 1960s, 
conglomeration  was  extending  across  cultural  industries  as  part  of  a  broader  trend 
throughout industries as a whole. According to Fligstein (1990), in 1939 seventy-seven 
of the largest one hundred companies in the United States operated in a single industry 
only. By 1979 only twenty-three of the top one hundred still operated in this manner.  
Since the long downturn this process has intensified and accelerated. By the mid-1990s, 
the major music companies had ‘never been more closely linked with the power centres 
of the media and electronics industries in America, Europe and Japan’ (Burnett, 1996: 
12). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s non-cultural  industry corporations bought into 
‘content-producing’ cultural industries (see, for example, Hesmondhalgh, 2007; Negus, 
1997).  This  trend is  perhaps  best  illustrated  by the  acquisition  of  CBS Records  by 
Japanese consumer electronics producer Sony in the 1980s. Such actions facilitated and 
accommodated the cross-promotion of content and technology.  Repertoire catalogues 
and star  performers  from the  spheres  of  music  and cinema were now employed  as 
mechanisms through which to market and sell new technologies.
Negus  (1997)  argues  that  this  ‘dream  of  synergy’  between  ‘hardware’ 
manufacturers and ‘software’ producers transpired as failure, arising from a ‘lack of fit’ 
between the production cultures of both sets of organisations9 (Negus, 1997: 83-99). 
Nevertheless, synergy-based cultural industry conglomeration has intensified over the 
past decade and a half. Sánchez-Tabernero et al. (1993) outlines three forms of cultural 
conglomerate  that  have  come  to  characterise  the  contemporary  environment:  media 
conglomerates (such as News Corporation); leisure conglomerates (such as the Disney 
Corporation);  and  information-communication  conglomerates  where  media, 
telecommunications and computers corporations have merged and formed alliances in 
an environment of increasing convergence between these markets. As Thussu explains, 
the convergence of these arenas means that:
9 Evidence supporting the apparent clash of cultures is perhaps best illustrated by the highly publicised 
court case involving George Michael and Sony in the 1990s when the recording artists unsuccessfully  
sued his record label on the grounds of restraint and inequality of earnings. Negus details various 
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…a  whole  range  of  new  revenue  earning  opportunities  has  surfaced  as  the  media  and 
communication  sectors  intersect  globally.  The  expanding  bandwidth  coupled  with  the  rapid 
globalisation of fixed and mobile networks, as well as the digitization of content and growing 
use  of  computers  worldwide  have  considerably  helped  global  media  and  communication 
conglomerates to capitalize on emerging markets and new media products. (Thussu, 2006: 99)
Furthermore, conglomeration also increases the ‘scope and power’ of cultural industry 
corporations and intensifies their lobbying strength and their ability to influence how 
cultural production is carried out (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 164-168). 
Post-fordist disintegration in the record industry?
The ‘central element of a Fordist economic structure is mass production articulated to 
mass consumption’ (Bagguley, cf. Longhurst, 1995: 38). Adorno’s culture industry can 
be  said  to  characterise  a  Fordist  structure.  In  the  case  of  the  record  industry  the 
suggestion is  of standardised,  homogenised  music  content  produced by an arm of a 
global  media  conglomerate  –  under  the  supervision  of  a  hierarchical  management 
structure ranging from senior executives that sanction the initial signing of the artist(s) 
and release of the product, to junior artist and repertoire (A&R) staff that first bring the 
act to the attention of the company – for consumers with limited choice. Lash and Urry 
(2002)  argue  that  the  1960s/70s  saw the  record  industry  acquire  ‘definitive  Fordist 
profiles’ manufacturing ‘large batches of very few formulaic models’ (ibid: 113). They 
assert, however, that the record industry has shifted from this centralised, Fordist mode 
of  production  to  a  decentralised,  flexible,  post-Fordist  manner.  The  crux  of  their 
argument is that the culture industries have developed flexible production systems that 
operate  a  process  of  ‘vertical  disintegration’.  This  post-Fordist  disintegration  of 
centralised  production  coincides  with  increasing  concentration  and  globalisation  of 
distribution  where  ‘only  these  concentrated  distributors  can  provide  the  finance  for 
these decentralised producers’ (ibid: 113). The result of all this is a ‘transaction-rich 
nexus’ linking small firms. 
Such an  approach  to  understanding  the  production  of  music  links  well  with 
Burnett’s system of ‘open production’ operated by the major record labels (2002). Here, 
each major label comprises of a plethora of widely dispersed independent production 
units to handle artist and repertoire activities and the recording process, while the parent 
company takes charge of manufacturing,  marketing and distribution.  This allows the 
majors to benefit from a global network of research and development units to source 
91
potential  successful  new  talent  while  having  at  their  disposal  the  machinery  to 
imminently mobilise large-scale distribution. In effect:
...the modern transnational phonogram company consists of many independently operating units 
at the input side and concentrated manufacturing and distribution at the output side. 
(Burnett, 2002: 12)
An internal  market  is  in  operation  that  regulates  the  flow  of  products  through  the 
channels of the major record companies – a system of internal competition in which the 
various national offices of the label are fighting to have their products released through 
the local arm of the same label in other territories. 
According to Lash and Urry, disintegration is evident through all elements of 
these independent creative units. While all aspects of production were once conducted 
in-house, the past three decades have seen such arrangements transformed:
The old A&R man was like multivalent publisher prior to the specialised modern firm. He was  
the producer as well. The music had to be arranged and the songs assembled; this too was the  
A&R  man’s  job.  Functional  departmentalization  serially  took  away  these  jobs  from  A&R. 
Today’s A&R will primarily find and develop the acts. (Lash and Urry, 2002: 119)
Contemporary A&R may still work to promote an act that they were involved in signing 
within the marketing, promotion and other departments within the company, but their 
‘centrality  and  indispensability’  has  withered.  In  many  cases  A&R  in  national  or 
regional offices operate on a part-time freelance contract basis. For example, in Ireland 
EMI are the only major company to actually employ an A&R worker. The function of 
A&R is effectively subcontracted to individuals.
Recording studios  and producers  have  also become externalised  from record 
companies. While the big record labels still own their own studios (the most famous 
being  EMI’s  Abbey  Road),  advancements  in  MIDI  (Musical  Instrument  Digital 
Interface)  technologies  means  that  many  artists  now  own  and  control  their  own 
recording facilities.  Regarding record producers,  they are independent  operators that 
work  across  the  spectrum  of  record  companies  and  whose  relationship  with  those 
companies is ‘more a market than a subcontracting one’ (ibid: 120). Thus, within the 
major  labels,  finance,  distribution  and  marketing  departments  function  with  an 
increasing importance relative to production.
Lash and Urry’s interpretation of production in the record industry suggests a 
shift from a mass production economy where large institutions are perceived to regulate 
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production and consumption to a process of ‘flexible specialisation’ where ‘innovation 
is  supposedly  encouraged  by  the  creation  of  interdependence  among  producers’ 
(Hesmondhalgh, 1996: 470). Negus (2002) challenges  the validity of taking such an 
interpretation to the production of music on the grounds that it misrepresents the past. 
Since its  advent  and early development  in  the late  nineteenth  century the recording 
industry  has  always  ‘been  organised  according  to  small-scale  productions  and  the 
selling to changing niche markets alongside the creation of big hits and blockbusters’ 
(Negus,  2000:  242-3).  The  main  implication  of  the  Lash  and  Urry  argument  is  a 
decentralised,  largely  autonomous  record  production  sector  selling  recordings  to  a 
fragmented market.  This  marks  a shift  of power away from the major corporations. 
However,  the  fact  that  record  companies  target  specific  market  sectors  with  their 
products indicates little beyond the fact that they have developed a greater degree of 
sophistication in exploiting the mass market. 
Hirsch (1990) offers support to the flexible specialisation argument, concluding 
that production in the music industry is now organised along craft lines as opposed to 
bureaucracy. The implication here is of a fragmented music marketplace, the emergence 
of niche markets catered for by a more diverse range of independent companies, and a 
shift in power regarding the production of music away from the major labels. Hirsch’s 
explanation for this restructuring of the production process lies in what he interprets as 
unpredictable  and changing behaviour  of both consumers  and the broadcast /  music 
media gatekeepers that determine those artists that gain profile over those that don’t. 
Hesmondhalgh  offers  a  somewhat  different  approach  to  understanding  this  shift  in 
production structures, arguing that:
…reproduction costs are so cheap that the occasional big success wipes out lots of failures – the  
search for the ‘Hit’ is vital and means that artists and scouts are, to a certain extent and for a 
certain time, trusted. (Hesmondhalgh, 1996: 480)
Thus,  it  is  of  little  relevance  to  the  major  record  company  whether  or  not  all  the 
individuals or teams involved in the processes of scouting, development, recording and 
manufacture are in-house or external. 
The model of production in the record industry advanced by Frith (1988) is the 
‘talent pool’ scenario where the independent recording sector, encompassing an ever-
increasing variety of musical genres in local / national markets, feeds into the global 
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corporate sector. Even if we move to associate a reasonable degree of autonomy with 
independent labels, we must still recognise their need to guarantee economic survival 
through sales. This requires distribution to an audience and sufficient marketing and 
promotion to generate profile at retail level. As smaller companies often do not possess 
the machinery to achieve this independently they must seek promotion and distribution 
through a major label and, subsequently submit to a filtering process that influences and 
shapes the content of the music they are seeking to exploit. The reality of what exists is 
then:
…a complex weave of licensing and distribution arrangements [that] creates a high degree of  
interdependence between major and independent companies while, in the non-corporate sector 
the scale of companies may range from substantial organisations whose turnover is measured in 
millions (such as the formerly independent Virgin Records) to ‘backyard’ and ‘garage’ concerns, 
with several scales of company size in between. (Rowe, 1995: 24)  
Power is centred in the areas of finance and distribution. The dominance of the major 
labels  is  not  affected  by  any  shift  to  flexibility  in  production.  Suggestions  to  the 
contrary  by  proponents  of  post-Fordist  disintegration  and  flexible  specialisation  are 
misguided  as  they  exclusively  emphasise  production  to  the  neglect  of  finance  and 
distribution.
We will return to these issues when considering my primary research in chapters 
seven and  eight.  Empirically  grounded research  on  recent  trends  and  developments 
outlined here, and how they have evolved during the first decade of the new millennium 
is  crucial  to  understanding  how  the  major  music  companies  have  maintained  and 
sustained themselves in the context of digitalisation and an era of falling recorded music 
sales. 
4.6 Chapter Summary
In this  chapter  we have examined literature outlining the disruptive potential  of the 
internet  with  regard  to  established  roles  and  practices  within  the  music  industry; 
contrasting theoretical approaches to the internet as a medium and platform for music; 
the centrality of copyright to the music industry, and a brief overview of its evolution to 
date; and ownership trends in the music industry. 
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The case of online music distribution reinforces two property-rights factors as 
being central to the music industry: ownership of content, and control of the channels 
that distribute it. The core activities of record companies and music publishers are the 
creation and exploitation of copyright. As we have seen, the technology-centred models 
promised that anyone who can access the web can enter the market and threaten the 
dominance of the major music corporations. Two issues are therefore of central concern 
to these corporations: the unwarranted use of their copyrighted material on the internet, 
and the potential  for new material  to be created independently and by-pass them en 
route to consumers. 
While serving to provide new methods of circulation and distribution, the online 
music  sphere,  through its  short  but  eventful  history,  emphasises  how the  economic 
value of music remains primarily determined by the process through which it accesses 
its final consumer. This case shows that while new communication technologies may 
threaten  to  diminish  the  power  of  those  who control  content  and distribution,  such 
technologies can ultimately be shaped to further the existing structures of an industry.
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Chapter 5: Methodology
5.1 Introduction
The  earlier  chapters  outlined  the  various  theoretical  perspectives  and  intellectual 
traditions  that  this  research  draws  upon.  This  chapter  is  concerned  with  drafting  a 
research  methodology.  Creswell  states  that  the  process  of  formulating  a  research 
methodology is primarily shaped by two key factors: ‘the nature if the research issue 
being addressed’, and ‘the worldview assumptions the researcher brings to the study’ 
(1998: 3). These two factors remain at the fore of my mind during the task of drafting a 
workable research methodology. The quality of the research is largely determined by 
the quality of the methodology employed. A strong focussed methodology provides a 
framework in which to gather information in a reliable, consistent manner and allow the 
researcher  to  make  productive  use  of  the  limited  time  with  his  informants.  The 
methodology also makes the research process transparent so weakness of the approach 
can be factored into a reading of the research. 
Before proceeding, we will  recap on the core research questions driving this 
research study.  The central  concern  of  this  thesis  is  thus  to  examine change in  the 
twenty-first century music industry. The core questions it asks are:
 ‘What’ has changed in the twenty-first century music industry?
 ‘Why’ has it changed?
 ‘How’ has it changed?
5.2 Research framework
This doctoral research project primarily employs a qualitative research framework for 
conducting our investigation of recent developments in the music industry. The overall 
aims of the study demand such an approach 
The ‘open-ended’ characteristics  of the research questions at  the core of this 
thesis  are designed to offer an insight into key informant’s  lived experiences  of the 
evolving music industry, and the dynamics currently underpinning the industry in an era 
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where it is widely reported as undergoing radical transformation. Crucially, as Cook et 
al. state, qualitative research questions ‘tend to inquire less about “whether” or “how 
much”, but more about “what”, “how” and “why”’. (2001: 469). Such an approach thus 
fit with the current research questions and the overall aims of this study.
While,  over the past three-to-four decades a large body of research has been 
accumulating on various aspects of the music industry, this is the first time a study such 
as  this  has  been  carried  out  in  an  Irish  context.  Furthermore,  what  makes  this 
contemporary study unique is that it is focussed on gathering the inputs and perspectives 
of a broad cross-section of actors from across the range of music industry sub-sectors. 
Examining processes of change and continuity in the music industry is aided by an 
understanding  ‘of  depth  and  complexity  in…people’s  situated  or  contextualised 
accounts and experiences’  (Mason, 1999: 65). As such, a qualitative approach is an 
appropriate  choice.  With all  of this  considered,  ,  I  have elected to use ethnographic 
interviews as the methodology that would be most appropriate. The reasons for this are 
outlined in the following section.
5.3 Ethnographic interview as a research methodology
Unlike a research project that employs closed questions (yes/no answers etc), which is a 
one-way process, ethnographic interview implies an exchange ‘in which the analyst is 
[him] herself caught up and examined as much as the person [he] she is submitting to 
the investigation’ (Bordieu, 1996 cf. Deacon et al., 1999: 7). Thus, a key question to 
consider at the outset of the primary research phase of this thesis was whether I was 
about  to  embark  on  data  collection,  i.e.  ‘excavation’,  or  data  generation,  i.e. 
‘construction’ (Mason, 1999: 68). Obtaining an insight into the evolution of the music 
industry since the internet emerged as a medium for music and, current industry trends 
has,  for  me,  involved  asking  questions  which  examine  the  lived  experience  of 
individuals who work or have worked in relevant fields. 
As Deacon et al (1999) detail, there are six main ways in which questions can be 
delivered  in  research:  self-completion  questionnaires;  standardised  face-to-face 
interviews;  telephone  interviews  (which  can  be  structured  or  unstructured);  semi-
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structured face-to-face interviews; non-directive face-to-face interviews; focus groups. 
Semi-structured  interviews  are  one  of  the  most  commonly  recognised  forms  of 
qualitative research method. For this reason, Mason (1999) argues, it is not unusual for 
a researcher  to assume that  their  project will  involve qualitative  interviews,  without 
actually giving due consideration as to why this should be the case. Mason thus advises 
that researchers examine the usefulness and drawbacks of a semi-structured, open-ended 
‘conversation with a purpose’ (ibid: 67) in relation to data gathering. 
In electing to pursue such ‘conversation with a purpose’ I have sought to draw 
from the experience, knowledge, understanding, perspectives and perceptions of a broad 
range of individuals within the context of the areas under scrutiny in this thesis. I have 
sought  to  interact  and  engage  with  these  individuals  by  talking,  asking  questions, 
listening and responding as an effective and meaningful way to access their accounts 
and views, and of generating data on the afore-mentioned ontological properties. The 
style  of  interviewing  pursued  is  what  Schutt  describes  as  ‘intensive  interviewing’, 
which  entails  relatively  unstructured  questions  and  which  aims  at  eliciting  indepth 
information about the interviewee’s feelings, experiences and perceptions (2006: 311). 
Such a  technique  enables  or  allows interviewees  to  respond in their  own words.  It 
allows for active engagement with the subject and for lengthy explanations and follow-
up questions. Unlike surveys or more structured forms of interviewing, semi-structured 
or qualitative  interviewing enables  a  depth and roundedness of understanding rather 
than a broad understanding of surface patterns.  Less structured questioning techniques 
held a significant advantage over more structured as they offered scope to elaborate and 
raise questions as to ensure greater clarity and understanding between interviewer and 
interviewee. While the questions I asked in each interview all fell broadly under a small 
number  of  headings,  questions  varied  from  interview  to  interview,  or  more 
appropriately depending on the occupational group(s) of the interviewee. As such data 
was achieved, not by asking a standardised set of questions, but rather by tailoring the 
questioning to the context(s) within which the interviewee operates in order to generate 
situated  knowledge.  Furthermore,  semi-structured  and  open-ended  interviewing 
generates a ‘fairer and fuller representation of the interviewees’ perspectives’ (Mason, 
1999: 67).
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However, as Mason warns, the interviewer must be aware that the extent of the 
effectiveness of such a method of gathering research data is largely dependent upon the 
ability of the interviewee to ‘verbalize, interact, conceptualize and remember’ (Mason, 
1999: 63-4). Equally, while Lewis (1991) argues that there are no set rules for the open-
ended,  semi-structured  style  of  questioning,  the  interviewer  must  be  alive  to  the 
consequences of his choice to either follow a carefully constructed schedule or else let 
the conversation flow more freely. There are a couple of examples to relate here from 
my  research  interviews.  In  a  number  of  instances  interviews,  particularly  when 
interviews were held in participants private residences, a rapport was developed over 
extended  informal  chat  at  the  outset.  In  some  of  these  cases  the  participant  would 
become side-tracked, prompted perhaps by personal recollections of events or instances 
or by something I said in response to their comments. Given that I did not wish to break 
the rapport that was being developed I remained largely unobtrusive and waited for an 
appropriate  moment  to  redirect  the  conversation  back  on  course  by  re-stating  the 
previous question or asking a new one.  This does mean,  however,  that some of the 
material recorded during these interviews is tangential to the core research interests.
Selecting and approaching interviewees
Interviews were initially requested from forty industry professionals and key informants 
courtesy of a formal letter that outlined the overall theme of the research. From these, a 
total of thirty-four participants were interviewed across 2007-08. In addition to this, five 
other earlier interviews were drawn upon from a 2003 research project10.
I elected to approach potential candidates from across the core range of music 
industry sub-sectors and, from a variety of directly related or ancillary fields. Drawing 
perspectives from such a wide range of actors holds the potential to offer a more holistic 
overview of the recent evolution of the music industry.  A breakdown of the various 
occupation  categories  pertaining  to  all  interviewees  is  included  below.  Here  again, 
however, we must me mindful of the three spheres of music production and practice 
identified  by  O’Flynn  (2004;  2009)  in  an  Irish  context:  popular;  folk/traditional; 
art/classical. While not exclusively focusing on the popular, it is on the popular that the 
main emphasis of this thesis lies. This is reflected in the range of interviewees who 
10 Jane Bolton, Elvera Butler, Keith Donald, Eddie Joyce & Niall Stokes were interviewed for a 2003 MA 
research project buy same author.
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participated in this research study. I must also concede that while those interviewees 
that may be categorised under the heading of ‘traditional’ in terms of their spheres of 
activity, it is, perhaps, more appropriate to view them as active agents in a traditional-
derived ‘popular’ music industry. 
In some cases those approached for interview initially responded by phone or 
email  to  accept  or  decline.  However,  in  most  instances  those  approached  did  not 
respond to this letter, but an interview was secured courtesy of a follow-up telephone 
call. During this phone call, I also sought their consent to having the interview recorded. 
Initially, thirty-five accepted and nine declined. Of those who declined, most emailed 
their response or else rejected the approach during the follow-up phone call. In three 
cases, while the individual (either directly,  or through their secretary)  signalled their 
willingness to be interviewed, or their willingness to give further consideration to the 
matter before proceeding, no interview subsequently occurred. In these cases, having 
failed to obtain a definite response after a short series of follow-up phone calls and/or 
emails  (over  a  matter  of  weeks,  or  in  some  cases  months),  I  ceased  pursuing  the 
individual. 
In one other case where an individual declined an interviewee, his company did 
forward me a copy of speeches he had just delivered at two international music industry 
seminars  on  a  topic  directly  related  to  my  research  interests.  This  relates  to  Paul 
McGuinness, manager of U2.  I initially approached Principle Management seeking to 
obtain an interview with McGuinness. This request was declined through an email  I 
received  from  Principle  Management’s  MD  Steve  Williams,  however  Principle 
subsequently  furnished  me  full  transcripts  of  two  keynote  speeches  delivered  by 
McGuinness  to  two  international  music  industry  seminars  in  2008.  Both  of  these 
speeches relate directly to the relationship between internet technologies and the record 
industry. The first was delivered at MIDEM seminar, Cannes, France; the second at the 
Music Matters Conference,  Hong Kong. While the tone of both speeches is broadly 
similar,  the  latter  speech  delivered  in  Hong  Kong  sees  McGuinness  place  more 
emphasis  on the  role  of  ISPs and argue that  ISP monitoring  is  not  an  intrusion on 
privacy. Both transcripts are reproduced in full below in Appendix H.
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The final thirty-nine participating interviewees consisted of thirty-five of those 
initially approached,  plus an additional  four interviewees whom I was guided to by 
another interviewee, or with whom an interview became possible as a result of another 
pre-arranged interview. For example, following artist manager Ben Barrett’s consent to 
an interview,  it  subsequently became necessary to  travel  to  London to  conduct  this 
interview. I thus approached George Ergatoudis, Head of Music at BBC Radio 1 and 
was granted an interview on the same trip.  During the course of my interview with 
Barrett she recommended that I also approach another artist manager, Peter Jenner and 
provided me with contacts for same. After researching Jenner’s work history I pursued 
and was successful in achieving an interview with him. Similarly,  my interview with 
artist manager John Williamson prompted a subsequent interview with another provider 
of management services, Bruce Findlay.
 
Three  participants  were  interviewed  twice.  In  one  of  these  cases,  the  initial 
interview was left incomplete due to unforeseen commitments arising which caused the 
participant to cut the interview short. In order to compensate they agreed to a second 
interview. In another instance, the interviewee agreed provisionally to be interviewed, 
provided we first conducted a short ‘rehearsal’ interview that would not be recorded. 
Upon completion of this, he consented to a full interview that was recorded some weeks 
later. In the third instance, the interviewee requested a second interview at a later stage 
in the research process. This relates to my interview with IFPI Chairman and CEO John 
Kennedy. His stated reason for requesting an additional interview was that a number of 
ongoing legal developments relating to questions I had asked him were likely to have 
reached a conclusion within a matter of months.
The final thirty-nine interviewees were as follows:
Bailie, Stuart: CEO – Oh Yeah Music Centre; Music presenter – BBC 
Radio  Ulster;  ex-Deputy  Editor  NME;  ex-music 
journalist / contributor – Q, Mojo, Uncut 
Barrett, Ben: Manager – Damien Rice; ex-live music promoter – The  
Mean Fiddler
Bolton, Jane: Managing  Director  –  Claddagh  Records  [2003  
interview]
Butler, Elvera: Owner – Reekus Records [2003 interview]
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Carroll, Jim: Music  Journalist  (Irish  Times);  ex-owner  –  Lakota 
Records;  ex-A&R – Go Discs!,  WEA and Rondor;  ex- 
press & promotions officer – London Records
Cooney, Steve: Record producer; musician
Curtis, P.J.: Record producer; musician; broadcaster; Educator
D’Ardis, John: Owner  –  Trend  Studios  (manufacturing);  ex-record 
producer; songwriter
Donald, Keith Musician  –  Moving  Hearts;  Chairman  –  Irish  Music  
Rights Organisation (IMRO); Educator [2003 interview]
Doyle, Dick: Director  General  –  Irish  Recorded  Music  Association 
(IRMA);  Chief  Executive  –  Phonographic  Performance 
Ireland (PPI)
Durnin, Eamonn Tesco, Ireland
Ergatoudis, George: Head of Music – BBC Radio 1
Findlay, Bruce: Manager – Aberfeldy; Simple Minds; China Crisis; ex-
owner – Zoom Records; ex-owner ‘Bruce’s (independent 
retail chain)
Graham, Ross: CEO  –  Northern  Ireland  Music  Industry  Commission 
(NIMIC); ex-Promotions Manager – Island Records
Hanrahan, Dermot: Chief  Executive  –  Electric  media  (digital  advertising); 
Radio  entrepreneur:  Director  –  4FM;  Chairman  –  Red 
FM, ex-CEO FM104; ex-Manager – Virgin Megastore
Harford, Gerry: Manager – Therapy; ex-live music promoter
Hayden, Jackie: General  Manager  –  Hot  Press  (magazine);  ex-
Promotions Manager –Polydor Ireland; CBS Ireland
Hennessy, Shay: Managing Director – Crashed Music (independent 
recording and publishing label); ex-chairman Irish 
Music Rights Organisation (IMRO)
Jenner, Peter: Manager  –  Billy  Bragg;  Eddi  Reader;  Secretary  
General – International Managers Forum 
Johnston, Una: European  Representative  –  South  By  South  West 
international music industry trade fair (SXSW - Texas); 
music event manager
Joyce, Eddie: Owner – Danceline Records [2003 interview]
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Kavanagh, Willie: Managing Director  –  EMI Music  Ireland;  Chairman  –  
Irish Recorded Music Association (IRMA)
Kennedy, John: Chairman  &  CEO  International  Federation  of  
Phonographic Industries
Lappin, Johnny: Music publisher – Chairman – Music Publishers 
Association  of  Ireland;  Board  member  –  Irish  Rights  
Music Organisation (IMRO)
Lindsey, Steve: Independent  music  publisher;  ex-Professional  
Manager  –  Warner  Chappell  Music  Publishing;  ex-
General Manager – Go Discs! Music
Lockhart, Jim: Radio producer – 2FM, RTE Radio 1; musician - 
Horslips
Murray, Frank: Manager – The Pogues; ex-Tour Manager – Elton John, 
Thin Lizzy 
O’Ceallaigh, Fachtna: Manager  –  Sinead  O’Connor,  Lissy  Trullie;  ex-
manager Clannad; Boomtown Rats 
O’Grady, Dave: Owner  –  Independent  Records;  Manager  –  David  Kitt, 
Mundy
O’Reilly, Willie: CEO – Today FM
O’Riordan, Michael: General  Manager  –  Rosette  Music  Publishing;  Board  
member – Irish Music Rights Organisation (IMRO) 
Pandula, Petr: Owner  –  Magnetic  Music  (independent  record  label  /  
publishing label / live music promotion / music 
retailing)
Sheehan, John: Former Chair – Sony Music Ireland
Stokes, Niall : Editor – Hot Press [2003 interview]
Vignoles, Julian: Television commissioning editor; radio producer; former 
music journalist
Wenham, Alison: Chair  &  CEO  Association  of  Independent  Music; 
President Worldwide Independent Network (Independent 
record industry trade body representative)
Whelan, Bill: Composer; record producer; music publisher
Williamson, John: Manager – Belle & Sebastian; former live music 
promoter
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Wilson, Ian: Producer, RTE Radio 2 FM
The ‘occupation’ breakdown of the final thirty-nine interviewees is as follows:
 Eight  are  or  were  employed  by  a  major  record  company  in  either  senior 
management or personnel roles
 Nine either own, work or have worked for an independent record company
 Three  are  or  were  employed  in  senior  management  roles  by  a  major  music 
publishing company
 Six either own or work or have worked for an independent music publishing 
company
 Eight are artist managers
 Four work or have worked in live music promotion
 Four work or have worked as record producers
 Five are either employed by, or sit on the board of management of music royalty 
collection societies
 Four  are  or  have  been  recorded  music  retailers.  Three  of  these  are/were 
independent  retailers,  the  other  a  manager  with  an  international  music  retail 
chain
 Six are professional musicians/creative artists
 Eight are representatives of music industry trade bodies/lobby groups
 Four are music journalists
 Eight work/have worked in the management and production of music radio
 Three have produced specialised music programming for television
 One is a record/CD/DVD manufacturer
 Two provide public relations services to music companies
 One is a former music industry lawyer
 Three work or have worked in training and education for the music industry
 One is a music industry trade fair co-ordinator / event manager
As the sums indicate, a significant number of those interviewed have worked 
across two or more spheres of activity throughout their careers. Appendix A provides a 
list of all interviewees who participated, accompanied by a short biographical note.
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Within the above, the eight artist managers provide particularly interesting and 
useful  informants.  As  managers  representing  the  interests  of  recording  artists,  they 
engage with all of the other actors throughout the music industry chain and surrounding 
spheres of activity and, as such, offer an additional insight into and perspective upon the 
role of all other actors.
It should also be noted that only a small number of the research participants in 
this thesis are women – five out of a total of thirty-nine. This may be seen as a reflection 
of overall gender trends within the music industry. 
Conducting the interviews
Of the final thirty-nine industry professionals and key informants who consented to an 
interview, thirty-three were interviewed face-to-face and the other five by telephone. 
The  face-to-face  interviews  were  held  in  a  variety  of  locations  including  the 
participant’s  work  place,  the  participant’s  home,  and  a  variety  of  public  spaces 
including hotel lobbies, restaurants and cafés. Rapley (2004) points to the importance of 
location when it comes to interviews, given that interviewees may not feel completely at 
ease in certain locations. In all cases I allowed the interviewee suggest their preferred 
location and, providing it was a suitable venue for recording our conversation. In almost 
all  instances  it  was  possible  to  accommodate  their  request  or  suggestion.  Prior  to 
formally commencing the interview I thanked the interviewee for their  participation, 
checked to see that they were happy with the location (in the case of it being a public 
space), reassured them about confidentiality,  re-capped on the overall purpose of the 
research  and  requested  that  they  ask  for  clarification  if  they  found  any  questions 
unclear. I also encouraged them to critique any questions I asked if they felt the need to.
All interviews bar two were recorded. In these instances, the participants had 
asked not to have the interview recorded on tape, so I depended solely on note taking 
for a record of the conversation. Rapley (2004) advances that the use of audio recording 
facilitates  interaction  as  the  interviewer  is  not  so  engrossed  in  note-taking.  While 
Thomas et al. (2005) acknowledge the potential for recording to induce nervousness in 
the  interviewee,  they also  state  that  the  interviewee  usually  tends  to  overcome this 
during the course of the interview, gradually becoming less conscious of the recording 
device. During the course of my face-to-face interviews for this study, this did not arise 
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as  an  issue,  with  the  exception  of  the  afore-mentioned  two  interviewees  who  had 
indicated at an earlier stage their discomfort with the matter of recording.
The  length  of  the  interviews  varied  in  length  from  forty  minutes  to 
approximately two hours. I personally transcribed all of the interviews. This allowed me 
to re-live the interview and familiarise myself  with the data at an intimate level. As 
such, the act of transcribing was in itself part of the data analysis process. 
5.4 Issues of subjectivity on the part of the author
It  must  be  noted  that  this  research  study  is  contextualised  by  my  decade-long 
employment history in the vocational training sector. My role as an ‘external’ training 
programme  co-ordinator  with  FAS  saw  me  assigned  to  the  management  and 
administration  of  technical  and  business  skills  training  projects  within  the  cultural 
industries. This involved regular first-hand contact with actors across the music industry 
including the marketing,  distribution and A&R departments within one of the major 
record  labels;  independent  record  and  publishing  companies;  a  variety  of  recording 
studios and related technical support services; music broadcasters and journalists; live 
music  promoters  and  venue  operators;  and  a  number  of  official  bodies  and  lobby 
groups. This period shaped my knowledge and understanding of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of 
the music industry and engendered within me an intense interest and curiosity about it. 
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has focused on the methodological approach used to answer the research 
questions  driving  this  research  study.  At  each  stage  the  decisions  taken  have  been 
explained  and justified  by reference  to  existing  literature.  I  believe  the  process  has 
generated rich findings which will now be presented in the following three chapters.
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Chapter 6: Findings 1 – Music Industry ‘Problems’
6.1 Introduction
The starting point of this thesis is the ‘assumption’ that significant change has been 
visited upon the music industry in recent years. The primary research phase of this study 
is charged with constructing a reality of the recent evolution of the music industry in 
place of this assumption. The raw materials for the construction of this reality are the 
insights and perspectives of thirty-nine industry professionals and key informants from 
across the spectrum of music industry sub-sectors and related spheres. 
Encouraging these industry professionals and key informants to articulate their 
particular  perceptions  of  change  in  the  music  industry  allows  them  to  reflect  on 
processes of change, which in turn may provoke and facilitate a more thorough, holistic 
examination  of  the  process.  In  many  instances,  the  responses  of  interviewees  to 
questions about change may best be categorised under two headings: one, focusing on 
‘problems’  generated  for  the  music  industry  either  directly  or  indirectly  by 
digitalisation; and the other, strategies formulated by the industry to provide ‘solutions’ 
to  these  problems,  or  to  compensate  in  other  ways  for  any losses  incurred  through 
falling record sales. While chapter seven will be dedicated to mapping the responses and 
‘solutions’  they perceive  as  evolving,  this  first  chapter  of  research  findings  focuses 
specifically  on  interviewee’s  perceptions  of  the  challenges  being  faced  by  the 
contemporary music industry, i.e. ‘problems’. 
At the outset  of our interviews I  asked each participant  to consider any key 
changes they regard as having occurred over the past decade. Perhaps unsurprisingly, all 
interviewees signalled the internet as the most significant development, and most linked 
this  to  a  downturn  in  record  sales  revenues.  However,  beyond  this  they  advance 
additional factors that they claim provide evidence of severe record industry decline, as 
well as forwarding perspectives on a range of phenomena that they perceive as causing 
these problems. While some of these factors extend beyond technological logic, most 
are  related  to  various  aspects  of  digitalisation.  This  leads  us  to  consider  recent 
employment  trends  across  the  major  music  companies;  the  decline  of  ‘bricks  and 
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mortar’  retailing;  criticisms  levelled  at  the  major  music  companies  over  long-term 
inefficiencies and a failure to realise or grasp opportunities afforded by the internet at an 
earlier stage; consequences arising from the shift from physical to digital formats; and 
the effects of supermarket retailing.
6.2 Primary perception of change: file-sharing = downturn in sales
When asked to consider if  change has occurred in the music industry over the past 
decade,  the  starting  point  for  almost  all  interviewees  is  two factors:  the  rise  of  the 
internet; and the concomitant fall of record sales. These responses follow closely many 
of the media and journalistic accounts referred to in chapter one. In some cases, the 
‘effects’ of the internet are presented as being more extreme or fatalistic than in others, 
but ultimately,  most interviewees concur that very significant change has occurred and 
it’s mostly for the worse. For example:
People aren’t paying for music anymore. That’s the problem. I think the majors have collapsed 
and it is over for them. 
(Dave O’Grady, MD, Independent Records, personal interview)
With moving online…the bottom has fallen out of the music industry’s sales…
(Michael O’Riordan, Ritz Records and Rosette Music Publishing, personal interview)
Digitalisation has totally rattled the industry. The internet is certainly hurting the industry…The 
big record companies have taken a real pounding in the last year or two. 
(Peter Jenner, artist manager, personal interview)
We put the downturn almost exclusively down to peer-to-peer networks and illegal uploading of 
music. Our estimates are that worldwide there are fourteen illegal downloads per one legitimate 
download at this stage which is phenomenal. Fourteen illegals for every one legal. 
(Dick Doyle, Director General, Irish Recorded Music Association (IRMA))
My interview with Dick Doyle was conducted in May 2008. By January 2009, IRMA’s 
parent  body,  the  International  Federation  of  Phonographic  Industries  (IFPI),  revised 
Doyle’s estimation upwards to a legal:illegal ratio of one in twenty, claiming that 95% 
of all music traffic on the internet related to illicit file-sharing and distribution (IFPI, 
Digital Music Report 2009, p.3).
Ex-Virgin (Ireland) MD Dermot Hanrahan describes the record industry of the 
1980s  and  1990s  as  being  dominated  a  small  number  of  ‘aggressive,  domineering 
businesses’ that ‘oozed arrogance’ (personal interview). Hanrahan described each of the 
major record labels as ‘a monopoly in their own right’ as they held exclusive access to 
the stars on their label and thus dictated the terms upon which retailers or third parties 
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accessed the recording and publishing copyrights they owned. However, Hanrahan sees 
such an era of dominance as having been ‘destroyed’ by the advent of the internet file-
sharing technologies: ‘Peer-to-peer means the game is up for the big record labels. It’s 
over. Finito’ (personal interview).
A similar sentiment is echoed by Billy Bragg (and former Pink Floyd) manager 
Peter Jenner who stated that the ‘crisis’ facing the record industry is now potentially 
terminal based on what he perceives as the industry’s inability to generate opportunities 
for monetising creativity in an internet environment:
The internet means the whole funding of music is now in question. How do we fund it? Where  
does the money come from? Where can we make money? How can we make money? What do 
we have to do to make money? (Peter Jenner, personal interview)
Record  industry  trade  body  representatives  from  the  IFPI,  IRMA,  the 
Association of Independent Music (AIM) and Phonographic Performance Ireland (PPI) 
advanced a number of specific cases of mass-infringements of copyrights to support 
their argument that file-sharing is severely damaging their market. These accounts also 
suggest  a  large  quantity  of  users  ‘stealing’  vast  quantities  of  recorded  music.  The 
implication is often that having access to free music on the internet means that many 
users will only consume pirated music, and many cases they will pirate all files at their 
disposal. For example:
Peer-to-peer  sharing,  it’s  a bit  like this:  a kid records something at  home, and it’s like he’s  
stealing a chocolate from Willy Wonka’s factory, but the problem with peer-to-peer is that it 
opens up the whole factory and they steal the lot. You know, there is this kid we are suing now 
who has uploaded 37,000 copyrights…People go: ‘the poor kid, you shouldn’t be doing that to  
him’, but the problem is he’s hurting us… 37,000 copyrights stolen…37,000 copyrights…37,000 
copyrights. 
(Willie Kavanagh, MD, EMI Music Ireland, personal interview) 
Dick Doyle cites an additional case where IRMA are pursuing an individual who has 
30,000  song  files  on  their  pc:  ‘When  you  think  of  it,  30,000  songs  being  shared 
worldwide  –  the  loss  to  our  industry  is  colossal’  (personal  interview).  It  remains 
extremely unlikely that every illicitly shared music file would otherwise correspond to a 
‘legitimate’ sale on the part of the record industry, but, as Doyle continues:
How much is file-sharing hurting [the record industry]? It’s definitely hurting badly. In Ireland 
you can see that we are down from about 145 million to 110 million so that’s about a 35 million 
drop since 2001…that’s 25%. So it is definitely hurting it badly. 
(Dick Doyle, personal interview)
For AIM chair Alison Wenham:
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The major industry has always controlled the means of distribution up until the digital era, and 
that control has been lost. Not just the major companies,  all copyright owners have lost that 
control with the internet. (Alison Wenham, personal interview)
Wenham proceeds how state that ‘everything’ can be accessed for free on the internet. 
IFPI  Chairman  and  CEO  John  Kennedy  advances  that  there  are  no  historical 
comparisons to the challenges faced by the record industry since the advent of peer-to-
peer networks. What makes the plight of the record industry unique in his eyes is the 
perpetration of:
…wholesale theft which is tolerated by society,  governments and the media. It  is sometimes  
even seen as virtuous that people are indulging in taking music for free…A small microcosm of 
one of the problems we have with society nowadays is whilst the music industry has suffered 
from illegal copying, copying has become part of kids instinct now, to the extent that it’s such a 
problem  in  education  that  teachers,  university  lecturers  are  having  huge  problems  with 
plagiarism which is damaging our education system and the young people within it in a very 
material way. (John Kennedy, personal interview)
Dick Doyle stated that his organisation were involved in an ongoing process of 
issuing lawsuits  against  individual  network users,  and that all  individuals  they were 
pursuing had infringed a minimum of five hundred copyrights:
Obviously the pricing of the CD was very good before because people saw it as a high value 
product and they were prepared to pay for it, where as now people think music should be for  
free. A lot of young people have been brought up on the fallacy that music is for nothing because 
they can get it on the internet and they can share it with friends. So there is a whole cultural  
change going on now compared to what was happening twenty years ago…We have spawned a 
whole  generation  of  people  now  who  never  have  bought  music…and  they  have  never 
appreciated that there is an economic value in music...Maybe with the next generation we can try 
to get back to where there is a value in music…where we can say that there is an artist who  
needs to be fed. (Dick Doyle, personal interview)
Doyle’s comment regarding the pricing of CDs must here be considered in the light of 
anti-trust allegations levelled at the record industry such as those highlighted in chapter 
4, section 4.6 [see Burkart and McCourt (2003) reference]. Doyle’s arguments regarding 
the ‘artist who needs to be fed’ is echoed among many of my interviewees. Both major 
and independent record and publishing company representatives alike ultimately reduce 
debates  surrounding copyright  infringement  to  an attack  on the  creative  artists  who 
produce the industry’s raw material. Thus, some interviewees saw this problem not only 
leading to the decline of record companies and broader music companies, but also the 
demise of musical creativity resulting from mass copyright infringement. They regard 
the evolution of a culture that regards music as a ‘free’ service as removing incentives 
for artists to engage in creativity and produce music and recordings. A number of key 
informants from the spheres of recording and music publishing point to an impending 
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crisis around creativity arising from a dirge of artistic endeavour amidst a culture that 
fails to place economic value on musical texts. For example:
This is the problem. The culture has seeped in where by people are beginning to think that music 
is  free. If you take that to its logical conclusion, well when the music runs out there’ll be  no 
more music…That is the flux that we are in at the moment…If people think that music is free,  
songwriters are going to stop making music because there will be no point. They are not going to 
make any money from their efforts so they’ll go and do something else…There’ll be no more  
music. 
(Johnny Lappin, Managing Director, Liffey Music Publishing, personal interview)
 
You know, if you take it to it’s natural conclusion, nobody wants to pay for music…If people, 
young people think that music is free, well…there’s no incentive for people to write new music 
unless they can get paid for it. 
(Eddie Joyce, MD Danceline Records and Jeeldaire Music Publishing, personal interview)
Because its there for nothing on the internet, people think music is free.  Music should not be 
free, but it is…If copyright law can no longer protect you against somebody running off copies, 
then you will no longer have any creativity. This is what people don’t realise. 
(Michael O’Riordan, Ritz Records and Rosette Publishing, personal interview)
IFPI  Chairman  and  CEO  John  Kennedy  agrees  that  removing  incentives  to 
produce creative works, courtesy of a ‘broad devaluing of music’ resulting from mass 
copyright infringements serves to make performing and creative careers in music less 
attractive propositions. Pointing to the mid-teens to mid-twenties age bracket as the ‘key 
offenders’  in  terms  of  illegal  file-sharing,  Kennedy  outlines  how  this  section  of 
consumer society has traditionally been the group providing the ignition for new artists, 
new investment and new revenues. The large-scale withdrawal of this group from the 
recorded music industry revenue chain holds implications for the long-term ‘health’ of 
the  industry  as  it  ‘hurts  those  who  provide  its  raw  material’  (personal  interview). 
However  Kennedy rejects  ideas  of  a  potential  dearth of  creativity  killing the music 
industry.  As he explains,  for the organisations he represents,  ‘the plus’ is  that  more 
music than ever is being consumed, ‘the minus’ is that less music is being paid for. 
Kennedy’s optimism for the survival of his industry derives from what he considers to 
be a shift in attitude towards the internet by broader society. He sees such change as 
primarily driven by society’s concerns over such issues of pornography, and the need 
for commercial operators to measure their bandwidth in a more effective way. As such, 
the internet is becoming an increasingly regulated environment:
Five years ago the idea of any policing of the internet would have been considered sacrilege, but 
the idea now that the internet wouldn’t be policed for any number of reasons is just naïve. 
(John Kennedy, personal interview)
Kennedy sees such an attitudal shift as ‘potentially breeding hope’ for a record industry 
as it implies governments are now displaying an increasing willingness to act on online 
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activities that ‘cannot be good for society’. Kennedy argues that the extent of actions 
taken by legislative and judicial systems against file-sharers, technology suppliers and 
networks within various nation states around the world is ‘too little, but I will not say 
too late’. He contends that governments are beginning to understand the problems faced 
by the member companies that his organisation represents, and are beginning to play a 
role that will assist the record industry in transforming consumption habits towards a 
point where more people start purchasing music again.
All of the above comments must be considered in the context of IFPI statistics 
which  report  how  the  global  recorded  music  market  has  largely  been  in  decline 
throughout the first  decade of the new millennium.  They indicate  an initial  drop of 
17.3% from a record high of US$38.7 billion sales 1999 to US$32 billion in 2003. 
While there was a modest recovery of 4.7% throughout 2004 and sales held (almost) 
steady throughout 2005, the subsequent period to the end of 2006 saw a further drop of 
5.4% to an overall global retail value of US$31.8 billion. By the end of 2008 this figure 
had dropped to US$26.5.
Table 6.1: Retail value of recorded music sales 1999-2008 (combined physical and digital formats 
in $US billions)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total 38.7 36.9 33.7 32.2 32.0 33.6 33.5 31.8 29.9 26.5
US 14.3 14.8 13.4 12.6 11.9 12.2 12.3 11.5 10.4 8.4
Rest of world 23.4 22.1 20.3 19.6 20.1 21.4 21.2 20.3 19.5 18.1
Source: Author, compiled from IFPI Recording Industry In Numbers reports 2000-2009
This  pattern is also reflected in an Irish context where record sales revenues dropped 
from a high of €145.6m in 2001 to €108.8m by the end of 2008 (IRMA/IFPI, 2009).
However, not all interviewees are at ease with the general consensus that peer-
to-peer file-sharing technologies have led to such a significant decline in record sales 
revenues.  Two  of  the  artist  managers  I  interviewed  and  a  small  number  of  other 
interviewees  from beyond  the  recording  sector  problematise  this  picture.  First  and 
foremost, Bruce Findlay and John Williamson point out that the source of these figures, 
the IFPI, is primarily, the representative trade body of the Universal Music Group, the 
Warner  Music  Group,  Sony Music  Entertainment  and EMI -  the  four  major  music 
companies. The published sales revenue statistics are supplied by these four companies. 
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In most  instances,  these figures are uncritically relayed to the public via  the media. 
Instances questioning their accuracy are extremely rare. As Williamson advances:
…the whole  1999  meltdown period…who  knows whether  that’s  true  or  not  because  we’re 
relying on the figures that come from guess where? The major record companies themselves… 
(John Williamson, personal interview)
Williamson proceeds to state that the majors are adept at creating the perception that 
best suits their current agenda ‘with a bit of creative accounting and a good PR team’ 
(ibid). He then tempers this somewhat by stating that he is not arguing that these figures 
are deliberately inaccurate or misleading, but rather that we must recognise how such a 
picture of declining revenues offers support to the lobbying power of record industry in 
their quest to encourage the legislative and judicial arms of nation-states to adopt and 
enforce longer, stronger copyright laws (the trajectory of which was detailed in chapter 
4, sections 4.4. and 4.6). During the course of my primary research interviews, IFPI 
Chairman  and  CEO  John  Kennedy,  and  IRMA  Director  General  Dick  Doyle  both 
emphasised their primary roles as that of lobbyists, in Kennedy’s case, at international 
level, in Doyle’s case, specifically in an Irish context. In just over a decade in his role at 
IRMA, Doyle claims to have spent ‘two to three years’ of this period in Leinster House: 
At one stage, lobbying for the 2001 Copyright Act to come in. I was in the Dáil every day for  
seven or eight months lobbying TDs, trying to get them to understand what the issues were etc 
etc. I am mentioned in the records of the Dáil because I got to so many of them at so  many 
different times that people started getting annoyed and asking is this the Dick Doyle copyright 
act or is it the Irish copyright act? So my most important job is lobbying.
(Dick Doyle, personal interview)
The picture of declining record sales revenues and its conflation with a wider 
music industries downturn also strengthens the arguments of major players in the music 
industries  when it  comes to  receiving  the blessing of  institutions  of  governance for 
mergers, joint-ventures and alliances such as the Sony-BMG11 merger in 2004. In 2006, 
the  European  Court  of  First  Instance  annulled  the  European  Commission's  original 
clearance  decision  from 2004 on foot  of  an  appeal  from IMPALA, an  independent 
record industry umbrella group. However, the merged parties successfully appealed this 
decision. In obtaining the original go-ahead for the merger they cited, amongst other 
factors, the necessity for consolidation ‘to help our artists realise their creative goals 
while at the same time…address the important issues that will enable this artform to 
evolve and prosper’ in the face of a shrinking market (Sony Music Entertainment press 
release, 5th August, 2004). Ironically, 2004 was the only year in the past decade when 
11  Sony subsequently subsumed BMG in 2009 and now operates entirely as Sony Music Entertainment.
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the IFPI posted an (albeit mild) upturn in record sales. Similar arguments are being used 
at present to justify the merging of Live Nation and Ticketmaster who combine to share 
significant  interests  in  recording,  music  publishing,  touring,  primary  and  secondary 
concert ticketing, artist management services, merchandising and the administration of 
all aspects of artist-related rights.
Bruce Findlay focuses less on the statistics produced by the IFPI and more on 
the  media’s  reporting  of  same.  Findlay  advances  that  the  IFPI  sales  data  might  be 
‘exactly  right…close  to  right…or  nowhere  near  right’  (Bruce  Findlay,  personal 
interview).  The point for Findlay,  a point  that  is  also supported by Williamson and 
another interviewee, Jim Carroll, is that these statistics are rarely if ever analysed in the 
media and are most often uncritically relayed as fact. The net effect of this, Findlay 
concludes, is to ‘hoodwink’ legislators:
…nobody actually  questions the figures.  Journalists  don’t  or  cannot  either.  So you  are  in  a 
situation where anyone who has got the resources to put together something that is reasonably  
impressive and has a whole lot of figures in it is going to get somewhere with the politicians.  
(Bruce Findlay, personal interview)
Furthermore, all of the above statistics relating to recorded music sales revenues 
must  be  considered  in  the  context  of  reported  revenues  for  the  combined  music 
industries  as  a  whole.  A  recent  economic  report  issued  by  the  Performing  Rights 
Society in the UK indicates that despite a decade-long decline in the value of recorded 
music sales, overall revenues have been on the increase. The royalty collection society 
estimate  a  year-on-year  rise  of  4.7% with  total  combined  revenues  from recording, 
publishing and live streams rising from ST£3.2 billion in 2007 to ST£3.6 billion in 2008 
(PRS  Economic  Insight,  20th July  2009).  Marketing  and  media  research  analysts 
eMarketer estimate the global combined revenues from these core streams to have risen 
from US$60.7 in 2006 to US$62.6 by the end of 2008 (eMarketer, Global Music, 2009). 
Placed in an even wider context incorporating musical instrument sales, portable digital 
players,  music  reproduction  hardware  and  advertising  revenues  generated  by  music 
radio, Price Waterhouse Cooper estimated the 2007 value of ‘music driven’ industries at 
US$130 billion (PWC, 2007). Thus, it is important to note that music has an economic 
relevance that extends far beyond the scope of record sales.
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Contradictory reports on the ‘effects’ of file-sharing
A further point I raised regarding the relationship between the internet and the decline in 
record sales stemmed from a confusing array of reports and surveys on the outcome to 
date of internet file-sharing technologies regarding user behaviour and practice. These 
accounts,  outlined  in  reports  by  trade  bodies,  consumer  lobby  groups,  industry 
consultants and policy makers offer various, often contradictory and conflicting data on 
the ‘effects’ of internet file-sharing. Below I outline the headline findings of some of 
these reports and the response of my interviewees to them.
A 2007 market research survey by NPD Group indicated that legal download 
sales  were  the  fastest  growing  digital  music  category  in  2006,  and,  despite  having 
increased  by  47% over  the  previous  2  years,  activities  on  peer-to-peer  file-sharing 
networks was slowing (NPD Group online,  26th February 2008).  The report  further 
argued that it was likely that the annual number of legal downloaders would surpass 
peer-to-peer file-sharers by the end of 2007.  Conversely,  in its annual digital music 
survey  for 2007,  Entertainment  Media  Research  suggested  pirate  downloads  had 
reached an all-time high in 2007 and were continuing to rise (cited in The Guardian, 
Monday,  July  30th  2007).  However,  the  same  report  also  found  online  social 
networking sites to be boosting interest  in music that translates into recorded music 
sales. Bebo and MySpace are listed as the most popular sites with 30% of respondents 
in a survey of 1,700 users claiming to make regular or occasional physical and/or digital 
purchases based on music they had discovered on a social networking site. 
While the annual IFPI Digital Music Reports and World Recording Industry In  
Numbers reports  illustrate  strong  year-on-year  growth  in  overall  digital  sales  since 
2003, these reports  invariably point  to  proliferating  file-sharing  activities  preventing 
digital market increases from off-setting physical sales losses, and thus plunging their 
industry into crisis. However, according to Jim Carroll, MD of the Sony-owned Lakota 
Records:
We need to draw a line here: In terms of the death of the record industry, it is a story, a media  
story. It is a media story and it is being fed through the media. 
(Jim Carroll, personal interview)
Carroll argues that popular media accounts of crisis in the record industry are based on 
‘half truths’ in so far as evidence of any downturn in terms of recorded music sales 
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revenues has long since long since existed. However, overall revenues from recording 
and music publishing remain high. As Carroll continues:
They are still making fucking money and people are still buying music. Every year I go into  
HMV on Grafton Street as near to Christmas as I can stand and I just marvel at the amount of  
people in there buying CDs and I wonder why it can’t be like that all year round. And sure there 
will be times like Christmas or when there is a big release, like Coldplay or U2 when there will  
be big fast sales. (Jim Carroll, personal interview)
Regarding the legitimate digital market, a 2006 sales analysis report by Forrester 
Research on the iTunes Digital Music Stores indicated a 65% drop in sales at the Apple 
store throughout 2006, with file-sharing labelled as the primary cause. Their findings on 
iTunes  were  based  on analyses  of  credit  card  transactions  over  a  27-month  period. 
While Apple labelled this report as ‘simply incorrect’, it did not publish any statistics. 
However  IFPI  statistics  illustrate  year-on-year  growth  in  the  overall  digital  music 
market to be in the region of 50%. Nielssen Soundscan sales data points to year-on-year 
growth in the digital market in the US to be approximately 75%. Both bodies emphasise 
iTunes as by far the most dominant player in the digital music store market.
Other reports indicate a significant level of ambivalence regarding the outcome 
of  peer-to-peer  file-sharing  for  the  record  industry.  Research  commissioned  on  the 
domestic recorded music market in Canada- compiled by Anderson & Frenz  (2008) for 
Canadian government department Industry Canada -  found that music file-sharing has 
no detrimental effect on recorded music sales, in fact it is associated with generating 
physical sales. Upon garnering responses from 2,100 participants, Andersen and Frenz 
concluded in their  government  sponsored research  data,  that  among  Canadians  who 
engage in peer-to-peer file-sharing, for every twelve songs-files shared, physical sales 
increase by 0.44 CDs. In effect this means that for every two albums shared on peer-to-
peer  networks  (or  the  equivalent  amount  of  songs  in  single  track  downloads),  one 
additional ‘legal’ sale is generated. Overall, Andersen and Frenz found that:
Analysis of the Canadian population does not uncover either a positive or negative relationship  
between the number of files downloaded from peer-to-peer networks and CDs purchased. That 
is, we find no direct evidence to suggest the net effect of P2P file-sharing is either positive or 
negative for Canada as a whole. (Andersen and Frenz, 2008: 24)
An earlier study by music research agency The Leading Question (2005) claimed that 
active  file-sharers  spend  four-and-a-half  times  more  money  on  recorded  music 
purchases than consumers of legal downloads. 
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While initially attacking peer-to-peer file-sharing as a major contributory factor 
to a crisis within the record industry,  EMI MD Willie Kavanagh proceeded to place 
such ‘piracy’ into a perspective that was, in the longer term, somewhat less threatening 
to his industry:
I don’t think that this is a bad kind of analogy: When television took off in the sixties the idea 
was that film companies were fucked. Why would anybody go to the cinema when you could 
watch moving pictures for free on your telly? But the reality decades later is that there are still  
new movies released every single week.  Cinema is a business model that works…It’s  about  
consuming and how people want to consume. There will always be illegal ways to consume 
music,  but  there  are  illegal  ways  to  consume  most  things  and  these  really  hurt  legitimate  
producers. (Willie Kavanagh, personal interview)
Kavanagh was  also  eager  to  stress  that  when it  comes  to  file-sharing,  the  level  of 
tolerance society possesses for the ‘illegality of it all’ is currently at a point that is ‘way 
beyond being palatable’  (personal  interview).  He views file-sharing technology as  a 
‘damaging but not fatal’ development for the record industry. 
Jim Carroll is equally at pains to emphasise that file-sharing, while significantly hurting 
the record industry, must be placed in a broader context. Carroll related an account of 
his attendance at the 2007 South By South West (SXSW) international music industry 
conference in Texas: 
I sat in on one very interesting panel where this guy actually broke down, in terms of file-
sharing, how an album gets spread around – where it begins and where it starts getting shared  
and downloaded. It was amazing to me that the likes of Limewire and eDonkey are only number 
five  in  the  sequence  –  There  are  four  levels  before  that,  four  levels  before  it  gets  to  the 
commoner  garden  peer-to-peer  file-sharing  services  that  we  have  all  heard  about.  And  the 
amount of people doing this are a tiny, tiny number relatively speaking. 
(Jim Carroll, personal interview)
Research on the symbiosis of peer-to-peer and iTunes at the Harvard Business 
School argues that the major record labels should give greater consideration to peer-to-
peer traffic when formulation online pricing schemes. A study compiled in conjunction 
with the Universtat Autonoma de Barcelona argues that prices low enough to encourage 
users away from peer-to-peer networks are not optimal in large markets (Casadesus-
Masanell and Hervaes-Draue, 2007). Rather, the study argues that the record labels are 
better off setting higher prices and attracting those consumers that are willing to pay due 
to congestion on peer-to-peer networks. Furthermore, the study finds that legal attacks 
by the record industry against software suppliers and individual file-sharers carries a 
harmful effect for peer-to-peer networks.
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A further  study published  by the  Berkman  Centre  (Harvard)  and Gartner  in 
December 2005 based on a survey of 475 early adopters suggests that the capacity to 
share music files with other consumers is an important consideration for users when 
choosing  an  online  music  service.  The  report  also  highlights  file-sharing  to  play 
significant role in determining subsequent recorded music purchases.
It  is  also worth remembering  at  this  point,  that  claims  of  new technological 
developments harming established content producers are nothing new. In his testimony 
to  the  US  House  of  Representatives  in  1982  as  part  of  their  hearing  on  ‘Home 
Recording and Copyrighted Works’, Jack Valenti, then President of the Motion Picture 
Association  of  America  (MPAA)  accuses  VCR technology  of  carrying  detrimental 
consequences for the movie industry:
I say to you, the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public what the Boston 
strangler is to the woman home alone…It’s like a great tidal wave just off the shore…One does 
not  have  to  be  trained  in  sophisticated  marketing  and  creative  judgement  to  understand  the 
devastation on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of tapings hat 
will adversely impact on the future of the creative community in this country [USA]. It’s simply  
a question of basic economics and plain common sense.
(Valenti cited in Committee of Judiciary records, Monday 12th April 1982)
Valenti  subsequently  labelled  the  MPAAs campaign  against  internet  ‘piracy’  as  his 
‘own personal war’ (see, for example, Lessig, 2004: 26). The record industry’s ‘home 
taping is killing music’ campaign in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the widespread 
diffusion of cassette duplication technologies as standard in home stereo systems echoes 
similar sentiments.
6.3 Other key evidence of record industry decline
Beyond  declining  recorded  music  sales  statistics,  interviewees  advanced  two  key 
strands of evidence pointing to record industry decline: 
1) The shedding of jobs at major music companies in recent years;
2) The collapse of ‘bricks and mortar’ retail outlets for recorded music
Job cuts at the major labels
Referring to the Irish context, radio producer Jim Lockhart tells of ‘swathes of people 
cut out of the record labels here’. In his ongoing dealings with labels regarding the 
acquisition of licensing rights amongst other factors, Lockart is more frequently referred 
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to  the  London  offices  of  the  companies  who  increasingly  administer  their  Irish 
operations. Lockhart’s testimony is borne out in the 2005 closure of Sony’s distribution 
depot in Dublin. Sony was the last major to retain an Irish-based distribution facility. Its 
closure also coincided with the stripping back of its local marketing personnel.
Many other interviewees describe the major record companies evolving into a 
smaller,  tighter  more  controlled  set  of  businesses  than  they  previously  were,  in  an 
environment  where  their  ongoing  viability  is  threatened.  For  example,  according  to 
Dave O’Grady, managing director of Independent Records:
If you look at how many people they lay off and have being laying off in the last couple of 
years…I heard a figure quoted recently at South by South-West12 that in America three years ago 
there were 500 major label A&R men, now there is 70. It is as simple as that. 
(Dave O’Grady, personal interview)
Association  of  Independent  Music  (AIM)  chair  Alison  Wenham  echoes  a  similar 
message:
For major companies there have been massive cutbacks worldwide. They have lost about one-
third of their workforce in the last four years and one-third of their artist rosters too so there is  
increasing contractions in labour and artists and repertoire activity. 
(Alison Wenham, personal interview)
Such comments come in the wake of a series of staff-cutting announcements by major 
labels  and,  for  Ross  Graham,  Chairman  of  the  Northern  Ireland  Music  Industry 
Commission (NIMIC), these cuts are:
…solid evidence that the majors are becoming less profitable. There have been savage staff cuts 
left,  right  and centre  because  the margins  are so slim. It’s  all  about  survival  in  a  retracting 
market. (Ross Graham, personal interview)
For  supporting  evidence,  Graham  draws  upon  Sony’s  2007  announcement  of  an 
undisclosed number of job cuts as part  of a broader restructuring operation with its 
internet  music  retailing  division.  Furthermore,  in  October  2007,  the  Sony  website 
predicted  up  to  sixty imminent  or  near-future  job  losses  from US and international 
offices after announcing an US$8m loss over the previous month alone which it blamed 
on the depleting CD market. This move followed the closure or downsizing of some of 
its  regional/national  offices  earlier  in  2007,  including  its  Canadian  head  office  in 
Toronto. 
12 South by South-West (SXSW) is an annual international music industries trade fair held annually in 
Austin, Texas, USA.
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In 2008, Universal announced the downsizing of its Island-Def Jam and Geffen-
Interscope-A&M label groups. However, by far the most notable staff-cutting exercise 
came in January 2008 when EMI’s recorded music division sliced two thousand jobs 
internationally reducing its workforce to 2,500 following a three-month review by new 
owners Terra Firma. According to Guy Hands, the founder and CEO of Terra Firma, 
this  was  a  direct  response  ‘to  the  challenges  posed  by  a  digital  environment’  that 
required  the  company  to  reduce  costs  by  £200m  a  year  (cited  in  The  Guardian, 
Tuesday, January 15th 2008). For John Williamson, the case of EMI is the most stark 
example of the major labels developing ‘much more efficient mechanisms’ of operation:
Suddenly, jobs started getting cut back. There is far fewer staff now, that’s an obvious change, 
and obviously that has a knock on effect as regards what a record company can actually do. 
Similarly the way that they were structured and how much they would actually pay people at a  
junior level has actually changed downwards over the past few years. If you are at entry level in 
these industries it’s  like ‘you should be privileged  to be working for  us’ so you’ll  on work 
experience and get virtually no money and you might actually get a job at some point in the 
future. (John Williamson, personal interview)
The collapse of retail outlets
Another factor which is flagged by interviewees as a symbol of crisis is the decline of 
physical  retail  chains  and outlets  for music.  Primarily,  the transfer  from physical  to 
digital and the concomitant spread of peer-to-peer file-sharing is perceived as reducing 
the market for recorded music, with physical retail a resultant prime casualty.
According  to  artist  manager  Peter  Jenner:  ‘what’s  really  on  the  frontline  of 
query is what’s happening to retail and what that means’ (personal interview). Jenner 
explains  that  a  combination  of  falling  ‘legal’  consumption  and  shifting  purchasing 
patterns are combining to ‘kill off’ physical retail outlets. Jenner’s comments come in 
the  midst  of  ongoing  closures  of  record  ‘megastores’  and  retail  chains.  For  Ross 
Graham, CEO of the Northern Ireland Music Industry Commission  (NIMIC),  music 
retail was:
…bound to collapse. Physical retail has become the most dangerous business to be in in this 
game. It has been in decline for years, sometimes reducing steadily, and sometimes you get very 
sharp large jumps downward. You can get a quarter in a year now where suddenly there will be a 
12% drop in sales. (Ross Graham, personal interview)
Peter Jenner further explains that, primarily as a result of digital distribution, the 
turnover  time  for  hit  records  is  becoming  shorter  and  shorter  as  record  companies 
‘front-load the charts’ in a strategy to combat falling sales. Jenner sees the proliferation 
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of formats upon which a single recording is now released as an attempt to ‘maximise the 
return on any one fan of a record’. Jenner’s experience is that consumers of singles are 
likely  to  purchase  multiple  remixes  of  one  song  and  he  argues  that  they  growing 
importance the record labels afford to this market sector indicates a level of desperation 
on the part of the labels, aiming products at ‘an increasingly focused fanbase’.  In the 
midst of this process, which is conducted largely via digital distribution:
…physical retail is what’s really taking a hit, the bricks and mortar store, and that is a symbol, as 
is  all  of  this  heavy  marketing  and  heavy,  heavy  finance  used  to  front-load  the  charts,  of 
dwindling consumers. (Peter Jenner, personal interview) 
For John Sheehan, former Chairman of Sony Ireland:
…it all comes back to the technological developments that are ongoing. Digitalisation places  
question marks over the future of all aspects of the industry,  but in particular retail is really 
suffering…the record shops. They got a second lease of life with the emergence of DVD and the 
back catalogue of films. It  was that which really sustained their revenue growth.  But that is  
slowing down now…The sad aspect for me is that I don’t see the physical carrier in the music  
business growing at all. (John Sheehan, personal interview)
Beyond this, former independent  retailer  Bruce Findlay highlights the rise of online 
‘dispensers’  of  physical  recordings  such as  Amazon,  CDNow and  other  mail  order 
services  in  ‘forcing  bricks  and  mortar  guys  off  the  map’  (Bruce  Findlay,  personal 
interview). 
All of these comments come in the context of a series of physical retail closures 
over the past two years. For example, summer 2007 saw independent retail chain Fopp 
close down all of its 105 outlets across the UK. Media reports primarily blamed the 
‘surging popularity of downloading music from the internet’ for the demise of Fopp 
(BBC World News, Friday 29th June 2007). The same week, HMV announced that its 
annual profits had been more than halved (RTE News, Thursday 28th June 2007). On 
Christmas  Eve  2008  retail  chain  Zavvi,  formerly  Virgin  Megastores,  went  into 
administration. It subsequently closed the majority of its stores throughout January and 
February 2009 – (HMV purchased 19 of the Zavvi outlets across the UK and Ireland). 
In February 2009, the High Court in Dublin appointed an examiner to the Golden Disc 
music retail group, which has 20 stores throughout Ireland. The court heard that Golden 
Discs  was  currently  insolvent  with  liabilities  of  €9.5  million,  primarily  due  to  the 
downturn in sales and increased competition from online sources (Irish Times, Tuesday 
24th February 2009). Independent Dublin retailer Road Records also closed its doors in 
spring 2009.
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Having  detailed  declining  sales  revenues,  job  losses  across  the  industry  the 
demise of physical retail as evidence of crisis in the record industry, many interviewees 
proceeded to  outline  a  number  of  different  causal  factors  relating  to  these  negative 
trends.  Based  primarily  on  the  accounts  of  twenty-three  of  my  interviewees,  the 
remaining sections of this chapter outline and summarise these various factors in turn. 
These respondents comprise of major and independent record company representatives; 
major  and  independent  music  publishing  company  representatives;  artist  managers; 
representatives  from the  recorded  music  retail  sector;  and  representatives  of  record 
industry  trade  bodies.  Additionally,  I  have  drawn  upon  information  and  statistics 
detailed in industry reports, press releases, trade publications and the coverage of these 
issues in the wider media.
6.4 Other  digital  factors  perceived  as  causing  record  industry 
decline
In  most  cases  I  opened  interviews  by  asking  a  general  question  about  the  recent 
evolution  of  the  broader  music  industry  and  the  state  it  is  now  in.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly,  the  initial  response  of  all interviewees  from the  recording  industry, 
music publishing industry and recorded music retail sector, and  most artist managers 
was  to  single  out  digital  technologies  as  the  most  significant  negative  development 
relating  to  their  business  in  the  past  decade.  Interviewees  identified  three  primary 
factors relating to developments in network technologies and consumer electronics that 
are damaging their industry: first, compact disc duplication technologies combined and 
digital media libraries as standard utilities on personal computers; and also the increased 
capacities associated with portable digital storage devices. 
These  two  factors,  combined  with  the  issue  of  peer-to-peer  file-sharing  are 
placed by interviewees at the core of the problems facing the music industries.
CD burning technologies
For John Kennedy, digitalisation has spawned an even bigger problem than peer-to-peer 
file-sharing on the internet. He details how the compact disc (CD) has been available on 
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the market since 1982 and remains the standard playback medium for commercial music 
recordings to the present day.  While  the earliest  CD recorders cost in the region of 
ST£25,000 in the early 1980s, CD burning technology has been mainstream in personal 
computers since the turn of the millennium. According to Kennedy, the copying of CDs 
has now become ‘a major problem around the world’ for the music industries because it  
crosses  much  greater  demographics  than  the  early  adopters  who  embrace  new and 
emerging internet file-sharing technologies. This sentiment is shared by record producer 
and  manufacturer  John  D’Ardis  who  argues  that  ‘CD  burners’  have  delivered  ‘a 
devastating blow’ to the broader music industry:
I  would  seriously  think  the  whole  music  industry  model  is  seriously  in  trouble.  The  main 
problem is that it is so easy to  burn a good quality copy of what you like and transfer it to 
everybody that likes it without charge. Given that situation, it is very difficult for a company to 
try and make money… (John D’Ardis, personal interview)
D’Ardis proceeds to state that digital libraries can be used to ‘infinitely’ store 
material ripped from CDs from where the material can be transferred shared and copied 
repeatedly.  Furthermore,  he  argues  that  such digital  libraries  potentially  remove  the 
necessity r the user to upgrade their music collection to a newer format at a future stage. 
This factor was a key driver of the CD market, where users re-bought on CD what they 
had previously bought on vinyl or cassette. Echoing a similar perspective, former Sony 
Ireland  chairman  Sheehan  argues  that  it  is  a  remarkable  achievement  for  record 
companies to have maintained the level of revenue generation that they have in such an 
environment where the ripping of CDs was now a ‘commonplace activity’.
According  to  former  CBS  Records  and  Polydor  marketing  and  promotions 
manager Jackie Hayden, the concept of buying music is alien to a growing percentage 
of  young  music  users.  A  combination  of  free  access  to  internet  databases  and  the 
proliferation  of  CD  burners  as  standard  devices  within  personal  computers  makes 
purchasing music ‘so out of date as to be almost laughable’ to a generation of ‘rip and 
burn merchants’. Hayden details much anecdotal evidence in support this argument. For 
example:
A guy recently told me that he was going out with his mate for a few drinks. He called to his 
mate and while he was waiting for him to come downstairs or whatever he was talking to his  
mate’s son who was watching MTV. The video for the new My Chemical Romance single came 
on and this guy said ‘That’s a fucking great song, I must get that’. Within about 15 seconds the 
mate’s son had downloaded it, burned it and gave it to him on a CD. 
(Jackie Hayden, personal interview)
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As  with  peer-to-peer  file-sharing,  some  interviewees  regard  CD  burning 
activities as not only depleting recorded music sales revenues, but also removing any 
incentive to produce creative works. For example:
You can copy CDs so easily  now,  everything  can  be burned,  Jesus,  so what’s  the point  in 
recording anymore? At the end of it you get nothing out of it. What’s the point?…But that’s the  
way that  life  is  going to be because  nobody wants to pay.  And nobody wants to pay for  it  
because they can copy it and get it for free. So they are stifling creativity, they are stifling it.  
(Michael O’Riordan, personal interview)
O’Riordan, Sheehan and others also identify side-loading is a key activity that 
drives down revenues. CD recordings that may have been purchased ‘legally’ in the first 
instance, and/or tracks that have been downloaded from the internet are entered into 
digital libraries such as Windows Media Player, Real Player or iTunes from which CD 
copies may be burned. Windows Media Player  or Real  Player  come as standard on 
many PC/laptop packages. The widespread existence of such digital libraries casts doubt 
over the need to replace music collections in the future in the way that new formats such 
as  the  CD have  been  used  to  replace  vinyl  or  cassette  in  the  past.  As  such,  some 
interviewees argue that back catalogue will lose its value in the future.
Portable storage devices 
In response to a general question about the evolution of the digital era, former MD of 
Virgin Ireland Dermot Hanrahan argued that we must place the advent of the internet 
and  MP3  files  in  a  longer-term  historical  context.  Hanrahan  described  a  series  of 
technological  developments  that  either  served  to  transform,  or  sought  but  failed  to 
transform music consumption up until  the advent  of the MP3 file.  He outlined how 
vinyl, cassette and CD technologies grew the market for music companies and bolstered 
the dominance of the most powerful ones. While minidisc and digital compact cassette 
technologies were employed to do likewise, they failed to repeat the success of the CD.
Hanrahan proceeds to argue that with these technologies, the dominance of the 
major record companies was assured by their ownership of the content these formats 
carried.  Copying  and  sharing  of  music  prior  to  the  internet  and  MP3  was  never 
significant  enough  to  stunt  the  growth  of  the  record  industry  and,  was  largely  the 
preserve of organised crime. However, Hanrahan, John Kennedy and other interviewees 
argued, digitalisation has transformed the arena of duplication and circulation to a point 
where ‘the masses have become the pirates’ (Dermot Hanrahan, personal interview). As 
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Hanrahan, John Sheehan and Willie Kavanagh explained, an additional key difficulty 
for the record business is the growing capacity of storage devices, and the growing ease 
with which music  can be  transferred.  During the  course of  our  interview Hanrahan 
produced a 60GB Apple iPod with sufficient storage capacity for approximately 20,000 
songs. This, as Hanrahan pointed out, was roughly the equivalent of 2,000 CD albums 
which vastly exceeds the ‘average record collection in the average Irish home’.  Citing 
Kryder’s  Law as  the  basis  for  his  thesis,  Hanrahan points  to  the rapidly increasing 
memory capacity of digital devices. This, combined with the ready availability of free 
music files and ever-increasing network speeds will serve to: 
…spread free music at a rate that was never conceived of before…Ten years from now iPods 
will theoretically have enough space to store the recorded catalogue of all the major record labels 
and carry it  around in your pocket. Can you imagine what a nightmare this is for the  music 
industry? The game is up. 
(Dermot Hanrahan, personal interview)
Although less fatalistic than Hanrahan in his analysis, ex-Sony Ireland Chairman 
John  Sheehan  sees  the  damaging  potential  of  such  storage  devices  for  the  record, 
arguing that: ‘there’s no doubt about it, that kind of technology is already in the stocks’ 
(John Sheehan, personal interview). 
EMI Chief Executive Willie Kavanagh, however, takes a more moderate view. 
Kavanagh  initially  argues  that  file-sharing  and  duplication  are  severely  hurting  the 
record business, and acknowledges a very significant threat posed by evolving storage 
devices. However, he rejects such doomsday scenarios as outlined by Hanrahan. The 
latter  explained  that  EMI  conduct  market  research  on  a  bi-annual  basis,  each  time 
updating, refining and building on a model encompassing ‘the broadest possible base of 
music  consumers’.  Conceiving  of  this  recorded  music  market  consumer  base  as 
‘complex  and multi-layered’  comprising  of  ‘whole different  levels  or  categories’  of 
music users, Kavanagh argues that beyond a minority of early-adopters who purchase or 
acquire large amounts of music, many consumers fail to possess sufficient interest or 
technological  knowledge to update their  files  or music library on a weekly or even 
monthly basis. Kavanagh further makes the point that while new releases generate big 
sales  in  the  short-term,  back  catalogue  is  hugely  important  to  his  company  and 
constitutes upwards of fifty per cent of sales in any given year. He explains that one of 
the biggest groups of buyers of back catalogue are people that buy either physical or 
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digital  recordings  as  a  replacement  product  for  recordings  they  already  have  in  an 
earlier format:
But are the buyers of back catalogue hugely technically savvy? And are they likely to improve to 
in their savvyness? Would they, for example, ever have known to go to Kazaa? They could have 
got anything they wanted there for free, but they still came to us…
(Willie Kavanagh, personal interview)
Shifting formats and associated consumption habits driving revenues down
While interviewees largely related peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies, CD burning 
appliances  and digital  storage devices  to  the ‘illegal’  distribution and duplication of 
recorded  music,  further  problems  arise  from  the  restructuring  of  the  ‘legitimate’ 
recorded music retail market in the internet era. Their core argument is that the decline 
of the album as the key industry format is resulting in lower profit margins. This is as a 
result  of  a  process  known as  ‘unbundling’  and  has  produced  a  marketplace  where 
consumers now purchase single tracks at digital music stores such as iTunes for 99 cents 
per song, rather than buying entire ‘bundled’ albums or collections.
According to the BPI (2009), sales of singles in the UK grew by 33% in 2008 
alongside a 3.2% decline in album sales. As table 6.2 below indicates, single sales over 
the five year period to the end of 2008 in the UK market increased by in excess of 
350%. So, while the market for singles is expanding rapidly, the market for albums is 
concomitantly contracting. 
Table 6.2: UK unit sales 2004-08 (combined physical and digital formats in millions) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Albums 163.4 159.0 157.7 138.1 133.6
Singles 32.3 47.9 67.0 86.6 115.1
Source: British Phonographic Industry (BPI) 2009
One interviewee,  Fachtna  O’Ceallaigh  outlines  how music  as  a  unit  as  been 
unbundled from whole albums to single songs via MP3s and subsequently unbundled 
further  in  ringtones  to  clips  of  music  no  more  than  a  few seconds  long.  This,  for 
O’Ceallaigh, is changing the habits and patterns associated with the music consumer in 
a manner that is causing the market to shrink:
The  Western  consumer  that  consumes  music  is  demanding  instant  gratification.  They  will 
download maybe two songs from an album on iTunes, and some of them might eventually pay 
for the whole album…but many who might previously have bought the album will now remain 
satisfied with their two 99c songs. (Fachtna O’Ceallaigh, personal interview)
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Music publisher Steve Lindsey goes much further, stating that the shift in formats to 
single-track downloading is the primary cause of crisis in the recording industry:
I think unbundling certainly has had a massive effect on the business as a whole. I have a bit  
more of a generalised view on all this. The public have more options now before them upon 
which to spend their money. When I was young, I’d go out and buy albums. I’d plan what I 
wanted to buy, I’d be in the record shops leafing through stuff for ages and ages, and the cost of 
an album was relatively high so you’d have to save your money to get them. Then the internet  
hadn’t been invented, there was no such thing as computer games, cinemas were fleapits – there  
were no multiplexes. But these days you have cinema and DVDs as commonplace. People, with 
their leisure time and leisure money spend it on things other than music. This is the main reason 
that the music business is in trouble. People don’t place any importance on albums anymore. For 
music, they just cherry-pick the tunes the want from iTunes. They are not necessarily interested 
in the albums that people are making anymore.
(Steve Lindsey, personal interview)
Lindsey’s  contention  is  supported  by  another  relatively  recent  report  on  the 
music industry is of interest here. The Value Recognition Strategy working group was 
created  in  the  UK in  2006 primarily  through  the  endeavours  of  independent  music 
companies and royalty collection societies, but with the backing of the industry as a 
whole. A 2007 report commissioned by this group to examine the declining value of 
revenue from sound recordings,  and compiled  by IT and business  consultancy firm 
Capgemini, lays the primary blame for falling sales revenues with format changes rather 
than piracy13. According to the Capgemini report, sound recordings revenues in the UK 
have  dropped  by  ST£480  million  between  2004  and  2007.  However  their  research 
indicates that only ST£86.4 million of this can be attributed to piracy, i.e. 18% of the 
total  estimated  loss.  Rather,  the  primary  cause  of  revenue  loss  they  identify  is  the 
unbundling of compact discs into an individual selection of digital songs. This process, 
according to Capgemini, has cost record industry ST£368 million over the same period, 
i.e. 77% of the total estimated loss. As such, the report suggests that lawsuits against 
illegal file-sharers and the suppliers of file-sharing software should not be the primary 
concern of the major music labels. Rather they should apply themselves to finding a 
consumer-friendly digital bundle.
13 In  addition to  format  changes  as  the primary cause  of  falling record  sales  revenues,  Capgemini’s 
findings indicate the discounting of recorded music products by established supermarket chains to be the 
secondary factor inducing the decline – again more threatening to the long-term viability of the record 
industry than internet file-sharing. Arguments around supermarket retailing are detailed in section 6.6 of 
this chapter.
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IFPI Chairman and CEO John Kennedy also outlined a shift from an album to a 
non-album world in which he argued single track downloads were costly to produce and 
disseminate, and fail to offset physical losses:
The digital business is not in its overall business as profitable as the physical, not least because 
the album model has fallen out in the digital world. It is not true that there are no distribution 
costs, or manufacturing costs just because it’s all done on the net. These are replaced by different 
types of costs like digitisation. On a single track model, in theory it is possible for that model to 
be more profitable, but you have marketing monies and promotion monies and recording cost  
investment which in the past would have driven an investment that would have given a return 
more often on an album than a single, and online it’s a much more per track business. So the 
economic model is much worse from that point of view. And remember too there are credit card 
costs. (John Kennedy, personal interview)
However Kennedy’s claims contradict an earlier assertion made by EMI Chairman Eric 
Nicoli. In a keynote address delivered at the 2006 Midem Music Industry Trade Fair in 
Cannes, Nicoli  stated that the digital  market  would grow to account for 25% of the 
overall music market by 2010. According to Nicoli, allowing consumers to download 
individual songs from an album – the so-called ‘unbundling’ of music – rather than 
requiring them to buy all of the tracks in an album package, is crucial to the ongoing 
success of the digital  market.  Nicoli  stated that ‘The day is surely within our sights 
when physical growth outstrips physical decline and we can all compete for a share of a 
growing pie’ (Nicoli cited on The Register online, 23rd January 2006).
Kennedy’s  assertion  about  the  lack  of  profitability  arising from a shift  from 
album to single track sales is also contested elsewhere. For example, Terry McBride, 
founder  and  CEO of  Nettwerk  Productions,  the  largest  independent  record  label  in 
Canada  has  consistently  argued  that  profit  margins  from  internet  downloads  are 
approximately  300%  greater  than  with  physical  formats  (Terry  McBride  blog  on 
www.nettwerk.com).  As such, the sale  of 3 to 4 single track digital  downloads can 
generate the equivalent profit of one CD album for record labels. 
This is in turn countered by independent record company owner Jim Carroll who 
views the logic of reduced costs surrounding manufacture, duplication and distribution 
as resulting in greater profit margins from single-track download as:
…a very sensible bean-counter economist approach to things.  But you must remember that the 
fucking record labels are still spending the same amount getting the product to market in the first  
place. The recording budgets haven’t shrunken, the amounts spent on marketing and distribution 
hasn’t shrunken. The packaging might be gone, but they are still paying out big advances to  
bands. They are still paying for recording studios. They are still paying big producers big fees. In  
terms of  the major  labels,  there  hasn’t  been  any cognisance  taken of  the  fact  that  they are 
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recording  and dealing  in  reduced  revenues  form digital  downloading.  (Jim Carroll,  personal 
interview)
However,  John Williamson contests  this  point  somewhat,  arguing that  reductions  in 
costs regarding packaging and physical manufacturing ‘ensures that the profit margins 
remain  as  high  as  possible  from  both  dealer  price  and  subsequently  retail  price’ 
(personal interview).
As such there are arguments and counter-arguments regarding to the benefits 
and drawbacks of the proliferation of single-track downloads for music companies.
6.5 Perceptions of record industry inefficiency
A  number  of  interviewees  who  participated  in  the  primary  research  phase  of  this 
research study level  two main  criticisms  at  the record  industry itself  for  helping  to 
induce the conditions within which its own revenues have being falling. The first, and 
most  common  accusation,  relates  to  the  industry  initially  choosing  to  ignore  the 
emergence of the internet as a medium for the distribution of music, and for failing to 
recognise or grasp the opportunities it offered by the internet for monetising digitised 
music files. This echoes Bakker’s (2005) research on the Dutch record industry (see 
chapter 4, section 4.6). The second accusation interviewees brought against the industry 
is that it became complacent during the CD boom years which yielded super-profits for 
the major labels and, that those same major labels were careless and wasteful in their 
investment in new talent. Given that MP3s and digital distribution originated outside of 
the  realm  of  the  dominant  players  in  the  record  industry  (unlike  key  previous 
innovations regarding cassette and CD technologies), some interviewees argued that the 
record industry was slow to evolve a response to such developments. For example:
The record industry has got itself into a lot of trouble by doing a lot of short-term thinking and  
short-term planning and by failing to look at long-term shifts. I can’t say that that isn’t a very 
difficult thing to do, but they are left trailing in the wake of every key digital change. They  
weren’t  on board  with file-sharing  early on trying  to  legitimise it  in  any sensible  way…So 
regarding key areas, key drivers that have been fundamental on how the music industry goes,  
they’ve been late at looking at how they can monetise those. 
(George Ergatoudis, Head of Music, BBC Radio 1, personal interview)
The record industry is largely to blame and I’m not talking about the Irish industry, I’m talking 
internationally. They have been incredibly sluggish about developing some kind of system for 
dealing  with  this.  It’s  not  like  it  just  came  out  of  nowhere.  This  has  been  a  very  distinct  
possibility for the past ten to fifteen years. The record companies have not been creative in terms 
of dealing with the advance of technology. 
(Bill Whelan, record producer, music publisher and composer, personal interview)
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Other interviewees emphasised a wastefulness that they traditionally associated 
with the major labels, and an incompetence that grew from the complacency of having 
long maintained a stranglehold on the channels of recorded music distribution:
Having  worked  for  two  companies,  I  think  the  major  companies  have  squandered  obscene 
amounts of money carelessly on artists who took the money that record companies should never  
have given them in the first place. A good example here would be the band An Emotional Fish. 
Record people tend to give people money, people who have no experience of dealing with it…
They just give money away, and then if they have a big hit, they forget. The issue becomes  
blurred as to where all of the other money went… It all became a bit fanciful really. In one sense 
they deserve everything they’ve got from letting the whole situation get out of control…Burying 
their heads in the sand from the internet is just another example of the same attitude. 
(Jackie Hayden, personal interview)
Such actions as described by Hayden also emphasise the extremely loose control they 
maintained  over  the  process  of  music  production.  Artist  manager  John  Williamson 
advances  similar  sentiments  based  on  his  experience  of  representing  artists  in 
negotiations with labels since the early 1990s:
You could build up mountains of anecdotal evidence about how inefficient they used to be. Even 
recently there was that report about how the new owners of EMI were deciding that they had to 
cut  back on the £20,000 a year  budget  for candles  that  they had! That sort  of  story can be 
replicated across all of the major record labels in terms of sheer wastefulness. The number of  
bands in the eighties and nineties that were using their taxi accounts to take them half way across  
the country… (Jackie Hayden, personal interview)
However,  others  argued  that  while  record  companies  were  guilty  of  such 
ignorance, this is now irrelevant as technology has rendered the outcome to be out of 
their hands:
The record industry has been playing King Canute for a decade now. They are almost like a 
version of the 1920s Detroit Guild of Blacksmiths, trying to stop the rollout of the motorcar.  
They  ignored  the  internet  and  have  done  everything  in  their  power  to  try  and  block  the 
advantages of the internet… They ignored it and believed that the world would remain theirs 
forever. But now they are running around in a flap wondering what to do next, so they sue the 
kids. (Dermot Hanrahan, ex-MD Virgin Ireland: personal interview)
Such an outlook, viewing technology in such stark deterministic terms, implies a futility 
to  the  actions  of  the  record  labels  or  their  representative  trade  bodies,  and  a 
hopelessness regarding their future.
One particular development, concomitant to the early digital start-ups such as 
MP3.com  in  the  1990s,  serves  to  support  views  that  the  major  music  companies 
misjudged  the  potential  associated  with  developments  in  the  digital  domain.  The 
inclusion of enhanced CD / CD ROM tracks as bonus tracks became standard on many 
CD album releases throughout the mid-to-late 1990s. Such add-ons often featured the 
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video relating to one of the single releases from the album, or documentary footage or 
photographs pertaining to the making of the album. The widespread use and promotion 
of such a format for pitching their products at PC-using music consumers suggests that 
the major music companies treated the personal computer primarily as a stand-alone 
reproduction device without considering or engaging with the possibilities associated 
with networks.
Unsurprisingly, record industry trade body representatives defended the actions, 
or lack of action of their members. While acknowledging that the record industry was 
slow to respond regarding the internet, IRMA Director General Dick Doyle argues that 
it could not have been any other way:
Did the record industry ignore the internet? I think yes, yes. That’s been said for many years,  
many years. But ten years ago nobody could ever have seen its growth. It’s been said that the  
industry had their heads in the sand for too long, and my response to that is yeah, it’s probably  
true…(Dick Doyle, personal interview)
However, IFPI Chairman and CEP John Kennedy argues that the response of the record 
business could not have been any faster or any different: 
As I travel around the world and speak to governments and media, when they continually throw 
the criticism at  me that  the record  industry didn’t  do enough to help itself,  or didn’t  move  
quickly in response to the internet,  I always  ask them to tell me what we should have done 
differently. Nobody has ever given me a great answer to that. 
(John Kennedy, personal interview)
Kennedy further argues that the response of the record industry to the advent of the 
internet is exemplified in how it migrated to a very successful online model initially via 
a-la-carte download digital music stores, and subsequently via other platforms. He then 
presented the mobile model as an example of the record industry ‘flying the flag’ for 
creative industries at the digital coalface:
In 2007 digital music went from two billion dollars to three billion dollars. Our digital industry 
has grown fifty per cent over the past year. Any industry would be very proud of that. 
(John Kennedy, personal interview) 
However,  Belle  and Sebastian  manager  John Williamson  is  fast  to  highlight 
what he regarded as an obvious solution that could have been implemented almost a 
decade ago. He focuses on the rapid and widespread diffusion of the Napster software 
programme between 1999 and 2001:
What strikes me most is what a wasted opportunity Napster was for the record companies. The  
number of chances they had during the 1999-2001 period to monetise things like Napster and set 
up a model at the beginning that would yield them profits for years, but they didn’t. I still think  
the really obvious one was, that when the Napster court cases were going on in 2001, at one 
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point  there  was an offer  of compensation,  and there was the opportunity to take it  as  well.  
Napster had however many users globally, and at that point, if they had had the vision to see 
forward. (John Williamson, personal interview)
Napster had started unauthorised sharing of copyrighted music files in 1999. By 2001 
had  become  one  of  the  world’s  most  popular  peer-to-peer  file-sharing  services. 
According to Napster’s own newsletter in 2000, it had 50 million users. If accurate, or 
close to accurate, that figure would make Napster comparable with AOL, the world’s 
largest ISP in terms of users. Williamson continues:
I think a lot of people bought into Napster more so than the subsequent file-sharing services,  
because everything was there,  it  had absolutely everything. You could find the most obscure 
seven-inch single from the seventies there and you could find the latest Madonna album there 
and everything in between, because it was there, somebody would have digitised it and uploaded 
it. People love the idea of being able to find anything. You could never get access to that much 
stuff in any record shop. So there was, through this mechanism, an opportunity to access and 
rope in a vast percentage of Napster users if, at that point, the record companies had decided to 
just take the compensation, buy out Napster, keep everything – all of the content, and pick up a 
small  subscription fee every month. I’ve seen the calculations before – If  10% of all  of the  
people who used Napster subscribed, then the turnover of the global record industry would have 
been bigger than it was from physical at the time. That was the opportunity they had. 
(John Williamson, personal interview)
A number of interviewees including Williamson, Jim Carroll, ex-Sony Ireland 
Chairman  John  Sheehan  and  IRMA/PPI  DG  Dick  Doyle  detailed  how  the  major 
companies  were  unable  to  agree  on  an  appropriate  business  model  for  any  such 
prospective digital venture. While subscription models and pay-per-download models 
were considered, none were pursued at the time. Dick Doyle offers a reason as to why 
no swift decisions were taken at the time, and why it was only in the years subsequent 
to the Napster case that digital business models emerged: 
It is much, much more difficult to set up a legitimate business model than it is an illegal business 
model. An illegal business model is simple – you just put someone else’s content up, and you 
make your money out of advertising. But to set up a legitimate business, you have to negotiate  
with all of the stakeholders in the industry. I’m not just talking about record companies here –  
record companies are just part of the industry. You also have publishers, the artists, and then you 
have to negotiate with the people who are going to deliver the service, so you buy SPs. Then 
once you’ve done all of that, you’ve got to set up a secure system for payment. So out of every  
ninety-nine cent track that you sell, there are about 5 or 6 stakeholders taking a cut.  That’s a 
legitimate business model. You have to talk to everyone. To set up an illegal one, it’s simple, 
you just don’t talk to anybody. This is why it took so long to respond. This is why it took so long 
to get everyone involved. (Dick Doyle, personal interview)
Williamson,  however,  contests this  explanation arguing that there were solutions the 
major companies could have taken much earlier, but the most potentially ‘dangerous’ 
factor was their indecisiveness. He contends that ‘any bold decision’ taken by the major 
companies during the MP3.com and Napster period such as the ‘full-scale launch’ of 
either à la carte, subscription or other models of service ‘would have worked’ because at 
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that point in time the major record companies ‘were so powerful that they could almost 
make the market bend around them’ (personal interview).
Furthermore, until recently the majors have adamantly refused to do the kind of 
deals necessary to replicate what the original Napster, Kazaa or eDonkey had provided 
–  i.e.  The  consistently  refused  to  issue  blanket  licenses  that  would  enable  internet 
service providers to sell music via an ‘all you can eat’ music buffet to network users 
whereby users could download, burn and swap files in return for a subscription fee. 
This, according to John Williamson, was a key mistake. However, in the light of recent 
legal successes against  the ISPs,  by the summer of 2008 the reticence of the major 
labels to engage in such licensing agreements was relenting somewhat. According to 
John Kennedy, ‘the labels would be willing to engage’ in discussion ‘should ISPs want 
to explore such a move as part of a wider process of assisting the record labels in the 
fight  against  piracy’  (personal  interview).  Kennedy’s  remarks  reflect  a  significant 
change in  the  attitude  of  the  major  labels  towards  online  business  models,  and the 
potential for revenue generation now seen from blanket subscription. . In the UK such a 
move is already underway with a venture called Playlouder MSP who are negotiating 
deals with record companies and music publishers for an internet access service that 
will include the right to download millions of songs, transfer them to portable devices 
and  subsequently  share  them.  Under  such  an  agreement  copyright  owners  will  be 
compensated  from  a  royalty  pool  deriving  from  subscription  fees  based  on  the 
popularity of their recordings on the service. To monitor the network and enforce its 
borders, Playlouder MSP uses technology that can identify songs as they pass through 
the network, and if necessary, block them. To date, several independent companies in 
the  UK  have  agreed  licensing  deals  with  Playlouder  MSP.  Of  the  key  labels  that 
Kennedy and the IFPI rpresent,  Sony-BMG and EMI have this far agreed to supply 
songs to Playlouder, but with the added security of electronic locks to inhibit sharing. 
Recognising that such agreements held ‘some potential’ for music companies, 
former Sony Music Ireland Chairman John Sheehan held that revenue streams would be 
limited as ‘record companies would be competing over a fixed pool of money’ (personal 
interview).  However  the  fees  that  consumer  would  pay  under  subscription  to  such 
services account  for only a portion of the monies  that  such ISP music  services can 
generate for recording and music publishing copyright holders. There is also potential 
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revenue from advertising,  mobile  phone companies,  device  makers  and other  music 
services that wish to have themselves incorporated into the network.
6.6 Supermarkets driving revenues down and stifling creativity
Another  significant  development  highlighted  by  many  interviewees  as  influencing 
recorded  music  revenue  trends  relates  to  the  increased  market-share  enjoyed  by 
supermarkets in music retailing.  Supermarket giants such as Walmart in the US and 
Tesco in  Britain  and Ireland have  gained  market  share  in  CDs through low prices. 
Chains such as Wal-Mart and Best Buy accounted for 65% of all  physical  recorded 
music retail purchases in the US in 2008 (Nielssen Soundscan cited in  The New York 
Times, January 1st 2009).
As  supermarket  chain  outlets  have  proliferated,  so  too  has  shelf-space  for 
recorded music products. For example, according to Tesco Ireland Assistant Company 
Secretary Eamonn Durnin, as of spring, Tesco operate a total of 107 stores throughout 
the Republic of Ireland, all of which are licensed to carry music (personal interview). 
On the surface, this appears to carry obvious benefits for record companies, given the 
added profile available for their recordings at retail level. According to Brian Rose, the 
Commercial Director of Universal Music UK and Ireland, supermarket music retailing: 
…fits  well  with  the  music  market’s  strongest  growth  demographic,  the  over-forties…They 
[supermarkets] make music easier to purchase for a mass market purely through convenience 
and the fact that fifteen million people who shop on Tesco each have music put in front of them.  
(cited in The Guardian, Thursday December 21st 2006)
In recollecting the entry of supermarkets into the spectrum of music retailing in 
the 1990s, IFPI Chairman and CEO John Kennedy recollects how music retail chains 
stocked vegetables on their shelves as an act of protest against their new competition. 
However  Kennedy,  Willie  Kavanagh  and  Sheehan  point  to  supermarkets  as  an 
additional and valuable point of outlet for their products. Failing to ‘do business’ with 
supermarkets would be ‘unthinkable’, according to Kennedy, given the vast consumer 
base that is reachable via these retailers. However Kennedy, Kavanagh and Sheehan do 
concede that supermarkets deals make for more difficult negotiation parties given their 
sheer size. Their subsequent ability engage in levels of bulk buying provides them with 
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a  significant  level  of  leverage  relative  to  other  forms  of  retail  such  as  dedicated 
music/entertainment stores.
Many other interviewees almost exclusively regarded the deals between music 
companies as damaging the long-term viability of their industry and levelled three main 
criticisms at the supermarket sector which they regard as contributing to the state of 
crisis:
1) The negotiating  power of giant  supermarket  chains  and their  in-store pricing 
structures have forced down retail prices of recordings and consequently driven 
overall sales revenues downward.
2) Supermarket music retailing feeds a growing perception of music as a low-value 
(or  no-value)  product.  In  combination  with  a  number  of  other  factors, 
supermarkets  contribute to recorded music being perceived as a product with 
little value in its own right, rather recorded music’s value is seen as an ‘add-on’ 
to other associated products.
3) In  addition  to  arguments  around  the  effects  of  file-sharing  on  traditional 
recorded music retailers [see chapter 6, section 6.2], some interviewees argue 
that by virtue of their pricing structures, supermarkets are hastening the decline 
of specialised music retailers. 
I  shall  briefly  examine  each  of  these  three  factors  that  are  seen  as  devaluing  the 
recorded music market.
Supermarkets driving down recorded music sales revenues
Some interviewees see the deals between the record industry and supermarkets as a 
short-term panic-induced strategy on the part of the labels aimed at increasing unit sales 
and market share in a declining market, but with diminishing returns:
With fewer records being bought, the record labels are doing whatever the can to try and get 
people to buy music, and this is what has driven them to the situation with the supermarkets. 
(Steve Lindsey, music publisher, personal interview)
As  key  bulk  buyers  of  recorded  music,  supermarkets  are  perceived  as  having  the 
negotiating  power  to  acquire  cheaper  wholesale  prices  than  specialised 
music/entertainment stores. For example,  according to former London Records A&R 
man Jim Carroll:
135
The supermarkets have become big powers in terms of pushing the price of the physical product 
down. They are happy to carry CDs as a loss leader because they need to have everything there.  
And they have got the power of the multiple buyer.  They are so vast and massive, and they 
operate with the record labels the same way the operate with the people who are selling them in 
milk  or  bread  or  cheese  or  whatever  commodity  they  are  buying  in.  So  they  are  pushing  
wholesale prices down. (Jim Carroll, personal interview)
In a similar vein, IFPI chairman and CEO John Kennedy argues that in most businesses 
people get volume discount from their suppliers. But what happens with supermarkets 
in particular is that they reduce their margins to next to zero. According to Kennedy, 
one of the key reasons that music is such a valuable commodity to the retail  sector 
because of the vast amount of marketing and promotion there is in music, so ‘it drives 
footfall in supermarkets’ (personal interview).
Other interviewees regard the major record labels as being complicit in driving 
their own revenues downwards by agreeing to terms laid down by the supermarkets, 
who in turn sell on the records at reduced margins, or even as a loss-leader in order to 
attract consumers to their stores for other more traditional supermarket products and 
goods. According to Independent Records MD Dave O’Grady:
The majors fucked up. I don’t personally believe that their decline is specifically to do with 
digital.  I  think  it  is  to  do  with  the  way  they  bent  over  for  the  supermarkets,  and  let  the 
supermarkets sell their biggest sellers…For the labels it was just greed too. They wanted market  
share  and  units.  They saw something  and  got  greedy.  They saw a  million Westlife  albums 
getting sold in a supermarket. They just bent over and took it. 
(Dave O’Grady, personal interview)
However, according to Steve Lindsey and John Williamson, the pricing structures and 
strategies  of  the  supermarkets  are  in  fact  of  little  consequence  to  the  major  record 
companies as it is retail and not wholesale prices that are primarily affected:
It is the supermarkets that are taking the hits on the profit margins, not the record labels. The  
record  labels  are  certainly  doing  deals,  they  are  doing  deals  for  bulk  that  might  not  be  as 
profitable as previous, but Tesco and the like will sell CDs at cost price or less than cost price in  
many instances just to attract shoppers. (John Williamson, personal interview)
The views of  those who regard supermarket-record industry deals  as  hurting 
ultimately  serving  to  contract  the  record  companies  are  reflected  in  the  Value 
Recognition Strategy working group’s report examining declining revenues from sound 
recordings (Capgemini,  2006). As well  as highlighting the decline of the album and 
proliferation of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks,  this report  highlights  the ongoing 
deals  between  music  companies  and  large  supermarket  chains  such  as  Tesco  and 
Sainsbury’s as the third most significant factor in driving down revenues from record 
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sales  and  reducing  the  value  of  recorded  music  products.  The  report  found  that 
supermarkets had succeeded in forcing the overall price of CDs and DVDs downwards. 
Tesco  Ireland’s  Eamonn  Durnin  refutes  accusations  of  his  company  selling 
music as a loss-leader. He states that Tesco’s:
…objective is to give customers convenience and value…The music and DVD aspect of our 
business has shown strong growth in recent years, showing that our customers like what we do. 
(Eamonn Durnin, personal interview)
Durnin further argues that sales of such items as CDs, DVDs, books and electronics 
experienced double-digit growth during 2008 in the context of growing its overall sales 
revenues in Ireland by 5.2% to €3.2 billion.  In 2008, Tesco relaunched a revamped 
music download service, seeking to position itself as yet another challenger to Apple’s 
iTunes. By early 2009, Tesco had licensed in excess of five million songs which it made 
available  for  download as  MP3s.  This  is  in  contrast  to  its  previous  download store 
(www.tescodownloads.com)  where  songs  were  available  in  Windows  Media  format 
only. All of this, according to Durnin, ‘is a sign of Tesco’s intentions to diversify and 
increase its  revenues by expanding into areas beyond traditional  lines like food and 
clothing’ (Eamonn Durnin, personal interview). 
Supermarkets narrow-casting and devaluing music
In addition to (economically) devaluing music, the second major criticism levelled at 
supermarkets is that they contribute to recorded music being perceived as a product with 
an  ever-decreasing  ‘stand-alone’  value.  For  music  publisher  and  former Polygram 
executive  Steve  Lindsey,  supermarket  retailing  combines  with  other  contemporary 
circulation and distribution trends to generate a growing perception of recorded music 
as a free product, or a product that comes as a free add-on linked to other products or 
services:
Supermarkets selling albums at the prices they are selling at, well that’s just business. You also 
have the Sunday papers  giving away albums. This doesn’t  help because it  means the public 
perceives music as being either free or else not having much value at all. So snapshot at this 
moment in time is that people can download it illegally where they just take what they want to  
take, they can get it for free from a newspaper or buy it cheaply in a supermarket. I think it is 
that devaluing of music that is the biggest  problem. That’s the main problem that the music 
business is now facing – finding the ways and means of getting music bought and that it does 
have a value as it once had. (Steve Lindsey, personal interview)
Alison Wenham, the CEO of the Association of Independent Music, the trade 
body  representing  independent  labels  in  the  UK  and  Ireland,  argues  that  by  only 
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offering an extremely limited mainstream catalogue, supermarkets are driving society 
towards a conformist music scene where:
…the  industry  pursues  ‘sound-a-likes’  for  James  Blunt  in  a  market  in  derivatives…The 
stranglehold that supermarkets now have on the CD retail market is ultimately bad for music…
The independents are the originators of all new trends and if you stifle the means with which  
they get into the market at an early stage, you will stifle the music market. 
(Alison Wenham, personal interview)
Thus by virtue of the fact that they only carry select Top 50 and classic hits recordings, 
supermarkets  not  only  preclude  vast  catalogues  of  recorded  music  repertoire  from 
access to an audience via their shopshelves, such narrow-casting also hinders artistic 
and creative innovation which, ultimately will carry commercial consequences for the 
industry as a whole:
The one thing to remember about the major record companies and the supermarkets is that they 
don’t give a shit about what is on the records they sell. They don’t care. That is another element  
that I am sorry to observe at the moment. The public are being sold very mediocre and very safe 
stuff and the record companies are trying to keep the accountants happy. 
(Steve Lindsey, personal interview)
Alison Wenham, Dave O’Grady and Jim Carroll also argue that while Tesco’s digital 
service provides a vastly broader repertoire than the physical supermarkets that only 
carry  Top  50  albums  and  select  back  catalogue,  Tesco’s  digital  store  is  almost 
exclusively licensed from the four major labels. 
Even when independent  labels  gain  access  to  supermarket  shelves,  a  further 
problem comes to light. Tesco, for example, operate exclusively on a sale or return basis 
in terms of their dealings with record labels. Such agreements are carry the potential to 
be significantly more problematic for smaller labels rather than the majors:
If Tesco want to stock that in all of their shops in the UK they might initially buy 50,000 copies  
of that album. If they only sell 20,000 copies then suddenly, six months down the road that label  
is finding itself being shipped back 30,000 copies. So this affects the way the record labels work  
because the supermarkets work in a totally different way. 
(Jim Carroll, personal interview)
Supermarkets collapsing music retailing
One  sector  which  has  suffered  significantly  from  the  move  by  Tesco  and  other 
supermarket chains into music retailing is the traditional record store. According to Jim 
Carroll, supermarkets are most damaging the independent retail sector. Price sensitive 
consumers, according to Carroll, no longer go to specialised music retailers who cannot 
compete with the supermarkets on retail prices. While the range of stock on the shelves 
of specialised stores usually far exceeds the narrow band of recordings retailed through 
supermarkets, outlets chains such as HMV and Zavvi are losing a significant portion of 
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their  consumer  base.  We have seen  the  disappearance  of  Tower  in  New York and 
London and Virgin in Dublin. According to John Kennedy, price competition based on 
the volume discounts supermarkets can negotiate makes it increasingly for music stores 
to sustain themselves. However, as former independent music retail chain owner Bruce 
Findlay emphasises, it is smaller chains such as Golden Discs and Dolphin Discs as well 
as independent  stores that  are suffering most.  In the UK, independent  retailer  chain 
Fopp went out of business in 2007. Road Records closed in Ireland in 2009. The loss of 
such stores  also means  the  loss  of  a  traditional  means  of  acquiring  knowledge and 
information about new music for music fans:
What people forget about, and this is something that the independent retail sector hasn’t been 
great at pushing is the fact that the independent sector was the place to go to get information  
about records, but that’s gone now. (Bruce Findlay, personal interview)
The demise of more traditional recorded music retail outlets must also be contextualised 
in the broader transition to digital,  the emergence of new online outlets  for physical 
such as Amazon and My Play, and rising high street rents.
Table 6.3: Retail (list) price (£) of top ten selling albums in UK Album Chart - Week of Monday July 
6th 2009
Pos. Artist Title Label HMV Tesco
1 Michael Jackson The Essential Michael Jackson Epic  (Sony) 18.99 8.93
2 La Roux La Roux Polydor (Universal) 9.99 8.93
3 Michael Jackson Number Ones Epic  (Sony) 16.99 6.47
4 Kasabian West Ryder Pauper… RCA  (Sony) 9.99 8.93
5 Michael Jackson King Of Pop Epic  (Sony) 10.99 8.93
6 Michael Jackson Thriller Epic  (Sony) 16.99 6.47
7 Paulo Nutini Sunny Side Up Atlantic (Warner) 9.99 8.93
8 Lady Gaga The Fame Interscope (Universal) 16.99 8.93
9 Greatest Hits Bruce Springsteen Columbia (Sony) 16.99 8.93
10 Michael Jackson Off the Wall Epic  (Sony) 10.99 6.00
Average 13.89 8.15
Source: Author
Note:  Prices obtained from HMV, High St., Sheffield; Tesco, Berkeley Precinct, Ecclesall Rd., Sheffield.
Belle  and Sebastian  manager  John Williamson questions a  disparity  between 
unit sales and falling revenues, and argues that declining revenues from sales at retail 
level does not imply that significantly less units of recorded music are being purchased. 
Williamson also highlights supermarkets as a key actor in reducing wholesale and retail 
revenues:
Increasingly HMV and Zavvi are competing with Tesco on chart releases but keeping prices up 
on the kinds of releases that don’t make it into Tesco. I’m sure it’s the case that unit sales are not  
necessarily down as far as falling revenues suggest. The average price of a music unit is much 
lower than it was ten years ago. Looking at BPI statistics, they show that the actual decline in 
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unit sales in the UK have held up pretty well. They have gone down, but not substantially, yet 
revenues have decreased substantially. 
(John Williamson, personal interview)
Williamson  further  argues  that  supermarkets  are  unfairly  vilified  by many over  the 
decline  of  overall  industry sales and the collapse of the traditional  retail  sector.  He 
considers  the  actions  of  the  supermarkets  in  ‘playing  hardball’  to  achieve  greater 
volume discounts as ‘no different from what Fopp or HMV or any of the music-specific  
retailers have actually done over the years’ (John Williamson, personal interview). In 
negotiating  lower  wholesale  prices,  supermarkets  have,  as  Williamson  sees  things, 
merely  taken  advantage  of  the  fact  that  record  companies  are  now  in  a  weaker 
bargaining position.
However, alongside the decline of specialised music retail stores, new physical 
outlets for recorded music have emerged. While artist manager Ben Barrett explains that 
on one hand physical retailing has become ‘so crunched up’ in recent years ‘that the 
margins are becoming smaller and smaller so its harder to make traditional retail work’ 
(personal interview). On the other hand, she proceeds to outline how non-traditional 
‘bricks  and  mortar’  retail  outlets  for  physical  recordings  have  become  increasingly 
important to both artists and record industry. Supermarkets such as Tesco in the UK and 
Wallmart  in  the  US form one  example  for  Barrett.  Starbucks  coffee  shops  provide 
another: ‘Starbuck’s is becoming a massive retailer of music in America, and it’s very 
important  for  people  like  who want  to  sell  records’  (personal  interview).  Similarly, 
Universal’s  Lost  Highway  record  label  partnered  with  Wal-Mart  to  give  the 
supermarket  exclusive ‘physical’  retail  distribution on The Eagles 2007 album  Long 
Walk Out Of Eden. Also, Paul McCartney chose to release his 2007 album Memory 
Almost Full exclusively though Starbuck’s. 
6.7 Chapter Summary
Ultimately  the  initial  response  of  interviewees  to  questions  of  change  in  the  music 
industry serves to reinforce common-sense assumptions advanced in media, journalistic 
and other accounts referred to at the outset of the introduction to this thesis. For many,  
the  record  industry  has  seen  its  power  fundamentally  diminished  as  a  result  of 
technological change, primarily the proliferation of file-sharing software on the internet. 
140
Declining  record  industry  sales  statistics  is  taken  as  the  key  evidence  of  a  crisis, 
alongside the consequent loss of jobs in the sector and the decline of physical retail 
outlets. A variety of causal factors are advanced as explanations for these problems. 
Primarily,  the evolution of  digital  distribution,  duplication  and storage technologies, 
resultant  ‘piracy’  and  the  related  factors  of  from  shifting  formats,  changing 
consumption habits and the rise of supermarket music retailing. With all of this we must 
consider  the  confusing  and  contradictory  array  of  research  on  the  ‘effects’  of  file-
sharing  as  well  as  arguments  around  the  record  industry  acting  to  induce  its  own 
problems.
The above accounts, however, become problematised in chapter seven. It must 
be noted that while my initial question asked for consideration of change in the music 
industry, the vast majority of responses initially focussed on the record industry. While 
the recording sector has been the most dominant force within the music industry for 
many decades, it constitutes only part of the larger framework that is the music industry. 
In addition to this, publishing, live performance and increasingly merchandise and other 
music services serve to form a network of business that increasingly generate revenues 
via the exploitation of rights from a broad, and increasing body of sources. As such, by 
focussing exclusively on recording, many other potentially significant revenue streams 
are precluded from consideration in the argument. As we shall see from the evolving 
trends across the broader music industries outlined by interviewees in chapter seven, 
arguing that there is a crisis in the record industry is distinctly different from arguing 
that there is a crisis in the music industry.  
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Chapter 7: Findings 2 – Music Industry ‘Responses’
7.1   Introduction
Chapter  six  identified  the  key  problems  currently  being  experienced  by  the  record 
industry. In this second chapter of research findings, we focus on the core strategies of 
the  established  music  companies  as  they  reposition  themselves  to  respond  to  the 
challenges posed primarily by the disruptive potential of internet technologies. Drawing 
primarily  upon  research  material  from  my  interviews,  supplemented  by  data  from 
industry reports and trade publications, this chapter examines the opportunities that have 
evolved for these companies as a result of new and emerging digital platforms. 
This chapter also places the record industry in the context of a broader range of 
music industry sub-sectors. It examines how proliferating revenue streams from both 
new and traditional  channels  around recording,  music  publishing,  live  performance, 
merchandise and other are increasingly falling under the umbrella of the core players 
that dominate the global music industries. 
The first  task of the chapter  is  to detail  the ongoing roles of legislative and 
judicial systems in evolving and enforcing copyright law. In addition to their pursuit of 
file-sharing software suppliers  and individual  network users  through the courts,  this 
chapter initially outlines how trade bodies representing the interests of the major music 
companies  have  more  recently  switched  their  attention  to  internet  service  providers 
(ISPs). Concomitant with these developments is the rise of the digital music market. 
While  ‘legal’  digital  music  stores  have  proliferated  to  grow the  digital  music  sales 
market, the major companies have also been adept at engaging the services of social 
networks as avenues of both promotion for their products, but also as sources of direct 
revenue through licensing agreements. These developments illustrate a trend where the 
major music companies have sued a social media network, settled, licensed and then 
gained equity in the service.
Beyond this, the chapter examines the benefits for both the recording and music 
publishing sectors accrued from synchronisation fees deriving from the use of music in 
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film,  television  and,  perhaps  most  significantly  in  the  contemporary  environment, 
royalties generated through the ongoing proliferation of advertising. In particular, the 
year-on-year growth in music publishing revenues suggests that more opportunities for 
the exploitation of music in public spaces now exists, and also that the royalty collection 
societies  have  become  more  assiduous  in  targeting  music  users  on  behalf  of  their 
members. Next, the chapter focuses on the growing live music industry and it examines 
how actors in this industrial chain are becoming increasingly vertically-integrated, with 
power across all aspects of the live industry increasingly falling under the control of the 
same  core  group  of  actors.  Furthermore,  it  examines  the  convergence  of  the  live 
industry with the other core industrial sectors, i.e. music, publishing and merchandising. 
The  chapter  then  addresses  a  broader  process  of  conglomeration  whereby  music 
recordings,  music  publishing  repertoires,  technological  devices  and  the  enabling 
software  and  services  are  all  increasingly  falling  under  the  ownership  of  the  same 
corporations. Such a convergence of interests between manufacturers and suppliers of 
technology and music companies enables the cross-promotion of products, services and 
content.  Then,  within  the  context  of  all  of  the  above,  a  number  interviewees  offer 
perspectives on the evolution of 360-degree deals for music artists. Here, the rights to 
all artist-generated revenues are increasingly centred at one corporate entity. Finally, we 
discuss the opening up of new markets for recorded music in China and Russia since the 
turn of the millennium.
7.2  Copyright, internet service providers and the courts
On a number of occasions during the course of both of my interviews with IFPI Chair 
and CEO John Kennedy, he makes reference to widespread internet ‘piracy’ on various 
networks across the world. For evidence of this, he directs me to visit the ‘news’ page 
on  his  organisation’s  website  (www.ifpi.org),  the  contents  of  which,  he  states, 
highlights  the  scale  of  the  problem facing  copyright  holders.  This  site  publishes  a 
proliferating  litany of  accounts  outlining  the  pursuit  of  the  suppliers  of  file-sharing 
technologies and individual network users. Below are a handful of examples of recent 
and archived stories.
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July 2009 saw the IFPI achieve the shutdown of Qsound, a South American file-
sharing  network  and  Colombo-BT.org,  the  largest  BitTorrent  tracker  site  in  Italy 
(www.ifpi.org,  7th  July  2009).  Promusicae,  the  organisation  representing  the  record 
industry in Spain, filed a claim for €13m against Pablo Soto with the Madrid Court for 
Commercial Matters (Promusicae press release, cited on www.ifpi.org, 5th June 2009). 
Soto  is  accused  of  profiting  from the  design  of  the  Blubster,  Manolito  and  Piolet 
networks that allow for the transfer of music for free on the internet. In July 2008, the 
Sunnydale Hub which provided file-sharing services was shut down by authorities in 
Mexico (www.ifpi.org,  16th July 2008). In May 2008, Zhongzou, a Chinese internet 
search engine,  was found guilty  of  infringing recording copyright  by the  Copyright 
Bureau of Hebei Province and Cangzhou City following the lodgement of a complaint 
to  the  Copyright  Bureau  by  the  IFPI  (www.ifpi.org,  21st  May  2008).  In  Prague, 
following  an  investigation  and  subsequent  complaint  by  the  IFPI  Anti-Piracy  Unit, 
Czech police shut down a computer server at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech 
Republic that was being used to store and upload music onto the internet via a site 
called Blind Alley (www.ifpi.org, 23rd April 2008). December 2007 saw a landmark 
case in China where a Beijing court ruled that Yahoo China’s music delivery service 
violates Chinese law by facilitating mass copyright infringement. The initial claims filed 
in the No.2 Intermediate People’s Court concerned infringement of key international 
artists such as U2 and Destiny’s Child. November 2007 saw Dutch peer-to-peer file-
sharing site Shareconnector.com closed by authorities following a successful case taken 
by BREIN, the Dutch anti-piracy watchdog, in the Civil Court of Appeal in Amsterdam. 
These accounts represent a handful of representative samples of the type of story 
relayed via this source on a near daily basis. Kennedy also advances that the pursuit of 
individual network users has intensified with, as of late 2008, approximately 35,000 
individuals  awaiting  court  appearances  in  the  US  alone  for  downloading  and  file-
sharing offences. As Kennedy suggests, such accounts imply the problems posed by 
digitalisation to copyright owners to be many and widespread. But, we recognise also 
that many of these stories are stories of success for the same copyright owners against 
‘infringers’  in  the  courts.  Thus  they  advance  another  reality –  the  continued  and 
successful pursuit of ‘pirates’ by the record industry’s various national offices across 
the world.
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The severity of the consequences for copyright  infringement  imposed by the 
judicial systems within nation-states around the world is perhaps most starkly illustrated 
by the much publicised 2009 trial of Jammie Thomas-Rasset, a Minnesota mother who 
was sued by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) for sharing twenty-
four  songs  on  file-sharing  network  Kazaa  back  in  2005.  Thomas-Rasset  was  found 
guilty on twenty-four counts  of wilful infringement  and ordered to pay the relevant 
record companies a total of US€1.92m – precisely €80,000 for each of the twenty-four 
music files either downloaded or shared. The RIAA had sought €3.6m in compensation, 
i.e. €150,000 per song. It is, again, sobering to contrast this with the €1,000 maximum 
penalty imposed in the state of California for the theft of a CD from a bricks and mortar 
store. Taking the average CD album to contain approximately ten tracks, that amounts 
to a maximum penalty of approximately €100 per track. Thus, the penalty for sharing 
something in cyberspace is eight hundred times greater than stealing it in real-space. We 
are reminded here of a recurring theme in Lessig’s work (1999, 2001, 2004) relating to 
the increasingly severe consequences of contemporary copyright protection.
One of the most high profile copyright infringement cases of 2009 featured The 
Pirate Bay, a Swedish website providing file-sharing services. According to  The Los  
Angeles Times, Pirate Bay operated as:
…one of the world’s largest facilitators of illegal downloading… the most visible member of a 
bourgeoning anti-copyright – or pro-piracy – movement that is striking terror in the heart of an 
industry that seems ever less capable of stopping it.
 (The Los Angeles Times, Sunday April 29th 2007)
However,  in April  2009 The Pirate  Bay’s  four founders,  Peter  Sunde, Fredrik Neij, 
Gottfrid Svartholm and Carl Lundström were each found guilty of aiding and abetting 
copyright infringement and sentenced to a one year prison term and a fine of US$3.6m. 
June 2009 subsequently saw software company Global Gaming Factory X acquire The 
Pirate Bay.  Global Gaming Factory X announced that they had devised ‘a new business 
model’ for The Pirate Bay which ‘satisfies the needs of all parties, content providers, 
broadband operators,  end users and the judiciary’  (Global  Gaming Factory X, press 
release, Monday 30th June 2009). This new business plan centred on making the site 
‘legitimate’  via  licensing  agreements  with  the  four  major  music  companies  for  the 
vending  and  streaming  of  their  recorded  music  content.  The  music  companies 
subsequently issued a fresh lawsuit  against  the former Pirate Bay owners, seeking a 
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share from the proceeds of the sale of the site to Global Gaming on the grounds that the  
value of the website derived primarily from its ‘illicit’ use of their copyrighted material 
(www.ifpi.org, Wednesday July 16th 2009).
 
The pursuit of internet service providers through the courts
Beyond pursuing the producers and suppliers of file sharing technologies and individual 
users of these technologies, a more recent trend has seen the major record companies 
turn their attention towards internet service providers (ISPs).
According to EMI Chief Executive Willie Kavanagh, who is also the current 
Chairman  of  IRMA,  the  selective  targeting  of  individual  file-sharers  is  both  time-
consuming and costly. Kavanagh emphasises how the company he works for and the 
industry he represents has suffered losses in revenue of approximately 30% since 2001. 
He argues that the record industry is being ‘savaged’ and that internet service providers 
must be placed under an obligation to filter traffic on their networks as to curb illegal  
file-sharing by their users. In a similar vein, a speech delivered to the Music Matters 
conference in Hong Kong in June 2008 by U2 manager  Paul McGuinness saw him 
launch  an  assault  on  ISPs.  McGuinness  argues  that  recorded  music  is  experiencing 
ongoing devaluation ‘that has been anything but inexorable’ since the advent of internet 
file-sharing:
The record industry is in crisis, and there is crucial help available but not being provided by 
companies who should be providing that help… The real problem here, I believe, is the lack of 
willingness of ISPs to act. That is why legislation could well have to be the answer. 
(Paul McGuinness, Music Matters conference, Hong Kong, 4th June 2008)
According to McGuinness, 80% of ISP network traffic is accounted for by peer-to-peer 
networks such as BitTorrent and Limewire. He argues that ISP revenues have ‘soared’ 
from broadband subscriptions concomitant  with the ‘collapse’ of record sales.  If we 
want  an  idea  of  just  how  much  the  expansion  of  broadband  means  to  large  ISPs, 
McGuinness urges us to consider that BT generated profits of £5.8bn sterling, 40% of 
which came from broadband and IT services.
Of course the champions of the ISP and technology industries spring from the internet  free-
thinking culture of California and Silicon Valley. Their passion for innovation and liberal hippy 
values in one sense sits well with the creativity of the music business. But at a deeper level there  
is  a  bigger problem and it’s one those brilliant  minds never resolved:  I’m talking about the 
problem of paying for music…The music business once had to bear the accusation that it was 
full of dinosaurs who looked back to an old business model rather than embracing a new one…
The visionaries and dinosaurs have perhaps changed places. If there are dinosaurs around today I 
think  they are  the  internet  free-thinkers  of  the  past  who believe  that  copyright  is  the  great  
146
obstacle to progress, that the distributors of content should enjoy profits without responsibilities 
and that the creators and producers of music should simply subordinate their rights to the rights  
of everyone else. 
(Paul McGuinness, Music Matters conference, Hong Kong, 4th June 2008)
As far back as May 2003 the Record Industry Association of America succeeded 
in a case brought against the internet service provider Verizon, forcing it to reveal the 
names of four service users suspected of offering music downloads for free download. 
November 2005 saw Ireland become the site of a similar court decision when, following 
a round of lawsuits  issued by Irish Recorded Music Association,  the High Court in 
Dublin set a new precedent for the region by forcing local internet access providers 
Eircom, BT Communications (Ireland) and Irish Broadband to reveal the identities of 49 
suspected file-sharers. However, legislation from governments regarding the actions of 
ISPs,  and cooperation  from ISPs  is  what  the  record  industry  has  been successfully 
achieving since 2007. While some ISPs, such as Sky in the UK moved to enter into 
partnerships with the music companies to provide additional platforms for the sale of 
recorded  music,  the  record  industry  has  also  been  successful  in  obtaining  legal 
judgements that hold ISPs responsible for activities that result in copyright infringement 
on their networks. Summer 2007 saw a landmark ruling delivered in a Brussels court 
when the Belgian society of authors,  composers and publishers,  SABAM, secured a 
court ruling stipulating that one of the countries internet service providers must install a 
filter to prevent users from illegally sharing and downloading music. A brief overview 
is outlined below, as is an overview of the proposed solution – the application of the 
Audible Magic CopySense Network system. 
SABAM versus Scarlet Extended, and the Introduction of Audible Magic’s CopySense 
Network system
On June 29th 2007, Belgium’s Court of First Instance instructed Scarlet Extended SA to 
ensure that filtering technology was installed not later than six months from the date of 
the ruling or else face paying the IFPI compensation of €2,500 per day there after. The 
Brussels  ruling  was  based  on  Belgium’s  interpretation  of  the  European  Union’s 
Information  Society Directive,  otherwise known as  the  EU copyright  directive.  The 
ruling was welcomed by the IFPI as a measure that sets the mould for government 
policy in other countries around the world to act to ensure that ISPs operating in their 
jurisdiction acted to control copyright infringement.
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In order to enable it to arrive at a decision in the SABAM versus Scarlet case, 
the  court  ordered  an  expert  opinion  on  the  feasibility  of  such  filtering  on  an  ISP 
network. The court ruling details that:
…in his report the judical expert has identified eleven (11) solutions “technically pertinent in  
short  term for  filtering P2P” in which seven (7)  are  “applicable to Scarlet’s  network” (p.30 
expert  report;  That among those seven (7) solutions, the expert  concluded that only one (1), 
called “Audible Magic” (CopySense Network Appliance) “seeks to identify the protected music 
content in P2P flows”…
(District Court of Brussels, No.04/8975/A. Decision of 29 June 2007)
Audible Magic have in essence provided a filtering technology that enables networks to 
identify, track and monetise the flow of digital media moving through their networks. 
According to EMI Chief Executive, and IRMA Chairman Willie Kavanagh, the 
SABAM versus Scarlet ruling is proving to be hugely influential:
The court listened to what the ISP had to say, it listened to what the copyright owners had to say, 
and it also commissioned independent research to assist the judge in coming to a conclusion. The 
independent research was delivered. The ruling that the judge made was that it is not the sole  
responsibility of the owner to chase somebody in breach of copyright. As gate-keepers of the  
internet,  ISPs have a joint  responsibility not to have their  premises  used, for  want of better 
words, by people to set up shop and do things illegally. Here in Ireland we are in the process of  
negotiating with the ISPs to discontinue and disconnect people who are doing that. Since that 
ruling I have had communications with Eircom and BT Ireland to try and get them to put in  
place Audible Magic. (Willie Kavanagh, personal interview)
During  the  course  of  our  interview  Kavanagh  subsequently  provided  me  with  an 
overview of the Audible Magic CopySense Network system. It essentially connects into 
an ISP network via a ‘monitor port’ to which the ISP routes or sends all network traffic. 
As such, Kavanagh explains, it acts like ‘a burglar alarm on your home’ – an intrusion 
detection system that monitors all  IP flows. Courtesy of the Audible Magic manual,  
Kavanagh points out that it does this via 3 key functions:
1) It works to filter peer-to-peer  traffic by blocking all peer-to-peer traffic on the 
network, or else by blocking specific works from being traded by peer-to-peer 
applications.
2) It can shape peer-to-peer bandwidth consumption by limiting peer-to-peer traffic 
to a specific level of bandwidth.
3) It  can  track  violations  using  a  point  system  and  provide  an  escalated 
programmed series of communications and sanctions
As such the  CopySense Network system can identify and block the illegal sharing of 
copyrighted content without interfering with the circulation of sharing of other ‘non-
infringing’ material. 
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The interview with Willie  Kavanagh was conducted in September 2007. The 
subsequent failure of IRMA to negotiate an agreement with ISPs in Ireland meant that 
by March 2008,  Kavanagh was pursuing Eircom,  Ireland’s  largest  ISP,  through the 
courts.  Subsequent  to the Belgian ruling,  since late 2007, the legislative and judical 
systems  of  various  nation  states  have  been  active  in  building  cooperation  and 
partnership between ISPs and the record industry. A variety of examples are outlined in 
appendix B. 
7.3 Growing the digital market: proliferating platforms for music in 
the digital era
In recent  years,  digital  platforms  for  music  have proliferated,  as have digital  music 
sales. As John Kennedy states, the internet may the biggest challenge that the record 
industry has faced in recent years, but it is also a site of opportunity. Boasting that the 
value of the digital recorded music sales almost doubled between 2006 and 2008, he 
advances:
…fifty  per  cent  growth  year  on  year…not  many  industries  have  managed  to  harness  the 
advantages and opportunities that the internet has in the way the music industry has done. 
(John Kennedy, personal interview)
He does quickly move to state that digital gains do not compensate for losses in physical 
sales: ‘That’ says Kennedy, ‘remains the problem’ (ibid).
There are, in 2009, over 500 legal online music services worldwide with more 
than 13 million tracks licensed to the major services (IFPI, 2009). Since the launch of 
iTunes  in  October  2003,  digital  sales  have,  according  to  IFPI  statistics,  grown  to 
account for 20% of overall recorded music sales, globally (IFPI, 2009). Ireland has, at 
present,  12 different  ‘legal’  online services  available  to  music  consumers:  3  Music; 
7digital; Bleep.com; Downloadmusic; Eircom; e-Music; iLike; iTunes Ireland; Last.fm; 
MySpace; Nokia Music Store; and Universal Music. Beyond such digital music store 
models that offer a-la-carte and/or subscription services, IRMA director general Dick 
Doyle  points  to  a  variety  of  recent  models  including  mobile  services,  streaming 
services, social networking sites, brand partnerships and other direct to consumer sites. 
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Since 2007, major record companies have been entering into joint initiatives or 
partnerships with ISPs for the first time. For example, Sky in the UK, Neuf Cegetal in  
France  and  Eircom  in  Ireland,  amongst  many  others  internationally,  have  started 
offering  music  services  to  consumers.  Thus,  the  record  industry  has  increased  the 
number  of  channels  through  which  music  can  access  its  final  users/consumers 
exponentially over the past half decade. Former Sony Ireland Chairman John Sheehan 
sees a positive outcome for the big music companies in the digital experience arguing 
that  copyright  mechanisms  will  evolve  to  protect  copyrighted  musical  works 
sufficiently to ensure control over them, and their  continued exploitation.  Regarding 
copyright infringement, Sheehan argues:
There will always be a fix to that…We’ve had mechanisms in the past of embedding codes in the 
music to stop people making copies. There are now more advanced versions of that, that will be 
able to control the distribution of it. (John Sheehan, personal interview)
Furthermore, Sheehan sees recent digital platforms for the delivery of music providing 
significant  new avenues  for  exploitation  of  new and,  more  importantly,  established 
record industry catalogues:
It [the record industry] got a second lease of life with the emergence of CD and DVD, and the 
back catalogue…That really sustained revenue growth. But that is slowing down now. However 
you have the new generation of formats and that’ll  give it  another spurt. There’ll  be a huge  
release of back catalogue on those formats. (John Sheehan, personal interview)
The range of this ‘new generation of formats’ that Sheehan talks of is illustrated most 
vividly through the 2007 Justin Timberlake album Future Sex/Love Sounds. According 
to the IFPI (2008), this was the biggest selling digital release of 2007, selling over 15 
million digital units across no fewer than 115 formats including ringtones, mobile full-
track downloads, video, bundled album digital music store downloads and other. It sold 
a total of 19 million units, only 20% of which were CDs (IFPI, 2008). According to the 
IFPI  Digital  Music Report which is  published each spring since 2004,  the value of 
digital music sales has grown from approximately US$20 million in 2003 to in excess 
of US$3.7 billion by the end of 2008. Digital revenues now account for 15% of overall 
global sales revenues. In the US, the world’s largest recorded music market, digital sales 
represent 30% of the overall  market,  in South Korea that figure is 60%. All of this 
serves  to  emphasise  the  recent  success  of  the  digital  music  store  model  and  their 
growing importance to the major companies.
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Table 7.1: Global Digital Recorded Music Sales Market Value 2003-2008 (US$ billions)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total 0.02 0.4 1.1 2.1 2.9 3.7
Source: Author based on IFPI Digital Music Reports 2004-2009
During the second quarter of 2005, an average of 700,000 digital tracks were 
sold each week in Europe (Nielsen Soundscan, 2007). However, by the first quarter of 
2007 this figure had risen to 2.8 million per week (ibid). In the UK, 77.6 million single 
tracks were purchased online throughout 2007, a 47% increase on the previous year. 
This figure jumped to 110 million in 2008, with an additional 10.3 million full-length 
albums being downloaded (IFPI, 2009). Single and album downloads in the German 
digital music market grew by 22% and 57% respectively over the same period (ibid).
It  should  be  noted  that  overall  recorded  music  sales  statistics,  as  published 
annually by the IFPI, do not take into account the growing revenue stream generated by 
ringtones,  nor  revenues  generated  for  record  companies  through  licensing, 
synchronisation  or  from advertising-supported  business  models  (such  as  Limewire). 
Even more promising news for the record industry came in 2008 when Juniper Research 
published a report predicting that the total  value of the global mobile  music market 
alone is expected to increase to more than US$17.5bn by 2012, driven primarily by 
rental music services and full-track downloads. According to report author Dr Windsor 
Holden:
I  think  it’s  fair  to  say  that  2007  marked  the  tipping  point  as  far  as  mobile  adoption  was 
concerned.  Far  more  subscribers  began  downloading  and  subscribing  to  music  content  in 
developed markets, and it must be said that that the publicity surrounding the iPhone launch 
undoubtedly contributed to consumer awareness of mobile music services per se. 
(Juniper Research, 26th February 2008)
The volume of commercially released music is also increasing. In 2006, 75,774 
new  albums  were  released  in  the  US  compared  with  60,313  in  2005  (Nielsen 
Soundscan, 2007). This represents an increase of approximately 25%. Of these, almost 
25,000 were digital  only release, however these accounted from only 1% of all new 
release album sales in 2006, with 95% of digital only album releases selling less than 
100 units each (ibid). 2,900 digital only albums were released by the 4 major record 
companies which accounted for 40% of overall  digital  only new release sales (ibid). 
Furthermore, Nielsen Soundscan note that overall music purchases, which includes sales 
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from albums,  singles,  digital  and music  video,  were up 17% through the  first  three 
months of 2007 with a total of 416 million music purchases being made in the United 
States through first 16 weeks of 2007 compared to 356 million purchases in 2006.
7.4 New licensing rights deals for new digital formats
The major music companies are involved in an ongoing process of forging alliances and 
pacts with established and emerging social media networks and also other online and 
mobile content platforms. Below I examine some of the key licensing rights agreements 
that  have  been  struck,  primarily  on  the  back  of  legal  actions  regarding  copyright 
infringement taken against the social media networks. These provide new avenues for 
the  generation  of  revenue  primarily  for  major  recording  and  music  publishing 
companies. 
YouTube
In late 2007 the Warner Music Group entered a licensing deal with YouTube which 
cleared all of its recorded music catalogue and music video catalogue for use 
by  the  consumer  media  giant  that  enables  users  to  watch  and  share  video 
content through a web experience. At that stage Sony Music Entertainment, 
had already signed a  similar  deal  with YouTube.  According to  a  YouTube 
press release upon the signing of this licensing agreement, the company will 
work  with  record  companies  ‘to  expeditiously  remove  certain  copyrighted 
materials  which  are  not  available  for  exhibition  on  the  site’ 
(www.youtube.com,  October  9th  2007).  YouTube  employs  a  content 
identification architecture that enables content holders to identify their content 
on the site and thus the opportunity to authorise and monetise the use of their 
works within the user generated content on the site.
A number of rights are triggered by YouTube usage that now generates revenue 
streams for  music  recording and publishing  companies.  While  deals  with  the major 
music  companies  as  outlined  above  brings  in  revenue  from  the  use  of  the  music 
companies  recording,  performance  and  synchronisation  rights,  royalties  are  also 
generated by users who perform or stream the songs in the making of their own content.  
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To this end, publishing royalty collection societies have struck deals with YouTube. In 
autumn 2007,  YouTube obtained  a  blanket  license  from the  British  Music  Industry 
(BMI)  which  covers  the  site’s  right  to  stream  all  of  the  society’s  repertoire  and 
catalogue in return for an undisclosed annual payment.  This particular deal covers a 
catalogue of ten million songs. According to music publisher Steve Lindsey:
The MCPS-PRS alliance and YouTube will not disclose the terms of their agreement…Nobody 
knows anything about the deal. It is part of the deal that it remains utterly confidential. Nobody 
knows what the amount of money is that YouTube has paid over to PRS, and nobody knows the 
nature of the license is. It’s secretive for business reasons for both sides…There are all sorts of  
reasons. I would guess that they don’t want to set any precedents for any other deals that are 
done in the future involving wither party. Other societies around the world would see that PRS 
got x amount of money from YouTube so they will ask for same or better than that. So we might  
deduce from that that the PRS got a bloody good deal. It’s a bit like asking a colleague what his  
salary is and then going to the boss for a raise. (Steve Lindsey, personal interview)
Subsequent deals were negotiated with the American Society of Composers, Authors 
and  Publishers  (ASCAP),  the  Society  of  European  Stage  Authors  and  Composers 
(SESAC) and Japanese Rights Clearance (JRC). 
During the course of my interviews, IMRO directors Michael O’Riordan and 
Johnny  Lappin  indicated  the  likelihood  of  a  similar  arrangement  being  negotiated 
between IMRO and YouTube. Both argue that monitoring and processing such material 
on YouTube is extremely difficult given the vast amount of user-generated content on 
the  site.  In  the  UK,  Cambridge  University  monitor  user  behaviour  on  the  site  and 
provide the PRS with an ‘analogy’ of which videos get played and how often they get 
played.  Royalty  payments  are  distributed  to  copyright  owners  on this  basis.  By the 
spring of 2008, when the first YouTube payments commenced, a similar deal had been 
brokered between the PRS and the popular social networking site Bebo. 
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What is also important to remember is that these deals only take into account 
music publishing copyrights; separate license fees are paid by social networking sites to 
the same music companies in respect of recording copyrights. For example, during 2008 
all of the major labels forged relationships with social media network Imeem, making 
audio and video content  available  via on-demand streaming in return for a  stake in 
advertising revenues generated by the site.
Vevo
April 2009 saw the Universal Music Group announce the launch of Vevo, a music video 
service  in  collaboration  with  Google.  Effectively,  Universal  own  the  site,  with 
Google/YouTube providing the technology. Users will be able to access and play music 
videos for free, with revenue generated from advertising being shared by Universal and 
Google. June 2009 saw Sony Music Entertainment sign up to this venture. The other 
major companies are in negotiations with Universal over potential licensing agreements 
regarding the use of their content on the site (CNET News, Thursday 4th June, 2009). 
MySpace
September 2008 saw the recording and publishing arms of all four major music labels 
launch partnerships with social networking site MySpace. These partnerships involve 
MySpace  providing  on-demand  and  ad-supported  streaming,  music  downloads,  a 
subscription plan and a variety of other music related features such as the sale of concert 
tickets and merchandise. In effect, these deals cover the entire 360-degree spectrum of 
potential revenue streams. Users are also enabled to assemble and share playlists using 
the cast catalogues of Universal, EMI, Warner’s and Sony. The pay-for-download and 
music streaming aspects of this service directs users to purchase tracks and albums via 
Amazon. As part of this overall deal, the music companies receive an equity stake in 
MySpace Music, which, according to the MySpace website boasts 68.6 million users in 
the US alone.
One of  the  key early  success  stories  of  this  service  was  the  album  Chinese 
Democracy by  US  artists  Guns’n’Roses.  During  its  initial  twenty-four  hours  of 
availability  for streaming on the bands MySpace site,  the three most  popular  tracks 
(Shackler’s  Revenge,  Chinese  Democracy and  Better)  achieved  1.3m plays  (Digital  
Music News, 20th November, 2008).
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 In the case of Imeem and the three above-mentioned platforms, Vevo, MySpace 
and YouTube, the outcome in all cases is illustrative of an ongoing trend where the 
major music companies have sued a social media network, settled, licensed and then 
gained equity in the service.
According to artist manager John Williamson, the fact that many of these online 
and mobile platforms are recent means that they would not have been a consideration 
when many artists negotiated their recording and music publishing contracts: 
I  know from the  perspective  of  managing  recording  artists  that  if  you  take  something  like  
Facebook or Last FM or MySpace or some other such space…This is such a recent factor that it  
wasn’t necessarily have been taken into account at the time many acts signed deals…so they 
won’t really benefit from it yet  via their recording or publishing contracts. From Universal’s  
point of view, for example, it, I suspect, might well yield significant royalties.
(John Williamson, personal interview)
As such Williamson contends that this is one area where major music companies are 
benefiting significantly at the expense of the artist.
Ad-supported streaming partnerships
Since 2006 ad-supported music streaming sites have also evolved as a significant source 
of  finance  for  music  companies.  Following a spate  of  lawsuits  taken by the record 
industry against such sites as Bolt and Grouper, revenue sharing models have emerged 
whereby these companies that were formerly streaming audio and music video content 
online  have  now  entered  alliances  and  partnerships  with  the  four  major  music 
companies. 
Since 2006 Spiralfrog has provided major label catalogues via its ad-supported 
download service. Universal became the first label to sell licensing rights to Spiralfrog 
for its entire catalogue. Downloads from the site are free of charge to the user, but come 
accompanied  with  advertising.  License  fees  are  thus  paid  for  through  advertising 
revenues. Similar deals have now been struck between all of the major labels and lesser 
profile sites such as Amie Street, Sellaband and Magnatune. 
February 2008 saw the Universal Music Group enter a partnership with Dutch-
based online live music platform Fabchannel.com, whereby Fabchannel acquired multi-
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territory  rights  for  the  streaming  of  recorded  concert  performances  by  Universal 
recording artists.
In August 2008 the Warner Music Group became the first of the major music 
companies  to  license  content  to  We7,  the  first  European-based  ad-supported  music 
service. Based on the Spiralfrog model, We7 grafts a series of short adverts into the start 
of music tracks based on consumer demographics  such as location,  age and gender. 
Users may stream content or take full-track downloads. September 2008 saw Warner’s 
and online music jukebox Deezer announce a global content and revenue partnership. 
Warner’s full catalogue of audio content is available for on-demand streaming as part of 
Deezer’s free to access service. Under the terms of the agreement both companies will 
share revenues generated by Deezer’s ad-supported platform. 
In summer 2009, Universal partnered with UK-based Virgin Media to provide a 
streaming and download service. As with the other major partnerships in this sphere, the 
other major labels, publishers and stakeholders are likely to follow. The Association of 
Independent  Music  in  the  UK  and  Ireland,  and  the  American  Association  of 
Independent Music are also pursuing similar deals for the independent music sector. 
From the  perspective  of  independent  labels,  in  addition  to  providing  revenue  from 
advertising,  such  platforms  carry  significant  additional  benefits.  According  to  AIM 
CEO Alison Wenham they ‘provide value as additional bandwidth providers to indies 
that  can’t  afford  to  stream  [music  content]  directly  fro  their  own  sites’  (personal 
interview). Furthermore, as Wenham and Reekus Records MD Elvera Butler point out, 
the rise of such portals and social networking sites can enable many independent labels 
to cut back on the amount of content they are offering on their own pages.
A brief overview of some additional alliances between the music industry and 
other internet and mobile platforms is contained in appendix C.
7.5 Proliferating revenue streams from secondary sources 
As we established in chapter 4.4, the ‘rights of the author’ era saw the formulation of 
the Berne Convention and the evolution of performing rights that  operate  to ensure 
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compensation  for  music  publishers  and composers,  generated  from the  use  of  their 
repertoire.  Neighbouring rights operate  to  provide recompense for record companies 
and recording artists, as well as publisher and composers arising from the use of their 
recordings. Beyond income generated through the sale of physical recordings, these sets 
of rights also serve to provide revenue via numerous secondary sources.  The sections 
below  examine  current  trends  regarding  the  trajectory  of  performing  rights  and 
neighbouring  rights  revenues  for  music  publishing  and  record  companies  in  the 
contemporary era.
The growing music publishing market
A number of interviewees highlight the fact that in the contemporary environment, new 
revenue streams are opening up for music publishing in particular. For example:
I’ve studied the ins and outs of the deals that music companies have done with a lot of the new 
outlets and both record companies and publishing companies are in a strong position because  
there are more films and more TV opportunities now for music than ever before, and they’ve got 
their income from all these new internet sources. But while these are also sources of money for 
record  labels,  publishers  don’t  have  falling  sales  to  contend  with  in  the  same  way  record  
companies do so the spin-offs of all these changes have been much, much better for them. (John 
Williamson, personal interview)
Significantly,  as  Williamson,  Jackie  Hayden,  Jim  Carroll  and  others  explain,  while 
music publishing rights yield smaller returns than recording rights for the major music 
companies, the profit margins for publishing are far higher as music publishers only 
incur a fraction of the overheads that a record label must contend with. Pointing out that 
the global music publishing market is dominated by the publishing arms of the four 
major record labels – UMG, WMG, Sony and EMI – Williamson argues that Universal 
and EMI ‘seem the most transparent’ of the majors ‘in terms of their business planning 
and shareholder briefings’ and increasingly ‘they are placing more and more eggs in the 
publishing basket’ (John Williamson, personal interview). Music publisher and artists 
manager  Steve Lindsey reinforces Williamson’s point on concentration in publishing 
industry:
It is pretty much the same as recording. The major publishers collect the major amount of money 
by a long way…Non-major publishing companies will only make real money by picking up the 
publishing rights of an artists on a major (record) label. If you have an artist then with a very  
successful album then the non-major publisher will benefit…But it does tend to be the major that 
benefits most often and will turn over a big revenue just because of the massive catalogue they 
have. (Steve Lindsey, personal interview)
That  royalty  collection  agencies  are  becoming more  assiduous in  monitoring 
public space on behalf of their clients is illustrated in the table below which indicates 
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how gross music publishing revenues gathered within the Republic of Ireland since the 
latter part of the 1990s have effectively doubled to a figure of €36.8m in 2008. The net 
distributable  income  from  music  combined  performing  and  mechanical  copyrights 
increased by almost 225% in a decade (IMRO, 2008). 
Table 7.2: Gross performing royalties collected by the Irish Music Rights Organisation (IMRO) 
1996-2006 (€m):
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
16.7 18.5 19.9 22.1 24.7 26.7 28.2 28.1 29.4 31.6 33.8 36.8
Source: Author, compiled from IMRO Annual Financial Statements 1997-2007
Similarly gross collection of performing and mechanical royalties by the PRS in the UK 
amounted to ST£608m in 2008 (PRS, Economic Insight, 15th July 2009). This reflects a 
year-on-year growth of 14%.
Table  7.3:  Gross  music  publishing  revenues  collected  by  the  PRS-MCPS  Alliance  1997-2008 
(ST£m):
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
392 408 435 452 482 490 510 517 528 547 562 608
Source: Author, compiled from MCPS-PRS Alliance 2007 Results; & PRS Economic Insight, July 2009.
These figures reflect revenues collected from a broad array of music users that 
now include radio, television, film production, digital platforms, advertising agencies, 
night  clubs,  hotels,  shops,  restaurants,  cinemas,  sports  arenas,  buses  and  airlines 
amongst  others,  in  fact,  almost  any public  space  within  which  music  is  heard.  As 
indicated  in  chapter  2.3,  radio  and  television  broadcasters  have  proliferated  across 
Europe since the early 1990s. This has brought with it a vast increase in music licensing 
revenues from this sector. For Lakota Records MD Jim Carroll:
This is making it look like very good shareholder value which is why you see a lot of investment 
in  music  publishing  at  the  moment  because  there  will  always  be  revenue  coming  in  from 
publishing sources. There will be money coming in from films, from ads, television, radio, all 
that sort of stuff. (Jim Carroll, personal interview)
What we must also note is that many of the sources of music publishing revenue 
also provide revenue for record companies as they involve the use of recordings. 2008 
saw a reported rise of 16% in such income with record companies taking US$1.5bn in 
global  recording  performance  rights  payments  (Informa  Telecoms  and  Media  press 
release,  Wednesday  14th October  2009).  While  relative  to  the  EU  countries,  such 
payments to record companies within the US remain relatively small, US performance 
rights payments still rose by 176% during 2008 to in excess of US$100 million (ibid).
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Synchronisation fees
Within the above picture of growing music publishing revenues, we must consider the 
revenues  currently  being  generated  through  synchronisation  fees  –  the  monies  paid 
when movie  and television  production  companies,  advertisers,  and the  producers  of 
computer  games license the right to use songs and/or music from the repertoires  of 
record  and  music  publishing  companies  in  their  productions.  These  particular 
agreements  are  usually  negotiated  between  a  music  company and  the  licensed  user 
independently of any existing performing rights licensing agreement. According to one 
interviewee, Úna Johnston, the integration of recorded music with other media forms 
and products has increased in recent years with more media meaning more openings for 
the synchronisation of recordings than ever before:
There are so many new outlets and platforms…It’s become so much more sophisticated in recent 
years.  So  many  other  things  using  music.  Music  to  sell  a  film.  Music  to  sell  television.  
Advertising. Music to sell a brand. You have advertisers migrating to link with bands and music 
brands more and more… Music revenues are more and more generated by the application of 
music in other things. It’s music as a secondary factor.  Music used as an emotional hook to 
attach you to other brands. There are just so many of forms of media now for music. 
(Úna Johnston, personal interview)
The synchronisation market is hugely lucrative for music companies.  While the music 
industries are now competing with a broad range of media types and products for the 
attention of consumers, many of its competitors provide a significant source of income 
for both record and music publishing companies. We are thus reminded again of Frith’s 
definition of the music industry as a ‘complex network of rights owners and licensed 
users’ (Frith, 2004: 176). 
Another interviewee, John Williamson argues that for both record companies 
and publishing companies, synchronisation is:
…definitely more important now than it was in times gone by. We (Belle & Sebastian) have 
entered into any deals for ads and I know plenty for whom it is a source of income and quite a 
substantial one at different points in their career. (John Willamson, personal interview)
Williamson explains that the income generated through synchronisation rights depends 
on a variety of factors. Sometimes advertisers and production companies will opt to 
pursue material by lesser known acts because it can be significantly cheaper than more 
popular catalogue. Furthermore:
Much can depend on how much they want a particular song. This is not necessarily artist-related,  
it just depends if there is a piece of music that suits a particular ad or programme or film. The 
other factor is where and when it’s being used. If it’s for use in Eastern Europe the amount can 
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be small but if it’s going out in the US or the UK it can be a lot, comfortably up into three  
figures. (John Williamson, personal interview)
Another informant, Steve Lindsey states that some record and publishing companies are 
better at this than others and ‘have identified the need to be more aggressive in this 
area…as TV can yield a lot of money’ (personal interview). According to Lindsey and 
fellow music publisher Johnny Lappin, the range for use of a popular song in an advert 
can run from €10,000 to well in excess of €250,000 depending on the context of its use.
Many interviewees emphasise the value of the US television market in particular 
to the major music companies. For Jim Lockhart:
The OC is a good example. You get a fee for the original usage plus a fee for subsequent usage  
plus a fee for further exploitation on DVD and box sets and things like that. So you can gain 
further gain from all that. (Jim Lockhart, personal interview)
This view is reinforced by Ben Barrett,  manager of Damien Rice. She outlines how 
Rice’s music has been licensed to television productions in excess of thirty times, most 
notably to Grey’s Anatomy, The OC, and Scrubs. Aside from the promotional benefits, 
Barrett states that the synchronisation fees ‘can be very lucrative…if you land the right 
shows’ (Ben Barrett, personal interview). 
Referring to recent trends at the South By South West (SXSW) global music 
industries  trade  fair  (of  which  she  is  UK  and  Ireland  co-ordinator),  Úna  Johnston 
advances that the presence of music supervisors at this event has become more visible in 
recent  years.  She states  that  their  role  in  television  production  ‘has mushroomed in 
importance’  as  music  brands  become  a  more  integral  part  of  selling  television 
productions internationally. 
Jim Lockhart further advances that the top three selling compact discs in the US 
in  2006 were  all  television  programme soundtracks:  The OC,  Grey’s  Anatomy,  and 
Scrubs.
 
Artist manager Peter Jenner points to legislation presently being formulated in 
the US that will increase the benefits of such television exposure as well as radio airplay 
to  music  companies  in  the  US.  During  the  summer  of  2008,  the  House  Judiciary 
Committee’s  Subcommittee  on  Courts,  the  Internet  and  Intellectual  Property  heard 
arguments for and against the updating of the Performance Rights Act. The Recording 
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Industry Association  of America  (RIAA) was seeking broadcasters  to  pay increased 
royalty rates to its member companies for use of their records in radio and television 
broadcasts. June 2008 saw the US Department of Commerce issue a letter of support for 
the Performance Rights Act on the grounds that:
Granting copyright owners of sound recordings a full performance right coupled with extending 
an existing statutory license is an appropriate and workable approach to providing compensation 
to  recording  artists  and  record  labels  for  the  transmission  of  their  works  in  over  the  air 
broadcasts. (cited on www.coolfer.com/blog/archive/academia/)
The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) opposed the Act on the grounds that 
in addition to the statutory royalties being paid to the record companies by its members, 
broadcasters already play a significant role in promoting sales of recordings via airplay 
for records. However spring 2009 saw the House Judiciary Committee pass the bill and, 
at time of writing, it is currently before the US senate.
Recent trends regarding music in advertising
Synchronisation rights for music in advertising have also become increasingly lucrative 
for  record  labels  and music  publishers.  For  example,  Steve  Lindsey,  publisher  and 
former catalogue manager at Universal Music states that:
…advertising is more lucrative now than even getting a track in a Hollywood movie. Advertising 
synchronisation fees have come down in general in the last ten years, but there are a lot more of 
them. I used to work for Polygram in London and even back in the early 1990s we could charge 
fifty  thousand  pounds  for  the  use  of  a  modestly  successful  tune  in  a  national  advertising 
campaign. Now there is satellite and cable that has really taken off in the last five or ten years.  
Now advertisers can really look at the demographic they are aiming for and just advertise on 
those particular channels that they know their target audience will be watching, and by doing so 
that means that they can go for a much shorter term licenses on fewer stations or channels and 
they are not obliged to buy a 12 month network TV license for the music anymore for the whole  
of the UK and Ireland. (Steve Lindsey, personal interview)
The significance of songs in advertising is illustrated through the increasing presence of 
music industry representatives  at  the Annual Cannes Lions International  Advertising 
Festival. According to the festival website, entries for the best use of music category 
increased 23% from 2007 and 50% over the past 5 years. The increasingly aggressive 
efforts of record labels and music publishers to licence their  products to advertising 
agencies  has  increased  the  competition  experienced  by  dedicated  jingle-writing 
companies. According to Andy Bloch of Human Worldwide – a New York based music 
production company – since 2007 there has been ‘a  palatial  shift  in  the record and 
publishing industries to monetise their back and current catalogues, and for emerging 
artists to find an outlet for their music’ (cited in USA Today, 29th July 2008). As such, 
according to Bloch, his company are losing clients to the major music labels, clients 
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who used to pay between $10,000 and $200,000 for advertising music, depending on 
the length of the music used and when and where the advert would run. According to 
Martin Bandier, Chairman and CEO of Sony/ATV Music Publishing:
If a brand is going to spend tens of millions of dollars for TV, radio or web time, they want a  
song that has immediate recognition and that can put you in a particular place or time…This is a  
good time to be in the music publishing industry. (cited in USA Today, 29th July 2008)
Interviewees  Jim Carroll  and John Williamson  both  allude  to  US trade  publication 
Billboard which has started tracking when the use of a song on a commercial causes its 
sales to increase. According to  Billboard, advertising is playing an increasing role in 
raising  the  profile  of  current  releases.  On  the  level  of  personal  observation,  an 
examination  of  recent  (2008/09)  observance  of  commercial  breaks  on  television 
channels  broadcasting  within  Ireland  provides  numerous  examples  of  major  labels 
artists and catalogue used in this way. Furthermore, websites selling downloads from 
vast databases of songs used in adverts have emerged in recent years. Examples relating 
to both of these phenomena are advanced in appendix D.
All  of  the  major  record  companies  now  actively  promote  the  advertising 
synchronisation services they provide on their company websites and, to a greater or 
lesser  degree,  enable  to  prospective  clients  to  listen  to  song  selections,  carry  out 
searches for ‘easy to clear’ copyrights,  preview new and upcoming releases on their 
labels, and to create and compile project folders. 
Of the four major companies, EMI and Universal provide more detailed online 
synchronisation  services.  At  EMI  UK  and  Ireland,  the  synchronisation  service  - 
www.sync.emirecords.co.uk - provides detailed information on current EMI recording 
artists, available back catalogue, and a full schedule of forthcoming EMI releases that 
will  be  available  for  licensing  to  advertisers  and  film  and  television  production 
companies.  For  example,  in  the  third  quarter  of  2008  EMI  UK  and  Ireland  were 
promoting  63  new  releases  for  synchronisation  in  addition  to  the  existing  back 
catalogue (www.sync.emirecords.co.uk/ecm/release_schedule_catalogue.htm). 
Steve  Lindsey  explains  that  such  a  drive  towards  advertisers  increased 
momentum during his time as Creative Director at Island Music, a Universal company. 
He states:
I remember on the Universal [web]site seeing the description of the Thin Lizzy song The Boys  
Are Back In Town as being ideal for a ‘lads night out drinking scene’. Quite a lot of work has 
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gone  into  pushing  that  sort  of  thing,  but  it  is  logical  that  we  were  doing  it  and  economic 
necessity is driving it. This is something that the record and publishing companies should have 
been working much harder on in years ago. (Steve Lindsey, personal interview)
UMG’s synchronisation service, SynchExpress (www.synchexpress.com), provides the 
most comprehensive and proactive service to prospective licensees. This website details 
a  catalogue of  recordings  dating  from 1923 to present  and forthcoming  releases  on 
Universal  and  its  various  labels.  The  SynchExpress  homepage  breaks  all  of  the 
Universal  content  into  31  different  musical  genres.  For  the  benefit  of  the  music 
supervisor  or  advertising  executive  SynchExpress  further  subdivides  the  Universal 
catalogue  into  no  fewer  than  109 song categories  that  are  designed  to  relate  to  all 
possible user synchronisation purposes. For example, they offer ‘cooking/food songs’, 
‘telephone  songs’,  ‘feeling  better  songs’,  ‘clean/dirty  songs’,  ‘female  empowerment 
songs’,  ‘travel/road  songs’,  ‘ready  songs’,  ‘nature/earth/environment  songs’,  ‘sports 
songs’ and 100 other categories of song matched to product or service type. 
In  terms  of  the  precise  value  of  music  license  fees  from advertising,  it  has 
proven extremely difficult to acquire data, and the accounts of different interviewees 
vary somewhat. However, their accounts, combined with the available data from music 
publishing  royalty  collection  societies  indicate  that  it  is  an  extremely  lucrative  and 
growing  market.  As  with  television  and  film,  many  interviewees  explain  that  the 
licensing fee with advertising companies depends on many variables. For example, the 
range of media across which the campaign will be issued, the geographical territories 
across which it will be broadcast and the duration of the advertising campaign and also 
the existing popularity or status of the music or song being pursued by an advertiser. 
John Williamson states:
For use within the UK, the ranges that I’ve seen for advertising can be as low as £10,000 and the 
highest  is  probably about  £100,000.  For  global  use it  can be  much bigger  but  you  have  to  
remember too that sometimes big gas-guzzling companies can extract a good deal from bands or 
record  companies  because  the  bands  and  companies  might  want  to  be  associated  with  the 
product or get the publicity and the rest of it. (John Williamson, personal interview)
Steve Lindsey also offers a sample range:
At Island I represented the Bob Marley catalogue, and because Bob Marley’s stature is such, you 
could ask way more, where as for an unknown artist, for exactly the same amount of music over 
the same duration and terms, you might get one-fifth of what you would get for Bob Marley…
You then might have a song that  is familiar to people but isn’t  by a mega artist  and a UK  
network campaign might get you forty or fifty thousand pounds, and if that’s only for a UK 
campaign for just 3 months, then you might be down to twenty thousand pounds…Where as 
with Bob Marley, or a Madonna, or a U2, you can be talking millions. For an artist that big for a  
global campaign, you would at least ask for millions. 
(Steve Lindsey, personal interview)
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All  of  the  above  points  to  the  increasing  contemporary  relevance  of  Frith’s 
conceptualisation of music as a ‘basket of rights’. Another market worth noting is that 
of private events that incorporate music into entertainments. Alhadeff (2008) estimated 
performing  royalties  generated  at  weddings  throughout  the  US  in  2007  to  be 
approximately US$2.3 billion.
Digital games and music revenues
By the middle years of this decade, the digital games industry had evolved to form a 
significant component of the broader cultural industries with revenues comparable to 
the  box  office  intakes  of  the  Hollywood  film  industry  and  global  recorded  music 
industry (Kucklich,  2004;  Thomas,  2003).  The estimated  value of  the global  digital 
games industry in 2008 was US$44 billion (NPD Group/Retail Track, 2009; Morgan 
Wedbush Securities  estimates,  2009).  Within this,  the US digital  games  market  had 
grown to in excess of double the combined value of the US movie box office and DVD 
market. The value of the global online games market was estimated to be US$7 billion. 
While these statistics may suggest that an expanding digital games market is providing 
growing competition for the music industries in terms of providing alternative forms of 
entertainment for consumers, the digital games industries also provides revenue streams 
for  music  companies  on  various  levels.  Games  have  grown  to  provide  not  only 
marketing  and  promotion  for  the  music  content  they  carry,  this  content  generates 
licensing revenues for record and music publishing companies via the sale and use of 
the digital games themselves, and many games generate direct music sales by offering 
exclusive music and artist related content. 
Recent years has seen traditional content owners such as Universal and Warner’s 
move into mobile games courtesy of licensing agreements with games providers. The 
convergence of content providers with digital  games hardware and content providers 
works to their mutual benefit ultimately bringing profits from both sectors back under 
the one roof. Sony is a key example in that it is not only a key player in the music 
industries,  it  also  produces  and  supplies  the  various  generation  of  the  Playstation 
consoles and games.
164
While  almost  all  games  use licensed music,  games  such as  Song Pro,  Rock 
Band, Guitar Hero and Singing Star are of particular relevance. Song Pro is a cartridge 
that can download music to be played on a Gameboy console. The Song Pro package 
includes a flash memory card, headphone, music management software and a USB line 
to enable users to access the internet for music downloads. Song lyrics and artwork can 
also be downloaded from the Song Pro website. The significance of such music-based 
games is illustrated by statistics released by Microsoft in October 2008 showing that the 
computer  company sells  3.8 million  song downloads a  month  via  the Xbox for  the 
games  Rock Band and  Guitar Hero (Digital Music News online, 21st October 2008). 
Figures for the previous twelve months indicate music download sales of 45 million 
tracks. The figures don’t take into account song download sales for the same two games 
on Sony Playstation format.  October 2008 also saw Harmonix,  the company behind 
Rock Band, gain licensing rights to The Beatles catalogue for use in the game.
A selection of other examples that highlight the growing significance of digital 
games to the music industry are provided in appendix e.
7.6 The live music industry
The value of the live music industry has experienced sustained growth in recent years. 
For artist manager Peter Jenner:
…people  who  are  not  really  interested  in  buying  The  Rolling  Stones  latest  album are  still  
prepared to pay money to see them play live, or Genesis, or The Police. Have The Police put out  
a new album? No, nor does anyone care. But do they do huge live business? Yes…a goldmine 
there. (Peter Jenner, personal interview)
Likewise  Bruce  Findlay,  who has  produced the  T In  The Park music  festival  on a 
number of occasions explains:
For years the price of a concert ticket and an album kind of remained the same…but the top 
price of a new album now is £13 or £14 or whatever the equivalent is in euro. But if you want to  
see the same band live it’ll cost you £50 or £60 or more. The price of live tickets is astronomical.  
There are more festivals than ever, more concerts than ever, and it all means that more people  
are willing to pay more money than ever for music. 
(Bruce Findlay, personal interview)  
Another interviewee, NIMIC CEO Ross Graham argues that while less profit is being 
generated from record sales in recent years, the live industry is thriving:
A lot of artists are generating huge profits on the live circuits and the thing about that is that  
it’s not just income direct from the tour, it’s merchandising too. In fact some artists are making 
most of their money out of merchandising…Gigs make money and gigs  let you sell other  
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things. A ticket for a once-off live show for an hour and a half’s entertainment can now often  
cost you two or three or four or five times as much as a product like a CD that would be a  
product for life. But that’s the way the market is at present, for the industry’s elite, live is  
where it’s at for the big money, and the market is always right. 
(Ross Graham, personal interview)
Pollstar,  a live music industry trade publication in operation since 1981, and 
Boxscore,  published  by  Billboard  magazine  collect,  organise  and  publish  data  on 
concert  ticket  sales  and concert  tours.  Over the past  decade,  both publications  have 
published year-on-year record-breaking figures for global live concert revenues. They 
estimated the global value of the live music industry to have grown to US$19.4 billion 
in 2008, accounting for almost one-third of the revenue generated by the overall global 
music  industries  that  year.  According  to  Pollstar  (2009),  the  value  of  the  US live 
concert  industry  has  more  than  doubled  between  2002,  generating  approximately 
US$4.2 billion in 2008. The global turnover of the live music industry exceeded US$25 
billion in 2008. These figures comprise of data collected regarding ticket sales, ticketing 
fees, venue ancillary, sponsorship and other miscellaneous related revenue streams. 
Table 7.4: The value of US concert industry revenues 2002-08 (US$)
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenues 2.0 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.6 3.9 4.2
% change - +20.0 +12.0 +10.7 +16.1 +8.3 +7.8
Source: Author, based on Pollstar and Boxscore 
The Performing Rights Society (PRS), the performing royalty collection society 
in the UK, published statistics indicating that music publishing royalties generated by 
UK concert revenues exceeded £400m for the first time ever in a single year in 2008 
(PRS press release, 3rd July 2009). This marks a 30% increase on 2007 revenues. In 
addition to this,  the PRS estimate that 2008 saw primary ticket sales grow by 13%, 
secondary ticket revenues increase by 4% and ancillary revenues increase by in excess 
of 18% (PRS,  Economic Insight, 15th July 2009). Overall, they place the value of live 
revenues in the UK at ST£1.4 billion for 2008. With the BPI placing the UK value of 
recorded music sales at ST£1.309 billion for 2008 (IFPI, 2009), live revenues actually 
surpassed record sales revenues UK last year.  In Australia,  ticketing agency receipts 
compiled by Live Performance Australia (2008) indicated that the live concert industry 
was experiencing year-on-year growth of approximately 12% to the end of 2007, when 
it had an estimated value of AUS$503m. 
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Former Polydor and CBS marketing manager Jackie Hayden highlights how the 
large touring profits that have been generated in recent years have largely derived from 
older, established acts with extensive recording histories and catalogue. Many of these 
acts,  Hayden states,  were once  defunct  but  have reformed primarily  to  avail  of  the 
‘concert cash cow’. Hayden cites superstar acts such as The Eagles, Yes and The Police 
provide evidence, as do smaller acts like Orchestral Manoeuvres in the Dark. Hayden 
details how his role of a concert reviewer for his magazine  Hot Press has, in recent 
years, involved a ‘never-ending string’ of incoming major international artists such as 
Bruce Springsteen, Bob Dylan, Leonard Cohen, Barbara Streisand, Neil Diamond, U2, 
Ry Cooder and a host of others. Hayden notes how acts such as Dylan, The Eagles and 
Springsteen  are  effectively  on  ‘a  never-ending  tour’,  travelling  the  globe  annually 
including visits Ireland for (often multiple) stadium or big arena shows. Acknowledging 
that the annual volume of live concerts by touring international acts has proliferated 
over the past five years, Hayden is doubtful of the sustainability of this in the long term, 
arguing that the record industry will ‘pay the price’ for banking on established acts to 
the detriment  of investing sufficiently in newer emerging acts  over the past decade. 
However, as Ben Barrett explains, touring is not just profitable for older superstar acts. 
In the case of her artist, Damien Rice, who has released two albums through the Warner 
Music  Group,  touring  revenues  form an important  part  of  the artists  overall  annual 
income:
You can tour and make money, but it’s about being clever in the first place and not exceeding  
your  means.  There  is  a  certain  investment  of  time  and  money  and  then  touring  becomes 
lucrative. When it works it also brings income from merchandise and income from increased 
record sales, and if all of the stars align then it financially makes sense… Looking at it over a  
year, we’ll come out at the end making good money. (Ben Barrett, personal interview)
Irish  Times music  columnist  Jim  Carroll  outlines  how  in  decades  gone  by, 
outdoor  concerts  were  occasional  events,  with  no  more  than  ‘two  or  three’  major 
international touring acts visiting each year. This, according to Carroll, has evolved into 
a plethora of stadium concerts and outdoor festivals  occurring from late spring until 
autumn and, ‘near nightly’ performances by major international acts in Dublin’s main 
indoor concert arena, The Point Depot (now the O2 arena), as well as ‘medium-size 
gigs’ in theatre venues such as Dublin’s Olympia. This, for Carroll, marks as ‘quantum 
leap’ in the profitability of touring, which, formerly, according to Carroll and former 
Moving  Hearts  musician  and  manager,  Keith  Donald,  was  primarily  a  vehicle  for 
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promoting records and selling merchandise, without being necessarily profitable in its 
own right. 
Another interviewee, Ian Wilson, advances :
You can see from the proliferation of live music events in Ireland, there is certainly something 
going on... There must be a festival, or live music event every day throughout the summer in 
Ireland, and they are all big business. So there is obviously something going on out there, the 
music industry is not just necessarily related record companies. 
(Ian Wilson, personal interview)
Crashed Music MD Shay Hennessy concurs, stating that artists and music companies 
now view touring and live performance in a new light:
There is much money in live performance. I think there is. Look at all of the international acts  
that come. There are very few international acts who come to this side of the Atlantic who don’t  
have Dublin on their gig dates. Yet we are frequently told by the big acts and big labels that  
touring doesn’t pay? Well Westlife don’t do five nights in the Point Depot to please a record 
company and sell records. They do it because it works in its own right. Dolly Parton doesn’t  
come to Millstreet  because  it  doesn’t  make money.  It’s  more  than just  promoting a  record. 
Absolutely.  There  are  very  few people  who  will  perform of  it’s  not  making  money.  (Shay 
Hennessy, personal interview)
Hayden and Carroll  both question the sustainability of this ‘cash cow’ in the 
context of an overall economic downturn. However, festival promoter Bruce Findlay 
and artist managers John Williamson and Gerry Harford point to the continuation of a 
decade long trend regarding increases in advance ticket  sales for major acts. Online 
ticketing has accelerated this trend.
Many  other  interviewees  such  as  music  publisher  Johnny  Lappin  and  artist 
manager  Fachtna  O’Ceallaigh  highlight  the  growing  age  range  of  concert-going 
audiences  as  a  factor  contributing  to  the  sectors  continuing  growth,  with  many 
established artists attracting a ‘seven to seventy’ patronage. O’Ceallaigh, Frank Murray 
and Independent Records owner Dave O’Grady cite social networking platforms and 
other similar sites in the digital domain as another factor driving increased attendances 
at concerts and concomitant growing revenues form the sector. They detail how there is 
no longer  a  time lag between hearing  about  a  band and hearing  a  band.  MySpace, 
YouTube, artists own websites and other online sites means, according to O’Grady, that 
audiences are ‘primed’ for seeing artists live much earlier now than was previously the 
case. They all emphasise, however, that this development is more usually the case with 
new acts  reaching  peripheral  markets.  Nevertheless,  Peter  Jenner  advances  that  this 
‘grassroots’ live industry needs to be strong to facilitate success further up the chain, 
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and that it is a significant contributor to overall revenues in the sector, primarily through 
the generation of performing royalties in the multitudes of small venues throughout the 
country. 
Secondary revenue streams generated by the live music industry
Beyond the generation of revenue for agents, promoters and artists directly by the sale 
of concert tickets, live sponsorship and other related ancillary activities, live concerts 
also generate  significant  income for  the music  publishing industry courtesy of  both 
primary and secondary performance sources. Music publisher Johnny Lappin cites the 
live  music  industry  as  a  key  area  within  which  music  publishing  companies  have 
benefited in recent years with ‘more and more people going to see live concerts than 
ever  before’  (personal  interview).  The  live  performance  itself  generates  publishing 
‘performing’ royalties based on every song or piece of music performed in a concert 
venue. These license fees, calculated on the basis of gross (primary) ticket revenues, are 
collected from the promoter and administered by performing rights collection societies 
on behalf of publishing copyright owners. In cases where copyrighted music recordings 
are used as part of a live performance, as is the case in many rap and hip-hop acts, a 
licence  fee  is  also  collected  on  behalf  of  the  recording  rights  owners  by  the  local 
phonographic performance royalty collection  society.  Performing royalties  generated 
through live concerts in the UK in 2008 totalled almost ST£1.3 billion (PRS, 2009). 
Since  2008,  more  performing  royalties  are  generated  through  the  popular 
practice of concert patrons recording sections of live performances on camera phones 
and subsequently  uploading the  contents  onto  sites  such as  YouTube.  As YouTube 
video  plays  are  now  covered  as  part  of  a  licensing  agreement  between  royalty 
collections  societies  and  the  sites  owners,  amateur  concert  footage  containing  their 
copyrighted songs and music generates publishing revenues for rights owners. 
Secondary ticketing
Another indication of an expanding live music industry is the increase in traffic relating 
to  secondary  ticketing.  According  to  its  Concert  Ticket  Revenue  Report (2009), 
StubHub - the eBay-owned online ticket market - grew its business by 91% during 2007 
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and a further 40% throughout 2008. Ticketmaster  also provides a secondary service 
called TicketsNow where concert tickets can be resold.
In 2007, the UK Music Managers Forum, with the support of major recording 
artists such as Radiohead, The Verve and over 200 British recording artists launched the 
Re-sale Rights Society – an industry group seeking to regulate the secondary sale of 
concert tickets.  By early 2008, agreements between this group and online secondary 
ticketing sites such as Ebay,  StubHub and TicketsNow! were forged in the wake of 
artists rights to an interest in the secondary sale being written into British law [check 
accuracy of this  out].  The Re-sale  Rights  Society estimated  the value of the  online 
secondary ticketing market to be in excess of £200m in 2007. Similar processes are 
currently being  negotiated  in  the US or  other.  According to  IMRO director  Johnny 
Lappin, the sale of concert tickets is effectively a contract between the seller and the 
consumer. Lappin argues that the seller should be able to dictate the terms of use of the 
ticket,  including the right to re-sell  the ticket  in territories  where such activities  are 
legal.
Live Nation Entertainment: growing concentration and vertical integration in the live  
music industry
The  live  music  industry,  internationally,  is  becoming  increasingly  concentrated  and 
vertically  integrated.  This  is  most  vividly  illustrated  by  the  merger  announced  in 
February 2009 between Live Nation and Ticketmaster. This marked the alliance of the 
world’s  largest  touring  agency  with  the  world’s  largest  ticketing  retailer  under  the 
banner of Live Nation Entertainment. 
In many instances, local promoters are engaged in exclusive agreements with 
Ticketmaster, whereby Ticketmaster have exclusive retailing rights regarding primary 
ticketing.  Furthermore  Live  Nation,  formerly  the  live  entertainment  arm  of  Clear 
Channel Communications, has in recent years acquired numerous live music promotion 
companies  internationally.  Examples  include  Milano  Concerti  (Italy),  Gunnar  Eide 
Concerts  (Norway)  and MCD (Ireland)  amongst  a  multitude  of  others.  The case  of 
MCD (McCann-Desmond) in Ireland provides an example of how concentrated power 
has become in this area. MCD delivers live music events through approximately forty 
venues which it either owns or operates across Ireland. These include The Olympia, The 
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Academy and The Ambassador  in  Dublin.  Through its  joint  acquisition  of  London-
based promotions  company Mean Fiddler  (re-branded Festival  Republic)  MCD also 
promotes  and manages  some of  the  biggest  music  festivals  in  Ireland,  the  UK and 
Europe on an annual basis. These include Oxygen (Ireland), Heineken Green Energy 
(Ireland),  Electric Picnic (Ireland),  T in the Park (Scotland),  the Reading and Leeds 
festivals  (England).  From 2005 until  2007 its partner in Festival  Republic  was Live 
Nation,  at  which  point  Live  Nation  acquired  MCD. Subsequently  Live  Nation  also 
acquired a 50% stake in Dublin’s largest indoor concert arena, The Point Depot (re-
branded as the O2 in December 2008). 
Live Nation already owns and/or operates hundreds of venues, predominantly in 
the US but with a growing international portfolio consisting of ampitheatres, arenas, 
theatres, clubs and festival sites. They radically increased this aspect of their business in 
2008 with the formation of a strategic alliance with the American Capital owned venue 
operator  SMG, bringing a further 216 venues under their  management.  Live Nation 
Entertainment is thus the predominant player in the global market regarding the sale of 
tours, concert promotion, primary and secondary ticket sales, merchandising, and, in the 
case  of  artists  signed  to  360  degree  contracts  with  the  company,  the  additional 
ownership of recording rights, music publishing rights, artist image rights and all other 
artists related licensable rights. 
With 360 degree deals providing Live Nation Entertainment with the rights to 
new recordings from some of the most established artists in the world, users visiting 
Ticketmaster  sites  are  now,  in  some  cases,  offered  the  option  of  buying  music 
recordings or merchandise as an alternative to paying the booking fees added to concert 
ticket prices. 
In 2008, Ticketmaster had itself acquired Front Line Management, one of the 
world’s most prominent artist management companies. This means that in addition to 
owning 360 degree rights relating to artists like Madonna, Shakira and Jay-Z and 180 
degree rights to U2, Live Nation Entertainment now manage The Eagles, Aerosmith, 
Christina  Aguilera,  Guns’n’Roses  and  over  two-hundred  additional  recording  artists 
internationally.  
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Peter Jenner argues that it is becoming harder for independent touring agents 
and promoters to sustain themselves:
Anyone with a fucking brain knows that with this merger you are reducing competition across 
the entire industry. They’ll probably have investigations for two years to try and work out how 
they can pretend it’s not reducing competition. But it  is self evident. (Peter Jenner,  personal  
interview)
Likewise for AIM chair Alison Wenham, this merger marks the further consolidation of 
the  established  music  industries  and  the  continued  evolution  of  a  trend  that  is 
‘detrimental to smaller operators in all areas of the business’. 
**********
Overall, the live music industry is an expanding sector that carries increasing benefits 
for its stakeholders in terms of direct revenues for agents, promoters, ticket retailers, 
merchandise  companies  and  artists  accruing  from  live  events.  It  also  produces 
significant indirect benefits in terms of performing royalties for music publishers and 
secondary ticketing revenues for outlets facilitating these activities. Liver concerts are 
also a vehicle for promoting records and stimulating record sales. Power within this 
sector is becoming more centralised with the sector evolving into a vertically integrated 
structure, with many of the core stakeholders falling primarily under the umbrella of 
Live Nation Entertainment. 
7.7 Ongoing content-technology conglomeration
A further matter for consideration in examining the apparent crisis in the record industry 
relates  to  conglomeration  of  music  and  electronics  companies.  A  number  of 
interviewees, most notably Bruce Findlay and John Williamson point to music industry 
companies actually gain from internet downloading and CD burning via sales of various 
electronic devices and software programmes used for these activities. Music recordings, 
publishing  repertoires  and  electronic  items  and  the  software  that  enables  them are 
increasingly falling under the ownership of the same corporations. 
We must consider that each of the big four companies also forms part of a larger 
conglomerate  corporation  that  own  various  other  media  companies  that  generate 
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products and content across a variety of media formats. With such structures of vertical 
and  horizontal  integration,  processes  of  production,  marketing  and  distribution  are 
integrated throughout various media holdings in efforts  to reduce costs and increase 
revenues. The parent companies of UMG, WMG, Sony Music Entertainment and EMI 
all own holdings in other areas associated with media entertainment and electronics. For 
example the Sony Corporation has interests in electronics, CD manufacturing, battery 
production, movies, television, digital games and mobile phones. Warner has interests 
in movies, television, the internet, book publishing and mobile phones.  Universal has 
interests in film, the internet and telecommunications. Bertelsmann has interests in print 
publishing  and broadcast  media.  While  EMI is  now in  the  hands  of  financier  Guy 
Hands, and as such can claim to be the largest stand-alone music company, it had until 
recently interests in consumer electronics and information technology.
The parent companies of the big four music companies have created new media 
and hardware in attempts to urge music consumers to repurchase music recordings on 
fresh formats. For example with CDs, consumers have ended up buying content they 
already  owned  on  vinyl  and  cassette  formats.  From  the  launch  of  the  CD  onto 
international music markets in 1983 until the global peak of record sales in 1999, record 
industry sales units and revenues increased consistently. In terms of full-length formats, 
annual units sold from 1.5 billion in 1983 to 3.3 billion in 1999 (IFPI, 2007) at which 
point the global retail value of record sales was US$38.7 billion (IFPI, 2000). The big 
music companies have more recently looked to the internet, video game consoles and 
new audio formats to generate revenues. For artist manager and ex-label owner Bruce 
Findlay, one key goal of the parent companies is to force people into buying additional  
hardware, software or services that enable access to music and allow it to be reproduced 
and/or stored. 
Equally the parent companies of the music majors may be seen to have a foot in 
both camps when it comes to CD burning. While John Kennedy and others argue that 
the music companies are losing money through CD burning technologies enabling users 
to  duplicate  music  recordings  quickly  and  easily,  their  parent  companies  generate 
revenues from sales of the same CD burning technologies. Some of the biggest music 
companies in the world operate under motherships that sell a combination of hardware 
enabling  CD  copying,  blank  CDs  or  software  for  CD  duplication.  For  example, 
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Matsushita, which part-owns the Universal Entertainment Group (which is the parent 
company of UMG) also owns Panasonic, a manufacturer of CD burners, DVD burners 
as well as various storage and reproduction devices. Matsushita also manufactures JVC 
CD  burners.  Also,  Sony  Music  Entertainment  now  operate  the  RCA  Music  Group 
which  in  turn  manufactures  electronic  hardware  enabling  CD  burning.  Sony 
manufactures blank CDs. Sony and UMG also own stocks in Roxio who, according to 
the company’s own webite in 2008, claimed to have a share of approximately 70% of 
the global  market  for CD burning products.  Furthermore BMG, who despite selling 
their recording interests to Sony Music Entertainment still remain one of the five largest 
music publishers on the planet, have a stake in software company RealNetworks which 
enables CD burning amongst other digital services. We must also remember that blank 
CDs are taxed within several states around the world, with subsequent monies providing 
revenues for the major record companies.
For  artist  manager  Bruce  Findlay,  alliances  between  content  providers  and 
technology providers serve the continuing interests of both sectors: 
This idea about free music pisses me off a wee bit. I’m going to sound old-fashioned here, but 
we don’t get music for free, we buy computers, we pay for software, we pay for connections, we 
buy iPods and lots of us subscribe to music services. They say it’s free. It’s never free. Even 
when the content doesn’t  cost  you  anything,  you  buy the machinery from the same fucking 
people, so there is always a cost to the end user. (Bruce Findlay, personal interview)
Findlay proceeds to argue the ‘add-on’ value of music to technological devices, where 
music  is  used  to  attract  consumers  or  entice  them  to  purchase  devices,  and 
‘telecommunications  licence  music  and the payments  go into a kitty for intellectual 
property rights owners’ (ibid). He further compares the present environment with that of 
the 1970s when he owned an independent chain of recorded music retail outlets across 
Scotland. He argues that: 
all that’s changed is the means of receiving music…with the internet and  iPods all of the stuff 
that goes with it, they’ve just found another way of cutting out old record shop men like me.
(Bruce Findlay, personal interview)
With regard to arguments that the sharing of digital audio files is contributing to 
a crisis in the record industry, the afore-mentioned hardware manufacturers with links to 
major music companies also produce and distribute MP3 players.  While the iPod by 
Apple has been the biggest selling MP3 player, operating only in conjunction with the 
iTunes digital library, it serves not only to converge two technologies in order to make 
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one product more appealing and functional for users, it also works to ensure that neither 
content nor hardware enable ‘unauthorised’ copying or transferring of files.
Such  convergence  of  interests  between  manufacturers  and  suppliers  of 
technology and music companies also enables the cross-promotion of products, services 
and content, e.g. recording artists are used to promote hardware, software and services; 
technologies  are  used  to  promote  recording  artists  and  content.  For  example,  Dire 
Straits, who were signed to the (then) Philips-owned Polygram label released a 1985 
album  entitled  Brothers  In  Arms album  which,  along  with  their  subsequent  world 
concert tour was used to promote the CD internationally. Some six years later, the bands 
next album and tour –  On Every Street – was used as a key promotional vehicle for 
Philip’s  somewhat  less  successful  Digital  Compact  Cassette  (DCC).  More  recently, 
artists  such as U2 have allied with Apple in cross-promotional  exercises around the 
iPod.  Also,  Hewlett  Packard  offer  exclusive  designed  tattoos  featuring  Universal 
recording artists latest releases to place on the Apple iPod.
7.8 360-degree artist deals
In recent years the major music companies have executed broader, all-encompassing 
deals  with  the  artists  on  the  respective  rosters.  The  emphasis  has  been  on  growth 
through diversification. Not only have the spheres of recording, publishing, live music 
services  and merchandising  grown more  concentrated,  they have also become more 
integrated.  The four  major  recording and music  publishing companies  have become 
more aggressive in securing touring rights for both new and established acts on their 
rosters. Artist managers Gerry Harford, Fachtna O’Ceallaigh, Bruce Findlay and John 
Williamson all state that while record labels have traditionally applied pressure to sign 
to their publishing arm, recent years has seen them increasingly push for touring rights 
in  recording negotiations.  Equally companies  that  have traditionally  focused on live 
aspects of the industry are now moving into the terrains of recording, publishing and 
associated marketing and promotion of recordings and repertoire.  As Damien Rice’s 
manager Ben Barrett explains:
From our dealings with Warner over Damien [Rice], the labels are obviously very keen to get  
their share of every aspect of an artist’s income, from recording to publishing to merchandising 
to live to whatever.  That’s very much one way that they look at  the future,  one sort of big 
umbrella organisation with everything under the same roof. 
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(Ben Barrett, personal interview)
360-degree deals, thus, see artists sign contracts with one company, assigning to 
them the handling of all facets of the artists career including recording, publishing, live 
performance, primary and secondary ticketing for tours, merchandising, endorsements, 
all aspects of image rights, and all other artists related rights. For Ross Graham, CEO of 
NIMIC:
The majors will not be on the ropes if they can more readily access merchandising and live  
incomes. Merchandising incomes are more important than they ever were and live incomes are 
certainly much more important than they ever were. (Ross Graham, personal interview)
The most significant and high-profile 360-degree signings include acts such as 
Madonna, Jay-Z and Shakira who departed from their respective music labels to sign 
deals with Live Nation,  the hitherto (almost)  exclusive live touring agency.  U2 also 
signed  a  180-degree  deal  with  Live  Nation,  giving  them  rights  to  touring  and 
merchandising, while retaining a licensing agreement with the Universal Music Group 
in relation to recording and publishing. 
For artists with the stature and (current) selling power such as these, such deals 
mean  greater  revenues  can  be  generated  and  greater  economies  of  scale  achieved 
through such consolidation. Dedicated online and print music publications have carried 
numerous accounts of music companies across the recording, publishing, merchandising 
and  live  music  spheres  staffing  increasingly  broader  levels  of  expertise.  Examples 
include the Warner Music Group’s acquisition of a majority stake in Spanish artists 
management firm Get In. This company oversees the career of Spanish chart-topping 
group La Oreja de Van Gogh, a band that has also achieved significant commercial 
success  in  Mexico  and other  Latin  American  countries.  Similarly  Warner’s  carry  a 
majority  stake  in  Japanese  management  company  Taisuke  as  well  as  substantial 
investments in online properties Lala and Imeem. 
While the Paradigm booking agency has traditionally functioned as a touring 
agency,  more recently the company developed a ‘Head of Marketing and Branding’ 
position (Digital Music News, September 18th 2008). Since then Paradigm has forged 
alliances with all four major music companies to source additional avenues of revenue 
on its roster via endorsements, sponsorship, merchandising and branding deals as well 
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as integrating artists such as Aerosmith, Coldplay, Pharrell Williams and Lily Allen into 
television and film projects being managed by the agencies sister Paradigm divisions, 
and beyond.  Such alliances  between companies  from different  strands  of  the  music 
business also means more muscle within bigger negotiations, especially in the areas of 
non-traditional/ancilliary  revenue  streams  such  as  endorsements,  merchandising, 
sponsorships, acting or book deals. 
As my interviewee John Williamson stated, it is no longer about how many units 
of an album a band can sell, rather its ‘how much profit can be made across various 
sectors or earnings and revenue’ (personal interview).  In effect,  recorded music and 
songs  represent  two  of  an  increasingly  broader  variety  of  products  and  services 
available from major music labels and their allies. As such, a more holistic structure 
encompasses  all  aspects  of  an  artistic  career  and  all  potential  sources  of  revenue 
deriving from that career, and the fruits of artistic labour.
A number of interviewees point to such developments leaving recording artists 
at a distinct disadvantage. Festival and music conference organiser Úna Johnston argues 
that it has always been in an artists best interests to ensure that the administration of 
each discrete activity is kept in the hands of separate actors. For example, she outlines 
the  drawbacks  associated  with  artists  signing  a  ‘cross-collateralisation’  clause  in  a 
recording contract – Under the terms of this clause, the artist signs their repertoire over 
to  the  publishing  arm  of  the  same  record  company.  Johnston  describes  a  scenario 
whereby a band or artist might generate a profit through publishing, but make a loss on 
a recording. If this artist has signed ‘independent’ publishing and recording deals, then 
they will receive their agreed share of publishing profits. However if they have signed 
to the same record and publishing company, then cross-collateralisation means that the 
record company are entitled to recoup their loss from any publishing profits before the 
artist qualifies for any payment. For Johnston, cross-collateralisation is ‘rarely a good 
deal for a band’ (personal interview). 
Former manager of trad-rock band Moving Hearts, Keith Donald, advanced an 
identical  scenario  during  our  interview.  As  Johnston  and  others  argue,  360-degree 
makes such scenarios the norm for artists in their dealings with all music industry sub-
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sectors, and removes any autonomy to engage with actors outside the one company. As 
Ben Barrett,  John Williamson state,  already ‘superstar’  acts  are rewarded with huge 
advances  in  exchange for  handing over  all  rights,  however  smaller  or  new acts  are 
increasingly only offered an ‘all  or nothing’ deal when it comes to negotiating with 
major labels. In these cases, without the ‘clout’ of a successful catalogue or established 
artist brand behind them, they have little leverage in these negotiations. Furthermore 
these deals also include management services. As Keith Donald also stated, having ‘all 
eggs in the one basket’ means that ‘too much power lies with one source’ (personal 
interview).  
7.9 New ‘physical’ markets and new possibilities for music
This research finds that whilst global sales revenues have been falling, it should also be 
noted that fresh markets with fresh possibilities are opening up for the major labels. A 
number of interviewees have identified China and Russia in particular as countries that 
have  grown  their  recorded  music  markets  significantly  during  the  last  decade.  For 
example:
You would hope it [China and Russia] is positive for the record companies. If you add India into 
the  equation  you  have  three  huge  potential  music  markets.  A  lot  depends  on  economic 
movement I those countries as well.  Over the next five to ten years  there is great  predicted  
potential because over the past five or ten years these economies have grown and there has been 
access for Western music companies there. It remains promising… and it is an avenue that music 
companies should be avidly pursuing. (John Williamson, personal interview)
When I raised this issue with IFPI Chairman and CEO John Kennedy, his initial 
response was to  state  that  recorded music  sales  figures  gathered by trade bodies  in 
China  and Russia  are  unreliable  primarily  due  to  the  high  level  of  piracy  in  those 
countries. For example, the IFPI place the annual value of the digital music market in 
China at $700m, but argue that 95% of this is accounted for by pirates (IFPI,  Digital  
Music Report, 2008).  As Kennedy states:
You only need to look at the statistics for what is happening in the market, our statistics on the  
use of file-sharing, the statistics in the music industry…it’s 95% piracy, and even if we’ve got it 
wrong, the film industry are quoting 99%. (John Kennedy, personal interview)
The  size  of  these  markets  is  nevertheless  considerable.  China  and  Russia 
combined  account  for  over  a  quarter  of  the  world’s  population,  thus  offering  huge 
potential  to  the  music  industry.  Kennedy  expresses  disappointment  at  the  ‘Russian 
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market has not achieved the potential everyone had expected’ primarily as a result of 
what  he  regards  as  the  failure  of  the  Russian  authorities  to  ‘co-operate’  more 
enthusiastically on copyright infringement. He is much more optimistic about the long-
potential of the Chinese market, stating:
The Chinese market will fulfil its potential, but it, like other markets, has to contend with the fact 
that if free is available then consumers aren’t going to pay. But based on my dealings with them 
I do think  the Chinese government will get more engaged and will have instant success with 
litigation there as well. (John Kennedy, personal interview)
As another interviewee, Jim Carroll advances, the major music companies have, 
since the turn of the millennium, been developing their presence in China. EMI has 
launched a joint venture with Chinese-based Push Sound; Sony Music Entertainment 
have entered a partnership with Shanghai Audio and Visual Press; the Universal Music 
Group has formed a partnership with the Shanghai Media Group; and the Warner Music 
Group has set up Warner Music China. 
The  IFPI  website  details  how  China  accounts  for  ‘nearly  half  of  all  the 
broadband  lines  in  Asia’  and  also  boasts  ‘almost  half  a  million  mobile  phone 
subscriptions’ (www.ifpi.org). In a speech delivered to the China International Forum 
on the Audio Visual Industry in Shanghai in 2006, John Kennedy stated that in China, 
sales of music via mobile phone alone accounted for 15% of industry revenues, some 
5% higher than the global average for digital sales (www.ifpi.org). This has all occurred 
in  the  context  of  a  booming  national  economy.  According  to  the  IMF,  the  world 
economy averaged a growth of 4.9% in 2007, China experienced a growth of 11.4% 
(IMF, 2008). 
In an interview preceeding the merger of Ticketmaster with Live Nation, Sean 
Moriarty, CEO of Ticketmaster stated that significant growth for the live industry in the 
near  future  would  come  not  only  from  demand  for  ‘high-end  talent’  in  developed 
markets, but also from ‘construction overseas’, where he listed China as a key site for 
significant growth (The Music Business Journal, February 2009, p.4).
Success for  the major  companies  in  the courts  in  China is  also in evidence. 
Zhongsou,  one  of  China's  top  five  internet  search  engines,  was  found  guilty  of 
infringing record companies copyrights by the Copyright Bureau of Hebei province and 
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Cangzhou  city  in  May 2008.  The  authorities  ordered  the  internet  company  to  stop 
infringing  immediately  and  pay  the  maximum  penalty  of  RMB  100,000 
(musicweek.com). 
Like China, overall economic growth and investment has accelerated in Russia 
in the past decade. According to the World Bank, Russia experienced a full-year GDP 
of over 7% in 2007 (worldbank.org). This is consistent with growth trends since 2003. 
Household consumption in Russia is ‘bouyant’ with improving access to credit fuelling 
demand (The Economist, June 18th 2007). Jim Carroll outlines how, since 2002, the 
major  music  companies  have  been  developing  their  interest  in  the  Russian  market, 
primarily through the formation of the National Federation of Phonographic Producers 
(NFPP),  a  body  that  is  backed  by  the  IFPI  and  unites  the  major  Russian  and 
international  companies.  Sony,  EMI,  Universal  and Warner’s  have  all  subsequently 
opened  Russian  offices.  Between  2002  and  2006,  the  IFPI’s,  possibly  conservative 
(considering  their  arguments  regarding  unreliable  data  due  to  piracy)  value  of  the 
Russian  recorded music  retail  market,  grew from US$297.5m to  US$406.5m (IFPI, 
2007).
In my interview with John Kennedy he pointed to the potential joint initiative 
involving the major  record labels and leading Russian labels aimed at  compiling an 
extensive database of file-sharing sites operating in the country. This alliance will also 
promote  legal  methods  of accessing  online music.  To this  end,  Kennedy states  that 
copyright holders and major web portals will create streaming services to provide for 
listening to music online without having the capacity to download it.  Following my 
interview with Kennedy, one of Russia’s biggest internet firms launched such a service. 
Yantex, having signed licensing agreements with all the major copyright owners and 
funded by advertising and subscriptions went online in July 2009.
Overall the sheer size of these two markets and the opportunities that come with 
them paint a much more optimistic picture than the official IFPI statistics portray. The 
IFPI are keen to emphasise how piracy is blocking the development of these markets for 
music,  and how the  effective  enforcement  of  copyright  regulations  is  central  to  the 
future  of  the  music  sector  in  these  territories.  However,  as  we  have  earlier  noted, 
arguments regarding poor or unreliable sales figures deriving from piracy boosts the 
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lobbying  power  of  the  major  music  companies  by  strengthening  arguments  that 
domestic  industries  need  government  support  in  shaping  legislation  and  the 
administration/application of copyright law.
7.10 Chapter Summary
The ongoing pursuit of individuals, producers and suppliers of technologies and internet 
service  providers  reinforces  property-rights  factors  as  being  central  to  the  music 
industries. Ownership of content and control over the channels that distribute it remain 
crucial. The ongoing formation of alliances and pacts between content and technology 
sectors indicates that both record companies and music publishers are creating business 
models and licensing systems that enable them to profit from emerging and growing 
digital distribution opportunities. Overall the emergence and proliferation of these new 
digital  platforms,  and  the  alliances  and  partnerships  between  music  companies  and 
actors in the technology sector is serving to accelerate the growth of the overall digital 
music  market,  increase  the  number  of  revenue  streams  open  to  music  companies 
relating to recording, publishing and other related products and services. When we also 
consider  the  expansion  of  outlets  for  music  content  through  already  existing 
intermediaries such as radio, television and advertising and the significant growth of the 
live  music  industry,  the  broader  music  industries  landscape  paints  a  significantly 
healthier picture than the digitally induced Armageddon suggested by published record 
sales  data  and  popular  media  reports.  Continuing  processes  of  convergence  and 
conglomeration  and the evolution of 360-degree artist  contracts  points to a  growing 
centralisation of power within the music industries. 
Given the emphasis placed on declining record sales in much media and industry 
discourse  surrounding the  relationship  between  the  internet  and the  music  industry, 
chapter  eight  will  now  proceed  to  examine  the  organisation  and  structure  of  the 
contemporary record industry over a decade after the internet emerged as a conduit for 
recordings. In doing so, chapter eight will focus on the disruption caused to established 
distribution and promotion practices, and, given the proliferating range of platforms for 
music to reach an audience, examine the potential of new technological platforms to 
enhance the ability of independent artists or smaller record labels to get to market. 
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Chapter 8: Findings  3  –  New  Rules  of  the  New  Music 
Economy?
8.1 Introduction
Chapter six examined the case forwarded by those contending that the music industry is 
in crisis, and evidence offered in support of such crisis. Chapter seven placed this crisis, 
predominantly associated with the recording sector of the music industry, in the context 
of the broader music industry. It highlighted copyright as central to the sustenance of 
the  industry  and also  detailed  the  expansion of  traditional  revenue  streams  and  the 
emergence of new sources of income for the music industries in the digital era, all of 
which serves to illustrate a different reality to the picture of a music industry in crisis as 
illustrated  commonly  in  media  accounts.  This  chapter  is  primarily  concerned  with 
another aspect of the internet music ‘revolution’, – the promise of disintermediation and 
the potential for digital distribution and internet promotion to provide creative artists 
with the necessary machinery to access and succeed in the marketplace, independent of 
the  intervention  of  the  major  record  labels.  It  is  useful  to  recall  here  the  extent  of 
internet-induced disruption predicted to the ‘rules of the economic game’ by Kelly and 
Negroponte, the two foremost ‘information-age gurus’. Such predictions, keeping suit 
with Toffler’s theme of a break with the old relations of industrial capitalism suggest a 
much  more  level  playing  field  upon  which  cultural  corporations  no  longer  hold 
advantage or power over the individual content producer [see chapter 3, section 3.3]. 
This  chapter  thus  examines  the  extent  to  which  a  ‘do-it-yourself’  approach  to  the 
promotion and distribution of music has been enhanced by internet technologies.
To  meet  these  ends,  this  chapter  first  examines  the  composition  of  the 
contemporary recorded music  market,  outlining  the current  market  share breakdown 
between major and independent companies. We proceed to consider the roles of and 
relationships  between  major  and  independent  actors.  My interviewees  are  asked  to 
reflect upon earlier techno-centric predictions to the effect that more independent actors 
would  achieve  increased  and  easier  access  to  the  marketplace  and  offer  their 
perspectives on / experience of the current relationship between major and independent 
actors. Beyond this, drawing largely on the contributions of the artist managers who 
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participated in interviews, we examine contemporary processes for getting new music to 
market  and  the  role  and  implications  of  internet  technologies  in  evolving  these 
processes. Then, acknowledging the ongoing significance of the major record labels in 
shaping the market, I draw upon research material from my interviews for insights into 
why this is the case. A number of interviewees outline what they perceive as the current 
working model for breaking a recording artist into the mass market. This leads us to 
consider the role of tastemakers in the internet age and which ‘intermediaries’ are most 
effective in growing a consumer base. Leading on from this, interviewees are asked to 
reflect upon and advance their concepts of the contemporary music consumer and the 
consumer bands that constitute the music consumer market. The evidence gleaned from 
this aspect of my primary research interviews serves to problematise accounts indicating 
that file-sharing activities are having a detrimental effect on recorded music sales.
8.2 The composition of the contemporary recorded music market
The combined market  share of the four  major  record companies  currently stands  at 
approximately 74% of the global market (IFPI, 2009). 
Fig. 8.1:  Global record industry market share 2008
Source: Author - based on IFPI figures from 2009 [*Now operating as Sony Music Entertainment]
Alison Wenham, president of the Worldwide Independent Network (WIN) – a 
body representing over 20 independent music trade associations globally – argues that 
the recorded music market is ‘a market that is suffering from the features of collective 
dominance’. While, according to Wenham, the record industry operated on a ‘relatively 
territorial’  basis  up until  the early 1980s,  it  has subsequently evolved to  experience 
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increasing consolidation of control.  This affects artist  and repertoire acquisition,  sets 
increasingly global/international priorities for majors operating in national territories, 
and raises the cost of entry into markets  for independent  companies.  Such ‘massive 
concentration’ has created ‘a vicious circle where the larger you get the larger you need 
to be’ (Alison Wenham, personal interview).
The Irish recorded music market is one of the most highly concentrated in the world 
with the four major labels accounting for 92% of the market (IRMA, 2008).
Fig. 8.2: Irish recorded music market share 2008
             Source: Author - based on IRMA figures from 2008
Another interviewee, Úna Johnston echoes Wenham’s statements, advancing that, in the 
Irish context, while the ease with which recordings can be produced these days means 
that there are many more independent labels in existence, those of ‘any [commercial] 
significance have been subsumed more quickly into the major labels in ‘an ongoing 
process of takeovers, mergers and consolidation’ (personal interview). 
As the existence of WIN indicates,  there has also been a strong international 
coagulation  of  independent  music  companies  in  recent  years.  IMPALA  in  Europe, 
A2IM in the United States, Cirpa in Canada and AIR in Australia all provide examples 
of independent music company trade associations. In 2006 these national/international 
associations formed into a global coalition that is WIN. The Association of Independent 
Music  (AIM),  of  which  Alison  Wenham  is  also  chair,  represents  various  sizes  of 
independent companies in the UK and Ireland. The only criterion for membership is that 
a major company cannot  own more than a 50% stake in  the independent  company. 
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Wenham detailed how the size of independent companies relative to major companies 
has diminished significantly in recent decades. She focused particularly on the Beggars 
Group. Beggars is one of the largest independent labels in the world consisting of 4AD, 
Matador,  Rough  Trade  and  XL  Recordings.  It  has  headquarters  in  London  and  5 
additional offices in North America, Europe and Japan. 
If you look back fifteen to twenty years you will find that the market was populated by dozens of 
larger companies – the largest independent was only half the size of the smallest major. Now, 
after the acquisition of those companies by the majors and the ongoing concentration which the  
industry has experienced over the last ten years you will find that there is not one of our member  
companies in Europe that has more than 1% of the market. So they are all small players, even if 
in comparative terms the size of a company of Beggars stature versus many of our new members 
is also staggering. But the point is that the size of someone like Universal compared to Beggars  
is also staggering. (Alison Wenham, personal interview)
Since  the  turn  of  the  millennium  some  of  the  largest  independent  music 
companies in the world have been brought under the umbrella of the major labels. For 
example,  2002  saw  BMG  purchase  Zomba,  what  was  then  the  world’s  largest 
independent  company  for  a  reported  US$3bn.  It  is  now a  division  of  Sony Music 
Entertainment.  Mute was acquired  by EMI.  Rykodisc,  the company once owned by 
former  Island  Records  founder  Chris  Blackwell,  was  bought  by  the  Warner  Music 
Group in 2006. V2, the label started in the 1990s by Richard Branson following the sale 
of Virgin to EMI is now owned by Universal. Until July 2007 Sanctuary Records was 
the largest independent record label in the UK until it too was acquired by Universal. 
For the four major companies, the corporate structures are global, so they have global 
marketing  initiatives  and  global  distribution  networks.  Even  for  an  independent 
company the size of Beggars, they remain reliant on separate independent distribution 
systems  in  different  territories.  Former  Island Records  representative  Ross  Graham, 
who is now chairman of the Northern Ireland Music Industry Commission (NIMIC), 
argues that beyond the issue of distribution, ‘the majors also have a stranglehold on 
media control for pushing their artists’. All of this, according to artist manager Peter 
Jenner combines to make it increasingly difficult for non-corporate labels to access the 
market:
They’re  pretty  hostile  towards  each  other  because  the  majors  make  it  very  hard  for  the 
independents to get to market. What they do is they drive up the price of admission. Whether it’s 
the price of bribing a DJ, or the price of getting your record displayed in the shops, the price of 
bribing a journalist – they have a lot of power and they use that power to make it harder for the 
indies. (Peter Jenner, personal interview)
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Prior  to  the  advent  of  the  internet  as  a  technology of  mass  communication, 
digital  had  long  since  established  itself  in  the  spheres  of  music  production  and 
consumption  and  provided  a  key  tool  that  enabled  and  facilitated  this  increased 
concentration – the compact disc. Amongst my interviewees, the accounts of (primarily) 
independent  record  company  bosses  Petr  Pandula,  Dave  O’Grady  and  Jim  Carroll 
indicate that the independent recording sector was unable to make significant gain from 
the premium profit market in CD sales from the late 1980s onwards. The shift in format 
from cassette to digital saw the multi-nationals employ their extensive back catalogues 
to grow the market and their market share. The potential for re-hashing former releases 
as ‘digital re-masters’ explained, in part at least, the willingness of the major labels to 
acquire the catalogue of the larger, more established independent companies in the late 
1980s - Motown, Island and Virgin provide examples. The dearth of back catalogue 
places newer and emerging independent companies at a disadvantage. Former Polydor 
marketing manager Jackie Hayden emphasises this point:
If you take a small company, say Setanta for example, they might need to sell 20,000 or 30,000 
copies  of  a  CD to have any kind of  income from a record.  But  for  a  small  label  like that,  
generating  the  equivalent  return  from  what  are  largely  going  to  be  individual  single  track 
downloads is very, very difficult…So they suffer in a way that the bigger companies don’t…So I 
see the internet  as a much bigger threat  to smaller companies than it  is  for the majors.  The 
majors have vast back catalogues to exploit at little or no additional cost to themselves, and they 
have the resources to market newer artists and records and the Justin Timberlake’s of this world  
through which they can sell millions in a way that the Setanta’s of this world can’t. 
(Jackie Hayden, personal interview)
Likewise sees the vast catalogues under the ownership of the major labels as 
buffering  them  against  potentially  harmful  effects  of  technological  change  and 
bolstering their  dominant  position in the marketplace.  According to  music publisher 
Steve Lindsey, ‘the actual medium of how people receive their music is academic’ once 
a  company  has  ownership  of  a  sizeable  repertoire  (personal  interview).  Lindsey 
emphasises  that  the  larger  the  catalogue  of  recordings  under  the  ownership  of  a 
company, the greater the opportunities for exploiting it across a variety of media and 
platforms. Successful back catalogues are perennial ‘cash cows’ for the major labels so 
one key strategy for maintaining dominance is to ‘batten down the hatches’ on spending 
on new acts and divert funds to the further marketing and promotion of already popular 
repertoire (ibid). At the time of my interview with Lindsey in late 2008, UK Culture 
Secretary,  Andy Burnham, had just recommended the extension of copyright term in 
sound  recording  from fifty  to  seventy  years.  This  was  in  the  wake  of  EC Internal 
Markets Commissioner Charlie McCreevy’s proposal to increase the term of protection 
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to ninety-five years in order to bring Europe into line with the US. This proposal was 
subsequently amended to seventy years. The European Parliament voted in favour of the 
amendment on April 23rd 2009. At the time of writing, the draft directive is still being 
considered by the EU Council of Ministers so, as yet, has not become law. A number of 
my interviewees point to the success the major music companies have had in lobbying 
for the extension and expansion of copyright laws in recent years [see also chapter 6, 
section  6.2].  While  they  acknowledge  that  such  changes  carry  potential  economic 
benefits  for  all  copyright  owners,  the  consensus  is  that  such  developments  as  an 
extension  to  copyright  term will  enable  further  major  labels  to  weather  the  ‘digital 
storm’ and maintain their position in the recorded music market. As Lindsey describes 
the marketing budgets for re-released and re-mastered back catalogue as ‘astronomical’ 
and ‘quite obscene’ but based on the reality that ‘millions of people are still  buying 
Hotel California’ (personal interview).
Beyond  the  above  arguments,  history  indicates  that  the  concentration  of 
ownership in  the record industry has enabled the major  companies  to exercise their 
power against the interest of consumers. For example, a Commons National Heritage 
Committee  report  (1992)  criticises  the  over-pricing  of  CD’s  in  the  UK.  The report 
concludes that the blame for unfavourable price comparisons between the US and UK in 
the  early  1990s  can  be  placed  on  copyright  restrictions,  and  the  Committee 
recommended accordingly that the UK Department of Trade and Industry re-examine 
legislation  around  copyright  issues  with  particular  reference  to  its  anti-competitive 
effects in the recorded music industry. The publication of that report coincided with the 
House  of  Commons  Committee  monopoly  enquiry  into  the  over-pricing  of  CDs in 
Britain in the 1990s.  
According to Alison Wenham, in a territory like Ireland it is almost impossible 
for  an  independent  company  to  survive  unless  it  is  attached  to  a  major  label.  For 
Wenham, the ability of a record label to sustain itself in a local market is largely a 
matter  of geography and a matter  of local market  practice.  Despite  the evolution of 
internet  music  markets  with  the  ability  to  transcend  physical  boundaries,  Wenham 
contends that ‘local’ remains a huge feature of the independent sector. She states that 
the US recorded music market is approximately 5 times the size of the UK market and 
‘many,  many  times  bigger’  than  the  Irish  market.  Wenham explains  that  there  are 
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hundreds of local independent companies who serve local markets within the US and 
‘survive very happily on their local reach’ (personal interview). These companies rarely 
generate  national  or  international  chart  successes  and  tend  to  shift  volumes  of 
recordings  in  tens  of  thousands  rather  than  hundreds  of  thousands  or  millions,  but 
economies of scale enable them to turn a profit. As Wenham explains:
By ‘local’  I  might  be talking about  Nashville,  or  Miami,  or  West  Coast.  There  are  plenty of 
consumers within any given constituency that create an eco-system upon which you can run a 
successful  business.  The same applies but to a lesser  extent in the UK where local  geography 
would see, for example, the North-West sector being particularly strong and Scotland maintaining 
a relatively decent industry around what is essentially locally-produced music. London and South-
East is another one. (Alison Wenham, personal interview)
Outlining how the UK and Irish markets have seen high street retailers and key taste-
makers like radio consolidate, many interviewees argue that there is less choice for the 
consumer on the shelves. As Wenham continues, supermarkets in particular are adept at 
‘taking the  cream’  by selling  recordings  at  low prices  and thus  upsetting  the  retail  
economy (see chapter 6 section 6.6).
The  evidence  gleaned  from  Wenham  and  the  independent  label  operators  I 
interviewed  points  to  a  decrease  in  the  number  of  independent  record  distribution 
companies in existence that serve the UK and Irish markets. Again, they relate this to 
issues of consolidation and the aggressive entry of supermarkets into music retailing 
from the  1990s  onwards.  Given  that  much  independent  recorded  music  product  is 
unsuitable  for  supermarket  shelves,  they  regard  a  whole  hinterland  of  independent 
music  as  operating  increasingly  beyond  mainstream  margins.  While  many  of  the 
independent label owners and artist managers I interviewed point to the potential of the 
internet to bypass these processes, they predominantly argue that it has not transpired to 
transform the retail of independent music. 
Despite its significant growth up until 2007, the overall size of the Irish market 
is relatively small. In such a market, where the four major companies dominate, many 
of  my  interviewees  argue  that  it  is  extremely  difficult  for  an  independent  label, 
indigenous or other, to have a commercial life. 
As  a  number  of  interviewees  explained,  the  distinction  between  major  and 
independent  companies  has  become  increasingly  blurred  and,  the  ability  of  an 
independent label to enjoy a commercial life increasingly relies on a relationship with 
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one  or  more  of  the  major  corporate  actors.  Fachtna  O’Ceallaigh  advances  that 
independent record labels that have ‘any substance to them or any longevity to them or 
any capacity to sell records’ would of necessity have ‘some kind of relationship with a 
major’ (personal). This point is reinforced by Bruce Findlay who states that independent 
labels face only two possible fates: they either ‘get swallowed up’ by the majors, or ‘go 
bust’  (personal  interview).  Findlay  explains  that  those  labels  showing  promise  will 
almost without exception move under the umbrella of a major if they are to enjoy a 
commercial life over time. He outlines how this relationship may involve one or more 
factors including distribution, marketing and promotion, licensing rights for a variety of 
purposes. O’Ceallaigh points to a number of cases where one of the major labels is the 
minority  or  majority  stakeholder  in  a  given  independent  label.  In  other  cases,  an 
independent  label  may  be  solely  funded  by  a  major  label.  This  latter  scenario  as 
forwarded by O’Ceallaigh is exemplified by Lakota Records, the label operated until 
recently by another interviewee Jim Carroll. 
You could call  us a  ‘mindy’  label  – a  major-indie.  To all  intents and purposes  we were an 
independent label in Ireland and the UK and were distributed by an independent distribution 
company, but we were entirely bankrolled by Sony. It was two incredibly bright people at the 
distribution and marketing end of Sony who basically did deals with labels…Lakota was owned 
by Sony but  all  our  records  in  the  UK came out  through Vital  because  we needed to  look 
independent. We had to because there is an awful lot of kudos involved. 
(Jim Carroll, personal interview)
Sony  has  similar  deals  in  operation  with  Setanta  Records  and  Creation  Records. 
Similarly  there  are  companies  such  as  Loog  and  Be  Unique  who  are  tied  to  the 
Universal Music Group. These, as Carroll explains, are all labels that effectively carry 
an ‘independent tag’ but are funded by majors. 
In some cases, as with Lakota, the impetus behind the formation of the indie 
label comes from the major. In others, as with Creation, an independent entity already 
exists  and  it  is  usurped  by  a  major.  Other  independent  labels  find  themselves 
simultaneously engaged with more than one major label. This scenario is best illustrated 
through the case of County Clare based independent label Magnetic Music. During the 
course of our interview, the label’s owner, Petr Pandula advanced that two of the most 
lucrative  deals  signed by Magnetic  in  recent  times  saw them contracted  to  provide 
promotion and distribution services in the German and Irish markets for new releases by 
Moya Brennan and Carlos Nunes, signed to Universal and Sony respectively. Pandula 
states that his success in attracting such contracts is attributed to his company’s thirty-
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year reputation as a promoter of ‘world music’ concerts and recordings, particularly in 
the German market. Another interviewee, artist manager Frank Murray, states that this 
process illustrates how the independent sector increasingly exists as a ‘shop-front’ for 
majors, taking them into sections of the market that were ‘once the preserve of niche’ 
suppliers (personal interview). Murray states that major companies ‘need the kudos’ of 
independent labels and will place bands on the rosters of those labels ‘that they know 
will benefit from an indie gloss’ (personal interview). 
Jim Carroll points out that even in the case of larger independent labels such as 
Domino and the Beggars Group (both of whom remain independently owned),  they 
have entered into distribution deals with major actors Columbia and Epic (both Sony 
companies). Thus, while they may have ‘no obvious allegiance’ to those companies, 
‘Domino and Beggars are nevertheless reliant on the machinery of major companies 
distribution networks’ (personal interview).
For Steve Lindsey, the process of majors ‘bank-rolling what you and I otherwise 
perceive  as  independent  labels’  is  not  new, but  has  accelerated  throughout  the  past 
decade. As Lindsey advances:
Genuine independent labels are very, very few and far between now…[In the UK] majors will  
put aside several million quid as seed money for any independent labels they like the sound of…
Independents with any degree of success will, to one degree or another have support from a  
major. It might just be distribution, or it might be marketing and distribution, or the independent 
label might be in effect the A&R office of the major. (Steve Lindsey, personal interview) 
Ultimately the picture the picture suggested by my interview materials is one 
where many independent companies are inextricably interwoven into the make-up of 
major  companies.  For  those  independent  companies  existing  outside  of  this  loop, 
sustaining a commercial life is extremely difficult with access to distribution, marketing 
and promotion and key tastemakers / intermediaries very limited. The opportunities and 
challenges  around accessing  the  marketplace  independently  of  major  companies  are 
examined in much greater detail in the following sections. 
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8.3 Getting new music to market in the internet era
Many interviewees highlight the advantages of digital in terms of production, promotion 
and  distribution  for  independent  artists  and  labels.  They  emphasise  the  growing 
potential for adopting a do-it-yourself approach in terms of the production of recordings 
and the promotion of artists and their wares. In addition to highlighting digital platforms 
for the circulation of music such as online streaming and video-sharing sites, a number 
of interviewees  point  to  the emergence  of  new digital  intermediaries  such as  social 
networking sites, weblogs and online music magazines as new key tools in helping to 
break a new artist. Other interviewees also point to the emergence of various public and 
privately funded information and training  initiatives  which,  they argue,  makes  for a 
much  broader  awareness  of  the  music  industries  and  enhances  the  do-it-yourself 
approach  to  producing  recordings  and  the  marketing  and  networking  involved  in 
launching artists. Crucially, interviewees also point to the limits of an independent, do-
it-yourself  approach, arguing that for successful acts,  access to mainstream revenue-
generating markets remains almost exclusively the preserve of major music companies. 
The remainder of this section looks at each of these factors in turn.
Digitalisation enhancing the do-it-yourself approach
As with many of  my interviewees,  Independent  Records  owner Dave O’Grady and 
Magnetic Music’s Petr Pandula point to cost reductions in making recordings and the 
increasing ease with which they can be produced as a primary benefit accruing to artists  
and ‘small operators’ associated with digitalisation. O’Grady also proceeds to explain 
that many artistic and administrative functions surrounding the production of recordings 
are now more efficiently executed than in the pre-digital environment:
There  was  always  someone  who  would  charge  you  more for  something  very  simple,  but 
something you couldn’t do without. There were all these little ancillary industries that were built 
around the production of CDs, or film for artwork or other stuff where you always had to pay a 
little more than you thought. You can do that stuff yourself now. You don’t have to pay to get an  
MP3 encoded anymore. You don’t have to pay to adjust and look at your own artwork. You 
don’t have to pay to burn a CD-R. It’s become a lot faster and cheaper to do these things and 
disseminate stuff…From a small independent labels point of view, you can definitely run an 
operation with less staff and less costs than you might have needed in the eighties and nineties. 
(Dave O’Grady, personal interview)
For festival  organiser  Úna Johnston,  digitalisation  has  produced a significant 
level of independence for Irish acts and labels in particular. Johnston argues that digital 
means that Irish acts and labels are no longer ‘bounded by geography and tied to majors 
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in England, and that levels the playing field a bit’ (personal interview). The fact that 
digital  bypasses  many  traditional  manufacturing  costs  and  provides  independent 
platforms for distribution and promotion means, according to Johnston, that:
…bands are empowered to have direct  access  to the market and to have direct  access  to an 
audience who can be anywhere. The fifth member of the band is the webmaster…We’re talking 
ten years really since the internet happened and because of its viral nature it’s changed in ten  
years  what  would  have  taken  a  hundred  years  to  change  before.  Artists  don’t  need  record  
companies the way the used to. (Úna Johnston, personal interview)
Johnston proceeds to explain that  the internet  has bred ‘a culture of entrepreneurial 
spirit’ that has hitherto been poor in an Irish context:
Bands doing it for themselves? That culture of entrepreneurial spirit or business development has 
been  poor in  Ireland  in  the  past.  Bands  setting up businesses  and  actually  being their  own  
business would be at odds with the current model of the way the majority of people work in 
Ireland. Eighty or ninety per cent of people don’t set up their own businesses here, they go and  
work for somebody else…We’ve got the major labels in the music industry the same way we’ve 
got  multi-nationals  in  other  industries…Our  model  has  always  been  to  bring  in  the  multi-
nationals and let them pay us wages…Now, with a new internet-based approach we can set up 
labels and companies to run the music industry here. There is a real, real opportunity now for a 
band as a business if you are clued in. (Úna Johnston, personal interview)
Much of the evidence from my interviews (such as the above) serves to highlight 
the potential for greater independence and disintermediation in the digital music world 
fit comfortably with predictions regarding the outcome of the internet made in the mid-
to-late 1990s [see chapter 4, section 4.2]. During the course of my interview with artist  
manager Fachtna O’Ceallaigh, he sought to explain the extent to which this potential 
has been achieved and the extent to which it remains unrealised. O’Ceallaigh initially 
argues  that  two  key  factors  combine  to  enhance  ‘do-it-yourself’  opportunities  for 
breaking new music in the contemporary environment: primarily,  the proliferation of 
social networks and other online avenues for self-promotion combined with relatively 
cheap and reliable digital recording technologies for the home computer; and second, 
O’Ceallaigh points to ‘the spread of knowledge’ about how to put out records, make 
them digitally  available  and promote  them (primarily)  via  the internet.  Beyond this, 
O’Ceallaigh  emphasises  that  a  digitally-facilitated  do-it-yourself  approach has  limits 
that  can  only  be  surpassed  by  using  the  support  and  resources  of  a  major  music 
company. Drawing initially on the account of O’Ceallaigh, and subsequently on other 
interviewees,  the remainder of this section outlines the changes and continuities that 
have evolved over the past decade in respect to breaking new artists  and promoting 
independent content.
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Using digital platforms and new digital tastemakers to break an artist
At the time of our interview, Fachtna O’Ceallaigh was in the process of developing a 
public profile for a singer-songwriter he was managing called Lissy Trullie. Trullie was 
being promoted and exposed via a plethora of online sites as part of the process of self-
promotion. For example, social networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook with 
an interactive user-submitted network of friends where users may post music, videos, 
blogs,  photographs  internationally;  video-sharing  website  YouTube;  Last.fm,  the 
internet  radio  website  owned  by  CBS  Interactive.  These  sites  are,  according  to 
O’Ceallaigh,  useful  but  limited  as  they  are  also  inhabited  by  many  of  the  biggest 
recording  artists  in  the  world  and  their  record  labels.  Furthermore  with  social 
networking sites MySpace and Facebook boasting tens of millions of registered users, 
gaining visibility and achieving significant hits on your audio files can prove difficult. 
Other  niche/underground  sites  that  Trullie  uses  more  effectively  to  gather 
‘friends’  and hits  include  Vbs.tv,  a  New York based online  broadcast  network  that 
carries news and features on ‘underground’ music and pop culture; MusicRemedy.com 
and  BandWeblogs.com,  sites  where  artists  and  users  can  post  songs,  videos, 
photographs,  reviews;  Stereogum.com,  another  user-driven  site  offering  free  MP3s, 
video clips and reviews. In addition prefixmag.com, papermag.com and filter-mag.com 
are three online daily music magazines offering live reviews, album reviews, links to 
blogs, and in the case of prefixmag.com, links to video clips and access to free MP3 
files. Trullie also has a presence on such sites as thefourohfive.com, an online music 
and film magazine containing reviews, interviews, audio-clips and video-clips, as well 
as promoting and reviewing her live performances on tourfilter.com and songkick.com 
– songkick.com also provides links to a variety of music-related blogs. Trullie is also a 
contributer  and  ‘friend’  to  a  wide  variety  of  weblogs  which  includes  mog, 
realprettyinblack, villagevoice, frictionnyc, and nylonblogs. 
Regarding the usefulness of blogs O’Ceallaigh talks of his collaboration with US 
public relations firm Big Castle in the marketing and promotion of Lissy Trullie:
When I was in New York two weeks ago I had a meeting with this woman [from Big Castle] and 
she produced an outline of how they saw things developing with Lissy…There were all the usual 
kind of print things like Rolling Stone, Spin, The New York Times etc etc etc. Then there were the 
various digital publications but first, before any of these, there were blogs. Now I said I wanted  
to have a t-Shirt that said ‘Kill All Blogs’ because I just hate them. She said she knew what I 
meant, but, when I asked if they had any impact she said that they definitely have an impact and 
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that their research shows how people will sit there religiously and absorb what’s being said…
They [Big Castle] are pushing this as an important form of dissemination and enthusiasm and 
excitement  for  breaking  new acts… So in  the  olden  days  when  I  was  trying  to  break  The 
[Boomtown] Rats we had  NME, we had  Melody Maker, we had  Sounds and  Disc and  Record 
Mirror full stop. You only got in NME if you got in Sounds first, and you only got in Sounds if 
you got in Melody Maker first, and they only wrote about you if they wanted to say they hated 
you. At least this [blogs] opens that up a little bit. (Fachtna O’Ceallaigh, personal interview)
O’Ceallaigh proceeds to state that he finds it difficult to quantify the ‘precise extent’ to 
which ‘the promise of the internet has been realised’, but argues that using these recent 
and new online spaces to generate  a sufficient ‘buzz’ about a new artist  in order to 
achieve synchronisation licenses, bigger a bigger live audience, music press coverage 
and digital sales is ‘a scenario that is perfectly valid and feasible’ (personal interview).
The emergence of public and private funded training initiatives
O’Ceallaigh’s point regarding the spread of knowledge is also taken up by various other 
interviewees who highlight the emergence of a number of music industry information, 
training and education initiatives, both state-sponsored and private, that evolved from 
the  early  1990s  onwards.  For  example,  IMRO  chairman  Keith  Donald  and  record 
producer  PJ  Curtis  provide  an  overview  of  music  management  and  technology 
programmes offered at the Ballyfermot College of Further Education – delivered by the 
City  of  Dublin  Vocational  Education  Committee  (CDVEC).  Donald  also  describes 
Musicbase and First Music Contact:  the former was an Arts Council funded popular 
music information and education resource of which Donald himself was director in the 
1990s.  The  latter  is  a  free  information  and advice  service  for  musicians  and bands 
funded by the Arts Council of Ireland since the mid-1990s. Independent label owner 
Eddie  Joyce  and  ex-Polydor  promotions  manager  Jackie  Hayden  point  to  the  FAS 
Music Training Programme; Festival organiser Úna Johnston argues that such initiatives 
have provided artists and prospective industry professionals with an awareness of the 
mechanics  of  the  music  industries  and  enhanced  the  do-it-yourself  approach  to 
developing a career in various aspects of the music industries. As Jackie Hayden argues:
Those initiatives are hugely valuable in a way that is almost impossible to quantify. If you have 
government money put into that area, and even if it never produces a single hit record, it still is a 
huge input into education in Ireland, never mind culture or music or anything fanciful like that. 
But it is teaching people basic skills. There are a whole range of social skills, technical skills and 
business  skills…simple  things  that  some people  might  not  have  any other  way of  learning. 
(Jackie Hayden, personal interview)
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In  addition,  Hot  Press magazine,  which  Hayden  co-owns,  publish  an  annual  music 
industries directory and have,  over  the past fifteen  years  organised numerous music 
business seminars and workshops. 
Some  of  these  interviewees  also  point  to  the  many  private  training  courses 
offering technical tuition and training for business that evolved. It is worth noting that a 
small  number  of  the industry professionals  interviewed  during  the  primary research 
phase of this thesis participated as trainees in some of the above-mentioned initiatives. 
For  example,  Ben Barrett  attended  a music  management  programme at  Ballyfermot 
College of Further Education.
Limits of the do-it-yourself approach in the contemporary environment
All of the factors considered above in section 8.3 combine to provide for, or comprise 
essential  resources  for  an  artist  or  small  label  taking  significant  steps  towards 
commercial  success  without  the  finance  and  resources  of  a  major  music  company 
behind  them.  As  many  interviewees  stated,  major  record  companies  are  now more 
reluctant than ever to invest in the early stage development of recording acts. While the 
independent  recording  sector  has  long  since  been  regarded  as  the  research  and 
development arm of the industry, artists and their managers are increasingly adopting a 
do-it-yourself approach. As Fachtna O’Ceallaigh argues:
You’re going to wait and you’re going to hold on to your ownership of your copyright, make 
your music available, develop your audience, because you’ve nothing to lose…
(Fachtna O’Ceallaigh, personal interview)
However, he immediately proceeds to emphasise that this approach has limits that can 
only be surpassed by using the support and resources of a major music company:
It’s all in this relatively small little box. You might even kind of permeate out of Ireland and the  
UK and across into Europe until you are at the point where you have been doing this for two or  
three years and…somebody comes along and says: ‘Now that you are selling 100,000 records in 
the UK or whatever and so many more in the US, do you want to change that to one million in  
the UK and five million in  the US? Well the only way you’ll do that is by having my [major  
label] machine behind you’. (Fachtna O’Ceallaigh, personal interview)
Artist manager John Williamson offers a similar argument, stating that smaller labels 
and artists are more empowered and independently capable of going much further than 
before, but ‘while more and more people become more competent and knowledgeable’ 
it still remains to be seen if there are individuals or companies in the industry, beyond 
the major labels, that are ‘actually capable of seeing it through to its conclusion’ and 
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breaking  into  a  mainstream  market  (personal  interview).  As  with  O’Ceallaigh, 
Williamson still sees the potential of the internet as a force inducing disintermediation 
as largely unrealised potential. So, while digitalisation greatly enhances the potential for 
successfully adopting an independent, do-it-yourself approach, this only works up to a 
certain point. 
Six  of  the  eight  managers  I  interviewed  stated  that  making  their  artists  as 
attractive  as  possible  to  major  labels,  primarily  for  the  promotion  and  distribution 
benefits  this brings, remains a key objective.  Many interviewees argue that it  is not 
necessary to commit to a major at an early stage, but they exclusively conclude that 
moving from a peripheral market where record sales may reach tens of thousands, to a 
mainstream  market  where  they  move  into  hundreds  of  thousands  or  millions,  still 
requires the marketing, promotion and distribution power of one of the major industry 
players. As O’Ceallaigh concludes:
Musically, the majors don’t know what’s going on, so the minute you come up with something  
that is a little different, or is different to what they’ve heard before, and you can show that your 
MySpace page has eight thousand friends, they are going to buy you up immediately if they can 
possibly buy you. (Fachtna O’Ceallaigh, personal interview)
Employing  recent  and  emerging  digital  platforms  and  new  types  of 
intermediaries ultimately forms part of a strategy to increase the stature of the artist,  
engage the interest of a major label and enhance the bargaining power of the artist or 
independent label when it comes to dealing with the major. Section 8.4 will proceed to 
further  examine  the  role  of  the  major  record  companies  in  the  contemporary 
environment.
8.4 So why has disintermediation not occurred?
Many authors have addressed the potential of the internet to greatly enhance the ability 
of artists  to produce,  market and distribute their  own work independently.  From the 
mid-1990s, many commentators predicted that digital distribution technologies would 
induce a process of disintermediation – the removal the middle layers of distribution 
channels. Producers of music would be able to directly access their public without the 
machinery of a major music company mediating that relationship. Yet, as the research 
findings advanced in section 8.3 has indicated, this much of this potential has not been 
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realised. Here, we draw upon the interview material to examine why, and to what extent 
the major labels remain key record industry ‘middle-men’.
In his keynote address to the 2008 Music Matters conference, U2 manager Paul 
McGuinness stated that international record labels remain crucial to the future of the 
music industry:
They [record companies] bring to the mix unique and valuable skills: A&R, marketing, financial  
management and career building. The truth is that there is always a long list of artists who are  
either succeeding with their record deal, or desperate to get one. 
(Paul McGuinness, manager U2, keynote speech delivered at  Music Matters conference, Hong 
Kong, 8th June 2008)
Such sentiments were echoed by the majority of my interviewees, who still perceive the 
major music companies as crucial to the present and future of the industry. While many 
interviewees  regard  digitalisation  as  greatly  enhancing  and  democratising  the 
production process and providing the potential for artists and independent music labels 
to  market,  promote  and  distribute  their  recordings,  the  level  of  success  achievable 
without  the  aid  of  a  major  label  is  seen  as  limited.  As  Gerry Harford,  manager  of 
Therapy and Nina Hynes explains:
If you want to sell records which is what we all want to do… you need to be connected to a big 
label to put the money behind you to tour and to pay for the advertising, the press, the video etc, 
the people with the infrastructure and the way of doing that are the big record labels. You need  
to have that clout…You do need to sign to a major label. (Gerry Harford, personal interview)
Another artist manager Frank Murray advances an almost identical perspective on the 
failure of the internet to remove the major labels from the process of intermediation:
People don’t have the time to go to a computer and listen to hundreds of bands every day. So 
how am I going to find out about a band? The industry hasn’t changed that much. Supposing I  
have an artist and he puts up ten tracks on MySpace and on his website…so it might start off 
with ten people listening to it, but then they’ve got to tell everybody around the world. People 
are still going to have to become aware of the act. You are still going to need somebody to get  
you that…Getting press, radio, TV, distribution is still  only available large-scale through the  
major companies… Where you have a major record company behind you, you can get into the 
right spaces. (Frank Murray, personal interview)
MD of Danceline Records, Eddie Joyce states that the internet has ‘undeniable 
potential’,  primarily for ‘established mainstream’  recorded music markets and labels 
that  serve  ‘very  narrow  niche  markets’.  However  Joyce  vehemently  rejects  the 
suggestion that smaller independent labels such as his own can now, as a result of the 
internet, avoid the machinery of the corporate industry in reaching the market place:
Fine. You can sell records to the world over the internet, which is quite true in theory, but when  
a small pop label like us release an album, how does anyone know to type that into a search  
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engine? We’re not niche, we’re not alternative, so no, I’d have to be quite frank and say that it 
hasn’t changed very much for us. (Eddie Joyce, personal interview)
Lakota Records  MD Jim Carroll  echoes  similar  sentiments  stating that  those 
who ‘bought into the idea of the internet taking the major companies out of the picture  
was wrong from the start. That has not happened and is not going to happen’ (personal 
interview).  He  points  to  the  dominance  of  a  small  number  of  corporate  players 
maintaining a stranglehold over the channels of distribution. Beyond this, Carroll sees 
the same major actors as being best placed to exploit the potential of new and emerging 
media:
He who pays the piper calls the tune…Sure you can use MySpace to create a bit of a buzz about 
your band or your label, but in terms of record labels the majors dominate that arena too because 
they have the money to spend on bumping up the amount of MySpace friends they have and all 
that. (Jim Carroll, personal interview)
My interview with Carroll indicates the potential the internet holds for the promotion of 
independent artists and labels. As with Fachtna O’Ceallaigh, he outlines for me various 
online platforms through which artists can generate a public profile. However, in terms 
of labels using these platforms to sell significant quantities of recordings independently,  
Carroll acknowledges that this potential remains largely theoretical. While he regards 
independent distributors such as ADA in the US and City Slang in Europe as ‘viable 
ways of getting your music out [and] being in the game’, the market they serve is: 
… peripheral…removed form the main centres of activity…You have got to be realistic about it. 
It ain’t going to happen just because you think the internet is where everyone’s playing on the 
same playing field… You still need a distributor, you still need a marketer, you still need a big  
promoter. (Jim Carroll, personal interview)
Carroll  argues  that  the  seed  capital  needed  to  market  and  promote  an  artist  or 
independent label can be acquired from sources other than major record labels:
But you will  probably take a major  labels  money at  some stage,  because,  to  use a  football 
analogy, the major labels are like the Real Madrid’s of this world, they will buy up talent when it 
reaches a certain stage as they are the primary means of getting it to the next level.
(Jim Carroll, personal interview) 
Steve Lindsey advances a similar perspective stating that:
The majors are still the only ones that can bring into force large promo budgets to push the  
artists they want to push…So if you’re not signed to a major label it’s extremely difficult to 
make yourself known…In many ways this picture is exactly the same as it was pre-internet. In  
fact it’s exactly the same as it was even thirty years ago. That hasn’t changed at all. 
(Steve Lindsey, personal interview)
Both Carroll and Lindsey echo the words of Paul McGuinness at the  Music Matters 
conference, he proceeds to qualify this by outlining that majors most readily possess the 
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infrastructure and experience necessary to generate a profile at mass-market level for 
recording  artists.  This,  according  to  Carroll,  is  primarily  achieved  through  the 
established relationships  that  the  major  labels  have fostered with broadcasters,  print 
media and other key taste-makers.
All  of  the  managers  I  interviewed  state  that  it  is  these  companies  that  most 
readily possess the necessary contacts and alliances to achieve broadcast exposure for 
recordings  and  music  videos,  press  coverage  and  synchronisation  licensing  deals. 
Further, they state that the primary source of funding for the necessary marketing and 
promotion to make a hit lies with the major music labels. For Gerry Harford, without 
this finance the opportunities for recording artists to gain profile are very limited:
What you need to break an act internationally is a bank, and that’s what the major labels still are.  
My artist Nina Hynes is a good example. We did a Nina Hynes album on Reverb [independent 
label]. It was a very good album, but there was nothing behind it. Reverb had no money…and  
they  didn’t  have  anybody  to  take  it  up  and  market  it.  Marketing  is  expensive.  It’s  a  big 
investment. To make your band leap out at people you are going to need some sort of finance  
behind you. (Gerry Harford, personal interview) 
Steve  Lindsey  further  emphasises  this  point  stating  that  an  independent 
recording artist might:
…bring things up to forty miles an hour by themselves, but a major will cone in and say ‘we’ll  
take it  up to a hundred miles an hour’. And to be honest, that is still  the only way forward  
beyond a certain point for any artist. (Steve Lindsey, personal interview)
Furthermore,  many interviewees  state  that  when it  comes  to  new or  emerging acts, 
major  music  companies  are  oftentimes  a  crucial  source  of  financial  support  for 
promotional touring. Beyond new and emerging acts, some interviewees also point to 
established acts still needing the machinery of a major label. As John D’Ardis advances:
It all still relies on the big companies. If the record companies promote you, you’ll be okay. But 
if they want to kill you, you’ll be dead. Even artists as big as Prince have discovered this. Once 
he cut himself off from Sony look at what happened. Commercial suicide. 
(John D’Ardis, personal interview)
This ongoing significance of the major record labels as industry gate-keepers is 
perhaps most succinctly outlined by Ben Barrett in her account of the career trajectory 
of  her  artist,  singer-songwriter  Damien  Rice.  According  to  Barrett,  the  key  to 
independently  breaking  Rice  into  peripheral  markets  was  a  broad  combination  of 
factors. She outlines in detail how, over a two-year period following the recording and 
release of his self-recorded debut album  O,  Rice achieved sales of 15,000 copies in 
Ireland and approximately 50,000 in the UK. This, according to Barrett, was achieved 
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through  their  formulation  of  a  ‘whole  plan’  of  promotional  activities  aimed  at 
specialised music press, specialised radio and television shows, and word of mouth in 
physical  and digital  realms,  as well as constant and extensive touring through small 
venues. Having negotiated with independent distribution networks such as Pinnacle and 
Vital,  Barrett  initially  secured  distribution  for  Rice  with  3MB, a  small  independent 
company.  She defines  this  process  not  as  an end in  itself,  but  rather  as  a  ‘plot’  to 
convince a major label to ‘back a horse that’s going to win…You just present them with 
the whole plan as something that has already proven itself somewhere, however small’ 
(personal interview). 
Barrett’s  ‘plot’  ultimately  resulted  in  Rice’s  album  O  subsequently  being 
licensed to Warner’s for international release. The blueprint for re-launching Damien 
Rice  internationally  was the  earlier  marketing  and promotion  plan  used  to  promote 
David  Gray,  also  signed  to  the  same  management  company,  Mondo  Management 
(under  the  auspices  of  Barrett’s  boss,  Rob Holden)  and released  through Warner’s. 
Barrett  states  that  within  twelve month’s  of  Warner’s  issuing  O,  sales  of  65,000 in 
Britain and Ireland jumped to 2,000,000 internationally. Barrett concludes:
It’s really all about who is spending the money,  and increasingly about who is spending the 
money at the very top level, with the power to get promotion and distribution in all its forms 
sorted out at a global level…To cut a very, very long story short, this is the way that that it’s  
increasingly going. (Ben Barrett, personal interview)
Another interviewee, Bruce Findlay, advances a similar approach to breaking his 
current act, Aberfeldy. Findlay places more emphasis than Barrett on the role of internet 
platforms on this process stating that:
In terms of getting your music to would-be labels, agents, promoters, distributors who might  
want you – they can look at you, see what you’re doing, hear what you’re doing, see live concert  
footage, read what people are saying about you, read fans reviews and all in an instant on their 
computer screen. (Bruce Findlay, personal interview)
Ultimately Findlay concludes that these platforms are tools for engaging the interest of 
an established label. The role of these tools in bringing artists to the attention of major 
labels  is  also  highlighted  in  my  interviews  with  record  company  management  and 
personnel. EMI’s Willie Kavanagh and Sony’s John Sheehan highlight MySpace as a 
key artist and repertoire (A&R) tool. A&R is the department in the record company 
charged with finding new talent.
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Findlay and Fachtna O’Ceallaigh both compare the contemporary environment 
with that of the late 1970s when, at the outset of their careers in artist management, they 
were  working  to  achieve  an  international  breakthrough  for  Simple  Minds  and  The 
Boomtown Rats, respectively. Both argue that while the range of promotional platforms 
available to bands and platforms has proliferated, these platforms operate on two levels: 
On one level,  sites such as YouTube, MySpace and other online platforms serve to 
promote establish artists directly to their audience / consumer base; on the other level, 
these  platforms  serve  to  promote  unsigned  or  independent  artists  and  acts  to  the 
established music companies.  Both of these long-established managers thus view the 
internet as an additional tool for attracting, and gaining leverage in negotiations with the 
major music companies. While technology has evolved to place a new range of media at 
their disposal, the process of breaking an artist internationally remains largely filtered 
through the same channels as it previously was.
Akin to Barrett’s account of Damien Rice, Fachtna O’Ceallaigh pointed to the 
almost  parallel  trajectory  of  American  recording  artists  Arcade  Fire  who,  having 
achieved moderate success with two independent releases on the Merge record label in 
North Carolina, subsequently signed to Universal through which they achieved a major 
international  breakthrough.  O’Ceallaigh  states  that  he  is  presently  plotting  a  similar 
trajectory with one of his current artists, Lissy Trullie: 
…because, in my opinion her music has that cross-generational  spread to it,  there is a good 
reason for me to talk to majors. At a certain point there is still a very good reason to have that 
big machine by your side. (Fachtna O’Ceallaigh, personal interview)
Further  emphasising  the  contemporary  importance  of  engaging  with  a  major  label, 
O’Ceallaigh proceeds to state that there are:
…two different layers to this industry – one huge, and the other one, this gritty underbelly that 
don’t  generate  articles  in  the paper  about  what  it’s  like to  sit  in a  van going from Cork to  
Ballybofey overnight to play to 75 people and then getting in the van again and driving back 
down to Waterford to play to 150 people and keeping your dream alive. It’s all well and good 
doing it once, or doing it twice, or maybe even doing it three times, but when it’s three years 
later and you’re sitting in the same van playing to the same people, even if the material is new… 
That’s the reality of the thing. All of this talk about touring and internet sales and merchandising  
making it possible to do it yourself is fine, but no more than theoretical in a lot of cases…The 
reality is that there’s a well-established path. (Fachtna O’Ceallaigh, (personal interview)
These  accounts  suggests  that  using  the  internet  as  the  primary  means  for 
launching or promoting a recording is of limited benefit to independent artists. However 
an example frequently cited in the media as exemplifying the transformative affects of 
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the internet on the sphere of music distribution is the album In Rainbows by the band 
Radiohead. Following the expiration of their recording contract with EMI, Radiohead 
initially released  In Rainbows in late 2007 for sixty days only as an exclusive digital 
download  that  customers  could  order  for  whatever  price  they  saw fit.  Echoing  the 
sentiments of a variety of media reports, The New York Times labelled this as ‘the most 
audacious experiment  in years’  to increase the misery of ‘the beleaguered recording 
business’ (New York Times online, 9th December 2007). 
I asked my artist manager interviewees if this independent, ‘digital only’ release 
provided evidence of the ability of the internet  to enable artists  to bypass corporate 
machinery.  They unanimously responded that this example is illustrative of how the 
internet works most effectively as a promotional tool for already established acts. By 
2005, Radiohead had already issued seven albums over a thirteen-year period on EMI 
labels  Parlophone  and  Capitol  records.  This  included  hit  singles  and  chart-topping 
albums on both sides of the Atlantic and reputed overall album sales of approximately 
30 million units. As such, by the time they departed their record label and released In 
Rainbows exclusively via the internet, Radiohead were a well established international 
act. All eight artist managers that I interviewed argued that the successful independent 
launch of an album akin to the In Rainbows model requires the artist concerned to be an 
already established brand with significant marketing and promotional support behind 
them. As Fachtna O’Ceallaigh states:
Radiohead’s all well and good but that’s not the Flaws from County Monaghan, or Director or 
whoever. Republic of Loose, look at them, where do they find themselves? They’ve put out a 
couple of records that have been acclaimed in Ireland and done very well. But they can’t really 
get a sniff anywhere else. So what does the fucking internet mean to them? Fuck all. 
(Fachtna O’Ceallaigh, personal interview)
Likewise, Gerry Harford argues:
Smaller bands can’t do what Radiohead did. Internet or not, you still need the same package that 
you always needed. Everything is still fairly traditional in that respect. 
(Gerry Harford, personal interview)
Neither  Radiohead  nor  its  management  have  made  public  statistics  or 
information relating to the number of downloads achieved or revenues generated from 
this experiment. It’s launch, however, generated widespread media coverage and earned 
them exposure as a mainstream news story. In Rainbows was subsequently released for 
retail  across a variety of physical  and digital  formats  via  licensing  agreements  with 
various major and independent companies in different territories.
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8.5 Making ‘hits’ in the internet era
Section 8.3 of this chapter advanced the potential usefulness of blogs, online audio and 
video streaming services, social networking sites and other online music discussion and 
review platforms  in  assisting  an  emerging  artist  to  independently  generate  a  public 
profile. In this section I examine the key ways in which big-selling hits are achieved,  
and mass market  audiences  reached based on my interviewee materials.  One of my 
questions for interviewees had initially sought to ascertain if the internet had evolved as 
a tastemaker for new music, and if so to what degree. While highlighting some potential 
benefits  associated  with  social  networking  sites,  interviewees  almost  invariably 
switched the conversation to the medium of (terrestrial)  radio as crucial  tastemaker. 
Television and music press were also highlighted, but only to signal their limited and 
diminishing effectiveness in the contemporary environment.  These issues and related 
findings are elaborated on in the remainder of this section.
The role of internet tastemakers
Major  music  companies  are  generating  revenues  directly  from licensing  agreements 
with social networking sites, amongst other online and mobile platforms for music as 
was  outlined  in  section  7.4.  These  same  social  networking sites  form an important 
constituent  element  in  the  major  labels  marketing  plans  for  new  artists  or  fresh 
recordings. Sony’s John Sheehan, EMI’s Willie Kavanagh and Peter Jenner all explain 
that there are different routes to launching and promoting different types of acts. As 
Jenner advances, managing an artist or label ‘is a bit like horses for courses’ (personal 
interview). While many ‘mainstream pop’ artists are launched directly at a mass market 
audience primarily through radio, other acts, for instance singer-songwriters or certain 
types of rock acts will require a more long-term strategy. This means building a fan-
base that was traditionally primarily achieved through the music press and specialised 
‘off-peak’ radio programmes. While these intermediaries retain importance they state 
that this process is increasingly linked to blogs and social networking sites. For another 
interviewee,  Jim  Carroll,  these  sites  have  evolved  as  crucial  ‘word-of-mouth’ 
mechanisms.  While  word-of-mouth  once  meant  those  peers  in  your  immediate 
geographic environment, the internet means those that are potentially much more widely 
dispersed and significantly larger in number. 
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For Willie Kavanagh, these sites are now hugely important in reaching ‘early 
adopters’ who are the sector of the record consumer market that will ‘actively seek out 
new music’ (personal interview). Kavanagh proceeds to state that when ‘pursuing’ an 
early adopter group as a strategy for breaking a new act:
…the internet has become a very big part of that…getting your message out there to the early 
adopter now, you have to infiltrate the Bebo generation and the MySpace group. These have 
been influential. (Willie Kavanagh, personal interview)
When I asked Kavanagh to elaborate on ‘infiltrate’, he explains that EMI Ireland have 
one full-time member of staff dedicated to generating online ‘IDs’ and profiles with the 
aim of joining and engaging with as many user ‘groups’ on social networking sites as 
possible  and promoting  EMI catalogue  and  artists  within  these  groups  of  ‘friends’. 
According to Kavanagh:
He’s got lots of IDs and will invite you to become a ‘friend’…It’s about getting the message to  
the small group, who then take the responsibility,  because they become fans of the band, to 
expand that and get it to the next layer. It’s like an onion, and we’re only at the inner layer…Say 
in your info on Bebo you say you like Guns and Roses, and if we had a band that was a guitar  
band with a screeching vocal, we will send the robot in to everybody who likes Guns and Roses 
and say, ‘I see you like Guns and Roses, why don’t you have a listen to this’ and we’ll send them 
a link to something else. It’s just getting people to sample it.  
(Willie Kavanagh, personal interview)
In essence,  ‘friendship’ is being actively commodified.  Kavanagh forwards the band 
Thirty Seconds To Mars as an example of an act that was successfully promoted in this 
way by his label.  While  at  the outset  the band had an extremely small  fanbase,  he 
outlines  how  EMI  used  profiles  on  social  networking  sites  to  ‘increase  the  whole 
community  base  and  try  to  broaden  it  as  much  as  we  could’  (ibid).  This  process, 
according to Kavanagh, grew the bands fanbase exponentially and provided his labels 
‘pluggers’ with significant leverage in promoting the band’s debut album to daytime 
music radio programmers and producers. 
It was getting no radio play, but as soon as it became popular it got radio play and that takes it to  
the next level. Sales in August [2008] for Thirty Seconds to Mars saw a 500% increase for the  
sales in July, purely through such internet marketing at the outset. It is word of mouth, that’s  
exactly what it is. (ibid)
While one member of Kavanagh’s staff in Dublin is permanently engaged in 
‘infiltrating’  online  groups,  EMI  offices  operating  in  different  territories  use  other 
means of achieving the same end:
There’s lots of ways to do it…I had a meeting with a French counterpart not so long ago and  
they send robots into those sites, and robots will pick out the groups and friends. (ibid) 
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According to many interviewees, while the internet has evolved as a medium 
through which music is promoted by copyright owners and acquired by consumers, its 
various facets are in themselves unable to produce mass market sales of recorded music, 
or broader music revenues. This according to many of my interviewees still requires the 
intervention of a more traditional and long-established medium – radio. 
The contemporary role of radio
As one interviewee states:
…in our rush to believe in communications revolutions and digital revolutions we can overlook 
the importance of radio…It has certainly maintained itself in the contemporary music world.  
(Ross Graham, personal interview)
The extent to which radio may be measured as a contemporary active promoter of music 
is elaborated on by Fachtna O’Ceallaigh who states that:
…there is huge evidence to suggest that radio sells records…The only way that a [artist’s] first  
single is going to succeed is if BBC Radio 1 puts it on their playlist…played thirty-five times a  
week for six weeks or so – hit record. Second single, played thirty-five times a week – hit record. 
Put out the album – hit album. So there is a specific pattern…They release a record to radio and 
they desperately hope radio will play it and if they don’t their record is buried. 
(Fachtna O’Ceallaigh, personal interview)
O’Ceallaigh has managed new and emerging acts to international success in the 1970s, 
1980s and the new millennium and contends that the significance of radio to breaking 
an artist and selling records is common to all periods. He views online streaming sites 
such as Sirius and XFM as an extension of traditional radio and, while individuals may 
exercise control over the content they choose to listen to on these sites, argues that they 
form useful tastemakers.  However,  O’Ceallaigh and his managerial  counterpart  John 
Williamson were the only interviewees who dwelled on internet radio to any degree. 
Most interviewees failed to make reference to it as tool in promoting music and when I 
introduced the topic into our conversation, reduced its role to minor significance. Many 
perceived  it  as  pursuit  associated  primarily  with  music  fans  who actively  seek  out 
music. 
In his  earlier  comments  regarding the trajectory of Thirty Seconds To Mars, 
EMI MD Willie  Kavanagh advanced that creating a ‘buzz’ about an artist  on social 
networking sites  and other internet  spaces provides significant  ammunition  to major 
labels in when it comes to plugging recordings in radio stations. In fact, for Kavanagh 
as for many of my other interviewees, these new and recent online taste-making sites 
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are most effective as tools for engaging the interest of daytime radio programmers. Thus 
radio, one of the oldest mediators between record industry and audience, remains hugely 
significant to achieving commercial success. Based on his experience of working for 
London Records and Sony, Jim Carroll explains:
You can quantify radio. Brian Adams, the music programmer at Today FM, has produced a 
private  radio  listenership  survey.  I’ve  seen  it.  It’s  goldmine  data…Radio  is  still  the  most  
important medium for the major labels. They fucking die where radio is concerned. It’s radio,  
print, television, carrier pigeon and the internet. And it’s in that order with radio leading by a  
mile…As far as the permanent establishment are concerned, radio is vital. That’s it.
(Jim Carroll, personal interview)
John  Sheehan,  former  Chairman  of  Sony  Ireland,  illustrates  Carroll’s  point 
during the course of our interview:
This is very simple. If you don’t get it on the radio you’re not going to sell it. I don’t care how  
good it is… One of the things you talk about when you’re in the studio and they’re mixing it is a 
radio  mix.  You’re  looking  for  a  radio  mix.  You’re  looking  for  three  minutes  twenty-five 
seconds, and as you’re listening you’re asking ‘will this work on contemporary radio’… And it’s 
always been the same. That’s not changed. (John Sheehan, personal interview)
The evidence from my interviews effectively describes a pool of intermediaries that has, 
in the words of Sheehan, become more ‘cluttered and complicated’ over the years. The 
positive within this for Sheehan is that there are now many more outlets, both traditional 
and new, through which music can be promoted and exposed than in former times. 
However, Sheehan validates Ben Barrett’s claim that radio remains central by stating: 
‘Without radio, the others [intermediaries] don’t work… It is fundamental to the whole 
marketing mix’ (personal interview). This point is further emphasised by artist manager 
Peter  Jenner  who  states  that  music  magazines  such  as  Q,  that  serve  a  larger,  less 
specialised audience essentially follow the lead of radio regarding the acts that their 
editors choose to feature. He states that this is likewise for other lifestyle and celebrity-
centred publications. According to Jenner:
Why will magazine editors know that they should write about you? Because they’ve heard you 
on the radio. That’s how it works. Radio play marks your output as being from someone who is  
in the game. (Peter Jenner, personal interview)
Jenner continues:
…radio is still a pretty crucial thing…Look at the results…I mean nobody takes seriously a book 
that is released straight to paperback or a film that goes straight to dvd. Likewise, radio a sort of 
badge of honour in commercial terms. (ibid)
Willie  Kavanagh advances  a  similar  sentiment:  ‘Radio  is  crucial.  Absolutely 
crucial in breaking any new artist or selling any established one’. Kavanagh explains 
how his label, EMI, also expend resources on marketing and promotion through various 
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new and recent digital platforms such as social networking sites and blogs, and entering 
into cross-promotional alliances with online music stores and outlets. He describes the 
promotional process as ‘a synergy’  of radio,  television,  press, touring and all  of the 
available online spaces, however he concludes that, of all of these intermediary spaces: 
‘Radio is number one by a landslide’. For supporting evidence, Kavanagh outlines the 
trajectory of The Plain White Tees, an act signed recently to a distribution deal on the 
EMI label:
We had a huge hit with a band called The Plain White Tees who have a track called Delilah. It is  
disproportionately successful here compared to the UK or elsewhere. Two months ago, nobody 
here had ever  heard of The Plain White Tees,  now they’ve  had a number one single and a 
number two album, and all of the back of their very first single which is very unusual…That’s 
the power of radio…So still to this day, in any country in the world, and I’m including America 
very much in this, and the UK, there is nowhere in the world that I can think of where radio isn’t  
the number one way to get your music heard and sold. 
(Willie Kavanagh, personal interview)
For  another  interviewee,  music  journalist  and  broadcaster  Stuart  Bailie,  the 
plethora of radio formats for a daytime audience may essentially be broken down into 
stations that fit two broad categories: ‘those for the housewives market with DJs that 
grow old with their audience…or they’ll be more youth orientated’ (personal interview). 
In the case of either, from a station manager’s point of view, ‘the persona of a daytime 
DJ is a lot more important than the musical content’ in stating the persona of the station, 
so record companies will ‘invest heavily’ in accommodating radio programmers with 
records that fit ‘the orientation’ of the station (ibid). 
Radio also remains a key priority for independent artists and music labels. For 
Danceline Records owner Eddie Joyce: 
Radio is the main way to let people hear a song. If people don’t hear it there, for most, it’s never 
really going to enter their consciousness to think of buying it…So that’s why I think radio is so  
important. (Edie Joyce, personal interview)
For  Joyce,  and other  interviewed  independent  label  owners  such  as  Dave  O’Grady 
(Independent Records), Elvera Butler (Reekus Records), Petr Pandula (Magnetic Music) 
and Shay Hennessy (Crashed Music), their core stated problem in this respect is the 
difficulty in accessing the airwaves. For labels other than those operated by the four 
major  music  companies,  lack  of  radio  play  is  widely  regarded  as  hindering  their 
development. According to Elvera Butler:
Whilst there might be more music infrastructure and outlets now, the situation has not become  
easier for alternative or independent music as the market has shrunk with the dominance of the 
major labels. The crucial factor in getting to an audience is broadcasting, but the problem of 
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getting broadcast is more difficult than the problem of getting distribution…It’s hard to do either 
without a major label. (Elvera Butler, personal interview)
For Crashed Music owner Shay Hennessy, launching and promoting an artist in 
the contemporary environment can be a ‘nightmare’ because there are:
…so many angles that you have to hit. You’ve got the local radio stations, the national radio  
stations,  television stations,  the mass of  print  media that  now exists,  and all  of  the internet  
spaces. It’s great in that you have so many opportunities, plenty of opportunities, but…radio is 
important…The big record companies take the approach that they have to get airplay and they go 
out and try to demand it…For a small company, this stuff breaks your heart, it really does. The 
number of artists that we’ve got and that we can’t get played, just can’t get played at all.
(Shay Hennessy, personal interview)
Hennessy states that for the artists on his label, the pursuit of a music career remains a 
part-time  activity  due  to  their  inability  to  generate  sufficient  revenues  to  sustain 
themselves through music. Achieving distribution through one of the major companies 
remains a key priority for Hennessy with all of his acts. Engagement with a major label, 
for Hennessy, is what will most readily open the door to mainstream radio airplay, other 
intermediaries and a larger audience. 
The success  of  radio as a promotional  tool  relates  to  the fact  that  it  is  both 
pervasive and invasive, as many interviewees emphasise. Beyond the role of specialised 
music shows in helping to introduce new music to niche audiences, many interviewees 
highlight how the public are exposed to mainstream daytime radio in a range of both 
voluntary and involuntary settings. We experience radio in our homes,  our cars, our 
places of work and various public and social settings. As Sony’s John Sheehan puts it:  
‘Radio is everywhere’ (personal interview).  
The account of Ben Barrett regarding the success of Damien Rice is again highly 
pertinent here. Barrett attributes his success to one primary factor: the increased radio 
exposure gained following Rice’s alliance to the Warner Records:
I still fully believe that radio is the thing that did it for us. There is no way that we would have  
sold two million records without the singles that we had on the radio.  It  just wouldn’t have 
happened…Radio is crucial…yeah, radio is essential. (Ben Barrett, personal interview)
Barrett proceeds to detail how having a presence on ‘certain new media outlets’ help in 
gaining access to a ‘younger MySpace generation’, but for the broad mass of ‘people 
like us working in offices, commuting to work, shopping, driving or whatever, radio is 
absolutely key, because radio is everywhere’ (ibid). 
208
Barrett describes the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of radio for Rice on an imaginary graph 
illustrating Damien Rice’s record sales trajectory. Prior to gaining access to mainstream 
daytime radio, she traces a slight gradual incline over a lengthy period of time. Post-
mainstream radio playlisting, she traces a sharp, steep incline. She subsequently outlines 
how mainstream radio  exposure opened the  door  to  key television  appearances  and 
areas of print press beyond specialised music publications that would not have been 
available previously. As such, Barrett’s testimony validates John Sheehan’s claim that 
radio opens the door to other gatekeepers and taste-makers. 
Aside from the promotional  aspect of airplay for recordings as evidenced by 
these accounts from my interviewees, we must note that radio is also a direct source of 
revenue for both recording and music publishing companies. As noted in section 7.5, a 
growing  music  publishing  market,  of  which  performing  royalties  from  radio-play 
feature as one of a number of core revenue streams. Equally, record companies benefit 
from  the  broadcast  of  their  copyrighted  recordings  through  licensing  arrangements 
between  broadcasters  and  phonographic  royalty  collection  societies  such  as 
Phonographic  Performance  Ireland  and  the  British  Phonographic  Institute.  As  John 
Williamson explains:
If you get onto the A-list of a BBC station you are getting paid £80-90 per play and you are  
getting played forty to fifty times per week over a number of weeks, then this does add up to a  
lot of money. The publishers and the record companies get money which is possibly why they 
still pursue radio maybe more vigorously than proportionately they should. 
(John Wiliamson, personal interview)
Remixing for radio
While, in the case of the album O, Damien Rice initially, independently recorded the 
songs for the album, many of these tracks were returned to the recording studio on a 
number of occasions for modifying and remixing for different platforms and markets, 
but primarily for radio exposure:
When we sat down with Warner’s, there was absolutely nothing on Damien’s record that would 
work on radio,  no matter how good it was,  so we had to remix the tracks for radio… They 
argued that people want to hear something with a beat, something with a pulse. They want to 
hear something that is a bit fluffy. So yeah, radio does dictate…And you know, even with the  
edits that we give them [Warner’s], they’ll shorten it, take bits out or whatever…
(Ben Barrett, personal interview)
Barrett then outlines how these initial remixes only met with limited success:
Radio pretty much still said no, and said no to many, many things. So away we went and did 
other remixes of the tracks.  If  they say no, you’ve just got to go back to the drawing board 
again…We had Cannonball [promotional single] released for the first time, and we had certain 
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friends in BBC Radio 1 and Radio 2 that played it, but that didn’t take it over the tipping point.  
So we had to go back and do another remix, and that one flew, it really took off on Radio 1, then 
Radio 3 and the other stations. In all of these cases it was the same songs we were working with, 
the very same ones we had started out with but were doing and re-doing…so I guess it’s all a big  
game really [laughs]. (Ben Barrett, personal interview)
Barrett argues that the more formats, both physical and digital, through which a single 
or  album  is  released  these  days,  the  greater  chance  of  commercial  success.  It  is 
important  to  ‘cover  all  angles’,  and this  frequently  involves  remixing  Rice’s  tracks 
primarily for radio, but subsequently for use by DJs in nightclubs, for specialised genre-
specific radio shows, for pitching at specific television and films productions, and also 
for a variety of different internet and mobile platforms.
The producer of the international release of O was David Arnold. Arnold is the 
long-established producer of global, multi-million selling acts such as Bjork, George 
Michael, Tina Turner, Joe Satriani,  and other European-wide successful rock acts as 
The Kaiser Chiefs and Cast as well as artists such as Cliff Richard, Natacha Atlas, and 
Propellerheads. He is also a successful producer and composer of film and television 
scores and soundtracks,  most  notably all  James Bond movies since the early 1990s. 
From Barrett’s account, the willingness of Arnold to act as producer for Rice’s album 
proved ‘helpful’ in engaging Warner’s, and his contribution in remixing various tracks 
proved  crucial  in  engaging  radio  producers  and  other  intermediaries.  In  Barrett’s 
account, all of this constituted ‘the drawing board’ they returned to for constructing a 
successful international release.
In many ways, the Plain White Tees trajectory resembles that of Damien Rice. 
From Kavanagh’s account, the band, from Illinois, self-released two albums, Come On 
Over and Stop in the early years of the new millennium before the latter album was 
licensed to Warner label, Fearless, in the US, and subsequently remixed and relaunched. 
The recently successful album Kavanagh details in the above quote is Every Second 
Counts, which was recorded on The Walt Disney Company’s Hollywood Records and 
distributed via Universal in the US and, in the case of Ireland, EMI. The track Hey 
There Delilah had originally been released in 2005 but failed to make an impression on 
the charts. The track was remixed by Ariel Rechtshaid, producer of such acts as The 
Hippos  (for  Universal’s  Interscope  label),  We  Are  Scientists  (for  EMI’s  Capitol 
Records), Taking Back Sunday (for the Warner Music Group) and Valencia (for Sony 
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Music Entertainment’s Columbia Records). Rechtstaid’s remix became a global chart 
hit.
Ultimately, according to Ben Barrett, amidst proliferating avenues for promotion 
and exposure, many established practices and continuities remain.  When it comes to 
generating ‘serious’ revenues from music: 
…it’s about hearing somebody on the radio… it’s radio that  really makes the difference…It 
helps you cross over to an audience that might not as individuals buy a whole lot of records, and  
it’s access to a big new market. That’s what radio is to us. (Ben Barrett, personal interview).
The contemporary role of television as a promoter of recorded music
The various accounts of my interviewees point to the relationship between television 
and  recorded  music  being  decidedly  problematic.  Television  brings  benefits  to  the 
record industry courtesy of licensing fees emanating from synchronisation rights,  as 
noted in section 7.5. Yet, many interviewees argue that the use of specialised music 
television output has long since been decreasing in its significance to the promotion of 
recordings. 
Within an Irish context, two popular primetime weekend RTE television shows 
form key targets in the marketing strategies of the major labels and other –  The Late 
Late Show and  Tubridy Tonight14. Julian Vignoles, a deputy commissioning editor at 
RTE, states that these outlets provide ‘the only real opportunity for music on television 
here’ as they broadcast to a large audience that encompasses the ‘broadest possible’ 
demographic (personal interview). However, Vignoles moves quickly to advance that 
the music output on such television shows is largely irrelevant to their success, rather, 
the  audience  the  show  commands  makes  these  slots  lucrative  for  record  company 
executives.  Along  with  the  exposure  gained  through  synchronisation  on  the 
international distribution of hit US dramas such as The OC, Grey’s Anatomy and Ghost  
Whisperer, he contends that this is the one of the few areas where television works to 
promote music. Vignoles states that specialised music programming for television has 
‘had its day’ and ‘doesn’t really work’ in terms of audience:
Music just doesn’t work on television. Radio is still the king for music, compared to television.  
Even with Jools Holland on BBC2, they’ll never chance it before half-eleven, and it has a tiny  
audience. It’s a cool audience…but it’s tiny. (Julian Vignoles, personal interview)
14 Tubridy Tonight ceased production in May 2009 when its presenter, Ryan Tubridy, moved to become 
host of The Late Late Show.
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Vignoles proceeds to outline how RTE research15 indicates that the teenage audience-
base  categories  that  constituted  the  main  target  group  of  such  output  have  largely 
migrated to YouTube and various internet sites where videos are streamed to access 
music video. He states that beyond this, the broad mass of potential viewership has little  
interest in music television. 
Vignoles views are shared by many working within the record industry. Artist 
manager John Williamson advances that specialised music stations and output has been 
continually  decreasing  in  importance  over  the  past  decade  as  its  audience  has 
‘rediscovered social  networking…a more interesting way of finding out about music 
and sharing it with your friends’ (personal interview). Ross Graham, Johnny Lappin, 
Jim Carroll and Jim Lockhart advance similar perspectives. Jim Lockhart states that the 
‘MTV  generation…has  stopped  picking  up  stuff  on  television  anymore’  (personal 
interview).  Stating  that  the  1980s  and early  1990s  saw specialised  music  television 
stations become prominent as sites for the promotion of music,  their effect has long 
since dissipated with the output of such stations as MTV and VHI increasingly veer 
towards reality and lifestyle programmes. 
Senior management at major record labels further emphasise many of the above 
perspectives. EMI MD Willie Kavanagh states that in the late 1980s getting promotional 
videos aired on MTV was crucial to breaking a record, particularly in America. Once it 
broke America,  MTV Europe picked it  up and ‘then the whole ball  started  rolling’ 
(personal interview).  However Kavanagh and Sony’s  John Sheehan, amongst others, 
advance that the influence of music television has dissolved. While its effectiveness as a 
promotional vehicle for recorded music was confined to a specific period in time, it also 
produced limited results in terms of generating sales. As Kavanagh states:
The whole message of video-play, because it was a great form of entertainment for a period of  
time, but it only produced relatively shorts spurts of consumption. Like, there was a programme 
here in the 80s called  MT USA with Vincent Hanley. That was enormous, but only enormous 
with teen audiences. It was hugely influential in what sold across record shop counters to them. 
But they are only one part of the picture…Television just doesn’t have the same punch as it used  
to. So it is absolutely radio. (Willie Kavanagh, personal interview)
In  short,  television  is  perceived  by  my  interviewees  as  possessing  limited 
potential for the promotion of recorded music. While limited ‘prize’ slots on primetime 
15 Vignoles states that both RTE television and radio services carry out both quantitative and qualitative  
research on a regular, periodic basis. Much data is garnered from focus groups.
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chatshows and drama can bring artists  and repertoire  to mass audiences,  specialised 
music  programming  output  enjoyed  a  significant  but  very short-lived  appeal  before 
seeing  its  importance  largely  dissipate.  Many  interviewees  perceive  one-time 
specialised music television audiences to have gravitated to internet platforms. 
The contemporary role of the music press
For most, the music press is viewed as having limited and ever-decreasing reach. Many 
interviewees reflect upon the 1970s and 1980s as a time when access to such specialised 
music publications was vital, particularly when it came to breaking a new act. While 
radio was also cited as the most influential tastemaker in making hits back then, Peter 
Jenner, Fachtna O’Ceallaigh,  Bruce Findlay and others advance that the music press 
was a key mechanism for building an initial fanbase and bringing an act to the attention 
of radio. As Findlay advances, making the cover of the  NME and  Melody Maker  was 
once  ‘a  big  statement’,  but  that  this  is  much  less  the  case  in  the  contemporary 
environment  (personal  interview).  Findlay and others  outline  how significant  record 
company investment was once directed towards securing ‘cover story’ status in such 
magazines as these. However, the dwindling size of the market for these publications is 
a reflection that this section of the music consumer market has gravitated else where and 
the interest of the record companies has accordingly dwindled. Some interviewees point 
out that blogs and online publications have replaced the dedicated music magazine for 
many  consumers.  This  was  noted  earlier  in  Fachtna  O’Ceallaigh’s  contemporary 
experience of working to break Lissy Trullie (chapter 8, section 8.3). Former deputy 
editor  of  NME,  Stuart  Bailie,  describes  a  ‘then’  and  ‘now’  scenario  relating  to 
specialised music press:
You had these  dedicated  music organs  like  the  NME around the  late  seventies  and eighties 
selling 300,000 copies a week. It was almost absurd. That was incredible. It was called the music 
business bible and it almost had that authority about it, to make and break reputations…  When I 
arrived in London [in the mid-1980s] there were New Musical Express, Record Mirror, Melody  
Maker and Sounds…The turnover was immense in those days…The NME do about 60,000 per 
issue these days. That used to be 300,000. (Stuart Bailie, personal interview)
Bailie then proceeds to outline the demise of  Melody Maker,  Sounds, pop magazines 
like  Smash Hits, hard rock publications like  Metal Hammer all went out of business, 
and Record Mirror was assimilated into Musicweek. Bailie highlights how all of these 
changes have occurred since the arrival of the internet. While not laying the blame for 
the demise of these once significant tastemakers solely with the internet, he advances:
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In an environment where they were increasingly under threat, the music press have done a very  
bad job of safe-guarding their own reputation. Tabloids, pop and lifestyle magazines were all  
taking slices of their market, and then the internet came. And that was that. So by and large, that  
era of the rock bible has been over since the 1990s. (Stuart Bailie, personal interview)
Music  magazines  with  a  commercial  life  in  the  contemporary  world  are 
perceived, by some interviewees, more as lifestyle  magazines pitched at an over-30s 
market  than  specialised  music  publications.  While  these  magazines  are  hugely 
important  sites  in  terms  of  advertising  and  promotion,  they  write  about  already 
successful artists and material. As Bailie again states:
...magazines like Q and Mojo are about re-selling the sixties and the seventies to a new audience, 
so the service the major record labels in this respect. All very consumer-orientated. They fall into 
a cluster of broader print publications that follow that demographic, that older consumer. 
(Stuart Bailie, personal interview)
In the case of newer acts, as Peter Jenner and John Sheehan most notably advance, these 
magazines will follow radio.
In the case of Hot Press, Jackie Hayden boasts of significant coverage given to 
new or unsigned acts, particularly Irish acts. However he also states that the ‘cover’ of 
the magazine is vital to generating sales, therefore the face on the cover must be already 
familiar to a potential readership. As with many of the UK publications, Hayden states 
that his magazine now has a reduced but hardcore readership and also ‘keeps afloat’ by 
the fact that it is only available online through paid subscription.
In summary,  while interviewees point to the dedicated music press as having 
once been of immense importance to both established and emerging artists, and major 
and independent labels, that has now diminished considerably. The music press retains 
significance  in  terms  of  the  overall  ‘plot’  outlined  by  Ben  Barrett  and  Fachtna 
O’Ceallaigh earlier in this chapter to bring new acts to the attention of major labels or 
distributors. However regarding its effectiveness at helping acts reach a wider audience, 
the  role  and  potential  of  dedicated  music  press  is  now  quite  limited  compared  to 
previous decades.
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8.6 Concepts of the consumer in the internet era
Within  the  context  of  this  highly  concentrated  recorded  music  market  it  is  worth 
considering the contemporary consumer base. Accounts in chapter six detailing various 
causal factors producing the decline in recorded music sales over the past decade raise 
issues around evolving consumer practices and trends. Arguments in particular around 
the proliferation of file-sharing and the illicit circulation and duplication of recordings 
as well as shifting formats imply important changes in the realm of consumption. The 
remainder of this section is dedicated to examining concepts of the contemporary music 
consumer based primarily on the accounts of key informants  within and around the 
music industries.
The record buying public can be seen to comprise of ‘actives’ and ‘passives’ 
according to some of my interviewees such as ex-Virgin Ireland MD Dermot Hanrahan. 
From his experience in the record industry and in music radio, Hanrahan argues that the 
actives  tend  to  be  predominantly  male  in  the  15-35  age  bracket,  highly  literate, 
‘disproportionately  well  educated’,  heavy  readers  and  heavy  consumers  of  movies. 
Hanrahan is at pains to point out that the ‘actives’ represent a small  minority of the 
overall music consumer market and they largely move in homogenous circles:
There are people who comment on the industry, who are interested in or work in or around the 
industry like myself, who do collect music, who are interested in music, who read about music, 
who want to know the names of band members. But most people don’t. Most people aren’t like 
that. Most people couldn’t give a flying fuck. (Dermot Hanrahan, personal interview)
Hanrahan describes the market for recorded music as a ‘consumer pyramid’, of which ‘a 
small wedge’ at the thin end is populated by the small minority of actives, while the 
bulk  of  the  pyramid  is  occupied  by  ‘occasional-to-rare’  purchasers  of  music.  He 
continues:
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Fig. 8.3: Virgin ‘consumer pyramid’ model
Hanrahan  qualifies  this  latter  comment  by  highlighting  how  the  occasion-to-rare 
purchaser constitutes by far the greatest share of the consumer pyramid. By their sheer 
numbers, this consumer group are hugely significant to the record industry.
Most Irish people visit a record store twice a year. Usually both visits are within ten days of 
Christmas. 50% of those two visits are to buy something for somebody else. This is far more 
typical of how the record business works, than the  Hot Press reader or the  NME reader or  Q 
reader who knows their music and is in on the day of release. These people are not the public. 
The twice a year guys are. (Dermot Hanrahan, personal interview)
Hanrahan further argues that radio stations that ‘kowtow to actives’ will  win 
critical  acclaim,  but will  quickly go out of business as such a policy only serves to 
alienate  the  greater  percentage  of  the  potential  music-listening  audience.  Hendy’s 
(2000) analysis of the re-branding of BBC Radio 1 as the promoter of Britain’s regional 
music scenes during the mid-to-late 1990s offers support to this contention. The key 
point, however, to be gleaned from Hanrahan’s evidence is that the music buying public 
comprises of a consumer base that extends far beyond the boundaries of the ‘music fan’. 
The music consumer scenario outlined by Hanrahan is repeated elsewhere by 
other key interviewees. George Ergatoudis, Head of Music at BBC Radio 1, describes a 
‘music industry cone model’ operating on a similar basis. This cone model, which is 
used by BBC Radio 1 in devising its programming output, is divided into three distinct 
segments. Radio 1 define the thin narrow end of the cone as the ‘scenester’ segment.
A  typically  Irish  home  has  a  chipped  Sanyo 
sitting in the corner  that  was bought  ten years 
ago  on  hire  purchase.  There’s  seven  or  eight 
albums  leaning  up  against  it,  there’s  probably 
Phil Spector’s Christmas, a U2 album, probably 
a Michael Jackson album, a Now That’s What I 
Call  Music  and  the  little  brothers  Arctic 
Monkeys  album.  That’s  a  typical  Irish  home. 
These are typical  music consumers.  They have 
no  interest  in  who  produced  the  album.  They 
don’t  even  know  there’s  such  a  thing  as  a 
producer on the album. They have no interest in 
that  kind  of  stuff,  but  they  are  a  much bigger 
force to be reckoned with than the actives.
(Dermot Hanrahan, personal interview)
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Fig. 8.4:  BBC Radio 1 ‘consumer cone’ model
This  is  the  group  that  Radio  1  define  as  creating,  nurturing  and  driving  music 
consumption and consumer scenes across the UK. According to Ergatoudis:
…this group is definitely about carefully balanced reflection, and leading… There is no question 
that there is  an element of subjectivity to this,  about who are the most exciting,  innovative, 
relevant, interesting new acts, and then gauge that and follow it and work with it. 
(George Ergatoudis, personal interview)
Beyond ‘the scenester’ end of this cone model, we move into what BBC Radio 1 
define as ‘the restless’ segment. They place ‘a few’ million people in this category. This 
group represents the segment of the music consumer base that is actively interested in 
finding music, i.e. the active music fan:
They are the ones that listen to Zane Lowe. They are the ones who read the NME, Q Magazine 
or whatever. They are active music fans. They go out to gigs. They like telling their mates about 
new bands or new artists but they are not people initially driving or nurturing the scene rather 
they are the next wave… Now those are the people who listen to BBC Radio 1 to some degree in 
daytime, and enormously so in our specialist night-time output. 
(George Ergatoudis, personal interview)
For Ergatoudis, this group represents a significant, but relatively small minority of the 
overall music radio listenership / music consumer market. 
The final segment of the cone model consists of what Ergatoudis terms as ‘the 
contented’. This segment, at the broad end of the cone, represents the mass market and 
covers by far the greatest section of the music listening / consumer base. According to 
Ergatoudis:
Many of these will probably never listen to the new Radio 1…They will find Radio 1 ultimately 
too challenging because we cover too many genres, play too much new music, and they will find 
us a difficult listen. (George Ergatoudis, personal interview)
This, according to Ergatoudis, is a group of up to ten 
thousand people in the UK that effectively create the 
domestic music scene – i.e. tastemakers. Within this 
group he places artists; music industry professionals 
across recording, publishing and live sectors, as well 
as  other  related  fields;  people that  edit  or  work on 
music  magazines  and  online  sites;  and  music 
broadcasters.
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However,  for  Ergatoudis,  this  segment  of  the  music  consumer  market  is  ‘most 
representative’ of the record buying public. They are most likely to choose a classic 
hits  /  top  forty  format  radio  station  to  listen  to,  and  will  occasionally  purchase 
recordings. Again, as Ergatoudis explains, it is the sheer size of this market segment that 
makes them so significant to the music industry and also the commercial radio sector.
As  with  Dermot  Hanrahan,  EMI  Ireland  MD  Willie  Kavanagh  employs  a 
pyramid to describe how EMI conceive of their consumer market. However Kavanagh 
outlines  a  more  complex  consumer  pyramid  within  which  there  exists  a  variety  of 
different levels of consumer categories. Kavanagh informed me that when he became 
chief-executive of EMI in the early 1990s he commissioned extensive research on the 
make-up of the recorded music consumer market in Ireland. This led to the construction 
of the consumer pyramid model which EMI Ireland update and upgrade on a two-yearly 
basis. 
Fig. 8.5: EMI ‘consumer pyramid’ model
Towards the tip of the pyramid, EMI place the ‘early adopters’ who are ‘heavy users’ of 
music that  purchase regularly (i.e.  on a  weekly basis,  or more).  This  group acquire 
music,  both  new and old,  across  a  wide  variety  of  record  genres.  The  methods  of 
consumption employed by this group include physical music stores, second-hand music 
shops, digital  music stores (e.g. iTunes),  electronic mail  order stores (e.g.  Amazon). 
Consistent with the accounts given by Dermot Hanrahan and George Ergatoudis, they 
are heavy consumers of music-based media in print, broadcast and electronic forms. 
Kavanagh  further  state  that  this  sector  of  ‘active’  music  fans  incorporates  an 
The broadest consumer sector at the base 
of the EMI pyramid consists of the once or 
twice a year  purchaser.  These consumers 
almost  exclusively  purchase  an  already-
popular  recording,  oftentimes 
compilations  released  for  the  Christmas 
market,  existing  Greatest  Hits or  Best of 
packages, or contemporary chart albums.
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increasingly wide age range. Although significant in the process of breaking new acts 
and making certain types of new acts accessible to a broader market,  this group do, 
however,  represent a small  minority of the overall  population of the EMI consumer 
pyramid.
However, a range of consumer bands gradually expands outwards from early 
adopter / heavy users to the once or twice a year purchasers. As Kavanagh proceeds to 
explain: ‘It’s not just divided into two. It’s not just early adopters and the rest, or music 
‘heads’ and the rest. That ‘rest’ is made up of quite a few parts’ (personal interview).  
Below the frequent heavy purchasers of music come the intermittent heavy purchasers, 
i.e.  individuals  that  buy  music  on  a  regular  but  ‘relative  infrequent’  basis  (i.e. 
approximately monthly). It is not unusual for consumers within this band to acquire two 
to  three  items  each  time  they  purchase.  Below  this  in  the  pyramid  there  exists  a 
significantly larger grouping who make multiple purchasers on an occasional to rare 
basis. According to Kavanagh, this consumer band represents:
…a more recent phenomenon…and [an] interesting bunch of people out there right now who 
might only buy records twice a year, but they do a multiple purchase thing where they might  
walk in and buy ten albums…I’m one of them myself. They mightn’t buy music for two or three  
months or more, but when they walk in they buy everything they meant to buy for the last three 
months…We do research on a regular basis as to who is buying what, what influences them and 
how to get to them blah, blah, blah. They way to get to the multiple purchasers is to somehow 
encourage them to get into the shop every now and again, and when they do they’ll buy around 
them. (Willie Kavanagh, personal interview)
Once again, below this group in the pyramid lie a variety of types of occasional 
purchasers including those who visit physical and/or digital retail outlets occasionally 
and purchase (often  multiple  items)  on each visit;  those who visit  occasionally and 
sometimes purchase; and those who visit occasionally but rarely purchase. Then at the 
bottom of the pyramid lies the broad mass of people who buy an album once or twice a 
year. So, as Kavanagh concludes, ‘it doesn’t hold true that there are just two types of 
consumer,  it’s  a  multi-layered  thing,  and  there  are  multi-layered  awareness  levels’ 
(personal interview). In the views of the three above interviewees, the general rule of 
thumb regarding methods  of  purchase is  that  the  further  down the  pyramid  you  go 
towards  the  broader  consumer  bands,  the  less  likely  digital  (i.e.  online  or  mobile) 
purchases become. 
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Former  Sony  Music  Ireland  chairman  John  Sheehan  provided  a  similar  but 
somewhat cruder conception of the music buying public courtesy of his description of a 
consumer ‘triangle’ which, as with the Virgin, EMI and BBC Radio 1 models, placed a 
small band of ‘serious music buffs’ and the thin end of the wedge, with a broad mass of 
occasional-to-rare purchasers  at  the base.  The latter  are  the most  significant  for the 
music business. As former independent record label owner and retailer Bruce Findlay 
puts it:
I’ve been in the business all of my life…Who is most important? The guy with the big stack of 
records?  Personally,  yes,  I’m  a  lover  of  music  junkies.  But  who  is  most  important  to  my 
business?...There is culture, and then there are the cultural industries, the business of culture. 
Now, the business of culture can fuck it up big-time, but equally the business of culture can get 
the music spread…So the business of culture needs the biggest audience possible.
(Bruce Findlay, personal interview)
For artist manager Frank Murray, the mainstay of the record industry has most 
often been ephemeral  pop acts  that sell  to a mass market  of occasional  buyers.  For 
Murray, this consumer band is largely uncritical and by virtue of the fact that the people 
within it only purchase music on very rare occasions, it is the easiest market for record 
executives to satisfy:  
For boybands and pop acts there is nothing indepth to say. Bouncy, cheery songs. You could 
review the whole Westlife catalogue in two paragraphs…[but] they sell millions of albums…It is 
the same in any of the arts. Barbara Cartland sold millions, but will I read any of her books? No.  
Was she a great  boom to the publishing industry?  Yes. So you have the Westlife’s,  the pop 
acts…For record company executives, it’s like selling water in the desert, and this is the stuff  
they are interested in…They’re after the housewife who goes out and buys two copies and you 
don’t see her again until next Christmas. (Frank Murray, personal interview)
Murray emphasises that it is not essential to sell to this mass market in order to achieve 
commercial success, however, it is this segment of the consumer base that generates the 
biggest hits, essential to sustaining the major labels. 
Such a  picture  of  the  recorded music  consumer  market  as  gleaned from the 
combined accounts outlined above complicates the view of a market decimated by illicit 
downloading. If the implication from many media and industry accounts is that file-
sharing  is  widespread and thus  having a  detrimental  effect  on  the  record  sales,  the 
suggestion from the above consumer profiles is that it  is  most likely the preserve of 
niche or minority groupings located towards the narrow end of the models illustrated 
where ‘actives’, ‘early adopters’ and ‘the restless’ are located.
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8.7 Chapter summary
This  chapter  has  highlighted  a  number  of  key  characteristics  of  the  contemporary 
recorded music market. There remains a high concentration of power in the recorded 
music  market  with  four  major  record  companies  continuing  to  dominate  the 
marketplace. For independent record companies, access to this marketplace is largely 
and increasingly mediated through the major companies, with the distinction between 
both  parties  becoming  more  blurred.  In  short,  the  power  of  the  major  labels  has 
intensified. Recent and emerging digital technologies and internet spaces provide new 
opportunities  for  unsigned  artists  and  wholly  independent  labels  (i.e.  those  not 
connected to the corporate sector) to generate a profile at retail  level. However, this 
access is  largely restricted to ‘peripheral’  markets  as the resources and relationships 
vital to accessing mainstream or mass markets remains under the control of the main 
corporate actors. This is most vividly illustrated through Ben Barrett’s account of the 
career  of  Damien  Rice  where  they  sold  records  in  tens  of  thousands  based  on  the 
utilisation of both traditional and new promotional tools. However moving this into a 
mass  market  with sales  of  hundreds  of  thousands and millions  of  units  required  of 
necessity, the distribution links, marketing resources and access to key ‘intermediary’ 
spaces (predominantly daytime radio) provided by a major label. 
The research findings indicate that internet platforms for the promotion of music 
essentially work on two levels: on one hand, they function as platforms through which 
already  established  artists  access  their  fanbase;  on  the  other  hand,  they  serve  as  a 
platform through which independent artists and labels compete, less for the attention of 
a mass audience, but more for the attention of a major music company that can provide 
them with the resources to access a larger market. What is key to note here is that the 
research findings indicate that while digital technologies have provided a new range of 
platforms for the promotion of music, the process of breaking an artist internationally 
remains largely filtered through the same major-industry-controlled channels as before.
Furthermore, in the ‘internet era’, it is radio, one of the oldest mediators between 
record industry and consumer,  that holds the position of most influential tastemaker. 
Finally, this chapter advanced the perceptions held by those working within and around 
the  record  industry  of  the  contemporary  recorded  music  consumer  market.  Most 
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interestingly,  the findings here suggest that  the largest and most  significant  band of 
consumers as identified by my interviewees (i.e.  those who make rare or occasional 
purchases) are among those least likely to engage in file-sharing.
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Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusions
9.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the major conclusions of this doctoral research study and engages 
more explicitly with the prior literature and the theoretical issues and conceptual frames 
discussed in the opening chapters of the thesis.
The previous three chapters described the main trends and findings from my 
primary research grounded (or derived) primarily in the perspectives, and invaluable 
tacit knowledge, afforded by my interviews with thirty-nine key informants – all of the 
current or recent actors from across the spectrum of music economy sectors or related 
spheres of activity. Some have been active over a number of decades, thus providing 
historical context to the insight and perspectives they offer. Many have been actively 
involved in more than one sphere of music industry-related activity throughout their 
career,  thus  the  perspectives  advanced  are  frequently  shaped  by  a  ‘cross-sectoral’ 
experience. Overall our findings so far clearly suggest that the evolution of the music 
industry since the advent of the internet as a major new communication platform is a 
much less straight-forward process than the mere story of decline in the face of novel 
file-sharing technologies as so frequently circulated via popular media and by other, 
often highly partial, sources.
Given the trends, perspectives and issues that have been described in chapters 
six through eight, it is now necessary to distil and reflect on how they relate to the initial 
research questions as well as how they relate to the theoretical perspectives outlined in 
earlier  chapters.  Thus,  this  chapter  seeks  to  re-examine  the  key  trends  and  issues 
described  above  by  explicitly  relating  them  to  the  theoretical  frames  and  concepts 
identified  in the earlier  chapters  of this  thesis.  In sum, the chapter  will  reframe the 
findings  so-far  in  terms  of  the  theoretical  and  conceptual  frames  afforded  by  the 
relevant academic research literature in order to yield a more intellectually robust and 
strategic understanding of the key contours of change (and of continuities) in the music 
sector.
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Ultimately this chapter contends that the music industry has indeed undergone a 
complex set of significant restructuring processes during the past decade. These changes 
primarily stem from the diffusion of internet technologies and other digital applications 
that have evolved to produce both threats and opportunities, particularly with regard to 
the record industry. However, the evidence collected posits that the changes that have 
occurred are not determined by technological  developments.  Rather they represent  a 
restructuring  and  reconfiguration  of  the  broader  music  industry  based  on  strategies 
designed  to  ‘manage’  the  outcome  of  technological  innovations  or  negate  their 
potentially harmful effects on the established industry’s core centres of power. 
9.2 Convergence of music industry sub-sectors
Music industry consolidation has resulted in the convergence of the various music sub-
sectors, as will be indicated throughout this section. This process has seen five major 
multi-national corporations come to share dominance of all music industry sub-sectors. 
What were until recently largely discrete but related music industry sub-sectors have 
now become synergised. 
This  research  underlines  the  value  of  reframing the  music  industry  as  a 
horizontally-integrated  chain  of  sub-sectors  where  record  companies,  publishing 
companies, live industry actors, and music merchandise companies all fall increasingly 
under  the  umbrella  of  a  small  handful  of  trans-national  entities.  In  this  light,  my 
research  paints  a  significantly  different  picture  of  the  music  economy  than  that 
commonly illustrated in media reports that focus purely on the fortunes of the recorded 
music sector. It indicates how the largest players in the music industry draw revenues 
from an increasing variety of streams across diverse sub-sectors and how such shifts 
allow them to spread losses incurred from any downturn in record sales across a broad 
line of activities. It also brings profits from a much wider range of sources increasingly 
under  the roofs  of  a  small  handful  of  super-powers.  While  traditionally,  record and 
music  publishing  companies  have  existed  under  the  one  roof,  the  merging  of  these 
sectors  with  the  live  sector  as  well  as  merchandising  is  a  recent  phenomenon.  In 
addition  to  the  four  major  record  companies  having  sister  companies  dominate  the 
music publishing marketplace, these companies are now significant players in the live 
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and merchandising sectors. Given the rapid expansion of the world’s largest live music 
actor,  Live  Nation  Entertainment,  into  the  spheres  of  recording,  publishing  and 
management, this research describes a situation where five corporate entities dominate 
all  spheres  of  music  industry  activity  globally.  Furthermore,  the  evidence  from the 
primary research (as reported in chapter eight) clearly points to the increasing blurring 
of  lines  between  major  and  independent  recording  companies.  Indeed  the  evidence 
gathered in this research study suggests that it is almost impossible for an independent 
label to enjoy a commercial life with being allied to or supported by one of the major  
labels and that many apparent independent labels are in fact ‘majors in disguise’. This, 
in turn, clearly implies an ongoing centralisation of power in the music industry over a 
decade into the life of the internet as a mechanism for distributing and promoting music.
In essence, these research findings highlight the major limits of techno-centric 
analytical frames when it comes to understanding the evolving structures of the music 
industry. A decade after Kelly predicted ‘new rules for the new economy’ and fourteen 
years beyond Negroponte’s assertion that no longer would the media corporation hold 
dominance in the marketplace, all music sectors have grown more concentrated. The 
only significant threat to the position of Sony, UMG, WMG and EMI in the recording 
and music publishing sectors comes from a Clear Channel Communications spin-off 
that  had already quickly grown to monopolise  the live  music  sector.   Far  from the 
diminishing of corporate and the dismantling of corporate structures, the dominance of 
the few has expanded and intensified. Such an outcome resonates much more intensely 
with Winston’s model where the ‘great corporation as the primary institution of our 
society’ countervails the disruptive potential of technology on existing power structures.
The integrating live music value chain
My research reveals rather similar trends unfolding in the live music sector – the one 
sub-sector of the music industry that traditionally has not experienced the same level of 
vertical integration as the record industry or music publishing industry. While a small 
handful of global touring agents dominated the international touring sphere, and live 
music  promotion  was  dominated  by  a  small  number  of  players  in  each  country  or 
territory,  from  the  point  of  view  of  ownership  these  specific  activities  remained 
unrelated. As such, the live music industry chain comprised of separate and discrete 
actors at the various stages of the process linking artist to audience. As noted in chapter 
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7.6, concomitant with the growth of this sectors economic value, the live industry has 
also experienced rapid vertical-integration over the past half decade. While, in terms of 
revenue, the live industry has become more and more lucrative, the various stages in the 
vertical chain have rapidly integrated. This is illustrated most vividly by the merging of 
Live Nation and Ticketmaster to form Live Nation Entertainment, thus providing one 
dominant actor with control over touring rights, promotion, ticketing, venue operation 
and all  other  ancillary  revenue streams surrounding the  live  industry.  This  research 
indicates how we must also consider this in the context of music industry convergence 
where all  sectors /  services including artist  management,  recording, publishing,  live, 
merchandise and other  are  controlled  and administered  from the one source.  In this 
light, the live music industry has developed a more integral role in the activities of the 
music  industry’s  largest  actors  and has  moved  closer  to  the  heart  of  the  industry’s 
economic action.
 
Re-conceptualising the recording artist
In light of the industry restructuring processes outlined above, the recording artist has 
been repositioned or re-conceptualised as a universal source of revenue for one central 
rights  holder.  This  is  best  exemplified  through  the  evolution  of  360-degree  deals 
whereby  all  revenues  generated  through  the  exploitation  of  artist  copyrights, 
trademarks, patents and other are funnelled back to the same corporate entity. 
In essence, the major corporations embrace of 360-degree deals effectively serve 
to  sidestep  any  downturn  in  recorded  music  sales  revenues.  For  copyright  owners, 
recorded music  sales  now forms the source of one set  of  potential  revenue streams 
alongside music publishing,  touring,  merchandising,  sponsorship and other.  The fact 
that touring agents and live concert promoters have been moving into the spheres of 
recording  and  publishing,  and  that  record  companies  have  moved  into  touring  and 
merchandising illustrates the creation of a new industrial paradigm a decade into the 
internet music economy.
This  research  points  to  how  ongoing  processes  of  vertical  and  horizontal 
integration in the music industry have facilitated the evolution of artist-label deals that 
involve  studio  recordings,  music  publishing,  touring,  television  and  film  projects, 
merchandise and, essentially, anything that is licensable and that can make gain from 
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the  brand  of  the  artist.  As  such,  the  twenty-first  century  recording  artist  is  now 
conceived  as  all-encompassing  bundle  of  rights  where  all  artist-related  exploitation 
ultimately  channels  all  revenue  streams  back  to  one  overall  rights  owner.  While 
recording and music publishing have long-since been siblings, the introduction of live 
rights,  merchandising,  management  services and other artist-related rights are  recent 
introductions to the same family. This illustrates how record labels, live music actors 
and investors have changed the business of underwriting recording artists. With a sole 
actor in charge of all aspects of rights, risks are now being hedged against all facets of 
an artist’s entire career rather than different actors controlling each discrete industrial 
strand of activity.
With many established recording artists  signing all  rights over  to one of the 
major industry actors for hugely lucrative lump sums up front their long-term income 
from  copyright  exploitation  and  other  sources  is  guaranteed  to  either  Live  Nation 
Entertainment or one of the four major record labels. The significant growth of live 
music markets in recent years means that Live Nation, the core actor in this sector, is 
increasingly able  to offer huge advances  to established artists  to encourage them to 
surrender their 360-degree rights. However such activities are not just the preserve of 
already established hit-making artists.  These 360-degree developments  make smaller 
acts increasingly lucrative to major labels. While, for smaller acts, no single revenue 
stream may be sufficiently significant to attract the attention of a major company, the 
potential for an act’s combined revenue streams to generate profit makes them a more 
lucrative proposition. As noted in chapter seven, Belle and Sebastian, the band managed 
by interviewee John Williamson,  provide  an example  here.  While  ‘superstar’  artists 
such as U2, Madonna, Jay-Z and Prince have all  reportedly been able to  command 
advances of up to US$100m for the surrender of their 360-degree (or 180-degree in the 
case of U2) rights to Live Nation, lesser established artists may well lose out to the 
benefit  of one of  the major  corporate  actors  as  revenues  that  were once,  frequently 
untouchable by record labels, such as music publishing royalties – both performance 
and mechanical,  touring,  merchandise,  image  and other,  now become open revenue 
sources.  With the same actor owning every potential  revenue generating source,  the 
potential exists for conflicts of interest to arise that may affect viable income for artists 
[this is dealt with in greater detail in the next section of this chapter]. The established 
music companies, the dominant live music industry actors, and their merged and allied 
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entities are the key winners in these developments as, in many cases, they now own 
every viable revenue stream an artist has.
The level of advances offered to some of the world’s top revenue generating 
artists indicates that Live Nation have the ability to leverage superstar acts away from 
the top four music companies.  While this means that hugely lucrative recording and 
publishing  revenues  are  now  being  diverted  away  from  their  traditional  ‘big  four’ 
owner,  the  underlying  oligopolistic  power  structures  are  nevertheless  being 
strengthened, not diminished.
In addition to copyright,  360-degree deals means that trademarks and patents 
now play an increasingly significant role in overall revenue generation. When any actor 
in the industrial  chain can avail  of the 360-degree business model  with a recording 
artist,  the entire  brand of  the artists  becomes securitisable  as the actor  is  no longer 
dependent on just one of many revenue streams as has traditionally been the case.  All 
artist related rights are owned by the one actor. 
A new music industry model
In essence, such developments as described in this research indicate a reconfiguration of 
the music industry, away from the discrete but related sub-sectors model, and towards a 
more  thoroughly  integrated  and  networked  model.  Fig.  1  below  illustrates  how  a 
recording artist has traditionally experienced individual relationships with each music 
industry sub-sector.
Fig. 9.1:  ‘Former’ discrete but related music industry model
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The music industry formerly comprised of related, but nonetheless discrete sub-
sectors. However, a symbiotic relationship had long-since existed between these various 
industry sub-sectors. Record industry investment has provided the ‘hits’ and ‘stars’ that 
have  been  the  mainstay  of  the  live  music  industry,  which  in  turn  has  promoted 
recordings, sold merchandise, and generated performing royalties for music publishers. 
The record industry has also generated ‘mechanical’ royalties for publishers (through 
the use of their copyrighted repertoire on their recordings) and, music publishers have 
marketed and licensed their catalogues to a host of users which has in turn generated 
licensing revenues and sales for record companies. This symbiosis has not altered. What 
has changed, as fig. 9.2 below indicates, is that these discrete but related activities have 
been  streamlined  under  a  central  power  whereby  revenue  channels  deriving  from 
activities across all sub-sectors increasingly lead back to one corporate entity.
This  development  holds  significant  implications  for  recording  artists, 
particularly  new or  emerging acts.  In  the  former  instance,  while  existing  largely as 
discrete sub-sectors, an actor in one sphere are best served when an actor in another sub-
sector moves most efficiently to promote and sell their interests. For example, it is in a 
music publishing company’s best interest to have a record company produce, distribute 
and market  a  recording  as  effectively  and efficiently  as  possible,  because  once  the 
record is being marketed, sold and used in the public domain, it is generating publishing 
revenues. Likewise, a record company will want a touring agent and live promoter to 
provide promotional concerts  ensure that the artist gets, to quote my interviewee, Keith 
Donald, ‘the right gig, at the right time, in the right place’ as this has traditionally been 
viewed as a key mechanism to generating record sales. Within these processes, the artist 
has most usually been represented by a manager who is charged with getting the best 
return possible for his client in dealing with all of the other actors. While,  as noted 
earlier, those companies providing recording and music publishing services to an artist 
have  sometimes  operated  under  the  same  roof,  many  artists  avoided  the  pitfalls  of 
‘cross-collateralisation’  by  signing  recording  and  publishing  deals  with  different 
companies. Achieving mass market access and ‘hits’ did not require an artist to sign all 
rights over to one actor. Rather, the artist was often signed to different companies to 
fulfil recording, publishing, live and merchanding functions. 
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Fig. 9.2:  ‘New’ converged music industry network
However, as fig. 9.2 above indicates, 360-degree artist deals are made possible 
by  the  ongoing  convergence  of  music  industry  sub-sectors.  Some  of  the  literature 
reviewed in chapter 4.7 (e.g. Chapple and Garofalo, 1977; Garofalo, 1999) highlighted a 
historical trajectory of convergence ‘within’ the record industry itself. This research has 
provided extensive evidence (see chapter 8.2) of an intensification of this process in 
recent  times  with  the  record  market  becoming  increasingly  concentrated,  and  the 
distinctions  between  independent  and  major  companies  becoming  more  and  more 
blurred.  It  is  within  this  model  that  the  role  of  the  recording  artist  has  been 
reconceptualised. Such developments serve to place the recording artists at a distinct 
disadvantage. With all roles and functions administered from under the same umbrella, 
the  potential  for  the  artist’s  interests  to  be  (albeit  incidentally)  promoted  by 
independently standing industry actors applying pressure to each other in their own self-
interest, has evaporated. As evidenced from various interviewee accounts in chapter 7.8, 
the position of the artist in dealing with this ‘converged’ music industry network is thus 
significantly  compromised.  This  is  particularly  so  in  cases  where  artists  sign 
management clauses in 360-degree rights thus assigning management service duties to 
the same entity as owns all other rights. As such, the traditional marriage between artist 
and manager is undergoing separation with the evolution of this new, converging music 
industry  model.  This  is  most  starkly  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  Live  Nation 
Entertainment  provides  management  services  for  in  excess  of  two  hundred  major 
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international  recording  artists  (see  chapter  7.6).  The  artist  increasingly  has 
representation ‘within’ the music company he/she is signed to, as opposed to external 
independent representation.
This research further highlighted the increased tendency of media corporations 
towards synergy to combat the effects of the economic downturn of the 1970s/80s (see 
chapter  4.7).  With  this,  opportunities  to  simultaneously  market  and  sell  the  same 
product across a variety of platforms expanded. Chapter 7.4-7.6 all indicate the further 
intensification of such synergies in the wake of digitalisation.  We considered how the 
parent  companies  of major  music companies  own holdings  in  other  areas  of media. 
Alongside  these  processes,  we  outlined  how  music  companies  are  engaged  in  an 
ongoing process of forging alliances and indeed gaining a stake in the ownership of 
online and mobile content platforms. What must be noted here is how copyright law has 
been used as the mechanism to incorporate new digital platforms that have emerged into 
this  synergy.  As  chapter  7.4  illustrated  in  the  cases  of  platforms  such  as  Vevo, 
YouTube, Imeem and MySpace, the major music companies first sued, then settled with 
the sites. They then signed licensing agreements with them for the use of their content 
and finally, they acquired an equity stake in the company. 
The  internet  and  mobile  music  value  chains  consist  of  a  wide  range  of 
companies  and  the  industry  trends  show that  the  actors  are  converging  in  order  to 
compete for a larger share of the value chain. However the recorded music distribution 
chain is less than transparent given the constant development of new digital distribution 
partnerships  and  business  models.  As  noted,  initiatives  such  as  Nokia  Comes  With  
Music,  Orange-Sony Ericsson’s  Let’s  Go Mobile music  partnership,  EMI-SendMe’s 
mobile  music  alliance  in  the  US and other  similar  developments  serve  to  highlight 
music as a key enabler within the mobile entertainment sphere. As chapter 7.8 indicated, 
more  intense  alliances  have  formed  between  music  companies  and  the  technology 
companies that in many instances supply the consumer electronics and hardware that the 
record industry claims are a primary cause of damage to its welfare. Arguments that 
digital  technologies  are  killing  the  record  industry  might  thus  be  more  accurately 
defined  as  successful  attempts  at  legally  securing  a  claim  to  these  technological 
platforms as distributors of the major music companies’ copyrighted content. 
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Fig 9.3: Media synergy: secondary revenue sources for music
Again, the fact that it is now increasingly converged music companies that form part of 
this synergic network means that more of the benefits accruing from the exploitation of 
copyrights, patents and trademarks via these proliferating media channels are directed to 
an increasingly smaller group of bigger companies. 
Another  important  aspect  of  the  restructuring  processes  arising  from  this 
research comprises the increased blurring of the distinction between sites of promotion 
and sources of revenue. The research indicates how potential sources of revenue for the 
music industry have expanded with, for example, the increase in terrestrial broadcast 
space and the proliferation of cable, satellite and digital radio and television channels 
over  recent  years.  This  means  first,  more  dedicated  airtime for music,  second more 
television programmes licensing music,  and third,  more advertising that increasingly 
licenses music from the industry’s major suppliers. Suppliers here, as we have earlier  
noted, means two core music industry sub-sectors: recording and publishing. Beyond 
this we have shown how the film industry, the digital games industry and a multitude of 
online platforms  of various natures increasingly license recorded music [or,  perhaps 
more  appropriately,  are  increasingly  forced  to  legally  license recorded  music]  from 
copyright owners. All of these sites serve to promote music recordings, and all of these 
sites are equally sources of direct revenues for music labels. As we have established, the 
most  significant  owners  of  recording and publishing copyrights,  i.e.  Sony,  Warners, 
EMI and Universal have now become evermore industrious and assiduous in marketing 
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their wares for license to all of the afore-mentioned users of music. These developments 
also point to an increased centralisation of marketing, where major ‘hits’ are produced 
through the simultaneous promotion of artists and music across an increasing number of 
platforms, each of which also pays licensing fees to music companies for the use of their 
repertoire.
One  further  implication  of  this  research  is  worthy  of  note  here.  Given  the 
emphasis placed on the increasingly intense relationship between recorded music and 
advertising by many interviewees, we observe a change in attitude towards the interface 
between music and advertising/marketing functions.  When we consider the range of 
established and new artists and repertoire (see for example, appendix D) that are used in 
advertising  campaigns,  and  how  aggressively  they  are  promoted  to  advertising 
executives by the major record labels (as outlined in chapter 7.5), this trend effectively 
goes against  the traditional  trope or standards  for  authenticity  in  rock/critical  music 
culture. While this is something of an aside from the core points being addressed in this 
thesis, it  does emphasise the increased commodification of this cultural  form. These 
trends resonate with Harvey’s ‘spatio-temporal fixes’ and Hannah Arendt’s arguments 
that capitalism is dependent upon a ‘fund of assets outside itself’ in order to relieve 
pressures of accumulation. The broader proliferation of media has produced a multi-fold 
increase  in  advertising  space  which  has  in  turn  produced  rich  new  soil  for  the 
exploitation  of  their  music  copyrights.  Such  arguments  also  lend  themselves  to  the 
music  industry’s  appropriation  of  internet  spaces  and  platforms  courtesy  of  the 
extension  of  copyright  control  mechanisms  into  cyberspace  which  has  seen  them 
wrestle control of social networking sites, streaming services and others as outlined in 
chapter 7.4.
All of the above serve to refine the logic of the contemporary music industry as 
a growing network of marketing/promotion activities and revenue generating activities, 
all of which hold resonance for each other. It is no longer the case that marketing and 
promotion occurs purely in order to sell music recordings or music products. Rather, 
marketing and promotion avenues are revenue streams in their own right for the music 
industry. Marketing and promotion opportunities generate revenue and revenue streams 
provide increased marketing and promotion. While in the case of broadcast and film, we 
can argue that this has been the case for many decades, this research suggests that their  
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significance as direct revenue streams to record and publishing companies has increased 
in recent years. As this has occurred, many new platforms/outlets that both use music 
while simultaneously promoting it have emerged. Marketing mechanisms are revenue 
streams,  and  revenue  opportunities  are  promotional  tools.  This  is  the  logic  of  the 
contemporary music industry, a logic within which the notion of the industry revolving 
around the ‘basket of rights’  advanced by Frith over two decades ago is  ever more 
pertinent. Music publishing deserves particular note here.  The strategies of the music 
industry over recent years illustrate the continuation and intensification of their capacity 
to  act  as  exploiters  of  copyright.  Unlike  recording,  music  publishing  is  a  low cost 
activity for music labels. The expansion of sites for the use of their repertoire and trends 
of growth in the live music industry as described in this research all seem to suggest that 
publishing copyright will continue to grow in importance to the overall music economy 
in years to come.
9.3 Unfolding record industry structures and value chain
As we established in chapter seven, the ‘crisis’ rhetoric commonly circulated regarding 
the  music  industry  is  primarily  based  on  perceptions  of  one  of  its  sub-sectors,  the 
recording  industry.  The  evidence  presented  in  chapter  eight  tells  us  something  of 
processes of change and continuity in the record industry over a decade after the internet 
emerged as a mass medium for the distribution and promotion of music.
One of the most salient features of globalisation is the spread and intensification 
of social  practices  across space and time (Giddens,  1990).  Theories of globalisation 
centre on the transformation of spatial and temporal practices by evolving media and 
communications  technologies.  The  oligopolistic  music  industry  has  long  since 
established  the  technological  and  organisational  infrastructure  underpinning  the 
circulation  and  distribution  of  music  across  time  and  space  on  a  global  scale.  For 
example,  the  record  industry  has  always  operated  on  the  basis  of  a  chain  of 
technological processes required to produce,  manufacture and distribute its products. 
The powerbase of the major record labels was traditionally to be found in maintaining 
the vertical integration of these processes which serve to present a significant techno-
economic barrier to new entrants in the market. On the evidence of independent labels 
234
and artist managers gathered during the primary research phase of this research study, 
the power and role of the major music companies is actually reinforced by the need of 
recording  artists  and  smaller  record  labels  for  this  vertically  integrated  industrial 
structure that transcends time and space so that music can be recorded, packaged and 
distributed globally.
Contemporary ‘music-to-market’ model
Based on the various accounts  described and discussed throughout chapter eight, Fig. 
9.4  below indicates  the  path  music  must  travel  in  order  to  achieve  a  mass  market 
audience in the contemporary era.
Fig. 9.4: The path of music to market in the contemporary environment
It must first be noted that the second outermost segment in fig. 8.3 represents a 
field of tastemakers and gatekeepers that has grown more complex since the advent of 
the internet.  Not  only can network users download recordings to  computers,  mobile 
phones  and  digital  portable  music  players  from a  host  of  digital  music  stores  and 
‘illegal’  online  outlets,  blogs  and  social  networking  sites  now form new ‘word-of-
mouth’ marketing mechanisms while streaming forms what may be best described as 
                                                                     Creative Artist
Tastemakers:
 Peripheral Markets
                  Major Record Labels
Daytime Radio
& other tastemakers
Mass
Market
Specialised M
usic  Press
Sp
ec
ia
lis
ed
 M
us
ic
 B
ro
ad
ca
st
s:
 R
ad
io
 &
 T
el
ev
is
io
n
New Digital Platforms: Blogs, Social Networking Sites, Other
Touring / G
igs
235
personalised or individualised online radio services.  The expanding plethora of such 
sites in cyberspace complicates the job of the music marketer in an environment where 
we must also recognise that music users have the potential to experience music without 
ever purchasing a music recording. Overall,  the various platforms for promotion and 
distribution of music that now exist  on the internet  have enhanced opportunities for 
independent artists pursuing a ‘do-it-yourself’ approach. As the evidence in chapter 8.3 
indicates,  artists  can  produce,  market  and  distribute  recordings  independently,  but 
crucially, these opportunities are largely confined to niche or ‘peripheral’ markets. As 
numerous interviewees explained in chapter 8.4, moving beyond this still requires the 
intervention of the industry’s traditional middlemen. Mass market distribution as well as 
the marketing and promotion resources necessary to sell records in the ‘mainstream’ are 
still  largely only attainable  through a major  label.  As noted earlier  (in chapter  8.4), 
electronic platforms such as blogs and social networking sites can now be combined 
with more traditional  media such as specialised music press and broadcast media to 
successfully promote an artist,  but if the ambition of artist and manager is to extend 
sales beyond the tens of thousands, then all of these promotional activities must serve 
convince a major label ‘to back a horse that’s going to win’. Thus, on the evidence 
derived from Ben Barrett and others evidence and that of others, as reported in chapter 
8, Negroponte’s (1995; 1996) contention that digital signals a more level playing field 
where the major media corporation no longer holds advantage over the small  player 
remains largely unrealised.
Indeed this research reveals another significant continuity within the process of 
marketing music. Despite the expansion of a more complicated field of tastemakers and 
gatekeepers in which many more sites for the promotion of music now exist, terrestrial 
radio is still the most potent force when it comes to influencing the consumption habits 
of a mass audience.
We  might  also  consider  that  in  many  respects,  the  role  of  new  platforms 
regarding tastemaking and gatekeeping may be seen as extensions of, or the electronic 
equivalents of already existing functions based on older technical platforms. As noted in 
chapter eight, streaming can be seen as the extension of radio and social networking 
sites  are  frequently  referred  to  as  expanded  ‘word-of-mouth’  mechanisms  by many 
interviewees. Equally blogs may be viewed as an additional contemporary manifestation 
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of the music press/music critic. As evidenced by a number of interviewees, the demise 
of music television as a significantly effective promoter of recordings coincided with 
the migration of its core audience to the online world and sites such as YouTube, which 
in itself can be seen as an extension of television.
In chapter  three we noted how prior researchers such as Marvin (1988) have 
argued  that  new  technological  practices  are  frequently  fashioned  out  of  existing 
practices to facilitate a new technological system. In short, new technological worlds are 
essentially  ‘elaborating  an  old  one’  (ibid:  232).  The  contemporary  internet  music 
economy  is  essentially  fashioned  in  the  likeness  of  the  older,  established  music 
economy. Furthermore this digital economy sits comfortably within the context of the 
broader  music  economy  that  encompasses  long  established  industrial  practices  and 
revenue streams across a plethora of new and previously existing platforms. In many 
cases, the internet is merely extending or modifying established revenue paths.
From the primary research discussed in chapter 8.5 we can also observe another 
recent trend in the record industry which further emphasises that despite technological 
developments, the major labels still exercise control over record production for the mass 
market. This relates to the role of the record producer in the production process.
The ‘cult’ of the record producer
In considering the literature on debates surrounding changing models of production in 
the record industry since the 1970s, chapter four noted how some have argued that the 
record industry has shifted from a centralised, Fordist mode of production (where all 
activities in the vertical chain from the point of production to the point of wholesale 
distribution are directly under the ownership and control of the record company), to a 
decentralised, post-Fordist process of ‘flexible specialisation’ where the disintegration 
of this vertical  chain results in much looser control over the production process and 
consequently a decentralised, largely autonomous record production sector generating 
recordings to a fragmented market (Hirsch, 1990; Lash and Urry, 1994). In essence, that 
perspective argues a shift of power away from the major corporations. On the other 
hand, some authors recognise increasingly loose control over processes of production as 
a characteristic of contemporary cultural industries and argue that it is of little relevance 
to the major record company whether or not all the individuals or teams involved in the 
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processes of scouting, development, recording and manufacture are in-house or external 
as long as they retain tight control over distribution (e.g. Burnett, 2002; Hesmondhalgh, 
2002, 2007). While these accounts have somewhat different implications for the power 
of the major  record labels,  both accounts  indicate  a  significant  degree of autonomy 
regarding  the  production  process.  The  primary  research  discussed  in  chapter  eight 
above, however, clearly points to major labels exercising a significant level of control 
over production processes in more recent  times.  This relates  to the evolution of the 
record producer as a brand in his/her own right, and the role of this ‘actor’ in achieving 
greatly  enhanced  profile  at  consumer  level  for  the  recordings  that  they  produce  or 
remix, or perhaps more appropriately, to which they lend their brand.
Fig. 9.5: ‘Major’ record producer ‘interrupting’ path of music to mass market audience
The evidence  afforded by several  of  my informants,  most  notably EMI MD 
Willie  Kavanagh  and  artist  managers  Ben  Barrett  and  Fachtna  O’Ceallaigh,  is  that 
bridging the gap between peripheral market and mass market now increasingly means 
employing the right producer to remix recordings for mass market tastemakers (most 
notably radio), and a mass audience (chapter 8.4). Barrett’s account, which focussed on 
the role  of record producer  David Arnold in  the trajectory of Damien Rice’s  debut 
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album O, vividly illustrates how having the brand of a celebrity producer applied to the 
recording of a new artist enables the record label, Warner’s in this case, greater leverage 
in pitching this recording to daytime radio programmers and mainstream print media. A 
key point here is that Arnold, and other big-name producers are largely only accessible 
through  one  of  the  major  labels.  Thus,  while  the  recording  may  have  been 
independently created and produced in the first instance and, enjoyed a commercial life 
to a point, it is of necessity returned to the production phase of its development, under 
the direct control of a major label, in order to be re-branded for mass consumption, i.e.  
in order to  become a ‘hit’.  So,  while  recent  digital  technology makes the recording 
process easier and cheaper and enhances a do-it-yourself approach to promotion and 
distribution to a point, this only moderately reshapes the industrial structure at the level 
of  peripheral  markets.  Beyond  this,  a  process  that  we  may  term  ‘the  cult  of  the 
producer’ helps to maintain and bolster an oligopolistic industrial structure. 
Implications arising from profiles of the ‘consumer’ in the record industry chain
The  assumption  that  ‘early  adopters’  or,  to  draw upon  BBC Radio  1  terminology,  
‘restless’ consumers are indicative of the actions of the majority is erroneous. Yet, this 
assumption is commonly implied in media and other accounts. The findings reported in 
chapter 6.2 largely support this assumption. As noted, the IFPI claim 95% of all music 
traffic  on  the  internet  to  be  ‘illicit’  file-sharing.  We  also  noted  that  perspectives 
advanced  by  many  interviewees  in  chapter  6.2  imply  the  perception  of  widescale 
internet ‘piracy’. Comments such as: ‘People aren’t paying for music anymore’ (Dave 
O’Grady); ‘…wholesale theft…’ (John Kennedy); ‘…nobody wants to pay for music…’ 
(Eddie Joyce) were frequently articulated. 
However, if the assumption based upon these claims, and commonly reported 
accounts in the media is that free access to music on the internet is terminally wounding 
the record industry, the primary research findings reported in chapter 8.6 complicate and 
problematise such an assumption. When it comes to generating big hits, the ‘contented’ 
or ‘rare-to-occasional’ consumers, by far the largest consumer band according to all of 
the accounts reported, are crucial.  The sheer size of this consumer band makes their 
rare-to-occasional  contributions  to  the record industry hugely significant.  While  this 
research  study  did  not  employ  a  consumer  study  and  thus  has  not  gleaned  any 
information directly from end users/consumers of recorded music, the perspectives of 
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senior management in major record labels, and others (on the profile of their overall 
record  buying  public),  implies  that  file-sharing  activities  remain  the  preserve  of 
minority or niche groupings. These findings also need to be digested in the light of the 
various reports that combine to outline conflicting and contradictory ‘effects’ of file-
sharing as advanced in chapter 6.2. In sum, the research indicates that the relationship 
between file-sharing and falling record sales is far from straight-forward. 
Here, we might also consider the potential for ‘cannibalisation’ to be occurring, 
whereby the emergence of online streaming services, but also the proliferation of other 
sources of music (via digital, and more traditional sources) has an impact on sales. The 
variety of spaces where music can now be ‘legitimately’  accessed/consumed without 
actually purchasing it  has, as noted particularly in chapter 7, been expanding.  So, a 
downturn in recorded music sales may be explained in many ways, not just peer-to-peer 
file-sharing and other explanations that interviewees offer.  The ‘legal’ availability of 
music via new platforms may also eat into the traditional sales market. However, at this 
point, my views on this are largely speculative. In terms of future research, clearly a 
study  focusing  on  the  consumption  habits  of  the  music  consumer  from  their  own 
perspective would supplement and enhance the findings produced in this research study.
Network gatekeepers and issues of scarcity
What we must also note here in relation to consumption is that the various licensing 
arrangements,  and  other  transactions  between  copyright  owners  and  online/mobile 
platforms  serves  to  put  in  place  network  ‘gatekeepers’  and  ‘intermediaries’  which 
ultimately aid scarcity. 
The  rise  of  dominant  discourses  and  assumptions  regarding  the  detrimental 
effects of file-sharing on the music industry and the relative futility of legislators and 
judiciary in combating this trend, rest on very specific assumptions regarding the loss of 
scarcity. While technological determinist approaches point to the end of scarcity for that 
which  can  be  reduced  to  ‘bits’,  i.e.  digitised,  this  research  study  indicates  that 
increasingly,  network  intermediaries/gatekeepers  are  not  neutral.  Alliances  and 
agreements between recorded music content providers and online outlets dictate what 
recorded music content these intermediaries will deliver, the form the content will take 
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(e.g. bundles/packages, single-track downloads etc), the cost to the consumer, and who 
will  be  able  to  access  the  content  or  not  (e.g.  pay-per-download,  subscription  etc). 
Furthermore, legal precedents set in courtrooms in cases between content providers and 
technology providers  and internet  service providers,  and resolutions  and agreements 
between these parties have established grounds for denying some users access to the 
network per se. 
In sum, the potential loss of scarcity suggested by the combination of Moore’s 
law,  Metcalfe’s  law,  Gilder’s  law  and  Kryder’s  law  has,  to  a  significant  degree, 
remained unrealised. 
Other record industry ‘spatial’ fixes
Harvey’s analysis of the strategies employed by capitalists and nation-states to combat 
stagnation have, as noted earlier, resonated with the music industry’s colonisation of 
new spaces that have been opened to it in recent years courtesy of its media neighbours. 
Likewise, as we saw throughout chapter 7, the music industry has also colonised many 
new spaces in cyberspace. Here, however, we note the expansion of the record industry 
into  new  ‘physical’  markets.  The  investment  of  the  major  labels  in  developing  a 
foothold in the Russian and Chinese markets as reported in chapter seven signals such a 
spatial strategy. While Warner’s are the only major to date to open an office in China, 
the other major labels have all entered partnerships and alliances with existing media 
actors in the Chinese market. Since 2002, Sony, EMI, Warner’s and Universal have all  
opened  up  Russian  offices.  Despite  the  protestations  of  the  IFPI,  the  potential  for 
growth in these two markets that combine to provide approximately a quarter of the 
world’s population is clearly significant. 
9.4 The reinforcement of music as a copyright industry
As  noted  earlier,  issues  regarding  ownership  and  control  are  central  to  political 
economy  debates,  and  this  research  study  has  drawn  upon  such  approaches.  The 
evolving trends outlined  in  section  9.2 above indicate  that  the student  of the music 
industry needs to place emphasis on questions of ownership by examining issues of 
concentration, vertical integration, horizontal integration and conglomeration. But what 
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this study also indicates is that the student of the contemporary music industry must also 
concern themselves with another form of ownership – ownership of ‘rights’, particularly 
copyright, but also, increasingly, other strands of intellectual property rights in the form 
of patents and trademarks. Issues of intellectual property lie at the heart of the vertically 
integrating live music value chain, the re-conceptualisation of the recording artist and 
the converging of the music industry from a body of discrete but related sub-sectors to a 
more  integrated  industry network.  These  processes  all  emphasise  trends  towards  an 
intensification  of  the  exploitation  of  rights.  Within  these  processes,  this  research 
highlights how, to an increasing extent, the recording artist exists as a ‘bundle’ of rights 
to be exploited through as many channels as possible.
Successive  generations  of  increasingly  cheaper  and  better  technologies  of 
production, distribution, duplication and consumption have often emerged to threaten 
these structures. McLuhan’s ideas have experienced a renaissance over the past fifteen 
years,  underpinning much commentary in both media and academic output since the 
internet became a technology of mass communication. The approach of McLuhan and 
the subsequent work of others advancing techno-centric perspectives holds significant 
attraction for those who see the internet (or wish to have the internet seen) as the driver 
of radical change in society, not least for those who argue that it is causing the radical 
transformation  of,  or  even  terminal  decline  of  the  music  industry.  Some  (e.g. 
Negroponte,  1995;  1996) contend that  digital  technologies  have effectively rendered 
copyright law obsolete, or, as a number of my research informants argue (e.g. chapter 
6.2),  make  it  significantly  ineffective  from  the  point  of  view  of  protecting  sound 
recordings. As Boyle (2008) noted, the common-sense assumption of the ‘information 
age’  is  that  copyright  cannot  any  longer  be  protected  in  the  wake  of  digital 
developments.  The  characteristics  of  digitizable  cultural  or  informational  texts  –  in 
Boyle’s terms, that which is ‘non-rival’ and ‘non-excludable’ (Boyle, 2008: 3) – is in 
essence, extremely difficult to monetise, or so goes the received wisdom. The call of the 
record industry has consistently  been for a  stronger  legal  hold on their  copyrighted 
catalogues in the wake of recent and new digital platforms. The stated grounds upon 
which they base this call are that their industry will not survive unless copyright laws 
are  strengthened  to  counter  the  threats  viewed  as  arising  from  these  technologies, 
particularly the widespread ‘piracy’  that occurs over the internet. As the accounts of 
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IFPI’s John Kennedy and IRMA’s Dick Doyle testify, the record industry presents their 
arguments to legislators and judiciaries in nation-states across the world on a regular 
and ongoing basis. The litany of court cases reported on the IFPI website and elsewhere 
clearly suggests, they are frequently successful in their petitioning. For the major record 
companies,  the  severity  of  the  threat  of  technology  to  their  ability  to  control  the 
exchange and flow of recorded music is lessened by strengthening copyright law, which 
itself acts as yet another barrier to new competitors entering the market. 
The fear of technology enabling individuals and groups outside the established 
industrial power centres to independently engage in the distribution of recorded music 
results in legal  responses to technological  innovation.  Given that most copyright are 
owned by the recording and publishing arms of the major music companies, it is these 
companies  themselves  that  are  the  primary  beneficiaries  of  longer  and  stronger 
copyright laws. Such developments and trends again resonate strongly with Winston’s 
‘law  of  the  suppression  of  radical  potential’  in  that  the  pressure  and  actions  of 
established music industry actors are shaping the role and outcome of the internet and 
other digital technologies in the music industry. We are also reminded here of Lessig’s 
(2001) second ‘futuristic vision’ of the internet,  where it evolves as a technology of 
control, shaped and regulated by evermore restrictive intellectual property constraints. 
As  we have  seen,  a  now familiar  pattern  has  evolved where  by digital  distribution 
technologies  arrive,  initially  with  the  promise  and potential  of  radical  disruption  to 
existing industrial interests and social practices, but only to find themselves embroiled 
in  conflict  and struggle  with  regulation.  There  is  an inherent  conflict  with the  new 
potentials  arising  from  new  or  emergent  technology  and  the  established  music 
industries. This has been the case from Lessig’s (2001) account of the piano roll, to 
Frith’s (1978) and Scannell  and Cardiff’s (1991) account of radio in the post-World 
War One years,  to the cassette duplication technologies  of the 1970s as detailed by 
Lister et al. (2003), to the technologies of digital reproduction and distribution as dealt 
with  in  this  thesis.  The  relationship  between  internet  technologies  and  the  record 
industry thus point, not to the  ‘Gatesian’ promise of fiction-free cyber-capitalism, but 
rather to an interrupted process of consumption where the various court actions have 
ensured friction. To apply Winston’s model to the key trends reported in the current 
research study, the capacity of the internet for the circulation and distribution of music 
has been suppressed by the ‘brake’ of the established entertainment corporations. The 
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need of capital to create new markets is the force applying the brake that suppresses the 
radical potential of internet technologies with regard to the mediation of music. As we 
have seen, the digital world has been shaped to provide a plethora of new platforms and 
opportunities  through  which  major  copyright  owners  can  exploit  their  intellectual 
property. The reality that has unfolded is one where these corporations have been using 
their legal muscle and economic power to disable and subsequently usurp many of the 
online entrepreneurs that have emerged to challenge them.
The  underlying  principle  emerging  from  the  various  copyright  infringement 
cases taken by the major companies and/or their representative trade bodies - against the 
suppliers  of  file-sharing software  programmes,  individual  network  users,  and  most 
recently,  internet  service providers – is  that  the law is  as significant  in shaping the 
outcome of a new media as is the technology itself. The extension and application of 
copyright law in these cases have constrained the potential of the technologies to disrupt 
the roles and interests of the major music companies, their established practices and the 
nature and form of their relationship with their consumers. In addition, the subsequent 
licensing agreements and other forms of alliances between the major music companies 
and the various digital outlets/platforms illustrate how the technical possibilities arising 
form the technologies for digital distribution and copying can be made subordinate to 
corporate interests.
 
Furthermore, this research observes that issues surrounding the recent trajectory 
of copyright and its growing centrality to the evolution of the music industry and the 
outcome of technologies within it also shed light upon another - debates around the 
nation state.
The role of the nation-state
Chapters two and three offered contrasting perspectives on the roles of the nation-state 
in  contemporary  society.  As  we  saw  in  chapter  two,  Harvey  (2003;  2005)  and 
particularly Wood (2002; 2003) emphasise the role of the state in the neo-liberal phase 
of capitalism and how it is acting to facilitate the opening of borders and removal of  
restrictions to global capital, whilst simultaneously acting to prevent the integration that 
globalisation purports to promote. Examining contemporary media industries, we also 
saw emphasise that these industries would not or could not exist in their current form 
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without the intervention of state regarding regulation and control (Croteau and Hoynes, 
2003). Conversely, chapter three considered techno-centric perspectives that envisaged, 
at  their  most  extreme,  the  nation-state  becoming  effectively  obsolete.  To  recall 
Negroponte’s claim: digitalisation will ‘flatten organisations…decentralise control’ and 
make the nation-state ‘go away’ (cited in Wired, February, 1995). As we saw in chapter 
4.2, authors such Harley (1993) point to an ever-decreasing role for the nation-state in 
the music industry. The role of copyright in shaping the outcome of the internet in the 
music industry to date leads me to reject these latter claims, based on the primary and 
secondary research findings reported earlier.  In recent  history (where capitalism has 
developed a significant interest in culture and information) the necessity for the state 
legislative and judicial systems to capitalism is exemplified through developments in 
the  intellectual  property domain.  This  has  become particularly  evident  in  an  era  of 
music downloading, where, as we have seen, the major record companies use copyright 
law as a means of repositioning themselves in response to actual or potential disruptions 
associated with novel technological innovations in the area of digital distribution. The 
nation-state’s legislative and judicial  systems are required to implement  and enforce 
international copyright laws, and it is the willingness and/or capability of the nation-
state to do this that determines the success or failure of copyright law. The role of the 
state  in  implementing  changes  in  and  extensions  to  copyright  law  is  thus  crucial 
preconditions for capital accumulation. The legal system within the state is thus called 
upon to impact upon the production, distribution and consumption of recorded music. 
Copyright regulates both economic and cultural processes when it comes to recorded 
music. 
Developments  within  the  twenty-first  century  music  economy  thus  evoke 
parallels with Wood’s account of the ‘enclosures’ that characterised early capitalism so 
that ‘primitive accumulation’ was enabled courtesy of state intervention via legislative 
and judicial means. This was vital to the expansion of capitalism as it imposed specific 
economic imperatives where they did not already exist.  Similarly with contemporary 
capitalism, state laws and policies operate as crucial preconditions for private capital to 
enhance  its  profit  via  new  forms  of  enclosures  and  scarcities  in  music  and  other 
information service sectors.
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9.5 Concluding Summary and Remarks
This research study on the recent  evolution of the music industry has examined the 
complex relationships unfolding between technology, socio-economic factors and media 
cultures in the new millennium.
Through chapters two, three and four, a conceptual framework was developed 
which was applied to this study of the contemporary music industry at both macro and 
micro levels. This multi-level approach is important in that it provides the student of the 
music industry with a sense of the various forces and influences  shaping the recent 
evolution of the industry.  It  offers a more  nuanced alternative  to the transformative 
ideas  associated  with  techno-centric  notions  that  inform some  academic,  and  much 
industrial and journalistic discourse surrounding music and the internet. 
This framework then underpins a critical interrogation of the popular idea that 
technological trends are producing a fundamental decay or decline in the role, place and 
power of the music industry. Instead, this research study proposes that whilst the initial 
disruptive effects of the radical new digital technologies may have induced a certain 
‘crisis’ for the prevailing models and practices of the recorded music industry,  these 
‘effects’ are largely restricted to this one industry sub-sector. Beyond this, these digital 
technologies  have  also  prompted  and  been  accompanied  by  new  opportunities  for 
restructuring and reshaping of the scope and operations of the record industry.
Chapters  six,  seven  and  eight  moved  to  a  more  detailed,  empirical  level 
investigation. These chapters examined how new digital technologies are perceived as 
inducing a certain ‘crisis’ for the prevailing models and practices of the recorded music 
industry.   But we note and explore how these developments have also prompted the 
music industry to mobilise its considerable resources to promote institutional, policy, 
regulatory and other kinds of innovations to meet these challenges. In essence, these 
chapters  comprise  a  grounded  empirical  analysis  of  recent  restructuring  processes 
unfolding within the music industry as a whole as well as key shifts in the industry’s 
relationships with other media sectors.  We examined how various new business models 
launched  by  the  music  industry  have  opened  up  many  new  revenue-generating 
opportunities from music culture despite the relative decline in recorded music sales. 
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The concept of convergence has particularly been applied in conducting and describing 
this  grounded  empirical  analysis.  Ultimately,  we  examined  how  the  interplay  of 
technological,  institutional,  and  policy/regulatory  innovations  have  provided  new 
opportunities for a restructuring of the music industry’s scope, practices and operations 
over the past decade, leading to the evolution of a new ‘music industry model’. Here, as 
noted  previously,  we recognise  that  such manoeuvres  have  actually  served to  grow 
overall revenues from combined music industry sub-sectors.
All  of the processes that  we have explored are embedded in a socio-cultural 
geography and,  they  are  also embedded  in  a  specific  way of  doing economics,  i.e. 
capitalism. There are routes that exist between a recording artist and the audience/user 
for their recordings. While these routes exist in space and time, they also exist within a 
specific political-economic dynamic. The space and time within which recorded music 
is produced and accesses its audience is embedded in capitalism. The processes outlined 
in  this  chapter,  and  earlier,  reveal  aspects  of  the  dynamic  nature  of  capital,  its 
continuing drive and capacities to expand into new markets, often facilitated by state 
laws and policies such as intellectual property rights. 
While  the  structure  and organisation  of  the  music  industry  has  altered  on  a 
number of levels in recent years, no decentralisation of power has occurred. The decline 
in physical sales has primarily affected traditional physical record retailers.  Job cuts 
within  the  record  industry  and  consolidation  across  the  wider  music  industry  has 
ensured the  retention  and sustenance  of  oligopolistic  structures.  In  the midst  of  the 
online music ‘economies’ (both ‘legitimate’ and ‘black market’), new business models 
have emerged and evolved. These do not constitute the ‘new music order’ promised by 
the potential of internet technologies and those commentators and analysts who drove 
the  transformative  hype  that  accompanied  the  diffusion  of  the  internet  as  a  mass 
communication technology. 
Furthermore, I have argued that the commonly reported ‘crisis’ that is largely 
attributed  to  digitalisation  has,  in  light  of  the  developments  outlined,  been  much 
overstated. However, such a perception of an industry in crisis has served the interests 
of the major music companies when lobbying for policy change, particularly in relation 
to copyright law, and also in obtaining approval for mergers and alliances.
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Overall,  this  research  study  illustrates  that  the  music  sector  provides  an 
increasingly  suitable  site  for  exploring  the  evolving  meanings  and  relevance  of 
processes of integration and synergy in media industries, and also in examining techno-
social  relations in the early twenty-first  century.  The study indicates  how the music 
industry  comprises,  in  many  respects,  the  leading  edge  sectors  in  terms  of  the 
opportunities and challenges posed by radical technological change for the media and 
cultural industries more broadly. Thus analysing how this sector has responded to new 
technological developments can serve to illuminate more general trends of the shifting 
global media, culture and technology.
The  industrial  concentration  of  cultural  distribution  and  exchange  represents 
power and control over global markets. As noted in chapter four, the increasing flow of 
cultural products from an oligopoly of corporations, and their control over the means of 
distribution has been a cause of concern for many authors (e.g. Bagdikian; 2004 Thussu, 
2006).  This  research  study  illustrates  that  long-established  concepts  applied  in  the 
analysis of media industries, such as concentration of ownership and convergence, are 
still relevant to grounded analyses of the key trends unfolding in the music sector over 
the past decade and for understanding the scope and meaning of these changes. Beyond 
this,  it  indicates  that  another  concept  of  ownership  –  the  ownership  of  intellectual 
property in all its forms – is increasingly relevant to gaining a deeper understanding of 
the outcome of technological innovation in media and cultural spheres.
We must also consider a certain naivety in the notion that many of the digital 
‘start-ups’  that  purported  to  disrupt  the  interests  and roles  of  the  established  music 
companies  were  ever  acting  with  the  intention  of  democratising  the  distribution  of 
music. Those such sites that have proven successful in attracting network users have 
relied largely on the use of existing sound recordings copyrighted to the major labels, 
and making the distribution of this content easier. In doing so, they turned themselves 
into  highly  valuable  tools  to  be  acquired  and  taken  advantage  of  for  the  further 
development of their services by the large and established players in the industry. This 
again  is  evidenced  most  recently  through  the  cases  of  Vevo,  Imeem  and  others 
discussed earlier.
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While serving to provide new methods of circulation and distribution, the online 
music  sphere,  through its  short  but  eventful  history,  emphasises  how the  economic 
value of music remains primarily determined by the process through which it accesses 
its final consumer. This case shows that while new communication technologies may 
initially threaten to diminish the power of those who control content and distribution, 
such  technologies  can  ultimately  be  shaped  to  further  the  existing  structures  of  an 
industry. 
A note on implications for further music industry research
A key implication for further research on the music industry relates to concepts of the 
term ‘music industry’ itself. During the introductory chapter I outlined how the music 
industry is  frequently conflated  with the  record industry in  many of  the  media  and 
journalistic  accounts  that  emphasise  a  ‘crisis  of  digitalisation’.  Furthermore,  this 
conflation results in the common conception of the music industry as a single industry. 
As this  thesis  has emphasised,  the record industry is  one of  a  core group of music 
industry sub-sectors – albeit increasingly converging sub-sectors – which combine to 
paint a larger and more complex picture than the notion of a single industry. Conceiving 
of  the  music  industry  as  a  single  industry  is  inaccurate  and,  conflating  the  record 
industry with the music industry as a whole makes for an inadequate model for analysis 
of economic processes and other surrounding music. I do not propose a rejection of the 
work of those academics referred to in chapter 1.2, amongst others, who have helped to 
make the record industry synonymous  with the music  industry.  However,  given the 
primacy  hitherto  afforded  to  the  record  industry  by  music  industry  studies,  it  is 
necessary now, more than ever to redress this imbalance. Music industry studies must 
recognise, not just the role of the record industry, but the role of the other industrial sub-
sectors and consider all their respective contributions to shaping the form and trajectory 
of the industry as a whole. This is increasingly important given convergence of music 
industry sub-sectors which is materialising. It is also vital to producing a more holistic 
and  thorough  understanding  of  the  evolution  of  the  industry  since  the  internet 
materialised as a medium for music. Such an approach can serve to deflate some of the 
transformative  hype  surrounding  the  role  of  the  internet  in  relation  to  the  music 
industry.  As  such,  this  research  study  has  sought  to  aid  in  the  redressing  of  this 
imbalance. 
249
Also, while this research study has emphasised that accounts of the demise of 
the music industry are, at best very premature (or at worst, downright nonsensical), and 
that far from decentralising power, the era of music downloading has actually seen a 
growing centralisation of power, this should not be interpreted as an outright rejection 
of many of the developments  that  risen to challenge  the major  music companies  in 
recent years. The very fact that I have been able to readily obtain a collection of news 
stories such as those related at the outset of the introductory chapter suggests that in 
recent years, the music industry has entered public discourse on an unprecedented level. 
Frequent media reports of copyright cases involving individuals, software suppliers and 
internet service providers may serve to generate an interest in, or sense of the social 
relations of music production for many of those resting in the categories towards the 
broader end of the consumer/user models. While power has not been shifted away from 
a small group of dominant actors, many of the online developments highlight significant 
retaliatory aspects  in  social  or  cultural  attitudes  towards music.  As indicated  earlier 
(chapters two and four in particular), all of this has served to move copyright and other 
strands of intellectual property further into academic debates around media and cultural 
criticism.  Digitalisation  makes  such  material  increasingly  significant  in  terms  of 
conducting  music  industry  analysis,  and  indeed  wider  cultural  or  media  industry 
analysis.
Gender: a lens for future study
The  male-female  breakdown  of  participating  interviewees  in  this  research  study 
suggests  that  gender  would  provide  an  interesting  lens  through which  to  conduct  a 
future study on the music industry. As was noted, only five out of thirty-nine of the 
participants  in  this  research  study are  women.  This  may be  seen as  a  reflection  of 
overall gender trends within the music industry. Within an Irish context, this point is 
evidenced by the small percentage of female music industry personnel listed in recent 
publications of the Hot Press Yearbook, an annual music industry directory. There are 
indications that this trend is changing elsewhere, e.g. in the USA the CEO of MTV 
Networks,  Chair  of  Atlantic  Records  and  the  Co-President  of  Sony/ATV  Music 
Publishing are all women.
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Finally…
This research study has sought to provide a more indepth understanding of the role of 
the internet in relation to the music industry,  and the changes that have been taking 
place  within  and  around  the  music  industry  since  the  advent  of  the  internet  as  a 
technology for the mediation of music. Overall the patterns and trends presented in this 
study illustrate the resilient nature of the established music industry in the light of the 
widespread diffusion of digital technologies which, theoretically, hold the potential to 
radically diminish their role and power. Hopefully, this research has demonstrated that 
the terminal decline of corporate power celebrated by Napier-Bell in the midst of the 
‘digital revolution’ proclaimed by the likes of Kelly and Negroponte remains, in the 
music industry at least, a distant and unlikely outcome.
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Appendix A: Interviewee Biographies (in alphabetical order)
Bailie, Stuart: Music journalist and broadcaster
Stuart  Bailie  was  a  critic  and  feature  writer  with  NME  for  a  period  of  ten  years, 
ultimately serving as deputy editor in the late 1990s. He has subsequently worked as a 
freelance music journalist, writing for such publications as Q,  Hot Press,  Mojo,  Uncut 
as well as music columnist with  The Times and  The Sunday Times in London. Since 
1999 he has been a producer and presenter with BBC Radio Ulster. He has also written 
and researched music documentaries for BBC Radio 2 and BBC Television. Since 2007 
he has combined his work at the BBC with the role of  CEO of the Oh Yeah Music 
Centre  in  Belfast.  He  founded  this  dedicated  music  recording,  rehearsal  and 
performance centre in Belfast with support from recording artists Snow Patrol, Ash and 
David Holmes. 
Barrett, Ben: Artist manager; live music promoter
Ben Barrett is the manager of international recording artist Damien Rice. She has also 
worked at  Mondo Management  in  London as  assistant  to  Rob Holden,  manager  of 
David Gray and Orbital. Previously she worked as a live music promoter with the Mean 
Fiddler  organisation.  Initially  booking  Irish  tours  for  international  artists,  she 
subsequently worked for the company’s London office where she promoted UK tours as 
well as music festivals in Boston, Chicago, San Francisco and London.
Bolton, Jane: Independent record label manager
Jane Bolton is managing director of Claddagh Records, a Dublin based record label that 
primarily  focuses  on  traditional,  folk  and some contemporary  popular  music  forms. 
Artists that have recorded and released records on the label include Sinead O’Connor, 
The Chieftains and Kila. 
Butler, Elvera: Independent record label owner
Initially working as a live music promoter in Cork, Elvera Butler worked with such acts 
as  The  Frank  and  Walters  and  Microdisney.  She  subsequently  worked  in  the  film 
industry in London for a number of years before returning to Dublin to set up Reekus 
Records. Since the turn of the millennium Reekus have released and promoted records 
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for new Irish artists such as The Radio, Perry Blake and Saville. Butler also serves on 
the board of IRMA as independent sector representative.
Carroll, Jim: Independent  label  owner;  major  label  press  officer; 
journalist and radio presenter
Jim Carroll is currently music columnist with  The Irish Times and a DJ with Dublin 
based rock radio station Phantom FM. Until  recently he operated Lakota Records,  a 
joint-venture with Sony Records. Previously he worked as press and promotions records 
with  London  Records  where  he  represented  acts  such  as  Goldie,  Echo  and  the 
Bunnymen and Armand Van Helden. He has also worked in the artist and repertoire 
department of GoDiscs! (Universal),  WEA (Warner’s) and Rondor (Universal).  Over 
the past decade he has also written music features for  Hot Press, NME and  Melody 
Maker.
Cooney, Steve: Record producer; musician
As a session musician Steve Cooney worked with artists such as Jerry Lee Lewis and 
The Bushwackers. In the 1980s he was guitarist with successful Australian rock band 
Red Gum before joining Stockton’s Wing. Over the past two decades has also recorded, 
performed and toured with Sharon Shannon, Altan, Martin Hayes, Mary Black, Sliabh 
Notes and many others.  Cooney has also worked extensively as a record producer, most 
recently working with Sinead O’Connor.
Curtis, P.J.: Record producer; musician; broadcaster; educator
Having  initially  served  as  artists  and  repertoire  manager  with  independent  label 
Mulligan, PJ Curtis has subsequently worked as a freelance record producer. At the time 
of our interview, Curtis had 54 album production credits to his name over a period of 
almost  thirty-five years.  Working in  the US,  Ireland and the  UK, his  album credits 
include  Albert  Lee,  Rory  Gallagher,  Altan,  Pumpkinhead,  Liam Clancy  & Tommy 
Makem,  Dolores  Keane,  Maura  O'Connell,  Scullion,  Stockton's  Wing,  Mary Black, 
Frances Black, Arcady, Sean Keane and Davy Spillane. Records he produced for Altan 
have  won  both  Grammy  and  NAIRD  (National  American  Independent  Record 
Distributors)  awards.  Between  1980  and  2004  Curtis  also  enjoyed  a  professional 
broadcasting  career  producing  and  presenting  specialist  music  programmes  and 
documentaries with RTE Radio 1, 2FM, Lyric FM, Clare FM and BBC Radio Ulster. 
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Since 2006 he has served as lecturer in Irish Music Studies at NUI Galway. Formerly, 
he was instrumental in setting up music performance, music business studies and music 
management  training  programmes  with  the  City  of  Dublin  Vocational  Education 
Committee (CDVEC).
D’Ardis, John: Record  manufacturer  (Trend  Studios);  record 
producer; songwriter
For the past four decades John D’Ardis has owned and operated Trend Studios, a sound 
recording, manufacturing and video production facility in Dublin. To this end he has 
worked with  all  the  major  record  labels  and a  host  of  independent  music  and film 
companies. He is also a songwriter and music publisher. Along with Bill Whelan he was 
instrumental  in  the  creation  of  the  Irish  Music  Rights  Organisation  (IMRO)  which 
replaced the Performing Rights Society (PRS) in the 1990s.
Donald, Keith: Musician; Chairman IMRO; educator
Keith Donald is currently the chairman of the Irish Music Rights Organisation (IMRO), 
the  royalty  collection  society  that  administer  performing  publishing  rights  in  the 
Republic of Ireland. He formerly served as popular music officer with the Arts Council 
of Ireland and was also the director of Musicbase in the 1990s, an Arts Council funded 
popular music advice and information service. As a session musician he has worked 
with Van Morrison, The Pogues and Christy Moore among others. He is also a member 
of the band Moving Hearts. For over two decades he has been actively involved in 
designing  and  delivering  music  performance,  music  business  studies  and  music 
management  training  programmes  with  the  City  of  Dublin  Vocational  Education 
Committee (CDVEC).
Doyle, Dick: Director General, IRMA; Chief Executive, PPI
Dick Doyle is director general of IRMA, the umbrella trade body for the record industry 
in the Republic of Ireland. He is also chief executive of Phonographic Performance 
Ireland (PPI), the organisation that oversees the collection and distribution of royalties 
to record companies for the use of the copyright on recordings they release. He formerly 
served as personal secretary to Fianna Fail government minister Seamus Brennan during 
his tenure at the Department of Trade and Marketing in the late 1980s/early 1990s. 
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Durnin, Eamonn Tesco, Ireland
Eamonn Durnin is assistant company secretary of Tesco Ireland. His responsibilities 
include music licensing across the range of Tesco outlets in the Republic of Ireland. 
Ergatoudis, George: Head of Music BBC Radio 1
Since 2005 George Ergatoudis has worked as Head of Music at BBC Radio 1. Prior to 
this he served as a producer at Radio 1 while also managing BBC Radio 1Xtra's music 
policy.  In the 1990s Ergatoudis served as senior producer with Kiss FM in London 
where he won a Sony Gold Award for producing  The Steve Jackson Breakfast Show. 
During his time as producer at BBC Radio 1 he also won a Sony Award for his radio 
documentary Last Night A DJ Saved My Life: A History Of The Remix. Before pursuing 
a career in radio, Ergatoudis worked in the record industry with Island Records as Club 
Promotions Manager at the urban/dance label 4th & Broadway.
Findlay, Bruce: Artist manager, label owner, retailer 
Bruce Findlay is currently the manager of Scottish band Aberfeldy as well as working 
as a promoter with Scottish festival T In The Park. In the past he has worked with major 
international acts such as China Crisis and most notably the multi-million selling rock 
band Simple Minds, whom he managed for a period of twelve years. Formerly he ran a 
chain  of  independent  record  shops  across  Scotland  (Bruce’s).  He also  founded and 
operated an independent record company (Zoom).
Graham, Ross: CEO NIMIC; ex-major label promotions manager
Ross Graham is chief executive of the Northern Ireland Music Industry Commission, a 
state sponsored initiative to provide strategy and services towards accelerating music 
industry  development  in  Northern  Ireland.  The  organisation  provides  a  range  of 
information  and consultancy services  to  emerging artists  and industry professionals. 
NIMIC have been to the fore in the early promotion and management of recording artist  
Duke  Special.  Formerly,  Ross  Graham worked  as  promotions  manager  with  Island 
Records, now part of the Universal Music Group.
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Hanrahan, Dermot: Radio  and  entertainment  entrepreneur;  ex-music 
retailing executive
For a period of fourteen years Dermot Hanrahan acted CEO of Dublin radio station 
FM104. He is currently one of the investors behind 4FM and also has the managerial 
reins at Cork station Red FM. In 2007, in a joint investment with  The Irish Times he 
launched  www.entertainment.ie.  Formerly,  Hanrahan  was  MD  of  Virgin’s  retail 
division in the Republic of Ireland. 
Harford, Gerry: Artist manager; live music promoter
Gerry Harford has been manager of Irish band Therapy since 1990. 2008 saw the band’s 
twelfth  international  album  release  on  A&M  Records.  Harford  has  also  managed 
Tindersticks,  singer-songwriter  Nina  Hynes  and  Norwegian  heavy  metal  band 
Magdalena.  Throughout  the  1980s  Harford  worked  as  an  independent  live  music 
promoter in Dublin.
Hayden, Jackie: Journalist; ex-major label promotions manager
Jackie Hayden is co-owner and general manager of Hot Press magazine where he also 
authors a column on new and emerging Irish acts, ‘First Cuts’. He formerly worked as 
promotions manager in the Republic of Ireland for CBS Records and Polydor Records. 
In the 1990s he served on the FORTE Music Industry Task Force and acted as chairman 
of the committee  to examine the international  marketing of Irish music.  In the new 
millennium he has worked with the independent recording sector as chair of two lobby 
groups aimed at generating increased exposure for Irish music on Irish airwaves – Jobs 
In Music, and Fairplay For Airplay.
Hennessy, Shay: Independent label owner; ex-chairman IMRO
Shay Hennessy is the managing director of independent music group, Crashed Music. 
He was formerly general manager of Pickwick Records and K-Tel Records. He also 
served as press and promotions officer for A&M Records, Ireland. He has also served 
on the board of IFPI and chaired the board of IMRO.
Jenner, Peter: Artist manager 
For the past four decades Peter Jenner has worked in artist management. His clients 
have included Pink Floyd, Syd Barrett, T-Rex, The Clash, Roy Harper, Ian Dury, The 
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Disposable  Heroes  of  Hiphoprisy as  well  as  Eddi  Reader  and Billy  Bragg  who he 
currently  represents.  He  is  currently  secretary-general  of  the  International  Music 
Managers' Forum. In the past, Jenner has also worked as a live music promoter.
Johnston, Una: Music  industry  trade  fair  organiser;  music  event 
manager
Based in Thurles, County Tipperary, Una Johnston is the European representative for 
the South By South West festival (SXSW), a global music industry trade fair which 
takes place annually in Austin, Texas. She previously organised unsigned Irish artists to 
perform at the annual New Music Seminar in New York. She also co-owns and operates 
a music event management company, Carpe Diem, whose projects include In The City 
and the Guinness Blues Festival.
Joyce, Eddie: Independent label owner
Eddie Joyce is co-owner of Danceline Records and Jeeldaire Music Publishing. Since 
1984 the label has been releasing once-off singles and albums for new Irish artists. They 
have also handled publishing for international acts such as Fish. He has also served on 
the board of IMRO and is a founder member of both the Jobs In Music campaign and 
Fairplay For Airplay.
Kavanagh, Willie: Major music label executive; Chairman – IRMA
Willie Kavanagh has been managing director of EMI Music Ireland for almost twenty 
years. He is also the current chairman of IRMA, the Irish arm if record industry trade 
body  IFPI  and  was  also  a  board  member  of  the  Music  Board  of  Ireland.  He  was 
formerly promotions manager at CBS Records, Ireland.
Kennedy, John: Chairman & CEO IFPI
John  Kennedy  is  chairman  and  chief  executive  of  the  International  Federation  of 
Phonographic  Industries  (IFPI),  the  trade  body  representing  the  record  industry, 
globally. He started his career as a lawyer working at several record companies. In 1983 
he set up a private agency specialising in the music industry and in 1985 was awarded 
an OBE for his work as a trustee of the Band Aid Trust and Live Aid. In the 1990s he 
became chairman of Polygram Music and Film, and subsequently chief executive of 
Universal Music UK.
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Lappin, Johnny: Music publisher
Johnny Lappin has been an independent music publisher since the 1970s. His clientele 
include Clannad, The Celtic Tenors and Sharon Shannon. He is also managing director 
of Liffey Music Publishing,  the company set up to handle publishing for the  Celtic  
Woman show internationally.  He is chairman of the Music Publishers Association of 
Ireland  and  has  also  served  on  the  boards  of  the  Irish  Music  Rights  Organisation 
(IMRO) and Mechanical Copyright Protection Society (MCPS).
Lindsey, Steve: Music publisher
Steve Lindsey has worked with major record and publishing companies for twenty-five 
years.  He  served  as  professional  manager  with  Warner/Chappell  Music  Publishing 
before  moving  to  Go  Discs!  Music  as  general  manager.  Following  its  takeover  by 
Polygram he worked for Island Music as creative director and general manager. He has 
also worked as an independent music supervisor on such film productions as  Mission 
Impossible and Welcome to Sarajevo.
Lockhart, Jim: Musician; Radio producer 
Jim Lockhart is keyboardist and flute player with trad-rock band Horslips, who having 
enjoyed significant success across Europe in the 1970s and early 1980s, have recently 
reformed. For almost twenty-five years he has worked as a music radio producer at RTE 
with responsibility for a variety of weekday shows on both RTE1 and 2FM.
Murray, Frank: Artist manager 
Frank Murray is currently manager of Dublin act The Mighty Stef. He has formerly 
manager such artists as The Pogues, Black 47 and Kirsty McColl. He formerly worked 
as tour manager for Elton John and Thin Lizzy.
O’Ceallaigh, Fachtna: Artist manager 
Fachtna O’Kelly currently manages international recording artist Sinead O’Connor, and 
emerging New York based singer-songwriter Lissy Trullie. In the past he has managed 
Bob Geldof & The Boomtown Rats, Bananarama, and more recently US rapper Amon. 
His career in music started in the 1970s as music writer with The Irish Press. He also 
briefly managed Mother Records, an Island Records label in the late 1980s.
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O’Grady, Dave: Independent record label owner; artist manager
Dave O’Grady is managing director of Independent Records,  a Dublin based record 
label  which  has  been  releasing  records  since  1994.  The  labels  also  specialises  in 
licensing independent US albums for the Irish market. He is also the manager of two 
Irish  recording  artists,  David  Kitt  and  Mundy,  both  of  whom  have  achieved 
international releases.
O’Reilly, Willie: Radio station manager; record producer
Willie  O’Reilly  is  managing  director  of  national  radio  station,  Today  FM.  He was 
formerly a producer at RTE Radio 2FM. He has occasionally produced records, most 
notably Man United Man which spent five weeks at number one in the Irish charts in 
1996. He also worked in recording studio sessions with The Waterboys in the 1980s.
O’Riordan, Michael:Independent publishing and record label manager
Michael O’Riordan is general manager of Rosette Music whose roster includes Daniel 
O’Donnell. He was formerly manager of Release Records, a label that dominated the 
domestic market in the 1960s and 1970s courtesy of numerous showband releases. He 
chairs the public relations committee of IMRO and has also serves on the board of the 
Music Publishers of Ireland.
Petr Pandula: Independent record label owner; publisher; live music 
promoter; music retailer
Petr Pandula is the managing director of Magnetic Music, an independent company with 
interests  in  recording,  publishing,  live  concert  promotion  and  record  retailing. 
Originally working as a live concert promoter in Germany, Pandula launched Magnetic 
Records in 1998. The company has offices in Germany and Ireland.
Sheehan, John: Major music label executive
John Sheehan spent twenty-four years  as chairman of Sony Music Ireland (formerly 
CBS Records) until the merger of the company with BMG in 2004. Since then he has 
remained with the company as head of artist and repertoire (A&R) for their Irish office. 
He has also served as chairman if  IRMA and was a member of the FORTE Music 
Industry Task Force and the Music Board of Ireland.
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Stokes, Niall: Journalist; media owner
Niall Stokes if the founder and editor of  Hot Press magazine, which in 1977 became 
Ireland’s  first  dedicated  rock music  publication.  He also  served as  chairman  of  the 
Independent  Radio  and  Television  Committee  in  the  1990s.  He has  also  co-written 
music documentaries for television.
Vignoles, Julian: Television commissioning editor; radio producer
Julian Vignoles is assistant commissioning editor for entertainment at RTE television. 
He has also worked as a producer in Radio 2FM and as a music journalist at Hot Press.
Wenham, Alison: Independent  record  industry  trade  body 
representative
Having worked for fifteen years in both the major and independent recording sector, 
Alison Wenham has been Chair  and CEO of the Association of Independent  Music 
(AIM) since its formation in 1998. The member companies of this independent record 
industry umbrella trade body represent approximately 20% of the UK recorded music 
market. In 2006 Wenham was elected as founding President of Worldwide Independent 
Network  (WIN),  an  umbrella  organisation  comprising  of  more  than  twenty 
national/regional independent trade associations representing thousands of independent 
music companies globally. Wenham is also a Trustee of Creative and Cultural Skills, a 
Fellow of the Royal Society for the Arts, Special Music Adviser to the British Council, 
attends PPL and VPL Board meetings and sits on a variety of government and industry 
committees.
Whelan, Bill: Composer; record producer; music publisher
As a composer Bill Whelan is best known as the creator of Riverdance. As a record 
producer he has worked with numerous artists including U2, Kate Bush and Charlotte 
Church.  Over  the  past  decade  he  has  set  up  a  music  publishing  company with  U2 
manager  Paul  McGuinness,  McGuinness-Whelan.  He  also  launched  Irish  Film 
Soundtracks,  a  music  production  company  aimed  exclusively  at  film and television 
production companies.
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Williamson, John: Artist manager 
John  Williamson  is  the  owner  of  the  artist  management  company  Banchory 
Management. He is current manager of international recording act Belle & Sebastian. 
He has also worked as live music promoter.
Wilson, Ian: Head of Music RTE Radio 2 FM
Ian Wilson is head of music production at RTE 2FM, a position that he has held since 1989. Between  
1997  and  2003  he  was  chairman  of  the  European  Broadcasting  Union’s  (EBU)  ‘Eurosonic’  group, 
representing sixty-eight stations across Europe. As a producer at 2FM he was the long-time producer of 
the Dave Fanning Show where he introduced ‘The Fanning Sessions’ – the recording and broadcasting of 
new Irish talent. He also ‘Eurodance’, one of the first live online dance events which brought together a 
network of seven ‘dance centres’ across Europe. These shows have involved up to 48,000 ‘real video’ 
participants.
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Appendix B: Record Industry – ISP Court Cases and Negotiations
UK: From the Gowers Report to ISP-BPI Memorandum of Understanding
Prior  to  the  decision  in  the  SABAM versus  Scarlet  case,  December  2006  saw the 
publication  of  the  Gowers  Report  in  the  UK which  recommended  that  government 
request  ISPs  to  ‘cooperate’  with  creative  industries  in  the  interests  of  protecting 
copyright in cyberspace and, to draw up appropriate legislation in the event of the ISPs 
failing  to  cooperate.  In  February  2008,  in  the  wake of  the  Gowers  Report  and  the 
Belgian ruling, the UK government published a strategy paper on cooperation between 
ISPs and the record industry, and stated that it would introduce legislation in the event 
of an agreement failing to be reached. Subsequently, July 2008 saw the publication of a 
Memorandum of Understanding between ISPs and the BPI, representing all of the major 
players in the record industry in Britain. Both parties have signed the agreement with 
the key stated aim of realising a ‘significant reduction’ in the level of file-sharing on 
UK networks. As part of this agreement, six ISPs in the UK have undertaken to write 
letters of warning to network users suspected of peer-to-peer file-sharing. 
France: The Olivennes Agreement
In November 2007, the Olivennes Agreement saw a pact made between French ISPs, 
copyright owners, and government. The agreement was struck under the supervision of 
the  Olivennes  Commission,  named  after  its  chairman  Denis  Olivennes  -  President-
Director  General  of  FNAC,  the  largest  French  retailer  of  cultural  and  consumer 
electronics products. This pact essentially approves the adoption of a ‘three strikes and 
you’re  out’  approach  to  copyright  infringement  by  network  users.  Users  receive  a 
warning from the ISP for each illegal download they make. In the event of the user 
making  this  ‘mistake’  on  3  occasions,  they  risk  losing  their  internet  access.  An 
independent authority has been set up in France under the management of a judge that 
will determine if and when network abusers will lose access to the network.
Denmark: IFPI versus DMT2
In February 2008 courts  in  Copenhagen ordered Danish telephone company DMT2, 
who provide one of the country’s largest ISPs, Tele 2, to block access to a service that 
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indexes  torrent  files  containing  copyright  infringing  music.  The case  concerned  the 
Swedish website The Pirate Bay, a peer-to-peer service which enables users, provided 
they have downloaded a specific software application, to generate links to music, films 
etc. on other websites on the internet. The Danish branch of the international record 
industry trade body IFPI filed for an injunction against DMT2. IFPI on the grounds that 
Pirate  Bay reproduced  and made  publicly  available  copyrighted  works,  without  the 
consent  of  the  rights  holders,  and  that  DMT2  contributed  to  the  infringement  by 
allowing  its  subscribers  access  to  the  Pirate  Bay’s  website.  The  Bailiff's  Court  of 
Frederiksberg,  Copenhagen  found  that  ‘by  giving  its  customers  access  to 
www.piratebay.org ‘DMT2 assists in the violation of the copyrights administered by the 
claimants’ and as such ‘engages in actions that conflict with the rights of the claimants’. 
The court subsequently ordered them to ‘undertake the adequate measures suitable in 
the prevention of DMT2 customers to the website of  www.piratebay.org and related 
sub-pages and sub-domains’ (School of Law, University of Vienna - English translation 
of IFPI Denmark v. DMT2 A/S Bailiff's Court of Frederiksberg, Copenhagen).
Ireland: IRMA versus Eircom
In spring 2008, the Irish arms of the four major record labels, under the umbrella of 
their representative body IRMA, instigated legal proceedings against Ireland’s largest 
ISP, Eircom, in an attempt to force it to block peer-to-peer file-sharing by its users. 
During my interview with IRMA Chairman Willie Kavanagh, he argued that Eircom 
were ‘not oblivious’ to the actions of their users and they were, in effect, facilitating and 
accommodating the illegal circulation of music via their network. February 2009 saw an 
out of court settlement reached where by Eircom agreed to implement a ‘three strikes’ 
policy similar to that formulated in the Olivennes Agreement negotiated by President 
Sarkozy  between  French  internet  service  providers  and  entertainment  corporations 
operating there. Under the terms of this agreement, Eircom consent to remove network 
users who persist in file-sharing activities after two warnings have been issued. The ISP 
also  consent  to  the  sharing  and  exchange  of  information  with  IRMA  regarding 
suspected file-sharers.
During the course of our interview, IRMA Chairman Willie Kavanagh stated 
that  two  other  ISPs  operating  in  the  jurisdiction,  BT  Ireland  and  UPC,  were 
subsequently asked to consent to and implement the measures laid out in the Eircom 
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agreement.  Both companies  refused – wrongfully in  the eyes  of Kavanagh -  on the 
grounds that  such agreements  failed to  consider  the rights  and interests  of the ISPs 
subscribers  (personal  interview).  Consequently,  July  2009  saw  IRMA  issues  legal 
proceedings  against  both  parties  on  the  grounds  of  aiding  ‘illegal’  file-sharing  by, 
amongst other factors, wilfully neglecting to employ the means at their disposal (i.e. 
filtering  technologies  such as  Audible  Magic)  to  curb these activities.  According to 
IRMA, approximately 45,000 copyright infringements per month on BT Ireland, while 
75,000 such infringements take place on UPC (Irish Times, July 7th, 2009, p.4).
A  simultaneous  development  worthy  of  mention  is  the  issuing  of  legal 
proceedings  by  Phonographic  Performance  Ireland  (PPI)  against  the  State  on  the 
grounds that it has failed to amend a law that exempts hotels from paying royalties for 
music played in hotel bedrooms. 
* IRMA, BPI and IFPI websites and publications also indicate that 2008 and 2009 saw 
discussions begin in Japan, the Netherlands,  New Zealand and Spain between ISPs, 
governments  and  record  industry  trade  bodies  aimed  at  addressing  copyright 
infringement and introducing legislation to terminate the accounts of users who have 
repeatedly infringed copyright.
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Appendix C: Overview of Additional Music Industry Internet/Mobile 
Alliances
2007 saw EMI Music Publishing finalise a deal with global internet communications 
company  Skype.  Under  the  agreement  Skype  acquired  licensing  rights  to  song 
copyrights from the EMI catalogue for sale as downloads or mastertones via the sites 
online  retail  store.  EMI  Music  Group  has  also  signed  the  first  ever  pan-European 
download  agreement  for  a  peer-to-peer  music  service  with one  of  Europe’s  biggest 
mobile  entertainment  provides,  Arvato  Mobile.  The  deal  enables  Arvato  to  offer 
retailers the ability to provide users with music downloads or a subscription package 
from a catalogue of 300,000 recordings (EMI press release, June 2007). 
2007 also saw the Warner Music Group enter a global strategic partnership with 
mobile  operator  Telenor.  In  a  deal  that  encompasses  nine  out  of  Telenor’s  thirteen 
mobile phone companies, users can now access Warner music content in a variety of 
formats including full-track downloads, ringtones, ringback tones, mobile music videos 
and wallpapers. 
Sony Music Entertainment, the Warner Music Group and the Universal Music 
Group announced in April 2008 that they had completed deals with a Danish telecoms 
operator TDC which opened digital catalogues of over one million tracks to mobile and 
broadband  users  as  part  of  their  monthly  contract/subscription.  This  development, 
according to IFPI CEO and Chairman John Kennedy signals a key result form such 
ongoing negotiation with telecoms companies (personal interview). Universal have also 
struck a deal with Zune where by they will receive royalties from the Zune MP3 player 
as well as download revenues in exchange for the use of its catalogue on Microsoft’s 
digital music service. With Sony and Warner following suit in deals with Microsoft, 
such deals now provide the four major labels with the leverage to negotiate with Apple 
for a percentage of iPod sales once existing iTunes contracts expire.  
While  2007  and  2008  saw  the  major  labels  peeling  back  on  digital  rights 
management (DRM) software on CDs and some other digital formats, the material on 
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many services, including the TDC deal outlined above remains DRM protected, thus 
requiring users to periodically renew their access to the music tracks they download 
courtesy of a keycode made available to them by TDC, conditional on their ongoing 
subscription  to  TDC  services.  At  the  time  of  my  follow-up  interview  with  John 
Kennedy in late 2008, similar deals were being pursued by all of the major labels in the 
UK. Sony-BMG and Universal have joined forces on this initiative under the umbrella 
of a partnership called Total Music which is offering the combined catalogue of both 
companies  in  return  for  a  share  of  monthly  revenues  from  mobile  and  broadband 
providers.  Warner’s  and EMI are  meanwhile  involved in  separate  negotiations  with 
mobile and broadband providers.
EMI has itself forged links with various digital platforms. In 2007 Microsoft and 
Apple both reached agreements to sell EMI catalogue without DRM protection via their 
respective Zune and iTunes platforms.
287
Appendix D: Examples of Music in Advertising 
Artists  with current  or recent  releases  that  appear  on high profile  television  adverts 
either  nationally  or  internationally  include  The  Yeah  Yeah  Yeah’s  (Yves  Saint-
Laurent), The Flaming Lips (Dell), Groove Armada (Marks & Spencer), Girl’s Aloud 
(Homebase), Stellar Sound and Paula Flynn (Ballygowan), The Plain White T’s (Parker 
Pens),  Craig  Armstrong  (Channel),  Moby  (Nokia),  The  Scratch  Perverts  (Lucozade 
Sports), Mis-teeq (Armani), Madonna (Motorola), Coldplay (Play.com), The Klaxons 
(Wrigley’s), The Zombies (Bulmer’s) among a host of others. 
Examples from the back catalogue of the major music companies include Sting 
(Jaguar), The Cranberries (Open University promo), Canned Heat (Bus Eireann), The 
Rolling  Stones  (Bulmer’s),  Pink Floyd  (Road Safety Authority),  The The (M&Ms), 
Status  Quo (Pimm’s),  Oasis  (Sky Sports),  Queen (Cadbury’s),  Guns ‘n’  Roses  (EA 
Games), Iggy Pop (Carnival Cruises), and specifically in the United States, Bob Dylan 
(Victoria’s Secret), Meat Loaf (AT&T), The Beatles (Target). 
Websites selling downloads from vast databases of songs in adverts have also 
emerged in recent years.  For example,  www.songsofthesalesman.co.uk have licensed 
(from the major record companies) the rights to 348 separate recording artists whose 
music features in current or previous television advertising campaigns in the UK and 
Ireland by 293 different advertisers. This site includes Tesco Digital as one of its key 
sponsors / advertisers and provides links to iTunes and a number of other ‘legitimate’ 
music download services for users wishing to buy the tracks listed on their database. 
Promoting  itself  as  the  prime  UK  television  advert  database, 
www.commercialbreaksandbeats.co.uk offers links to songs and music from 2,469 past 
and present adverts listed in reverse chronology. Soundsfamiliar.info provides, among 
other services,  links to songs from 744 new and old UK television  adverts  that  are 
available for purchase on iTunes and/or via the amazon.com website. Claiming to have 
a  database  of  information  on  approximately  4,500  television  adverts, 
www.uktvadverts.com also provides links to iTunes and amazon.com for numerous 
entries in its database.
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The growing significance of ad synchronisation to record and music publishing 
companies  in  breaking  new  artists  is  illustrated  through  English  vocalist  Natasha 
Bedingfield’s 2006 debut album Unwritten. During the course of our interview, Sony 
Ireland Chairman John Sheehan stated that personnel at the Sony-BMG owned record 
label Epic, and at SonyAV Music Publishing achieved no fewer than 30 licenses for the 
album which contains 14 tracks. For example, songs from the album have been used 
internationally on TV promotion spots for the series  Ugly Betty, on the soundtrack of 
the feature film  Flicka, and in a number of different advertising campaigns, the most 
notable  being  a  global  campaign  for  Pantene  shampoo  from late  2006 onwards.  In 
addition to generating revenue from each of the 30 licensing deals, its widespread in 
promo spots spurred on both physical and digital sales of the album – which became a 
million selling album in the United States with the title track having become the eighth 
most  downloaded  track  on  iTunes  in  2006  (Nielssen  Soundscan  statistics  cited  on 
reuters.com), and one of the top 10 selling singles of 2006 in the UK, whilst achieving a 
number 5 placing in the US Billboard charts.
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Appendix E: Examples  of  the  Growing  Use  of  Music  in  Digital 
Games
Beyond the music-based digital  games outlined in chapter  7.4,  all  four major music 
companies  are  providing  music  content  for  games.  In  some  instances  popular  back 
catalogue material by established recording artists is used as a constituent element of the 
digital game experience – for example artists like Blur on FIFA Soccer and Run-DMC 
and Ozzy Osbourne on Grand Theft Auto. In these three examples, all three recording 
acts are Sony Music artists generating direct recording and music publishing revenues 
for the company,  as well  as receiving promotion  via  their  use on Sony Playstation. 
Equally digital games are used for promoting exclusive material and releases that are 
only accessible through digital games consoles. For example a limited edition version of 
Payable on Death by the band P.O.D. (issued on the Atlantic label, that is in turn owned 
by the Warner Music Group) included an accompanying exclusive Sony Playstation 2 
DVD that contained music not available on the standard album release. The game NFL 
Street features eleven exclusive previously unreleased tracks by various Sony recording 
artists that only play on Sony Playstation 2, Microsoft Xbox and Nintendo GameCube 
consoles.
Other examples of music-digital game cross-promotion include a deal between 
Universal  and Electronic  Arts  (EA),  one of  the  world’s  largest  producers  of  digital 
games, which has been in existence since 2003. The deal sees music recordings owned 
by  Universal’s  Def  Jam  label  incorporated  into  EA  games.  For  example,  the  first 
version  of  the  game  Vandetta featured  twelve  Def  Jam  recording  artists  including 
Method Man, Scar Face,  Ghost Killah and others.  This game allowed users to  play 
recordings from selected artists  in a wrestling ring. This was the chosen method for 
initially releasing new music by these artists. New singles would only be released in 
other physical and digital formats, and for radio broadcast, subsequent to being released 
via the digital games. Snoop Dogg, The Black Eyed Peas, Vanessa Carlton and Marilyn 
Manson all had new music previewed exclusively through the games. Chicane, Beyond 
this,  The Bare Naked Ladies,  Metallica,  Aerosmith,  Blink-182,  Papa Roach,  Apollo 
290
440, Paul Oakenfold,  Naughty By Nature and Nelly provide just  some examples  of 
artists whose repertoire is currently (or recently was) being used in games.
In April 2008 US rock band Motley Crüe released their  Saints of Los Angeles 
single exclusively as a downloadable track via the Rock Band game on both Xbox and 
Playstation  formats.  Furthermore  the  2008-09  Motley  Crüe  US tour  was  used  as  a 
platform for promoting the game. Concert-goers were invited up on stage during the 
intervals between support acts in order to play the game on a giant screen and compete 
with each other to become the Rock Band champion.
In addition to all of this, revenue streams are also generated for artists and music 
companies  by incorporating  the  personas/characters  of  popular  recording artists  into 
characters  in  the  games  themselves.  For  example,  the  voice  of  Geffen (a  Universal 
label) recording artist Eve is used in the Ubi Soft game XIII; the character of Interscope 
(also a Universal label) recording artist Marilyn Manson features in the game Area 51; 
Atlantic Records (a subsidiary of Warners) artist Cupid features in the Acclaim Games 
online game Dance. This latter game enables users to ‘virtually’ dance to music tracks 
they choose from a catalogue that is exclusively licensed from the Warner Music Group. 
This particular game is also used to promote and directly sell a variety of artist-branded 
virtual  items as well  as clothing,  accessories and other  physical  merchandise.  Other 
similar dance games include Roxio’s In The Groove, Nexon America’s Audition Online 
and Disney’s High School Musical Dance.
Other games are in themselves brand-products of specific artists. For example 
Britney’s Dance Beat allows users to guide a representation of the character of Britney 
Spears through a variety of dance sequences and scenarios.
Many digital  games have,  based on their  success, spawned music soundtrack 
releases. For example the EA game Sims 2 audio soundtrack released in 2008 features 
such  artists  as  Natasha  Beddingfield,  Datarock,  They  Might  Be  Giants  and  Great 
Northern.  The  soundtrack  also  features  an  ‘in-game’  which  features  Natasha 
Beddingfield singing her chart hit  Pocketful Of Sunshine in the language of the Sim 
characters, Simlish. Also, in addition to incorporating music into the game experience 
itself,  the  various  versions  of  the  Rockstar  Games  game  Grand  Theft  Auto have 
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spawned no fewer than thirteen soundtracks on the Epic and Interscope labels. These 
soundtracks are designed around a variety of musical genres: dance/techno, rock/pop, 
jazz, classical.
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Appendix F: Sample Interview 1 
Interviewee: John Williamson
Venue: By telephone
Date: 22nd September 2008
Duration: 1 hour
JW - John Williamson
JR - Jim Rogers
ON THE KEY CHANGES IN THE INDUSTRY OVER THE PAST DECADE…
JW
I think by and large the majors have changed a lot, particularly in the last ten years. I 
think a lot of that is down to the ownership of the labels. That’s the key thing. What’s  
happened with Warner’s and with EMI over the last two or three years is the logical  
extension  of  where  it’s  being  going  overt  he  past  twenty.  When  major  hardware 
manufacturers  like Sony started buying into record companies  it  didn’t  immediately 
create a knock down effect in the record companies as regards management structure 
and so on. For the first few years, as far as I could see, Sony operated exactly the same 
as CBS had. The cultural changes were much slower in happening. Also, through most 
of that period, record companies were successful, so whether it was Seagram or whether 
it was any of the various other companies that have owned majors over the past twenty 
years, so long as the whole recording industry part of things was doing well, there was 
no momentum for change. It took the whole 1999 meltdown period for people to waken 
up and realise that in spite of being successful for a long number of years and to have an 
industry that seemed to be growing all that time – and again, who knows whether that’s 
true or  not  because we’re relying  on the  figures  that  come from guess where?  The 
record companies…
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ON RECORD INDUSTRY DECLINE
JW
The thing that really strikes me is that the majority of the record companies are still 
trading  quite  profitably.  There  are  lots  of  instances  in  other  industries,  maybe 
newspapers are good to look at in parallel to music, where the nature of the industry is 
that it is still possible to be hugely profitable in ways other than just off the back of 
physical sales. I think it is very easy to say that the industry is in crisis, but an industry 
can be more  profitable  even if  it  sells  less,  by employing  less  staff  and being less 
wasteful and less inefficient and if it exploits its international opportunities better and if 
it is continually looking at new sources of revenue. Conflating high turnover and high 
volume of sales with success is misleading. Universal are selling less music but still  
reporting good quarterly profits this year, so there is evidence that record companies can 
still make money of they get their business models right. 
Equally the record companies have to accept hat they are probably never going to sell 
the same volume of records that they did in 1999 and they have to adjust how their 
businesses operate and the deals that they do accordingly, but that does not preclude the 
possibility of them being profitable and successful entities.
JR questions if the record industry was over-inflated for a number of years and what’s  
happening now is part of the market ‘adjusting’…
JW
There is certainly an element of that going on. Ten years ago, around about the time 
music on the internet started, there was all this outrage about the price that CDs had 
gone up to.  In a lot  of people’s minds that was used as the justification for people 
turning to Napster and the like. All of the record companies were charging too much 
and the reason they were able to charge too much was that they’d had an unparalleled 
run of success from 1983 to 1999 when sales went up every year. The big factor in this 
was the CD and people re-buying on CD what they’d previously had on vinyl. But that 
boom can only sustain at that level for a certain number of years and when you take that  
factor out of the market it will leave a whole. When we talk about digital music we tend 
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to talk about MP3s from 1999 but the move to digital in terms of selling music came 
with the CD in the 1980s. The move from analogue to digital with the CD was the key 
technological development because on one hand it created a new format and gave the 
recording industry an opportunity to resell everything that they had; but at the same 
time it was the first part of the digital technologies that would make it easier for people 
to copy and exchange music.
There is a brilliant Dave Harker article from an old edition of popular music in the early 
nineties where he is pulling apart all of the anomalies in the IFPI figures regarding the 
value of the global industry. Again that sort of thing just shows that we’ve chosen to 
believe it. Whether that’s the record companies making it look like they are doing well 
with a bit of creative accounting and a good PR team – maybe they’ve been putting on a 
much better front on how they’ve been doing than actually was the case. I’m certain it 
was at least spun to make success like great success or moderate success look like good 
success.  I think that the kind of critical  point came when record companies stopped 
making the same money around 1999-2000 period. Suddenly, whoever the owners were 
would start looking at things, and this was when the jobs started getting cut back. There 
is far fewer staff now, that’s an obvious change, and obviously that has a knock on 
effect as regards what a record company can actually do. Similarly the way that they 
were structured and how much they would actually pay people at a junior level has 
actually changed downwards over the past few years. If you are at entry level in these 
industries it’s like ‘you should be privileged to be working for us’ so you’ll on work 
experience and get virtually no money and you might actually get a job at some point in 
the future. 
Supermarkets  are  unfairly vilified because I  don’t  think what  they are doing is  any 
different from what Fopp or HMV or any of the music-specific retailers have actually 
done over the years, which is to put pressure on record companies to do them better 
deals and sell them stock at better prices. In negotiating prices, supemarkets have taken 
advantage of the fact that  record companies are now in not such a good bargaining 
position  but  I  certainly  they  can’t  be  held  responsible  for  the  fact  that  the  record 
industry sells less records.
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Increasingly HMV and Zavvi are competing with Tesco on chart releases but keeping 
prices up on the kinds of releases that don’t make it into Tesco. I’m sure it’s the case 
that unit sales are not necessarily down as far as falling revenues suggest. The average 
price of a music unit is much lower than it was ten years ago. Looking at BPI statistics  
show that the actual decline in unit sales in the UK have held up pretty well. They have 
gone down,  but  not  substantially,  yet  revenues  have  decreased  substantially  but  the 
average price has dropped. 
Also, in terms of what the record companies do, it’s changed a lot as well. If you look at  
the content of a major label now and compare it with the content of a major label like 
Virgin or EMI in the mid-to-late eighties there are huge changes. Less artists signed, no 
obvious sense of,  I  was going to say adventure…There  is  a management  culture of 
safety first. Now I know people have always criticised major labels for this, but I don’t 
think it stands up. If you look at the roster of Island Records in the 1980s, if you look at  
the roster of Virgin up until the point (1993) that it was bought over, you can look and 
see stuff that was just pulp and would sell hundreds of thousands of copies, but there 
was also a lot of jazz and folk that would never get anywhere near a major label these 
days, there was obscure art project stuff – Virgin are a good example of this. Now they 
clearly were making more money, but the balance was always with some blockbuster 
type acts. Like U2 would pay Island for signing Polly Harvey, and I know she’s been 
quite successful, but it was quite an adventurous signing at the time. They cannot do 
that  anymore.  There  has  been  a  huge  shift  away  from that  with  the  bigger  record 
companies, there has been a shift away from fulfilling any sort of A&R function to just  
becoming a marketing machine. It tends to be other people who find acts these days – 
whether that’s some guy in the press, whether that’s  some guy with his own studio 
who’ll take an act to a company with a business plan – ‘we’ve signed this artist, we’ve 
had this many hits on MySpace so we think he can do this.this and this. Do you want 
in?’ The whole thing has changed. And from an artists point of view there is probably a 
lot less money going around, and again that goes to back to record companies – they 
may have less employees now, but they are much, much more efficient than they used 
to be. You could build up mountains of anecdotal evidence about how inefficient they 
used to be. Even recently there was that report about how the new owners of EMI were 
deciding that they had to cut back on the £20,000 a year budget for candles that they 
had! That sort of story can be replicated across all of the major record labels in terms of 
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sheer wastefulness. The number of bands that were using their  taxi accounts to take 
them half way across the country. I think they have much more efficient mechanisms 
now. Record companies take something that is already presented to them and make it 
really successful. But what they cannot do is find something…
ON  THE  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  MAJOR  AND  INDEPENDENT 
COMPANIES
JW
This is extremely complex. That (dichotomous relationship) has always been a quite 
simplistic view, even ten or twenty years ago, even though it was much more relevant 
then. A lot of the academic writing about notions of independent against the majors is 
quite stuck in that era. There are a couple of Dave Hesmondhalgh articles from the mid-
nineties where he was doing case studies of Creation and labels like that, where he was 
trying to show that they were clinging on to the punk and post-punk ideals…labels like 
Rough Trade first time round. And that’s all well and good, you can just about make a 
sustainable case there, but the whole notion of independents has been watered down so 
much… 
Of the independent labels that are operating now, I don’t think any of them can claim to 
be genuinely independent. If they’ve not had money from a major label, the chances are 
that they’ve had money from a venture capitalist. If they are a Scottish indie label they 
might have money from the State these days. This is at a slight tangent, but it’s going 
back to what we were talking about earlier, but labels like Chemical Underground have 
on at least one occasion got money from the State. Now to actually get that money you 
have to fill in a lot of forms and go through interviews where the whole premise is 
based on enterprise culture. You have got to prove that you are going to make money 
and that they need to invest in you. That’s the way the state is viewing the ‘Music’s  
Future’ thing that they did last year in Scotland. Now, by buying into that, you are 
buying into the exact same premise that Universal… It’s not like the state is giving them 
a handout. The State is saying that ‘we want you to produce records and make money’. 
Now if you took money from a venture capitalist, probably the repayment terms would 
be worse from Sony or Universal or whatever… But so many independents, Sanctuary 
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being the best example, have become stock market playthings. What they do is dictated 
by share-holders as much as by any sense of direction. There are very few outside the 
micro-sized independent labels that can put their hands up and say that they are genuine 
independent labels. 
Even bands that are on independent labels, and this has been true since the eighties 
when bands like New Order and Sugar cubes and acts like that were first becoming 
successful – They were always perceived as big indie bands in the UK, but they were 
signed to major labels in America and it was through doing that that they made it. When 
I managed Bliss that was what they did – They were signed to a small indie label in the 
UK  but  signed  to  Capitol  in  America.  You  couldn’t  have  subsidised  being  on  an 
independent label without signing to a major. And similarly,  all of these independent 
companies are all out there now, and if they’re not a subsidiary of a major label, the 
chances are they’ll  be using a major labels distribution network or other services, or 
they’ll  be  licensed  to  a  major  in  Japan or  wherever.  The  whole  kind  of  notion  of 
independents  is  so  far-fetched  now  that  it  has  reduced  real  independents  to  a 
microscopic 1% of the bottom end of the indie market which is the genuine people in 
bedrooms, producing fanzines, producing records and selling them online or by mail 
order. So the whole idea of independents is completely blurred. I think has all to do with 
the ownership of both the majors and he independents and how both realise that they 
need each other to survive. It is a completely symbiotic relationship. The majors need 
strong independents for new and emerging talent that they can pick up after it’s been 
worked on and market tested, and the independents are always going to need the majors 
for financial survival. 
In some ways the relationship has become much more transparent…
ON THE POTENTIAL OF THE INTERNET TO FOR DISINTERMEDIATION, 
AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS HAS BEEN REALISED
JW
I don’t think it’s really been doing that. I think to it’s been realised to a certain extent. 
There are cases where people have the taken the possibilities pretty far. Again when it 
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comes down to it – even if you take your Arctic Monkeys as the most successful aspect 
of this, how much of that success was down to their MySpace site and all the stuff that  
was hyped up about it around about the time they came out, and how much of it was 
down to the fact that they eventually signed to record labels that had the contacts and 
the wherewithal to take them to a global market by entering into contracts, partnerships 
with bigger labels worldwide in order to get distribution. It’s hard to know, there are 
always  prophesies  of  doom  with  any  type  of  new  technology  –  it  happened  with 
Betamax and VHS but film and television industries are still there.
What  strikes me most  is  what  a  wasted opportunity the  internet  was for  the record 
companies. The number of chances they had during the 1999-2001 period to monetise 
things like Napster and set a model at the beginning that would yield them profits for 
years. But they didn’t want to do that, they had no interest in that. Their sole objective 
was to obliterate the problem. It’s taken until now to realise that saying it can’t happen 
and it’s wrong and it’s got to be banned is the wrong way of doing it. And it’s certainly 
too late now to salvage their existing business models.  And I guess how the majors 
survive depends on whether they can come up with business models quickly enough 
that will work. 
The one thing I do wonder about though, is that until recently there has always been a 
good  smattering  of  music  people,  whose  backgrounds  are  in  music,  in  the  senior 
management  of  majors  labels.  But  if  you  start  looking  around at  EMI and looking 
around at senior management you’ve got people who’ve got no experience in music at 
all. I’m not so sure that these will tolerate the things that went on in the past in terms of 
inefficiency  and  loss-making.  It  might  be  that  the  biggest  danger  to  the  record 
companies is themselves in some ways.  Bringing in management from other sectors 
coupled with the existing problems might change things. Nobody’s going to keep EMI 
alive just because it’s an historical artefact and released a few good records in its time. 
These are the type of hard-headed capitalists that I don’t think the music industry has 
traditionally  experienced.  You can  go  back  through you  entrepreneurs,  the  Richard 
Branson’s and David Geffen’s and the like – they were obviously very successful and 
undoubtedly hard-headed capitalists, but they also had plenty of leeway associated with 
them.  There  is  plenty  of  evidence  of  these  examples  and others  working on things 
because they loved them and were totally passionate about it. And that element is gone, 
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and when that element is gone, there is just the bottom line on a spreadsheet for the 
management of record labels. If they don’t get it together over the next few years I don’t 
think there’ll be any rope running for another ten years to see if they can sort it out. It’ll  
be game up and the money will move into something else.
I’m very wary about making predictions about the future. I remember writing an article 
about  recording  studios  in  1992  where  I  was  convinced  that  with  cheaper,  better 
recording equipment  becoming  available  I  thought  why would  anyone  still  want  to 
record in a recording studio? I wrote stuff along the lines of recording studios becoming 
obsolete by the year 2000. To a certain extent the recording studio market has been 
decimated, but the big ones are all still there plodding along. I kind of think the same 
sort  of thing could happen. I don’t think record labels are ever going to entirely go 
away. But I think people are going to be more empowered. You will be able to get much 
further. There is a situation now with all of the new technology on the internet that 
people know what the possibilities are, but at the moment there is only a very small  
number of people in the music industry actually capable of seeing that through to its 
natural conclusion and actually doing something about it. I think gradually more and 
more people will  become competent  and knowledgeable.  If I was in a major record 
company I’d still be worried about that. I think increasingly it doesn’t make sense to be 
signed to a major label. If you are am established artist it  doesn’t make sense to be 
signed to a major label, or to any record label. If you have got a solid market then I 
don’t see the advantages in giving away the rights, giving away the 50% or however 
much of your income. 
It doesn’t make sense for you Radiohead’s, Blur’s, Madonna’s to remain signed to a 
major label. Even on a smaller level, were it not for, in the case of Belle and Sebastian, 
personal loyalty to the people at Rough Trade, I’d have been very, very wary of taking 
that option up. Even at  their (B&S) moderate  level of success, it  would make more 
sense to not be on a record label and licence stuff. So it is a really interesting situation. 
When  Radiohead  and  other  bands  start  doing  this  it  suddenly  gives  people  the 
confidence that this is a viable way of going about being an established band. But then 
there’s this big void where the major record companies are suddenly no longer of use as 
a bank for big artists, which is traditionally where they have always made their money. 
And they have cut back on their  talent  and nurturing processes. So they are getting 
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squeezed at the top end by top artists, but they are also getting squeezed at the bottom 
end because they don’t have the wherewithal and know-how to develop acts. 
JR
This is okay if you are Radiohead… But surely the marketing and promotion from a 
major record company is still needed if you are to break an act and get to that stage?
JW
Possibly.  I  don’t  know.  Although  I  think  increasingly  as  people  become  more 
empowered and more knowledgeable – I mean to a certain extent I think the majors 
have always relied on, maybe not quite exploitation because bands do know what they 
are getting themselves into… But… I think there are two ways... There was a lot of 
bands from Glasgow that got signed in the late 1980s that had million of pounds spent 
on them by major record companies and sold no records. And it was always interesting 
to see how they reacted to that. Some of them were really bitter about how the record 
company fucked them over – But you say, ‘Hang on. Somebody invested £1.5m in you, 
you’ve  been all  over  the  world  trying  to  make  a  record  that  somebody might  like, 
working with all of these amazing people but it hasn’t happened…’ Some people are 
very bitter about it, but some people will say ‘Somebody indulged me to the tune of 
£1.5m to make three albums.  I  don’t  care of nobody bought them,  I  still  had great 
fun’… So I  think that  depends on people’s  attitudes  towards  the record companies. 
You’ll  always have certain bands that will  say they are just musicians and let  other 
people sort the business out. I think when that mentality prevails, there always is the 
need for majors or record companies. Increasingly must be at a point where they can 
think, ‘Okay, Radiohead can do this. We don’t have the fanbase Radiohead have but we 
still have the technologies that they’ve used available to us. Maybe we don’t want to go 
tens or hundreds or thousands of pounds in debt to a record company when maybe we 
can do it  in partnership with somebody else’.  I just think there are more options to 
people that challenge the record companies monopoly of that position. That could be 
going and borrowing money from a bank of a venture capitalist to take your band to the 
next stage, or setting up your own label… There are different ways, and my point is that 
there  are  more  options  now  and,  unless  the  major  labels  are  able  to  reposition 
themselves again – and I think they are capable of it, I mean they have had to do it 
historically in a position where they become the must visit, only option again. Then I 
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think that the position of artist, success, intermediary, record company is possibly on the 
verge of cracking… I think that is what the record labels fear and they are trying to fill I 
the holes or come up with a new model… 
And I think part of the problem is contracts – and this is true for independents as well – 
I think that the contracts they are still offering are still stuck… They haven’t updated the 
contractual  stuff  forward  in  line  with  the  technology,  and  they  have  this  outdated 
business model that doesn’t work anymore. They are still trying to work around it in the 
hope that it might actually work again…And it’s kind of depressing when you see small  
independent  labels  that  are  quite  credible  and quite  successful  offering  the  kind  of 
contracts that as a manager you wouldn’t want an artist to sign. They want you to sign 
away the rights on your album in perpetuity. It’s insanity but that’s what a lot of the  
independents are doing now. They’re saying ‘oh we don’t make as much money out of 
records now because they don’t sell as much as they used to therefore we need more 
rights, and by the way we’ll sign you a publishing deal for £2,000 while we’re at it’. 
They’re trying to but in to all the different forms of rights these days. I think smart 
artists will take a bigger picture than that – and this is true whether you are at the top 
end of the scale of the bottom end – you look at it  and say ‘what are our potential 
sources of income, and what are the ways we can combine these so that we can make a 
living’… There  are  so many more  options  and so  many more  routes  that  they  can 
navigate through now… To go and sign a record deal isn’t the only solution that is on 
the table. In fact it may very well be for a new artist, one of the least likely solutions in  
terms of their development.
JR
What could or should the major labels have done, or what could they do in order to 
monetise p2p?
JW
I still  think that the really obvious one was, that when the Napster court cases were 
going  on,  at  one  point  there  was  an  offer  of  compensation,  and  there  was  the 
opportunity as well – Napster had however many users globally, and at that point if they 
had had the vision to see, because I think a lot of people bought into Napster more so 
than the subsequent file-sharing services and the like. Because everything was there. 
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You could find the most obscure 7 inch single from the seventies – because it was there. 
Somebody  would  have  digitised  it  and  uploaded  it.  And  you  could  find  the  latest 
Madonna album. People loved that idea of being able to buy everything. You couldn’t 
get that in a record shop. No shop could be physically big enough to store all of these  
tracks. But there was through this mechanism, and I think for a vast percentage of the 
Napster users, if at that point the record companies decided to buy out Napster, take the 
compensation, keep everything (content) and pick up a small subscription every month 
from… - I’ve seen somebody do the calculations before – If 10% of all of the people 
who used Napster subscribed, then the turnover of the global recording industry would 
be bigger than it was at the time. That was the opportunity. But they fussed about and 
couldn’t  work  out  if  the  subscription  was  the  way to  go,  they  couldn’t  if  pay  per 
download was the way to go, the couldn’t work out the digitisation things… And I think 
there are lots of different solutions they could have taken at different points. But the 
most dangerous part was the indecisiveness. Any bold decision during that period, the 
chances  were  that  it  would  have  worked  because  at  the  point  in  time,  the  record 
companies were still  powerful enough that they could almost make the market bend 
around them. But I suspect they’ve been weakened so much over the last 5 or 6 years,  
and suddenly you’ve got people like Apple becoming a big player in the music industry 
now… Suddenly you’ve got all of these external factors now, and it’s not as easy for the 
record companies now…
I think there’s evidence that they were – particularly during that whole anti-file-sharing 
period – a sense that they were operating as a cabal. They would work in a pack, the big 
four,  and they would all  be competitors,  but  when it  came down to the big issues, 
suddenly they would all be working together. I just think that their positions have been 
so weakened that even if they make the right decisions now, it is going to be harder for 
them to actually enforce them on the market. I think in that period when everything was 
so uncertain – Nobody in 2003 really knew what the impact of Napster was, everybody 
had their suspicions but nobody really knew what it all meant. I think it was the kind of 
approach of prohibition – stop this and make it go away – This wasn’t followed up by 
any sense of how they could neutralise this, and when they did it was so complicated 
and so user unfriendly that people thought why should they pay for something that’s got 
a whole lot of digital rights attached to it when we can download it for free somewhere 
else.  I  think  there  were  opportunities  in  there  but  I  don’t  think  anybody  was  bold 
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enough at the time. In a way there was an opportunity for the majors of that period to 
stitch up the global music market and keep 80% of it to themselves forever. To a certain 
extent they’ve still managed to do that…
ON THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKETS AROUND THE WORLD
JW
I’m sure that this is true of every capitalistic organisation in the West, but it appears to 
be their answer to everything, China and Russia, and I’m sure that it is in a lot of cases. 
I’m not sure if it is in the case of recorded music, but I’d love to think that it is. 
You would hope it  is  positive  for  the  record  companies.  If  you  add India  into  the 
equation  you  have three  huge potential  music  markets.  A lot  depends on economic 
movement  I  those  countries  as  well.  Over  the  next  five  to  ten  years  there  is  great 
predicted potential because over the past five or ten years these economies have grown 
and there has been access for Western companies there. It remains promising. Politically 
there are probably a whole series of issues that could derail the prospect of Western 
music  companies  making  a  whole  load  of  money  in  these  markets.  But  it  is  an 
interesting  one  though and  it  is  an  avenue  that  music  companies  should  be  avidly 
pursuing. 
ON SYNCHRONISATION AND ADVERTISING
JW
Synchronisation is definitely more important  now than it  was in times gone by.  We 
(Belle & Sebastian) haven’t entered into any deals for ads but I know plenty for whom 
it is a source of income and quite a substantial one at different points in their career. 
The income you get for synch rights depends on a lot of factors. Sometimes advertisers 
and production companies  will  go for lesser known acts  because they can get  their 
music for less than if they go for more established groups. And also it can depend on 
how much  they want  a  particular  song.  This  is  not  necessarily  artist-related,  it  just 
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depends if there is a piece of music that suits a particular ad or programme or film. The 
other factor is where and when it’s being used. If it’s for use in Eastern Europe the 
amount can be small but if it’s going out in the US or the UK it can be a lot. For use  
within the UK, the ranges that I’ve seen for advertising can be as low as £10,000 and 
the highest is probably about £100,000. For global use it can be much bigger but you 
have to remember too that sometimes big gas-guzzling companies can extract a good 
deal from bands or record companies because the bands and companies might want to 
be associated with the product or get the publicity and the rest of it.
Some record companies are better at this than others and have identified the need to be 
more  aggressive  in  this  area.  I  remember  seeing  on  the  Universal  site  seeing  the 
description of the Thin Lizzy song The Boys Are Back In Town as being ideal for a ‘lads 
night out drinking scene’. I think quite a lot of work has gone into pushing that sort of  
thing, but it is logical that they are doing it and economic necessity is driving it. This is 
something that the record companies should have been working much harder on in years 
ago.
TV can sometimes yield a lot of money. Over here Channel 4 doesn’t pay that well and 
getting  stuff  on  the  satellite  channels  doesn’t  either.  But  getting  on  some  of  the 
American series can be good. The OC  is a good example. You get a fee for the original 
usage plus a fee for subsequent usage plus a fee for further exploitation on DVD and 
box sets and things like that. So you can gain further gain from all that.
REVENUE STREAMS FROM VARIOUS DIGITAL FORMATS AND MONIES 
FROM YOUTUBE AND MYSPACE ADVERTISING REVENUES 
JW
It is too early to say. I know from the perspective of managing recording artists that if 
you take something like Facebook or Last FM or MySpace the record companies are in 
a bad negotiating position from a reaching an audience point of view. The founders of 
these sites know this. It’s not necessarily yielding that much money for the artists but it  
is possible it’s yield something for he record companies. This is a recent factor and as 
such a factor that wouldn’t necessarily have been taken into account at the time many 
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acts signed deals with their record companies so they won’t really benefit from it yet. 
From Universal’s point of view, for example, it, I suspect, might well yield significant  
royalties. 
Publishing companies are in a stronger position because they don’t have a big hole to 
fill like the record industry does. There are more films and more TV opportunities now 
for music than ever before, and they’ve got their income from all these new internet 
sources.  They  don’t  have  falling  sales  to  contend  with  in  the  same  way  record 
companies do so the spin-offs of all these changes have been much better than them.
Trying to think about the ownership of major publishing for a second, effectively it is 
still EMI. Universal, Warner’s and Sony so I guess it’s going back to the same place. 
Universal and EMI seem the most transparent of the majors in terms of their business 
planning and shareholder briefings and all that, and increasingly they are placing more 
eggs in the publishing basket.
360 DEGREE DEALS
I feel strongly about the way companies are pursuing 360 degree deals nowadays. There 
are fundamental flaws with them from an artists perspective. If you are an artist with 
any kind of negotiating power…well…Sanctuary Records claimed to be a 360 degree 
record company and to a great extent they were in that they were a record company, a 
publishing company, a management company and all the rest. But the reality was that 
they didn’t  have 360 on any individual  artist.  They might  have had 270 or 180 on 
various artists. They managed Destiny’s Child, but didn’t have recording or touring. 
They were Franz Ferdinand’s agent, but had neither recording nor publishing on them. 
360 is a misnomer as at most it is a 270 degree model. But the idea of bulk buying 
rights and getting what they can is certainly a potential solution to any problems music 
companies have. It’s good for the music companies but for the artists all of their eggs 
are in one basket. But for the big acts there is a minimisation of risk in terms of the 
upfront payouts they get, if the reports of figures we hear bandies about are accurate or 
even vaguely close to accurate.
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At the other end of the scale 360 is a bad strategy. As an artist manager, I would never  
allow one of my acts to sign a 360 degree deal with any record company or any sign. To 
be giving away that degree of rights to your work for any period of time is illogical. It 
makes more sense to sell your various sets of rights to different companies in each area 
rather than bundling them up in a package for one company to try and get some kind of 
value back. But of course all this is hypothetical because there is the need for a band to 
realise cash. So on a strategic level they make no sense and from a management point of 
view I feel very strongly against them but you might still have to go for them.
I do think the future is now in artists signing over bundles of rights where artists sign 
over more rights to one organisation or company than they would have in the past. As a 
manager you would also want shorter term deals with companies on this but of course 
the companies are looking for longer deals. So from an artist perspective there are a 
number of issues that I think are probably ultimately unresolvable. Record companies 
will say that you can release a record through us if you give us everything else as well. 
But you know I don’t think there is actually anything new in this. If a new band has no 
money or no means of getting their record out there, they will too often take a small  
advance and sign their rights away for a crap royalty that they might never realise. This 
has often been the way that it has worked…Yes there is bullying going on, if you want 
to call it that. But that’s just the pressures of the market and record companies or music 
companies of any kind are always going to want to exploit musicians as much as they 
can.
That is very much the way it will go. When Universal bought Sanctuary it was primarily 
to get their hands on Sanctuary’s touring agency Helter Skelter and, to a certain extent, 
that  breaks  with  the  kind  of  tradition  where  majors  have  bought  smaller  record 
companies for their rosters. In that instance Universal bought over Sanctuary not for the 
record company or their artists, but for the expertise in other areas that they reckoned 
would make profit in other areas. So there will be lots of cross-fertilisation on these 
kinds of deals, although it will still be very hard to direct all of the income from one 
artists into one company, which is clearly their aim so you will probably have more than 
one company involved when it comes to covering it all.
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ON WHERE ELSE MONEY WILL BE GENERATED IN THE FUTURE
JW
All the coverage recently has been in how live music has overtaken recorded as a source 
of income. It used to be that people went on tour to promote albums, whereas now they 
go on tour and it’s the other way around, they release a record to promote a tour – The 
Charlatans are a good example of that recently,  and bands like that who can make a 
healthy amount of money from touring but don’t sell any records anymore. So the fact 
that they’re giving away their album for free? Well so what, they make their money 
from touring…
JR
But that’s okay if you’re The Charlatans or someone established… But what about new 
acts??
JW
There are two caveats on that live thing – One I don’t think the live industry can sustain 
it’s current level of growth or success either. It may just be that it’s lagging behind the 
record industry.  I think one of the things that’s happened is that as people are under 
more pressure to make money out of playing live, it has resulted in greed, so you have 
ticket prices rocketing and booking fees rocketing. But the minute there is any sort of 
economic downturn like what everybody is saying what is going to happen soon, then 
the first  thing you are going to stop spending money on is concert  tickets  for Road 
Stewart or whatever. So I’d be cautious, I think live music should be a valuable part of 
any artist’s revenue, but equally that doesn’t preclude people who don’t play live from 
making money out of music. But again, increasingly the reality is that it is far more 
likely that you’ll make you £30,000 from licensing your music to a TV advert or a film 
of whatever. There are more ways of making money now, and I think the smart artists 
are the ones that are able to draw in modest amounts from four or five different areas, 
and I think sometimes now it’s more important to have someone who is really good at 
synchronising music working for you than have a record company, and I think that will 
become more and more the case over the next few years.
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ON THE ROLE OF MUSIC MEDIA GATEKEEPERS / INTERMEDIARIES
JW
I think radio is still really important but not as important as it used to be. It is quite 
possible to be successful without radio play of the other parts are working – If there are 
four or five different aspects to how you can make money as an artist – from licensing 
recordings, from publishing, from merchandise, from associated products… There have 
always  been these  different  areas,  and getting  radio play might  help  you  sell  some 
records and it will help you get to the next stage, but on it’s own it used to be that a  
solid burst of radio play would quite often make an act successful and then they could 
consolidate on that. I don’t think that’s the case anymore. I think you can get played on 
the  radio  but  you  need  other  things  as  well  –  streaming  on  the  internet  is  really 
important as well. If you view that as being an extension of radio, like radio stations that 
you can hear online, then radio is still really important because people still have to hear 
things  before  they  will  pay  to  buy it  or  go  out  and  see  it  live,  or  the  advertising 
executive still has to hear the someplace before he decides that he wants to use it in a 
car advert or whatever… 
I think that music journalism and music television have all decreased in importance 
because of the amount of other ways of finding out about music. In a way, all of the 
other interesting social-networking, they are going back in some ways to the kinds of 
ways that music sold before it became big corporate marketing – Somebody would buy 
an album and they would share it with their friends and they would tape it and there’s be 
this kind of word of mouth thing where albums sold over a two or three period because 
people were talking about them. When you look at relatively unknown bands online 
who’ve had 500,000 people listen to them on MySpace you’d be hard pushed to get that 
out  of  any radio  exposure.  But  it’s  difficult  to  know what  that  actually  leads  to  as 
nobody has done a scientific survey of where it all fits in the jigsaw. But it has kind of 
weakened radio, because for a long time it was the primary way to get your band heard 
and get a hit record. Now it’s just one of the many factors in doing that but I still think 
it’s significant. If you took radio out there’s be a big gap there. The other reason it’s 
important  is  that  radio-play generates  money so,  if  you  get  onto the A-list  of BBC 
station you are getting paid £80-90 per play and you are getting play x number of times 
per week over a number of weeks and this does add up to a lot of money.  And the 
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record  companies  get  money as  well  which  is  possibly  why they still  pursue  radio 
maybe more vigorously than proportionately they should…
ON MIXING/REMIXING RECORDINGS FOR RADIO
JW
Every band I’ve ever worked with has had radio pluggers coming back to us saying if 
you do this and if you do that it’ll get played on the radio. I think myself that most of 
the artists don’t actually believe that. If they want to play it I’m almost certain that they 
will. I always suspect that if you chop a minute off you song just to make it fit their  
format, well, if they didn’t like a 3 minute 40 second version they won’t like a 2 minute 
40 second version. And I’ve had numerous debates with radio pluggers over the years 
about this. Maybe because the likes of Belle and Sebastian have never done that and 
never followed the radio pluggers line might be why they stick at the 250,000 global 
sales for every album compared like someone like Damien Rice. Maybe it is a plausible 
explanation  that  radio-play is  the difference  between these two, but  I  think there is 
probably far more to it than that…
JW
There are not many bands that will release twelve albums… But you can still sell a lot 
of records and extend the life  of the band doing things your  own way… In around 
twenty years  time the people who’ll  have been around a long time will  have had a 
moderate level of success. The people who get absolutely huge over two, or if they are 
luck maybe three albums tend to fade away from a high peak down to nearly zero really 
quickly like it goes from zero upwards really quickly. If you’ve been in a band selling  
50,000 in the UK, and 100,000 in America and 100,000 in the rest of the world where 
maybe one album might do a bit better in one country or a bit worse in another but 
where your mean or your average is going to be the same all the way through, then 
probably longer term you are going to be better off. Obviously the fact that you’ve been 
around that long also makes the brand more recognisable and more solid in all sorts of 
ways, like selling merchandise or doing gigs. It has its advantages. Again, this can be a 
conscious decision, and making these decisions, the decisions that could propel you to 
that next tier of success, particularly in a band context… Like if Therapy suddenly had a 
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massive hit in the mid-nineties the chances are they wouldn’t still be making records 
now… That seems to be the way it works. I’m not sure if you can apply that across the 
board. If you can maintain it within a certain level and do things on your own terms 
there is the potential for durability, where as I think, and again Snow Patrol is a really 
good example of this, I mean how much in control of what they are doing can you be 
when there  is  that  many people to  please in  terms  of  record  companies,  managers, 
audiences…  Effectively  you  do  have  to  make  a  decision  and  they’ve  made  their 
decision and in a lot of ways I respect what they’ve done, but whether it’s true to what 
they set out to or whether it’s just a convenient tool to selling a lot of records I’m not 
sure. But I don’t believe that once you reach that level that you can control things. It’s 
like you are at the wheel of the car but you are not in control of where it’s going. I 
guess,  to  get  any level  of  success  involves  compromises  of  different  types,  but  the 
bigger you get the more difficult  it  is  to keep what it  is  your  vision is  of the band 
together.
ON  THE  EXTENT  TO  WHICH  COPYRIGHT  IS  SHAPING  THE  NEW 
INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES
JW
That’s such a huge question I’d have to sit down and think about it for a while, but my 
gut response to it is that think about music and reducing it to ownership of the rights  
associated with it, the business models that have sprung up around new technologies 
and around record companies, and certainly if you look at the whole towards this kind 
of  360 degree  model  that  first  of  all  Sanctuary  and  then  some  of  the  other  record 
companies posited, I think that you find the whole notion is that rather than having a 
percentage of the rights to something, they want to buy up the rights to everything – 
they want  to make money out  of selling your  t-shirts… Again the whole  copyright 
extension thing is also very much about that, to get control…and instead of making vast 
amounts of money really quickly this looks like a defensive strategy to secure some 
income over a longer period of time and to procure more income from more sources 
over a longer period of time. I guess copyright is at the heart of how people are trying to 
address new business models and they are hoping to move towards the extension of 
term is about making that even more lucrative than it would be already…
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There  are  fundamental  questions  about  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  even  the  existing 
copyright terms., and artists having to…what buys out their copyright, how they should 
do that,  and the various other rights associated with it… But I’d need to think that 
through a bit… 
Everything is so fluid at the moment. You think you have a take on something and then 
something happens to take it and completely disrupt that viewpoint – for example that 
whole move away from digital rights management over the last six months…I’d have 
answered that question that you’ve just asked differently six months ago or I’d have had 
an answer to it. Where as now I’m thinking that I thought I had an answer to it, but the 
goalposts have moved again so I’m not entirely sure…
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Appendix G: Sample Interview 2 
Interviewee: Ben Barrett (manager, Damien Rice)
Venue: Starbucks, Angel, London
Date: 5th June 2008
Duration: 1 hour
BB - Ben Barrett
JR - Jim Rogers
ON LAUNCHING DAVID GRAY AND DAMIEN RICE
BB
My daily life is people management and psychology and whatever else…But it is a very 
interesting time with all this change. I don’t think anybody really knows what they are 
doing and nobody really seems very sure of the future…I’ve worked with Rob Holden 
for the last seven years, and I cut my teeth working with him on David Gray. David had 
made  White Ladder and nobody wanted to know. They had just ended up making the 
record themselves having already had four records with very little success at all… They 
made  the  record  themselves  and  then  decided  that  they  were  going  to  license  the 
record…They released it themselves in Ireland. Something stick, and continues to stick 
over there. People in the UK watched that. Irish people are quite different from anybody 
else.  It  became  something  that  just  tipped  over,  it  just  connected  with  people  for 
whatever reason. The labels in the UK started to get interested. Rob had licensed the 
record to Warner’s for distribution. 
To cut a very, very long story short, for every artists this is the way it is increasingly  
going is that all the nuts and bolts and day-to-day stuff is really quite simple, but it’s 
really all about who is spending the money, and increasingly about who is spending the 
money at the very top level and the power to get physical distribution sorted at a global 
level.  But  even that  is  becoming  less  important  with  the  digital  thing…If  you  take 
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Damien’s [Rice] last record which came out in November 2006, 40% of the sales were 
digital  in  the  first  week of  release  in  America  which  is  just  phenomenal.  Through 
iTunes. This is just flabbergasting really. We’ve done some digital only singles now for 
him and it just sticks, it really sticks. 
Now we are sitting in Starbucks, and Starbucks is another non- traditional music retailer 
America that is becoming a massive music retailer in America and it’s very important 
for people who want to get records into shops. The ‘mom and pop’ stores are becoming 
more important again. Retailing has become so crunched up over the past couple of 
years that the margins are getting smaller and smaller and smaller and it’s becoming 
very difficult to make traditional retail work, especially in the last year or so…
JR
So is  it  retailers  who are losing out as opposed to  big record companies  at  present 
regarding file-sharing and the free availability of music in the net?
BB
Well it depends on what free or piracy means. I mean is piracy, what we used to call 
boot-legging,  taking from the  radio?  Or is  it  people  in  Eastern  Europe running off 
copies? I remember telling me recently that one of the key speeches at SXSW, one of 
the record executives  said that  everything changes all  of the time,  it  just  constantly 
evolves… In the 1930s record executives were trying to get their records not played on 
radio because they figured if people heard it on the radio then they wouldn’t go and buy 
the record, so it is extraordinary really the way it does come full circle. At the end of the 
day, a lot of major labels have had it very good for a long time and, I’m not sure if 
everybody would agree,  but  they haven’t  been very good at  developing new young 
artists, the next Radiohead, the next Bruce Springsteen, the next Bob Dylan and all of 
that… Artists with long-term careers are becoming increasingly less because there are 
so few artists  that have been developed. Over the last  ten years,  if you don’t sell  a 
million  copies  of  your  record  you  get  lost,  or  you  get  dropped  and  left  on  a  pile 
somewhere…
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JR
Is that because major record labels just aren’t interested in developing artists or because 
the relationship between major and independent labels has changed in some way?
BB
Independents will always exist, independents will always do what they do. I think the 
majors have just  become a machine  that  are so financially depressed,  so financially 
driven, so financially focused that…they spend so much money on records and it is a 
really, really expensive habit to make it work… You gotta sell the units. 
Even on an indie level it  is fascinating to see some of the bigger acts in the States 
recently,  like  The  Shins  were  at  no.2,  Madhouse  Mouse??  were  at  no.1…It’s  like 
independent records flying high in the charts and a lot of the major labels struggling to 
make it work. That’s been really interesting and I would say digital  and new media 
methods for kids who are buying those records makes them amazingly accessible to 
them.
ON THE INDEPENDENT ROUTE TAKEN BY DAMIEN RICE
BB
Damien had his own record deal literally from day one. He recorded the whole thing 
himself, it was self-financed, did his own artwork, released it in Ireland, got distribution 
through RMG. It went top 10. He played gigs all around the country and built up a 
really nice little following before the record came out. Then the record came out and it 
did really well. We picked it up over here and we released it ourselves on our own label. 
We did a word of mouth sort of promotion on it and we did around 15,000... And then 
we realised that we could only do so much with it and if we wanted to cross over a little  
bit or make a bigger impact, then we would need help with distribution and marketing. 
So that is when we got involved with Fourteenth Floor which is a subsidiary within 
Warner’s, set up by Christian Tattersfield who used to be at Warner’s… They are the 
sort of people who can get it into Woolworth’s and the sort of places that we can’t get it  
into.
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JR
How do you get them [retailers] to take it?
BB
You need to go through a distributor like Pinnacle or Vital or 3MB we were working 
with  at  the  time,  and they  sell  in  on  our  behalf.  So  we have  the  label,  we sell  to 
distributor, distributor sells to retailer.
JR
But how do you get them [distributor] to actually take the record, take x number of 
copies and send it to HMV, Woolworth’s etc?
BB
Everything is about a plot. Nothing works in isolation. I think if you have the single, 
show them what’s done already, show them the list of dates and blah blah blah… If you 
have a plan, if you have a scheme and some sort of marketing budget, no matter how 
small, and you just present the whole thing as something that has already proven itself  
somewhere, like it was in Ireland, and you have this live thing going on, then I think 
everyone will want to back a horse that looks like it is going to win. Nobody is going to  
put their money on something initially and everybody is quite cautious in placing their  
orders. But once it’s selling, people have a bit of faith… So initially you just present the 
whole plan… Lots of gigs, radio…
ON  THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  RADIO  AND  OTHER  MUSIC  MEDIA 
GATEKEEPERS / INTERMEDIARIES
BB
For Damien, radio came in quite late, we’d probably done about 50,000 records in the 
UK just by word or mouth and him doing shows and doing a bit of press. But certainly  
for somebody like him, the pecking order would be that you’d get the press, then you’d 
get radio, then you’d get TV and then it all eventually makes sense. Through all of it 
you are working really hard doing shows…
316
JR
Obviously radio isn’t crucial to selling records at all if you sold 50,000 without it?
BB
That was through a word of mouth campaign, for sure…and then we got a little bit of 
TV – he’d done Glastonbury, but I still fully believe that radio is the thing that did it for 
us. There is no way that we would have sold two million records without the singles that 
we  had  on  radio.  It  just  wouldn’t  have  happened…radio  is  crucial…yeah,  radio  is 
essential…
JR
Has  it’s  significance  been  diluted  somewhat  by  having  so  many  other  different 
competing media these days for people’s attention and for circulating music?
BB
I still think radio is crucial in so far as you can access people’s lives on a day-to-day 
basis. I mean obviously there is certain new media outlets for a younger generation, but 
I think for those of us working in offices daily, or commuting to work or whatever I  
think radio is absolutely key.
JR
So by having Damien placed on high rotation on BBC radio 1or whatever, that point 
marks the point where record sales go up?
BB
It’s like a graph that goes like that [illustrates slight incline] and then goes like that  
[illustrates steep incline]… There is no question about it at all…And there is something 
that I have more faith in as the years have progressed – At the time Christian was very 
adamant about TV advertising, which relative to the amount of records that we were 
selling at the time didn’t seem like the right thing to do as it was so expensive, but it 
absolutely paid off… It’s that synergy, if you have the press, you have the tour, you 
have  the  radio  and  you  have  some  TV  shows  –  Jonathon  Ross,  Jules  Holland  or 
whatever, and then you do TV advertising – and again you could spend a million quid 
on advertising but if you are now on radio and people don’t know who you are they are 
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not  going  to  buy  something  just  because  it’s  advertised  as  being  out  on  DVD  or 
whatever…
JR
So how do you get radio to play it?
BB
[Laughs] That’s a bone of contention…It’s down to…[long pause]…That person you 
met in BBC today, were they in programming?
JR
He was the head of music at Radio 1.
BB
Right…okay… I’d be interested to meet him.
JR
He said there were two Radio 1s…
BB
What does that mean? Radio 1 and Radio 2?
JR
There is Radio 1 daytime, and then there is Radio 1 after 7 o’clock in the evening and 
there is a very different approach to both…
BB
Well I am still unsure of what the demographic, but they have always been – I think and 
certainly from what I hear on Radio 1 – just for 18-20 year olds. So it is incredibly 
difficult to qualify what their target audience is. I’m not sure if they even know… There 
have been a lot of changes there over the last couple of years…But it is true, there is 
daytime and night time play.
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Basically, Christian had this fantastic plugger, and after much friction between myself 
and Damien, we had to remix a track for radio because there was absolutely nothing on 
Damien’s record that would have worked on radio, nothing, no matter how good it was. 
People want to hear something with a beat, something with a pulse, they want to hear 
something that is a bit fluffy or whatever so we had to remix the tracks for radio.
JR
So radio feeds back very much into the creative process?
BB
Yeah, it does dictate, and you know I have been told, again by quite reliable sources, 
that even with the edit that we give them – if it’s too long they’ll shorten it, takes bits 
out, speed it up, whatever…
JR
What happens if radio says no?
BB
Radio have said no. Radio have said no to many, many things. So then we go and try 
another remix. And if they still say no you’ve just got to go back to the drawing board 
again and just… Well there is no other drawing board really…
JR
So if radio doesn’t like it, is it a case of scrapping everything and start again?
BB
We had released Cannonball for the first time, and we had certain friends within Radio 
1 and Radio 2 who played it, but it didn’t pass over that tipping point, so we did another  
mix, and that was the one that flew. That was the one that people liked. So it was like 
getting somebody cool to remix it, that made it look good… It’s all a big game really.
[JR details how there are a variety of different mixes of single tracks these days and  
questions if this is designed to fit into radio formats]…
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BB
It’s like covering all possible angles. The formats you have out there the better chance 
you have of charting. But it is an interesting one if radio says no. I think that there are a 
couple of things – I mean there are so many records nowadays that do seem to do quite 
well without radio. And then there is the odd thing that comes along that breaks all the 
rules like that Jose Gonzales track or that Gary Jules Mad World. There are always rules 
that are broken… But it is extraordinarily difficult…it’s just accessing people. You have 
to access people driving in their car or whatever because people just are not going to 
buy a record they haven’t heard. They are not going to buy a record based on a print-out 
or a poster…If you see somebody live and you hear them on the radio – It has to be 
accessible. Nowadays that means the internet or radio.
ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TV IN GENERATING RECORD SALES
BB
TV is invaluable, but maybe not so much through advertising. I remember in the fourth 
quarter last year (2006) it just became completely ineffective. It was as if nearly every 
single release was doing TV advertising, so I think people just switched. At the time we 
were doing Damien’s first record it was a unique thing to do, and it was a real statement 
to spend so much money on taking out TV advertising. It was the same with David 
Gray’s records. But then it just became so commonplace that it just diluted the effect of 
it. I think any sort of TV appearances are good because they reach so  many people in 
their homes, and I do think that all the internet radio, the search engines is invaluable as 
well, all that new media.
ON THE ROLE OF PRINT MUSIC MEDIA
BB
It has a certain value and it will reach a certain audience, but there are only so many 
people who will read Mojo and Q and Select and the other music mags and whatever. 
But in terms of creating awareness it is a first step on the rung. If something is reviewed 
favourably it can be instrumental in getting other media interested.
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JR
Would you buy the front cover of NME?
BB
Interesting question. Obviously it depends on the artists. I mean it would be a lot more 
value to somebody like Muse than Damien or David Gray. It all helps…I think we’ve 
always  been in  favour  of  big sweeping statements  where we take out  full-page ads 
announcing concert tours rather than little ads. A lot of this is about perception. If you 
issue big sweeping statements, it is very helpful in launching a record.
ON WHETHER BEING INDEPENDENT IS EASIER THAN IT PREVIOULY 
WAS
BB
I think there are people out there making records who are being successful but are just 
not appearing on the radar. It’s so much easier to do now, the whole physical process of 
recording. You don’t have to go into a recording studio to make a record. You can do so 
much from home. If you are in any way savvy there is so much available to make your 
own music. So that is a huge transition from the days when you had to go into the studio 
for  six  months  to  make  a  record.  It’s  difficult  to  say  if  it  is  easier  now  because 
personally I haven’t experienced it any other way, but it would be better for the artists  
that we work with to do that rather than signing all their rights in perpetuity to a label.  
But I do really think that it is getting to a point where music is going to be free anyway.  
So I don’t quite know how that would work out and how everybody is going to get  
paid…
JR
So is the power-base of the major companies seriously damaged?
BB
I’m not sure if it’s the internet, or if it’s society or whether it just that everything is so  
much more transient now and happens so much quicker, everything is so much more 
short-term…
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I think the fact that you can…ten years ago I’d say to you ‘you’ve got to go and buy this 
record, you’ve got to hear this song’ but now I’d just email it to you. So that’s the way 
people are  now sharing music,  or  even simpler  than that.  So yeah,  the internet  has 
obviously  had a  massive,  massive  impact.  But  a  lot  of  the  music  companies  really 
haven’t being paying that much attention to developing the power to hold on to what 
they have. It’s basically the computer companies…
JR
The power? But have they not been successfully lobbying for copyright changes?
BB
Well I mean the power in terms of the technology. Certainly I think their interests have 
been well protected when it comes to copyright control…
JR details creative commons approach and asks if loosening of copyright laws can feed  
creativity and innovation? Would this be useful to music as an industry?
BB
It is damaging the fabric of the industry because the industry is obviously commercial, 
and what  you  describe  is  obviously  non-commercial  because  it  is  free.  That  is  the 
dilemma though, how you would turn that around to make it make sense for everybody.  
I think yes, there would be some massive creative benefits from that accessibility, but it 
is just harnessing that in a way that seems fair that the artists copyright and financial 
interests are upheld… I think that is what we are all struggling with at the minute. Not 
even struggling with, more a challenge…but how do you make that work long term if 
you have enormous amounts of websites that you can go a buy Damien’s records on for 
7 pence a track. How does that work? How does that get carved up down the line. We 
are still trying to find out about how we are getting accounted to in terms of all of the  
digital rights and whatever. It just doesn’t seem to be…It is certainly not clear at this  
point.
I remember Rob said years ago that mobile phones are going to be the future, and I’m 
like ‘Nah’. [He said] people will be using them to listen to music and do this and do 
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that… And we were in Australia and one of the guys had a sonar system where you pay 
a monthly subscription,  it’s  amazing,  you basically  pay a monthly subscription to a 
mobile phone company and then you can access their  database and they’ve got like 
millions of songs. 
JR
I this material form primarily the four major companies or does it include independents?
BB
I think there are majors there, yeah??
ON THE IMPACT OF CONCENTRATION ON THE INDUSTRY
BB
That’s the structure, that for me has seemed to have broken down in the development 
world  because  it’s  all  number  crunching… It’s  very,  very  pressurized  going into  a 
system  like  that  [major’s]  because  everybody’s  investment  is  so  high,  therefore 
everybody’s expectation is so high. The numbers don’t really stack up for a young artist 
on their first record, and there are some fantastic examples of…I can think of about ten 
acts off the top of my head that have just broken through and are doing phenomenal live 
business and on their first record are selling out multiple nights at the Brixton Academy 
and those kinds of venues, which is kind of unusual…
ON ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR SMALLER INDEPENDENT COMPANIES
BB
I think for the amount of money that is required it is quite difficult because it is also a 
longer term return. Again from our own point of view we knew we had to lock into 
somebody else’s system at that point because we just couldn’t do it on our own. I don’t  
imagine very many bands could. 
BB
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This is a very interesting time in that I don’t think anybody actually knows what they 
are doing…
ON THE LIVE MUSIC INDUSTRY
BB
I think recordings are diminishing in value, let’s say, where as people will always want 
to go and see shows. This has upped the ante for live shows to be better, and the labels 
are obviously very keen to get their share of every aspect of an artists income, from 
publishing to merchandising to live to whatever. That’s very much one way to look at 
the future, one sort of big umbrella organisation with everything under the same roof. 
But I mean you look at Prince – He’s issued a whole string of dates, and included in the  
ticket  price  is  a  copy of  the new record.  That’s  fascinating.  Who would have  ever 
thought of that happening even two years ago. 
JR
How lucrative is playing live now?
BB
There is a certain investment of time and money and then it becomes lucrative. And fun 
from the  artist’s  point  of  view.  And then they  have  merchandise  and income from 
increased record sales, and if all of the stars align then it financially makes sense! But 
for somebody like Damien (Rice) we don’t take a penny of tour support from the label.  
We look after that ourselves. Therefore we are not beholden to them to do promos for 
them and whatever when we are on tour. There can be a lot of pressure to do that,  
particularly in America, it can be very, very, very challenging out there as the schedules 
are so intense. There is this massive work ethic that nobody is shy of, but they forget 
that they are dealing with people who may not have done this before, and that can be 
really difficult. A load of bands in America on this tour – Lily Allen and a few others  
that we met – were just all burned out… That is just so, so, so easy to happen…
JR
Can touring be profitable?
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BB
Yes… Yes you can tour and make money, even for somebody at the level of Damien or 
David, but it’s about being clever in the first place and not exceeding your ovolution so 
if you can afford to tour in a Hiace van, or in our case, Damien and myself going around 
in a Ford Fiesta, but that’s what you do. You build up your fanbase and you take it from 
there.  But  now we are  touring  with  two trucks  and  two buses  and it  is  just  about  
balancing out, but looking at it over a year, we’ll come out at the end making good 
money. You have to make money. It doesn’t make any sense not to.
Merchandise is increasingly more important if you have the kind of deal where you can 
see CDs and you can sell…
JR
In terms of all of the various potential sources of income you have, how do each of 
them break down as a percentage of overall income…
BB
It’s difficult because it all depends how much the marketing budget for the record is, but 
publishing seems to be the most steady and consistent because of radio play and all of 
the other aspects to it. There comes a point where after a certain amount of records, 
recording royalties become quite lucrative as well, but that certain amount of records is 
quite high. The nature of the deals that we have done is lower than the traditional deal… 
But live can be,  again without going down the sponsorship route,  live can be quite 
lucrative. But it can be a long road. In 2004 we were in America every single month. 
You just have to put in the time and energy there and once people are on board they are 
on board for life.
But it’s radio that really makes the difference. If you get on radio and you are successful 
on radio it  is  the difference between hardcore music audiences  who read the music 
press, and people who might buy two records a year. Once in a blue moon they might 
step  into  the  petrol  station  on  the  way  home  and  buy  a  record  there.  That’s  the 
difference. It helps you cross over to an audience that might not as individuals buy a 
whole lot of records, and it’s access to a big new market. That’s what radio is to us. 
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Appendix H: Transcripts  of  Speeches  by  Paul  McGuinness, 
Principle Management, Manager of U2 
Below are full transcripts of two keynote speeches delivered by Paul McGuinness to 
two  international  music  industry  seminars  in  2008.  Both  of  these  speeches  relate 
directly to the relationship between internet technologies and the record industry. The 
first was delivered at MIDEM seminar, Cannes, France; the second at the Music Matters 
Conference, Hong Kong. While the tone of both speeches is broadly similar, the latter 
speech delivered in Hong Kong sees McGuinness place more emphasis on the role of 
ISPs and argue that ISP monitoring is not an intrusion on privacy. Both transcripts are 
reproduced in full below:
Transcript  of  speech  delivered  by  Paul  McGuinness  at  MIDEM, 
Cannes, France, January 28th 2008:
McGuinness: Good afternoon and thank you for giving me this opportunity.  I don't 
make many speeches and this is an important and imposing occasion for me. What I'm 
trying do here today is identify a course of action that will benefit all: artists, labels,  
writers and publishers.
I have been managing the best-known of my clients, U2, for exactly 30 years.  Sure 
we've made mistakes along the way but the line-up hasn't changed in 31 years. They are 
as ambitious and hardworking as ever, and each time they make a record and tour, it's 
better than the last time. They are doing their best work now. During that time the music 
business has been through many changes.
At the beginning U2's live appearances were loss-making and tour support from our 
record label was essential for us to tour and that paid off for the label as U2's records 
went to No.1 in nearly every international  territory starting in the mid '80s and I'm 
happy to say that continues to the present day. They have sold about 150 million records 
to date and the last album went to No.1 in 27 territories.
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U2 own all their masters but these are licensed long-term to Universal, with whom we 
enjoy an excellent relationship. With a couple of minor exceptions they also own all 
their  copyrights,  which are also licensed to Universal.  U2 always  understood that it 
would be pathetic to be good at the music and bad at the business, and have always been 
prepared to invest in their own future. We were never interested in joining that long, 
humiliating list of miserable artists who made lousy deals, got exploited and ended up 
broke and with no control over how their life's work was used, and no say in how their 
names and likenesses were bought and sold.
What U2 and I also understood instinctively from the start was that they had 2 parallel  
careers first as recording and songwriting artists, and second as live performers. They've 
been phenomenally successful at both. The Vertigo Tour in 2005/2006 grossed $355m 
and played to 4.6m people in 26 countries.
But I'm not here to brag. I'm here to ask some serious questions and to point the finger 
at the forces at work that are destroying the recorded music industry.
People all  over the world are going to more gigs than ever.  The experience for the 
audience  is  better  than  ever.  This  is  proved  by  the  upward  trend  in  ticket  prices, 
generally un-resisted. The live business is, for the most  part,  healthy and profitable. 
Bands can gig without subsidy. Live Nation, previously a concert and venue company is 
moving into position with merchandising, ticketing, online, music distribution as one of 
the powerful new centres of the music industry.
So what has gone wrong with the recorded music business? More people are listening to 
music than ever before through many more media than ever before. Part of the problem 
is that the record companies, through lack of foresight and poor planning, allowed an 
entire collection of digital industries to arise that enabled the consumer to steal with 
impunity the very recorded music that had previously been paid for. I think that's been a 
cultural problem for the record industry -- it has generally been inclined to rely for staff 
on  poorly  paid  enthusiasts  rather  than  developing  the  kind  of  enterprise  culture  of 
Silicon Valley where nearly every employee is a shareholder.
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There are other reasons for the record business's slow response to digital. The SDMI 
(Secure Digital Music Initiative) of the '90s pan-industry, was a grand but ill-fated plan 
to try and agree rules between the content and technology industries. It went nowhere. 
SDMI,  and  similar  attempts  at  cooperation  by  record  companies,  have  partly  been 
thwarted by competition rules. The US government has sometimes been overzealous in 
protecting the public from cartel-like behaviour.
I love the record business, and though I may be critical of the ways in which the digital  
space has been faced by the industry I am also genuinely sympathetic and moved by the 
human fall-out, as the companies react to falling revenues by cutting staff and tightening 
belts. Many old friends and colleagues have been affected by this. They have families 
and it is terrible that a direct effect of piracy and thievery has been the destruction of so 
many careers.
Nonetheless there is one effective thing the majors could do together. I quote from Josh 
Tyrangiel  in  Time  Magazine:  -  "The  smartest  thing  would  be  for  the  majors  to 
collaborate on the creation of the ultimate digital-distribution hub, a place where every 
band can sell its wares at the price point of its choosing". Apple's iTunes, despite its 
current  dominance,  is  vulnerable.  Consumers  dislike  its  incompatibility  with  other 
music services, and the labels are rebelling against its insistence on controlling prices. 
Universal  the largest  label  in  the world has  declined  to sign a  long term deal  with 
iTunes. "There's a real urgency for the labels to get together and figure this out," says 
Rick Rubin of Columbia Records.
There  is  technology  now,  that  the  worldwide  industry  could  adopt,  which  enables 
content owners to track every legitimate digital  download transaction, wholesale and 
retail.
This system is already in use here in Cannes by the MIDEM organisation and is called 
SIMRAN. Throughout this conference you will see contact details and information. I 
recommend you look at it. I should disclose that I'm one of their investors.
Meanwhile in the revolution that has hit music distribution, quality seems to have been 
forgotten.  Remarkably,  these  new digital  forms  of  distribution  deliver  a  far  poorer 
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standard of sound than previous formats. There are signs of a consumer backlash and an 
online audiophile P2P movement called "lossless" with expanded and better spectrum 
that is starting to make itself heard. This seems to be a missed opportunity for the record 
industry --  shouldn't  we be catering to people who want to hear music through big 
speakers rather than ear buds?
Today, there is a frenetic search for new business models that will return the record 
business to growth. The record companies are exploring many new such models -- some 
of them may work, some of them may not.
Sadly, the recent innovative Radiohead release of a download priced on the "honesty 
box’ principle seems to have backfired to some extent. It seems that the majority of 
downloads were through illegal P2P download services like BitTorrent and LimeWire, 
even  though  the  album  was  available  for  nothing  through  the  official  band  site. 
Notwithstanding the promotional noise, even Radiohead's honesty box principle showed 
that if not constrained, the customer will steal music.
There is  some excitement  about  advertising-funded deals.  But the record companies 
must  gain  our  trust  to  share  fairly  the  revenues  they  will  gain  from  advertising. 
Historically they have not been good at transparency. Let's never forget the great CD 
scam of the ’80s when the majors tried to halve the royalties of records released on CD 
claiming that they needed this extra margin to develop the new technology even as they 
were entering the great boom years that the CD delivered. It's ironic that, at a time when 
the majors are asking the artists to trust them to share advertising revenue they are also 
pushing the dreadful 360 model.
As Allen Grubman,  the well-known New York attorney said to  me recently...  ‘God 
forbid that one of these acts in a 360 deal has success. The next thing that will happen is 
the manager gets fired and the lawyer gets sued for malpractice.’
Maybe it would help if they were to offer to cancel those deals when they repair their 
main revenue model and the industry recovers, as I believe it will.
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But that's an issue for the future, when we're out of the crisis. Today, there's a bigger 
issue  and  it's  about  the  whole  relationship  between  the  music  and  the  technology 
business. Network operators, in particular, have for too long had a free ride on music -- 
on our clients'  content.  It's  time for a new approach -- time for ISPs to start taking 
responsibility for the content they've profited from for years.  And it's time for some 
visionary  new  thinking  about  how  the  music  and  technology  sectors  can  work  as 
partners instead of adversaries,  leading to a revival of recorded music instead of its 
destruction.
It's interesting to look at the character of the individuals who built the industries that 
resulted from the arrival of the microprocessor. Most of them came out of the so-called 
counterculture  on the west coast  of America.  Their  values were hippy values.  They 
thought  the  old  computer  industry  as  represented  by  IBM  was  neanderthal.  They 
laughed at Bell Telephone and AT&T. They thought the TV networks were archaic. 
Most of them are music lovers. There are plenty of private equity fund managers who 
are "Deadheads."
They were brilliantly innovative in finance and technology and though they would pay 
lip service to "Content is King" what many of them instinctively realized was that in the 
digital  age there  were no mechanisms to police  the  traffic  over  the  internet  in  that 
content, and that legislation would take many years to catch up with what was now 
possible online.
And embedded deep down in the brilliance of those entrepreneurial, hippy values seems 
to be a disregard for the true value of music.
This goes back some decades. Does anyone remember Abbie Hoffman? He was one of 
the "Chicago 7," the 'Yippies" of the Youth International Party who tried to disrupt the 
1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago and got beaten up and put on trial by Mayor 
Daley's police. He put out a book with the title "Steal this Book". I think he has a lot to  
answer for.
I've met a lot of today's heroes of Silicon Valley. Most of them don't really think of 
themselves as makers of burglary kits. They say: "you can use this stuff to email your 
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friends and store and share your photos". But we all know that there's more to it than 
that, don't we? Kids don't pay $25 a month for broadband just to share their photos, do 
their homework and email their pals.
These tech guys think of themselves as political liberals and socially aware. They search 
constantly for the next "killer app." They conveniently forget that the real "killer app" 
that many of their businesses are founded on is our clients' recorded music.
I call on them today to start doing two things: first, taking responsibility for protecting 
the music they are distributing; and second, by commercial agreements, sharing their 
enormous revenues with the content makers and owners.
I want those technology entrepreneurs to share their ingenuity and skill as well. Our 
interests are, after all, steadily merging as lines get more and more blurred between the 
distributors of content, the makers of hardware and the creators of content. Steve Jobs is 
now in effective control of the Walt Disney Studio and ABC Television so his point of 
view may be changing now that  he owns content  as well  as  selling  those beautiful 
machines that have changed our world. Personally I expect that Apple will before too 
long reveal a wireless iPod that connects to an iTunes "all of the music, wherever you 
are" subscription service. I would like it to succeed, if the content is fairly paid for. 
"Access" is what people will be paying for in the future, not the "ownership" of digital  
copies of pieces of music.
I have met Steve Jobs and even done a deal with him face to face in his kitchen in Palo 
Alto in 2004. No one there but Steve, Bono, Jimmy Iovine and me, and Lucian Grainge 
was on the phone. We made the deal for the U2 iPod and wrote it down in the back of 
my diary. We approved the use of the music in TV commercials for iTunes and the iPod 
and in return got a royalty on the hardware. Those were the days  when iTunes was 
being talked about as penicillin for the recorded music industry.
I wish he would bring his remarkable set of skills to bear on the problems of recorded 
music.  He's  a  technologist,  a  financial  genius,  a  marketer  and  a  music  lover.  He 
probably doesn't realize it but the collapse of the old financial model for recorded music 
will also mean the end of the songwriter. We've been used to bands who wrote their  
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own material since the Beatles, but the mechanical royalties that sustain songwriters are 
drying  up.  Labels  and  artists,  songwriters  and publishers,  producers  and musicians, 
everyone's a victim.
For ISPs in general,  the days  of prevaricating over their  responsibilities  for helping 
protect music must end. The ISP lobbyists who say they should not have to "police the 
internet"  are  living  in  the  past  --  relying  on  outdated  excuses  from  an  earlier 
technological age. The internet has moved on since then, and the pace of change today 
means a year in the internet age is equivalent to a decade in the non-internet world.
Remember  the  1990s,  when  the  internet  was  being  called  the  Information 
Superhighway? At that time, when the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the 
EU Electronic Commerce Directive were drawn up, legislators were concerned to offer 
safe harbours restricting the responsibilities of ISPs who acted as a "mere conduit". This 
was a different era: only a few hundred thousand illegal files could be accessed from 
websites. There was no inkling
at that time of the enormous explosion of P2P piracy that was to follow. If legislators 
had foreseen that explosion, would they have ever offered immunity for so-called "mere 
conduits" and, in doing so, given ISPs a decade of excuses for refusing to protect our 
content?
And as it turned, the "Safe Harbour" concept was really a Thieves' Charter. The legal 
precedent  that  device-makers  and  pipe  and  network  owners  should  not  be  held 
accountable for any criminal activity enabled by their devices and services has been 
enormously damaging to content owners and developing artists. If you were publishing 
a  magazine  that  was  advertising  stolen  cars,  processing  payments  for  them  and 
arranging delivery of them you'd expect to get a visit from the police wouldn't you? 
What's  the  difference?  With  a  laptop,  a  broadband  account,  an  MP3 player  and  a 
smartphone you can now steal all the content, music, video and literary in the world 
without any money going to the content owners. On the other hand if you get caught 
stealing  a  laptop  in  the  computer  store  or  don't  pay  your  broadband  bill  there  are 
obvious consequences. You get nicked or you get your access cut off.
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It is time for ISPs to be real partners. The safe harbours of the 1990s are no longer 
appropriate, and if ISPs do not cooperate voluntarily there will need to be legislation to 
require them to cooperate.
Why does all this matter so much? Because the truth is that whatever business model 
you are building, you cannot compete with billions of illegal files free on P2P networks. 
And the research does show that effective enforcement -- such as a series of warnings 
from the ISP to illegal file-sharers that would culminate in disconnection of your service 
-- can address the problem.
A simple "three strikes and you are out" enforcement process will see all serial illegal 
uploaders who resist the law face a stark choice: change or lose your ISP subscription.
Fortunately, there has recently been some tremendous momentum to get ISPs engaged 
-- notably in France, the UK, Sweden, Norway and Belgium. President Sarkozy's plan, 
the Olivennes initiative, by which ISPs will start disconnecting repeat infringers later 
this year, set a brilliant precedent which other governments should follow. In the U.K., 
the Gowers Report made it clear that legislation should be considered if voluntary talks 
with ISPs failed to produce a commitment to disconnect file-sharers. I'd like to see the 
U.K. government act promptly on this recommendation.
In  Sweden,  the  Renfors  Report  commissioned  by  the  Ministry  of  Justiceg  ISP 
cooperation. And in the courts, the Sabam-Tiscali ruling spelt out, in language as plain 
as could be,  that ISPs should take the steps required to remove copyright-infringing 
material from their networks. The European Union should now take up the mantle and 
legislate where voluntary intra-industry agreement is not forthcoming. This is the time 
to seize the day.
ISPs don't just have a moral reason to step up to the plate -- they have a commercial one 
too. IFPI estimates say illegal P2P distribution of music and films accounts for over half 
of all ISP traffic. Others put the figure as high as 80%. This is traffic that is not only 
destroying the market place for people who are trying to make a legitimate living out of 
music and films, it is hogging bandwidth that ISPs are increasingly going to need for 
other commerce, especially as a legitimate online market for movies develops.
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I think the failure of ISPs to engage in the fight against piracy, to date, has been the 
single biggest failure in the digital  music market.  They are the gatekeepers with the 
technical means to make a far greater impact on mass copyright violation than the tens 
of thousands of lawsuits taken out against individual file-sharers by bodies like BPI, 
RIAA  and  IFPI.  To  me,  prosecuting  the  customer  is  counter-intuitive,  though  I 
recognise that these prosecutions have an educational and propaganda effect, however 
small, in showing that stealing music is wrong.
ISPs could implement a policy of disconnection in very quick time. Filtering is also 
feasible. When last June the Belgian courts made a precedent-setting ruling obliging an 
ISP  to  remove  illegal  music  from  its  network,  they  identified  no  fewer  than  6 
technologies which make it possible for this to be done. No more excuses please. ISPs 
can quickly enough to block pornography when that becomes a public concern.
When the volume of illegal  movie  and music  P2P activity  was slowing down their 
network for legitimate users recently in California, Comcast were able to isolate and 
close down BitTorrent temporarily without difficulty.
There are many other examples that prove the ability of ISPs to switch off selectively 
activity they have a problem with: Google excluded BMW from their  search engine 
when BMW started to play games. This was a clear warning to others not to interfere. 
Another  show  of  power  was  Google's  acceptance  of  the  Chinese  Governments 
censorship conditions. The BBC has spent a fortune on their  iPlayer  project and the 
ISPs are now threatening to throttle this traffic if the BBC doesn't "share costs of iPlayer 
traffic." All this shows what the ISPs could do if they wanted. We must shame them 
into wanting to help us. Their snouts have been at our trough feeding free for too long.
Let's spare no effort to push the ISPs into taking responsibility. But that's only one part 
of the story. There's a huge commercial partnership opportunity there as well. For me, 
the business model of the future is one where music is bundled into an ISP or other 
subscription service and the revenues are shared between the distributor and the content 
owners.
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I believe this is realistic; the last few years have shown clear proof of the power of ISPs 
and cable companies to bundle packages of content and get more money out of their 
subscribers. In the UK, most ISPs offer different tiers of services, with a higher monthly 
fee for heavy downloaders. Why are there "heavy" downloaders? Isn't that our money? 
News Corporation offers free broadband to light users if they take at least a basic Sky 
Television package for £16 [$31.78] a month.
Looking at the events in the last year, this revenue-sharing model seems to be taking 
hold in the music business.
Universal -- U2's label -- recently struck a deal with Microsoft that sees it receive a cut 
of the revenues generated by sales of the Zune MP3 player.  It's unfortunate that the 
Zune hasn't attracted the sort of consumer support that the iPod did. We need more 
competition.
Under the agreement, Universal receives $1 for every Zune sold. When you consider 
Radio Shack sells Zune players for $150, you'll see that Universal has asked for less 
than 1% of revenue -- for a company that is supplying about a third of the U.S. market's  
chart  music  at  the moment.  This isn't  really  enough,  but  it's  a start,  I  suppose,  and 
follows from the U2/Apple deal, the principle that the hardware makers should share 
with the content owners whose assets are exploited by the buyers of their machines. The 
record companies should never again allow industries to arise that make billions off 
their content without looking for a piece of that business. Remember MTV?
Nokia has announced it  will  launch "Comes With Music," a service that  effectively 
allows consumers to get unlimited free downloads of songs for 12 months after they buy 
certain premium Nokia phones. At the end of the 12 months consumers will be able to 
keep the songs they download. Nokia gets to supply premium content and Universal 
gets to boost competition in the digital marketplace, to make it more competitive and 
open new channels to customers. A proportion of the revenue generated by sales of the 
handsets will flow back to Universal. The question must be asked; will they distribute 
that revenue fairly? Do artists trust the labels? Will artists, songwriters and labels trust 
the telcos and handset companies?
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These  are  obviously  commercial  deals  driven  by self-interest.  But  there  is  a  moral 
aspect to this too. The partnership between music and technology needs to be fair and 
reasonable. ISPs, Telcos and tech companies have enjoyed a bonanza in the last few 
years off the back of recorded music content. It is time for them to share that with artists 
and content owners.
Some people do go further and favour a state-imposed blanket licence on music. Let me 
stress that I don't believe in that. A government cannot set the price of music well any 
more than a rock band can run a government. The market has to decide. The problem 
with the global licence proposed in France two years ago was that it would not have 
worked  in  practice.  But  it  is  in  France  recently  that  legislators  have  been  most 
innovative and have shown most willingness to act to support recorded music rights. 
France leads the world on this.
So far I've focused mainly on the role of ISPs. But there are similar issues in mobile too. 
The mobile business accounts for half the world's digital music revenues and, crucially,  
is starting out from a much better position than the internet music market. You only 
have to look at a market such as Japan to see the amazing potential of mobile music for 
getting to the young demographic.
I believe that  in mobile  music we have the chance to avoid the problems that  have 
bedevilled the recorded music industry's relationship with ISPs: and I'm not talking just 
of their tolerance of copyright theft.  Other problems, like the lack of interoperability 
between services and devices; the lack of convenient payment mechanisms except via 
credit cards -- which of course are not available to all music users; the hacking and 
viruses that have undermined people's trust in online payment. All these problems can 
be avoided in the mobile sector, this is a task that should command the support and 
cooperation of labels, artists, publishers and writers. We're all in the same boat here.
That's a lesson for the mobile industry internationally. Don't go the way that many of 
the ISPs have gone. Mobile is still a relatively secure environment for legitimate content 
-- let's keep it that way.
So, to conclude -- who's got our money and what can we do?
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I suggest we shift the focus of moral pressure away from the individual P2P file thief 
and on to the multi billion dollar industries that benefit from these countless tiny crimes 
-- The ISPs, the telcos, the device makers. Let's appeal to those fine minds at Stanford 
University and Silicon Valley,  Apple,  Google,  Nokia, HP, China Mobile,  Vodafone, 
Comcast, Intel, Ericsson, Facebook, iLike, Oracle, Microsoft, AOL, Yahoo, Tiscali etc, 
and the bankers, engineers,  private equity funds, and venture capitalists  who service 
them and feed off them to apply their genius to cooperating with us to save the recorded 
music  industry,  not  only on the basis  of reluctantly sharing advertising  revenue but 
collecting revenue for the use and sale of our content.  They have built  multi  billion 
dollar industries on the back of our content without paying for it.
It's probably too late for us to get paid for the past, though maybe that shouldn't be 
completely ruled out. The U.S. Department of Justice and the EU have scored some 
notable victories  on behalf of the consumer,  usually against Microsoft.  They have a 
moral obligation to be true, trustworthy partners of the music sector. To respect and take 
responsibility for protecting music. To work for the revaluation, not the devaluation of 
music. To share revenues with the community fairly and responsibly, and to share the 
skills, ingenuity and entrepreneurship from which our business has a lot to learn.
And the message to government is this: ISP responsibility is not a luxury for possible 
contemplation  in  the  future.  It  is  a  necessity  for  implementation  TODAY  --  by 
legislation if voluntary means fail.
There's  more  exciting  music  being  made  and  more  listened  to  than  at  any time  in 
history. Cheap technology has made it easy to start a band and make music. This is a 
gathering of managers; our talented clients deserve better than the shoddy, careless and 
downright dishonest way they have been treated in the digital age.
********
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Transcript of speech delivered by Paul McGuinness at Music Matters 
conference, Hong Kong, 4th June 2008:
Title:  ‘Why won’t  the  ISPs stop defending the past,  start  embracing the  future  and 
partner the legitimate music business?’
McGuinness: Good morning. I am delighted to have this chance to address the Music 
Matters conference in Hong Kong. I don’t get up on stage like this that often and I don’t 
usually live my life in the limelight, even though I manage people who do. It is a good 
rule of thumb that when it is the manager and not the artist getting the headlines, then 
something is out of kilter. Well there is certainly something out of kilter in the music 
business today.
I’m here because I believe in something quite passionately. I would like to identify a 
course of  action  that  will  benefit  all:  artists,  labels,  writers  and publishers,  big  and 
small. The recorded music industry is in a crisis and there is crucial help available but 
not being provided by companies who should be providing that help - not just because 
its morally right but because its in their own commercial interest.
I have been managing the best known of my clients, U2, for exactly 30 years. They are 
as ambitious and hardworking as ever, and each time they make a record and tour, it’s 
better than the last time. They always understood instinctively that they had 2 parallel 
careers  –  first  as  recording  and  songwriting  artists,  and second  as  live  performers. 
They’ve been phenomenally successful at both. U2 have also been good at business and 
at  investing  in  their  own  future.  We  were  never  interested  in  joining  that  long, 
humiliating line of artists who made lousy deals, got exploited and ended up broke and 
with no control over how their life’s work was used and how their names and likenesses 
were bought and sold.
U2 has succeeded gradually over time from modest beginnings 30yrs ago, they have 
seen  their  records  consistently  reach  No.  1  across  the  world  since  the  1980s,  and 
continue to do so. They have sold about 150 million records to date and the last album 
went to No.1 in 27 countries. The Vertigo Tour in 2005/2006 grossed $355 million and 
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played to 4.6 million people in 26 countries. At the same time we have an excellent 
relationship  with  our  record  company,  Universal.  U2  own  all  their  own  master 
recordings which are licensed to Universal and the copyrights to all their songs which 
are also licensed to Universal.
People often wonder whether the era of the international superstar band is over. I don’t 
believe it is Even as I speak, there’s probably a group in Paris or Dublin or London or  
New York or Tokyo or Bejing practising in a room right now, today, that are figuring it  
out a new way, themselves, and they will be big stars all over the world in a couple of  
years  and  they  will  have  done  it  a  different  way to  their  predecessors  -  that’s  the 
exciting thing about this business.
The people who make it tend to have this extraordinary skill set of artistic and creative 
talent but they are also intuitively marketing people and politicians; in close touch with 
young culture, they think about style and all the other elements of that equation. When 
those skills and talents come together, you get the magic of an Elvis Presley or Faye 
Wong  or  Jay  Z.  They  are  always  extraordinary  people.  If  you  could  spot  them in 
advance, it would be great but you can’t which is why you have A & R departments  
who try it with many, knowing that not everyone is going to succeed globally and most 
will fail.
Meanwhile record companies are reinventing themselves for a much more complicated 
world. Their star-building function has taken a battering, but I can’t see the need for the 
record company ever going away. They bring to the mix unique and invaluable skills - 
of A&R, marketing, financial management and career-building. Sure, some artists, like 
Radiohead and Madonna, have proved that at different points in the artist’s career they 
may not all need all those functions all the time. The truth is that there is always a long 
list of artists who are either succeeding with their record deal, or desperate to get one.
So what is the challenge facing the future of our business? Let me start with great news.  
Music consumption is soaring. At the same time as more people are listening to and 
enjoying music than ever before, more people are making it, playing and recording it. 
Almost anyone with talent can now record, market and distribute their songs for next to 
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nothing. It is fantastic how the digital world has democratised the relationship between 
artist and audience in this way.
More good news is that, although the recorded music business is far from thriving, it is 
helping to drive a much larger group of businesses which are. IFPI did some interesting 
maths. They worked out that if you combine the total economic activity of the music 
sector  and the businesses that  it  drives  you  have a  sector  worth around 155 billion 
dollars– that’s nearly eight times the size of the recorded music business. And most of 
that business grew healthily last year. Live music was up 9%, music publishing up 5%, 
sales of portable devices up 16%, music revenues from public performance up 13%, 
musical instrument sales up 9%.
The recorded music business is itself, however, in a crisis. Growth of digital sales is not 
offsetting  the  decline  of  physical  CDs.  Sales  of  the  blockbuster  artists  that  have 
traditionally funded investment in large rosters have sunk dramatically. There has been 
real pain right across our business, thousands of livelihoods put at risk and jobs lost.
Amid  this  gloom,  there  are  also  great  reasons  to  be  optimistic.  The  digital  music 
business today is vibrant and full of experimentation and innovation. Record companies 
are full of the people with the right expertise to face the opportunities and challenges of 
the revolution we are going through. In the past I always felt they were over-inclined to 
rely for staff on poorly paid enthusiasts rather than developing the kind of enterprise 
culture of Silicon Valley where nearly every employee is a shareholder.
The record business is redefining its role in relation to virtually everything and everyone 
– its consumers and its partners, the live industry, management companies and artists. 
But – and here I speak with 30 years experience as a manager – record companies have 
to look at themselves too. Fairness, transparency, morality and efficiency have never 
been more precious qualities for them to prove than now. In a fast-declining market, we 
are being asked by the recorded music companies to accept  that they will  distribute 
fairly their new income streams from advertising or from subscription services bundled 
into telephone  devices.  The recorded music  companies  must  earn the  trust  they are 
asking for from artists.  It’s  hard to  forget  that  these are  the same corporations  that 
perpetrated the old 50% CD royalty scam in the 80s and to this day still have contracts 
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full of packaging deductions and breakages clauses. Executives at the major labels (and 
some of the small ones) should stop this nonsense once and for all and provide clear,  
easily understood contracts and accounting statements which will make clear where the 
money comes from and who gets it.
I have been auditing labels and publishing companies for nearly 30 years and I can tell 
you  I  have  never  once  found an  error  in  the  artist’s  favour.  Record  companies  are 
repositioning themselves. The 360 degree deal is a popular concept, but it’s still fairly 
experimental and personally I dislike it. As Allen Grubman, the well-known New York 
attorney so eloquently said: “God forbid that one of these acts in a 360 deal has success. 
The next thing that will happen is the manager gets fired and the lawyer gets sued for 
malpractice”.
The biggest challenge  of all  though, without  any doubt,  is  monetising the future of 
recorded music at a time when money is being sucked out it by other parties. There is 
enormous  interest  in  the  idea  of  monetising  “access”  to  music  and not  just  selling 
individual tracks and albums. What that will look like isn’t clear: maybe an iPod or a 
phone  with  all  the  music  available  through  it?  Maybe  a  beautiful,  non-clunky, 
subscription service that is compatible with mass market portable players and bundled 
into a phone or ISP bill? No one can second guess Apple, but personally I expect that 
Apple will before long reveal a wireless iPod that connects to an iTunes “all  of the 
music, wherever you are” subscription service. I would like it to succeed, if the content 
is fairly paid for.
The argument seems to be about price. If the price is fair perhaps artists and labels can 
begin to recover from the financially devastating P2P era. Apple will take care of the 
ease of use. They make beautiful machines. But the future isn’t just about Apple. Recent 
months have seen a fair  share of important  initiatives:  QTrax, albeit  still  recovering 
from a shaky start at Midem in January; in Europe, Nokia’s “Comes with Music”; in 
Denmark,  a  fascinating  world’s  first  widely-licensed ISP music  service  called  TDC 
Play;  Omnifone’s  mobile  download  initiative;  a  venture  into  music  downloads  by 
MySpace;  We7’s  free-to  consumer  ad-supported  service,  iLike  the  exciting  music 
platform on Facebook. And others.
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In a world where people are not paying for content, but where the money has to come 
from somewhere, ad-supported services have a potentially huge role to play. I have to 
confess I am not a huge fan of the concept. But the business model may work. The 
recently-announced MySpace Music service will offer a mix of free streaming of songs 
and videos, supported by advertising, as well as paid-for downloads. Chris de Wolfe, 
the CEO of MySpace,  has talked of “killing piracy with convenience”.  I hope he is 
right.  Live  Nation  also  have  big  plans  as  they  get  their  ticketing  rights  back from 
Ticketmaster this year in North America, next year in the rest of the world. They have 
discovered that when customers are online to buy tickets, they are inclined at the same 
time to buy other products including physical and digital music and merchandise.
Some of the best brains in the business are working on all these services. But there is a 
sad, unalterable fact and it has been around for some time. The market is rigged against 
them. You cannot monetize a business in an environment awash with unauthorized free 
content. And this is a crisis that is not just affecting music and record companies. It is 
affecting the whole world of cultural and creative content. Earlier this year in Britain the 
Society of Authors, representing 8,500 professional writers, warned that book piracy 
will ultimately drive authors to stop writing unless radical new methods are found to 
compensate  them for  lost  sales.  The  movie  industry,  long  protected  simply  by  the 
technical difficulty of shifting movie files, is now waking up to much more worrying 
future. Internet piracy is now a bigger problem for the UK film industry than home 
copying of DVDs. Meanwhile the value of live sports rights on TV is currently under 
threat because all events are available free on the internet. The big soccer leagues are 
deeply worried. Man United’s live TV rights are plunging in price world-wide. 
Some say this is the inexorable advance of technology. But I believe the devaluation of 
music by the internet in recent years has been anything but inexorable. A “free music 
culture” is undoubtedly percolating upwards from the teenagers and college students 
and establishing the mindset for future generations of music consumers.
But they are the symptom, not the cause. To find the cause, you just ask this – where 
has all the money gone? The answer is that it has gone to corporations – cable operators, 
ISPs, device manufacturers, P2P software companies - companies that have used music 
to drive vast revenues from broadband subscriptions and from advertising. They would 
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argue they have been neutral bystanders to the spectacular devaluation of music and the 
consequent turmoil in the music business; I don’t believe that is true – they turned their 
heads the other way, watched their subscriptions grow, and profited handsomely.
Researchers estimated at the end of last year that up to 80% of ISP traffic is accounted 
for by peer-to-peer networks like BitTorrent and Limewire, and we know that the large 
majority of that traffic is unauthorised music and movies. ISPs revenues from growing 
broadband subscriptions have soared during the exactly the same period that has seen 
recorded music sales collapse. From 2004 to 2007 broadband subscription sales rose 
from US$60 billion to US$113 billion, while the music market fell by about 20% in the 
same period.
And if you want an idea just how much the expansion of broadband means to a large 
ISP, look at last year’s profits of BT in the UK. Profits of £5.8 billion pounds sterling,  
40%  of  which  came  from  broadband  and  IT  services.  I’m  not  picking  on  BT  in 
particular - I’m sure the situation is similar among its competitors.
Of course the champions of the ISP and technology industries that have driven these 
impressive  revenues  are  not  bad people.  They spring from the  internet  freethinking 
culture of California and Silicon Valley.  They are fantastic entrepreneurs,  wonderful 
engineers. Their passion for innovation and liberal hippy values in one sense sit very 
well with the creativity of the music business. But at a deeper level, there is a bigger  
problem and it’s one those brilliant minds never resolved: I’m talking about the problem 
of paying for music.
Today,  encouragingly,  there is definitely a change in the air.  First,  the gold rush of 
broadband expansion, in most developed markets at least, is over. ISPs are looking at a 
future where their added value is going to come not just from pipes and cables but from 
tiered packages of commercial content. Throughout the ISP and cable industries, the 
lines  between  distribution  and  content  are  getting  blurred.  Look  at  the  fascinating 
position of a company like Rupert  Murdoch’s News Corporation – part-ISP via Sky 
Broadband in the UK; part broadcaster offering different levels of cable packages; part 
stakeholder in social networking sites via MySpace; and part music content provider as 
MySpace moves from the world of music discovery intothe world of monetised music 
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downloads. Part movie and TV content production via Fox Studios part sports content 
owners and distributors.
Apple is another example. Steve Jobs is now a serious content owner – he is effectively 
in control  of Disney Pixar Studios,  ABC TV Network and ESPN Sport.  Hollywood 
Records is a successful record company. Steve has a better reason today than he ever 
had to apply that genius of his not just to beautiful machines, but also to protecting 
music and all his other content.
Another big change is happening, as network capacity increases and technology allows 
the distribution of bigger and bigger files. Movies, broadcasting, music videos and live 
sports  are  all  online  now.  The  BBC iPlayer  in  the  UK is  already  estimated  to  be 
accounting for 5% of all internet traffic, and use of it has been increasing at a rate of 
20% a month since its launch at the end of last year.
From being in  a  position  where  they  simply  couldn’t  get  enough unauthorised  free 
content, ISPs suddenly have reason to feel dangerously deluged by it. In the UK they 
have even had the audacity to demand funding for investment in new capacity from the 
BBC to meet the increased demand from the iPlayer. This is truly outrageous. It’s like 
helping a shoplifter  carry stolen goods from someone else’s store and charging him 
AND the store for the service. Life must be good as an ISP: when there is a deluge of 
illegal content over your networks, you have no responsibility for getting rid of it; when 
the pendulum swings the other way and your pipes cannot cope with the traffic, you ask 
the content creators (and the license fee payers in the case of the BBC) to help bail you 
out!" And change is happening in the corridors of government too. Governments in a 
growing  number  of  countries  have  woken  up  to  the  catastrophe  that  their  cultural 
industries are facing. They have seen the statistics, understood the inherent benefits of a 
system  which  addresses  piracy  near  its  source,  via  the  ISPs  who  can  help  to  do 
something about it. For the first time there is the prospect that if ISPs do not cooperate  
at least with steps to help tackle copyright theft, then legislation may require them to do 
so. This is on the agenda in France and Britain, with discussions proceeding in other 
countries such as Japan and Hong Kong.
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There are broadly two things I would like to see from ISPs. One is a real commercial 
partnership with the music business in which they fairly share their revenues. The other 
is action to stop facilitating mass copyright theft themselves.
Let’s look first at the commercial  model.  Let me make clear here I’m talking about 
commerce here,  not a state-imposed flat  fee.  I’m convinced the global  license,  with 
governments  setting  the  terms  and  the  price  for  music  distribution,  is  totally 
unworkable.  Privately-negotiated  revenue-sharing  partnerships  are,  I  believe,  a  key 
model for the future. This is where the “Comes with Music” from Nokia concept could 
succeed on a large scale. The signs are not perfect but they are promising. Nokia has 
signed up Universal and Sony BMG as partners for its “Comes With Music” phone. It is 
a fascinating model that needs to succeed, can succeed, and if it does, could spawn a 
genuine competitor to the iPod and iPhone. The business model incorporates the cost of 
an  annual  music  subscription  service  into  the  purchase  price  of  a  handset.  Nokia’s 
“Comes  with Music” phones  may be launched in the second half  of this  year.  The 
launch date has been postponed several times, but it is crucial to get it right. I hope 
Nokia realise that the graphics for and visual presentation of online music and mobile 
music have to be as good as the artists, the industry and the fan is accustomed to.
Another different mobile subscription model is Omnifone. For a small weekly fee, the 
company’s Music Station phones offer consumers access to a library of more than 1.4 
million tracks from all the majors and many independents. The service is already live 
with Vodafone in the UK and is being rolled out around the world.
Unfortunately no similar deal yet exists with ISPs. Today, in Denmark, there is one of 
the very few examples of a major national ISP launching a licensed music service where 
downloads are bundled into the costs of an individual’s monthly subscription. The TDC 
Play service is free to the user and funded by a flat monthly fee that is paid to rights  
holders in proportion to the sale of track downloads. Denmark is a long way from Hong 
Kong but I think this is an interesting deal. TDC is a major national ISP which has made 
an important commercial decision – it has decided that it is worth paying for recorded 
music in order to add value to the subscription package that it offers its customers. It is 
using music legitimately to gain commercial advantage over its competitors.
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One way or another, ISPs and mobile operators are the business partners of the future 
for the recorded music business – but they are going to have to share the money in a 
way that reflects what music is doing for their business. That’s true nowhere more than 
in China. China Mobile makes hundreds of millions of dollars each year from sales of 
ringtones  and  ringback  tones,  yet  pays  a  miniscule  fraction  of  that  to  performers, 
producers and composers. That to me is not a fair business partnership.
But it’s not just about business deals. There is a very widespread support across the 
music sector now for ISPs to cooperate in helping curb piracy.  But the lack of any 
concrete proposals from the ISP sector in response is quite deafening. The power of 
their  lobby is  astonishing and dwarfs  the  resources  of  the music,  movie  and sports 
industries.
Fresh thinking is desperately needed and, I’m happy to say, fresh thinking is happening. 
The  general  international  legal  framework  is  only  of  limited  help.  The  ISP  “safe 
harbour” rules put in place by legislation in the US and Europe were really designed for  
a  different  vision  and  a  different  era  of  the  internet.  They  were  a  blueprint  for 
developing an internet unfettered by needless regulation and in which P2P piracy was 
barely even imagined. They were good for the mid 1990s. Not so good for today.
In France last November President Sarkozy, acting on the now famous report by Denis 
Olivennes,  offered a  new vision of  the internet,  pledging that  it  cannot  become the 
“Wild West”. He launched a groundbreaking plan to bring together the film, music and 
ISP industries, to implement a scheme to disconnect large-scale illegal file-sharers and 
explore the filtering of copyright infringing networks. That plan is moving forward. It 
will go to the National Assembly in France this summer. It has many elements which 
are a great model for the rest of the world.
The British government has taken up the case too. In the last few months, Britain has 
promised to introduce legislation requiring ISPs to help tackle online piracy if they fail 
to  do so voluntarily.  In  Japan a government-supported consortium has been formed 
involving entertainment companies, ISPs and the national police. In New Zealand a new 
Bill  passed  in  April  has  required  greater  cooperation  from ISPs  in  curbing  repeat 
copyright infringers.
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Unfortunately, this groundswell has not visibly shifted ISP attitudes. On the contrary,  
there  has  been  an  enormous  amount  of  resistance,  helped  by  a  fair  amount  of 
misinformation put out by their powerful lobbyists. For instance, no one is asking ISPs 
to be the police force of the internet. There will be no snooping on people’s emails. No 
monitoring  what  websites  they  visit.  ISPs  would  just  be  reacting  to  rights  holders’ 
complaints when copyright infringing music is uploaded to P2P networks.
Perhaps the really telling data here is not what the regulators and legislators who are the 
recipients and targets of well funded ISP lobbying campaigns worldwide think, but what 
consumers think. Last week IPSOS published research in France showing that 3 in 4 
French  consumers  support  a  scheme  of  graduated  warnings,  culminating  in 
disconnection,  for  repeat  copyright  infringers  on  ISP  networks.  They  also  said  the 
proposals would work: 90% said they would stop downloading illegally after receiving 
two warnings. That all strikes me as so much better a proposition than having to take 
legal  actions  against  tens  of  thousands  of  individuals  for  illegal  filesharing.  I  am 
personally opposed to prosecuting the customers.
The alarm has been raised about rights to free speech and privacy. A serious issue if it  
were justified, but in fact it’s just scaremongering. Of course privacy and freedom of 
speech are sacred rights.  And so too is  protection  of intellectual  property rights  -  a 
recent court case in Europe, involving the Spanish ISP Telefonica confirmed it. The 
balance can be struck and we must make every effort to strike it. We are waiting to have 
that discussion, to agree that balance. What are the ISPs proposing on their side? What 
are the solutions they would offer? Let’s end the deafening silence.
And it’s been argued that the ISPs don’t have the means to help. I don’t believe that  
argument  stands  up  any longer.  The  modern  history  of  the  internet  is  chockfull  of 
examples  of  ISPs  intervening  in  the  traffic  on  their  networks  when  it  suits  them. 
Comcast did it in the US, throttling traffic on BitTorrent until falling foul of concerns 
over net neutrality.  Last  year,  in a precedent-setting copyright  case,  a Belgian court 
ruled not only that an ISP had to stop copyright abuse on its network but also identified 
six technologies that could be used for filtering.
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It is time to re-evaluate our expectations of the role ISPs must play in sustaining a safe 
and  legitimate  internet.  This  goes  beyond  music,  and  it  must  go  beyond  narrow 
commercial  interests.  Today  there  is  a  rightful  concern  everywhere  about  how  to 
regulate  the  internet  for  young  people.  In  Britain  recently,  a  groundbreaking 
Government  paper  was  published,  the  Byron  Report.  It  identifies  all  the  risks  and 
harmful content that young people are exposed to online, but it mysteriously fails to 
propose a role for the ISPs who are best placed to solve them. Why the reticence? This 
letter to the Financial Times in February from Richard Yarlott suggests the answer more 
eloquently than I could:
“The transfer of responsibility from large corporations to parents, carers, teachers and 
even  child-minders  is  the  most  disappointing  aspect  of  the  review.  The  ISPs  have 
clearly had their say in managing its conclusions, while the search companies, the only 
entities capable of classifying content, are largely exonerated.” 
The real problem here, I believe, is a lack of willingness by ISPs to act. That is why 
legislation could well have to be the answer. This issue is really all about recognizing 
the value of music and fairly rewarding those who create and produce it. Value of music 
is an issue for other partners too, not just ISPs. Music is driving the profits of radio 
broadcasters and is being used as never before in a host of third party businesses. Music 
is ubiquitous in modern life, in stores, airplanes, gyms, hair salons, everywhere. This is 
a big issue internationally today, and especially in China.
You would think that the existence of basic rights to ensure that the performers and 
producers get a share in these profits would be taken for granted. Certainly you would 
be right to expect  that  in any country which values its  musical  culture,  nurtures its 
repertoire and values its international reputation. Yet the absence of such rights in China 
is a missed chord. China’s commercial radio sector is worth hundreds of millions of 
dollars in advertising revenue. I think is important for China’s music community and for 
its international reputation that that money is shared.
The same principle applies to China’s huge internet companies such as Baidu, Yahoo 
China and Sohu. Baidu, listed on the New York stock exchange, reports ever larger 
profits  each  financial  quarter.  To  the  artist  and  record  companies  whose  tens  of 
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thousands  of  copyrighted  tracks  are  being  distributed  in  order  help  generate  those 
revenues it seems very wrong and very unfair. The legal action record companies are 
involved in now against Baidu and Sohu is a sad necessity. I hope they will help shape a 
better landscape for music and other industries in China which depend on real respect of 
intellectual property rights. We have a long way to go: Yahoo China has a service that 
has already been ruled illegal by the Chinese court but refuses to respect the judgement. 
What kind of respect for the law is that?
This goes far wider than just  the internet  companies.  I  would like to think that the 
organisers of the Olympic Games, so protective of their 95-year old logo and of their 
brand,  would  know  a  thing  or  two  about  doing  the  right  thing  for  the  respect  of 
intellectual property. They have certainly not hesitated to enforce their rights over their 
own  brand,  as  they  did  against  the  French  group  Carrefour.  Yet  when  the  record 
companies  protested  repeatedly  to  the  Beijing  Olympic  Committee  that  Sohu,  the 
official ISP of the Olympic Games is running a massively copyrightabusing download 
service, they met with stony silence. I hope that will change. If music and the creative 
industries are to survive in the digital world, turning blind eyes to big-time copyright 
abuse  is  not  acceptable.  This  is  bad  for  the  reputation  of  modern  China  where  IP 
protection will become increasingly important for their own economy.
So what is the future for the music industry? Well, the world has never been so full of  
commentators who are so certain how it all went wrong. Most of them don’t seem to 
have much real responsibility for putting it right. Someone told me this joke recently. 
How many record execs do you need to change a light bulb? The answer used to be 
forty: one to change the bulb, one to hold the chair and thirty-eight to lig on the guest  
list.
That world has gone. These days the answer might well be one person, but with 39 
people  telling  him how he  should  do  it  differently  and  how he  should  change  his 
business model if it weren’t already too late, and how he should really have seen the 
light bulb fading years ago.
So to finish – we need new business models, yes. We have to reach the consumer in a  
way the consumer wants. To a very large extent that is happening already. But we also 
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need a fair partnership between the makers and creators of the content, and those who 
distribute it. That partnership is about fair rewards to creators, and it is also about using 
the ability that ISPs so plainly have to help protect content.
The  real  challenge  for  our  industry  is  to  monetise  music  and  avoid  going  out  of 
business. The task for the ISP industry is this: to pay for content fairly and ensure that 
there will still BE content in the future. Building and expanding the internet only makes 
sense if there's going to be new content in the future. The ISPs, if they carry on the way 
they are will have to explain to future generations why there’s nothing new to listen to 
but bad demos and nothing new to watch but reality TV shows.
Sometimes I think they are like latter day Medicis with the crucial difference that, as 
they are building their vast and wonderful cyber galleries, they are ignoring the fact that 
the artists are dying out and not being replaced because artists don’t get paid any more.  
It’s stupid really isn’t it?
The music business once had to bear the accusation that it was full of dinosaurs who 
looked back to an old business model rather than embracing a new one. Today, though, 
it is the music business that is charting the way to the future. We are the ones exercising 
the brains of government  about how to balance a free internet  with an internet  that 
respects intellectual property, is properly regulated and is not the Wild West. I believe 
President Sarkozy truly caught the spirit of the age with that statement. The visionaries 
and the dinosaurs have perhaps changed places. If there are dinosaurs around today, I 
think they are the internet free-thinkers of the past who believe that copyright is the 
great obstacle to progress, that the distributors of content should enjoy profits without 
responsibilities and that the creators and producers of music should simply subordinate 
their rights to the rights of everyone else.
We have not reversed the troubles of the music industry yet - but at least the dinosaurs 
are no longer running the show.
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